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A P P E N D I X

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THE ORGANIZATION OF FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND MANAGEMENT

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THE ORGANIZATION OF FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND MANAGEMENT

INTRODUCTION

Although this report touches incidentally on the internal organization of some of the Federal public land management agencies, its principal subject might, for lack of a better term, be called "macro-organizational questions" -- questions involving such matters as, for example, major transfers of jurisdiction from one agency to another, transfer of one or more bureaus from one department to another, or creation of a new department or new independent agency.

For at least 65 years, there has been a good deal of talk about "macro-reorganization" of Federal public land management, but not much reorganization of this sort has actually been carried out. In 1905, the Bureau of Forestry in the Department of Agriculture was renamed the Forest Service, a literally nominal reorganization that was accompanied by the much more important transfer of jurisdiction over the forest reserves from the Department of the Interior to Agriculture, where they were assigned to the Forest Service for management.

The next major organizational change, although perhaps not, strictly speaking, a reorganization, was in 1916 when the Park Service was set up in the Department of the Interior despite the objections of Gifford Pinchot and his adherents, who wanted administration of the national parks to be assigned to the Forest Service.

Both the Forest Service and the Park Service have remained in the departments in which they were originally established, and the agencies' jurisdictions have remained substantially as they were. The Park Service has, however, considerably increased the acreage under its control through acquisition of Forest Service lands and, to a lesser extent, through purchase; and the Forest Service has acquired land under the Weeks Act and the Land Utilization program.

There has been similar stability in the locus of departmental jurisdiction over the so-called unreserved public domain lands. Until 1934, the General Land Office in the Department of the Interior carried out what limited functions the Federal Government performed in respect to these lands. With the passage in that year of the Taylor Grazing Act, a substantial part of the public domain was designated as grazing districts, and the management of the districts was assigned to a Director of Grazing in the Department of the Interior, while the remainder of the public domain continued under jurisdiction of the General Land Office. Two years later, the Director of Grazing was succeeded by a Division of Grazing, and in 1939, the Division became the Grazing Service. In 1946, a reorganization plan merged the Grazing Service and the General Land Office and created the Bureau of Land Management, which assumed jurisdiction over all unreserved public domain lands assigned to the Department of the Interior.

The Bureau of Biological Survey, which had a land management function because it administered game refuges, was in the Department of Agriculture until 1939, when a reorganization plan transferred it to the Department of the Interior, where its name was changed to the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife.

In 1962, an Executive Order set up the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation in the Department of the Interior, and in 1965, the Water Resources Planning Act established the Water Resources Council as an independent agency. Although neither the Bureau nor the Council is a land management agency, they have some importance to management because the Bureau has a responsibility to plan and coordinate the planning of recreational management of Federal lands, and the Council has a charter to coordinate and engage in water and "related land resources" planning.

The fact that it is possible in so few paragraphs to summarize the "macro-reorganizations" that have occurred in Federal public land management should not be taken as an indication that there has been general satisfaction with the organization as it existed at any particular time. On the contrary, there has been a good deal of changing dissatisfaction with one or another feature of public land management organization, and this, over the years, has resulted in a number of reorganization proposals. Some of these have called for transfer of one or more bureaus from one department to another on the somewhat general ground that activities having the same major purpose, operating on similar objects, or involving the same or similar techniques should be grouped together in the same department. With the exception of the transfer of game refuge management from Agriculture to Interior, none of these proposals has so far come to anything, partly, perhaps, because of the rather general character of the arguments advanced in their favor and partly because of the possibly related existence of a stable balance of power between the Department of Agriculture, the Forest Service, and their supporters, on the one hand, and the Department of the Interior and its supporters, on the other. An outline of the more important of these reorganization proposals, what happened to them, and the major benefits that might reasonably be expected to result from adoption of some of them is set forth below in Chapter I.

Other advocates of reorganization, starting from rather specific dissatisfactions with the results of existing organization rather than general organizational "principles," have proposed substantially different reorganization schemes. One of these suggests creation of a public land management corporation of some kind, and another advocates a reorganization that would thoroughly decentralize most public land management responsibilities to land management regions. These two proposals and the reasons for them are outlined in Chapters II and III, respectively.

In the absence of a crisis comparable to that of 1933, there is considerable probability that any actively pursued proposal for major reorganization of Federal public land management will evoke substantial resistance. Chapter IV consists of speculations based as far as possible on the history of past reorganization proposals about the resistance various reorganization schemes may meet.

Overcoming resistance to reorganization, should it be possible at all, might entail costs that some may regard as substantial enough to make it worth while to explore the possibility of achieving a worthwhile portion of the benefits to be expected from interdepartmental bureau transfers, establishment of a public land management corporation, or a thorough decentralization of public land management without actually undertaking one of these forms of major reorganization. This question is considered in Chapter V.

CHAPTER I

PROPOSALS TO TRANSFER LAND MANAGEMENT AGENCIES FROM ONE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT TO ANOTHER

Past proposals to transfer land management agencies from one department to another fall into two categories, one consisting of proposals to transfer one or more bureaus from one existing department to another and the other category consisting of proposals not only to transfer bureaus but also to create a new department of conservation or of natural resources, which would include in addition to land management bureaus, water resources and other agencies. Although the National Budget Committee proposed a new department in 1921, as did the Brookings Institution in 1923, no proposal in the second category got on the active agenda until 1934 when Secretary Ickes began his efforts to capture the Forest Service and change the name of the Department of the Interior to the Department of Conservation. Prior to the beginning of Ickes' campaign, all the reorganization proposals that received serious consideration in the executive branch or Congress were confined to transfers of jurisdiction or of one or more bureaus from an existing department to another.

The Controversy Over Management of the Unreserved Public Domain

It was more than 100 years after ratification of the Constitution before Congress, in the Forest Service Organic Act of 1897, authorized Federal management rather than simple reservation or disposal of public domain lands. This Act, however, gave authority to manage only the forest reserves and ignored the larger unreserved public domain, which continued until 1934 to be open, with minor exceptions, to free use and the attendant damage that free natural resources typically suffer in the absence of controls.

Early in the century, it was clear to Pinchot and others familiar with the problems of the western range lands that the only way to arrest their deterioration was to bring them under management. And it was equally clear that the sensible thing to do was to have the management of forest reserves and public domain lands carried on by the same agency. Hayes says that

> Pinchot argued that all public land questions, being closely related, should come under the supervision of a single Federal department. This view sprang from the interrelatedness of the resources themselves and from a desire to avoid the interdepartmental conflicts which resulted when competing resource users played one agency against another for their own advantage. (Hayes, p. 72)

Despite his views on the need for unified management, Pinchot, for reasons of political strategy, became the instrument for dividing jurisdiction over the public lands. His conviction that the clerks of the General Land Office were irremediably corrupt and the difficulties he had in persuading Secretary of the Interior Hitchcock to open the forest reserves to commercial uses led Pinchot to engineer the 1905 transfer of the forest reserves from Interior to Agriculture. Once the reserves were in safe hands, he intended to take the next step of obtaining the transfer of the public domain lands, thus unifying that which he had divided.

He had, in fact, begun this strategy before the transfer of the Forest Reserves. In 1903, on Pinchot's initiative, President Roosevelt established a Public Lands Commission to study and try to rationalize the hodgepodge of laws purporting to govern the use and disposition of the public domain. The Commission -- consisting of Pinchot, the Head of the Reclamation Service, and the Commissioner of the General Land Office -- unanimously recommended classification of the unreserved public domain lands into two categories, one suitable for agriculture and the other suitable only for grazing. The Commission recommended that the grazing lands be retained in public ownership and managed by the Department of Agriculture.

Pinchot's strategy of re-unifying jurisdiction over the public lands went awry, first, because of rivalries between the cattlemen, on the one hand, and the sheepmen and homesteaders, on the other - rivalries that immobilized Congress during the two years of good feeling between Agriculture and Interior that began with the appointment of James A. Garfield in 1907 as Secretary of the Interior. Garfield and Pinchot agreed in their views of conservation and, in particular, on the desirability of transferring jurisdiction over the public domain to Agriculture. They might have brought the transfer off if it had not been for the conflict between users of the public domain; but

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that possibility disappeared when Taft succeeded Roosevelt and appointed R. A. Ballinger as Secretary of the Interior.

In 1907, Ballinger, who was then Commissioner of the General Land Office, had disagreed with Garfield's view that the public domain lands should be transferred to Agriculture. After he became Secretary, Ballinger was not inclined to take any steps that might impede development of the west by private enterprise; and, since transfer of jurisdiction over the lands to Agriculture would have implied continued public ownership, he would probably have remained opposed to the transfer even if the Pinchot-Ballinger controversy had not flared up.

As it was, the controversy ended for that time whatever minute possibility there may have been of restoring a unified jurisdiction over the public lands, and also it had the further effect of reinforcing the opinion of Pinchot and his followers that Interior was corrupt and quite unfit for efficient land management. This stereotype not only led Pinchot to oppose establishment of the National Park Service and proposals of the 1930's to transfer the Forest Service to Interior, but it may still affect attitudes of Forest Service officials toward transfer of the Service out of the Department of Agriculture.

Secretary Fisher, who succeeded Ballinger, was in favor of managing the public domain, and he shared Pinchot's view that lands unsuitable for farming should continue in public ownership. The end of the Taft administration was not, however, a propitious time for new departures; and the Wilson administration began with the public domain still unprotected and over-used.

Wilson's Secretary of the Interior, Franklin K. Lane, was against management of the public domain and in favor of disposing of it as rapidly as possible. (Pfeffer, pp. 173-4) In the course of an argument with Agriculture over control of waterpower sites on the national forests, Lane did propose that the Forest Service be transferred to Interior; but he was probably not serious about it. (Houston, pp. 125-6)

Early in Harding's administration the question of what to do about the public domain became a live issue once more, with Interior trying to get authority to manage the lands and Agriculture trying to get jurisdiction over them. According to Pfeffer,

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> up to this time the effort to secure grazing control in the Department of Agriculture had been made chiefly by the Forest Service, with strong support from the several secretaries. Under Secretary Wallace, it was made departmental business, with a departmental committee mapping the campaign. (Pfeffer, p. 179)

When, in 1921, Secretary of the Interior Fall had a bill drafted and introduced in Congress that would have authorized classification and management of public domain lands primarily useful for grazing, Secretary Wallace opposed the bill and had a counter-measure drawn up which would have authorized creation of grazing districts to be administered by Agriculture.

A joint congressional committee on departmental reorganization was set up in 1923 and reported in 1924 that

> the administration of national forests and of the Government's public-roads program is entrusted to the Department of Agriculture, although on their face these matters seem to have but an indirect relation to the major functions of that Department.

The committee recommended transfer of the Bureau of Public Roads to the Department of the Interior, but it was silent about the Forest Service, probably because, as two members said in a supplementary report,

> the Secretary of Agriculture very strongly argued before the committee that the great public domain, now under the jurisdiction of the Interior Department, is being so devastated that it has already become, and as to the residue is becoming, useless for production purposes, and should be transferred to the jurisdiction of the Agriculture Department, that its use may be so regulated as to check the present destructive processes. (Pfeffer, pp. 179-80)

Wallace died in harness in 1924 and was succeeded by William M. Jardine, who was cooperative and got along with Hubert Work, Fall's successor at Interior. The Chief Forester

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was W. B. Greeley, and he, too, was in a mood to worry more about the state of the land than about jurisdiction. Writing in 1926 to the President of the Society of American Foresters, Greeley said

> We have endeavored for years to bring about the regulation and control of grazing on the unreserved public lands. The old fight over jurisdiction between the Interior Department and the Department of Agriculture has been one of the serious stumbling blocks in getting such legislation. I believe that this activity could be more effectively handled by the Department of Agriculture . . . . But I see no prospect of getting such legislation as long as the fight between the two Departments is interjected in the picture. And I believe that the urgency of public range control is so great that it would be unwise to raise this jurisdictional conflict at the present time. (Pfeffer, pp.181-2)

Indications that the Forest Service intended to increase fees for grazing on national forest lands, led to the so-called Stanfield investigation of 1925, carried out by a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Public Lands and Surveys under the chairmanship of Senator Stanfield of Oregon. One result of the investigation was a bill introduced by Stanfield which recognized grazing "as one of the purposes for which forests are established and maintained" and provided for what amounted to 10-year grazing leases on both the national forests and the public domain. The bill also provided for state grazing boards to which appeals could be taken from decisions of grazing supervisors and had other provisions that were opposed by both Agriculture and Interior.

As a result, Secretaries Jardine and Work had two bills drawn up, one for the national forests and one for the public domain, which eliminated the more objectionable features of the Stanfield bill. Stanfield accepted the departments' bills as amendments to his own, but the bill died in the course of a fight between the Forest Service and its supporters, on one side, and the western cattlemen, on the other, over questions of grazing fees and the terms and tenure of grazing permits.

The Hoover administration, injecting a sort of states rights - private enterprise ideology into the question, proposed

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to turn the unreserved public domain lands over to the states, with the exception of mineral resources. On Hoover's recommendation Congress authorized establishment of a Committee on the Conservation and Administration of the Public Domain, on which were represented the Departments of Agriculture and Interior and the 11 western public land states. The Committee reported to the President in 1931 and recommended substantially what Hoover had earlier proposed. The administration had introduced a bill embodying the Committee's recommendations, but it was opposed by nearly everyone concerned, including the western states, and it never got out of committee.

Although the work of the Committee on the Conservation and Administration of the Public Domain had no direct results, its hearings, its report, and the discussion of the Hoover proposal to turn the public domains over to the states apparently made a good many people aware, for the first time, of the fact that the Federal Government owned nearly 180 million acres of land, which was being neither disposed of nor managed. This new awareness of the existence of the public domain helped to create a mood favorable to providing some sort of management when the Roosevelt administration took office in 1933.

For years, Congressman Taylor had been a strong advocate of disposal of the public domain to the states, but by 1933 he had come so far around from that position that he was willing to sponsor a bill providing for Federal management. He energetically pushed this bill, which became the Taylor Grazing Act, and for once there was no serious bureaucratic rivalry in the way of adoption of legislation: At the secretarial level, anyway, relations between Agriculture and Interior were amicable in 1933 and for most of 1934, and the Chief of the Forest Service went along with assignment of jurisdiction to the Department of the Interior. Pfeffer says that lower echelon Forest Service officials lobbied in favor of assigning jurisdiction to Agriculture, but, if so, their efforts were not enough to prevent passage of the Taylor Grazing Act in 1934.

Ickes' Efforts to Capture the Forest Service

If Forest Service officials did lobby against the assignment of jurisdiction over the grazing lands to Interior, as Pfeffer says, Secretary Ickes did not mention it in his published diary. The only disagreement with Agriculture he noted at the time was a difference in view between the two departments as to whether the President should sign the Taylor Grazing Act or not. Ickes wrote that "the attitude of the Department of Agriculture has been that this is an anticonservation bill and should be vetoed." Ickes thought that last-minute amendments made the bill satisfactory, and this point of view prevailed. (Ickes, Vol. I, pp. 169-70)

That was in June 1934; but it was not long before Ickes perceived a conspiracy against his department. At the end of December, he wrote:

> It begins to look as if the Department of Agriculture is opening a campaign on this Department. The Forest Service has become a law unto itself. It is a tight little organization which does a lot of lobbying. Some time ago a sudden barrage was laid down against me on the theory that I was trying to get Forestry over here. I do want it, but I have never raised my hand to get it, except to talk in a friendly way with Henry Wallace and Rex Tugwell, and jointly with the with the President. As a matter of fact, there was a movement in Congress at the last session to transfer Forestry over here, but I discouraged it and succeeded in stopping it . . . . Congressman Taylor . . . was in to see me today too, and from him I learned that members of the Forest Service in the West are opening an active campaign to have the Grazing Control Service sent to Agriculture to be administered.
>
> So on Saturday, I wrote a letter to Henry Wallace telling him that while nothing had been done here to disturb the friendly status quo between our Departments, it was apparent that the Department of Agriculture was opening a fight on a broad front and that if I found it necessary to defend this Department, I would do so although with great reluctance. . . . (Ickes, Vol. I, pp. 258-9)

In what Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., calls Ickes' "interminable campaign of intrigue, persuasion, and pressure designed to recapture Forestry from Agriculture," (Schlesinger, p. 346)

7/ Ickes, Vol. I, pp. 169-170.

8/ Ickes, Vol. I, pp. 258-259.

9/ Schlesinger, p. 346.

first the strategy of a direct approach to Secretary Wallace to try to work out an interchange of bureaus between the two departments. In March 1934, Wallace agreed to something of the sort; but, stiffened by the Forest Service, according to Schlesinger, he soon changed his mind or, as Ickes put it in his diary, "reneged" on the agreement.

Ickes then pursued a second strategy of trying to get a bill through Congress that would have changed the name of the Department of the Interior to the Department of Conservation and would have given the President authority for a period of two years to transfer unspecified bureaus. Concerning the introduction of his bill in April 1935, Ickes wrote in his diary that "the newspaper correspondents saw a conflict between Agriculture and Interior for control of the National Forest Service." "They are not far wrong at that", he said. (Ickes, Vol. I, p. 350)

The Forest Service and Secretary Wallace opposed Ickes' 1935 bill, as well as one that Ickes had introduced in 1936 that would have changed the name of the Department from Interior to Conservation but did not provide reorganization authority. The 1935 bill failed to pass either House, but the 1936 measure did pass the Senate. Ickes believed that the first bill -- and certainly the second -- would have passed both Houses if President Roosevelt had given active support on the Hill and had told Wallace to stop his opposition. Although Roosevelt apparently did agree to call Wallace off, he does not seem to have done so, and in effect, took the position that if Ickes could get the bill through, that would be all right with the President, but that he was not going to take sides between his two secretaries over the issue.

One important reason for Roosevelt's unwillingness to help Ickes with the Department of Conservation bill was probably that he had in view the much more far-reaching reorganization proposals made by the President's Committee on Administrative Management in 1937. In its Report, the Committee recommended elimination of the Department of the Interior and establishment of a Department of Conservation

> to advise the President with regard to the protection and use of the natural resources of the Nation and the public domain.

> To administer the public lands, parks, territories, and reservations, and enforce the conservation laws with regard to public lands and mineral and water resources, except as otherwise assigned.

Concerning the Department of Agriculture, the Committee recommended that its functions be

> to advise the President with regard to agriculture.
>
> To conduct research on agricultural problems; to continue and develop relations with state and local government in agricultural research, agricultural education, and the conservation and development of private lands and other resources affecting the agricultural supplies of the Nation; and to enforce and administer laws dealing with agriculture. (President's Committee on Administrative Management, p. 35)

The Committee did not say what bureaus it thought should be assigned to the various departments because, it said, to do so "would be to undertake an executive task which should be performed only by the Executive . . . after the enactment by the Congress of a law setting up for his guidance the general departmental structure." * What the Report said about the functions of the Departments of Agriculture and Conservation, however, looked very much as though the Committee had in mind a transfer of the Forest Service to the Department of Conservation; and that was undoubtedly the way the Forest Service and its supporters read the Report. As a result, the Department of Agriculture, the Forest Service, and their allies lobbied strongly against the administration's 1938 reorganization bill and were important factors in its defeat. *(President's Committee, p. 36)

A modified version of the original reorganization bill succeeded in 1939. Although the Forest Service was not included among the 21 agencies exempted from reorganization under the Act, the President declined to include its transfer to Interior in a reorganization plan, despite Ickes' efforts to persuade him to do so. His refusal, however, seems to have reflected a purely political judgment, and there is some evidence in his May 9, 1939 message transmitting Reorganization Plan No. 2 that Roosevelt agreed with Ickes that it made no sense in any other respect

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to continue the split in jurisdiction over the public lands between Agriculture and Interior. The message said:

> I have also considered the problem of certain public lands insofar as they present overlapping jurisdiction between the Departments of the Interior and Agriculture.
>
> Insofar as crops, including tree crops, are involved there is something to be said for their retention in the Department of Agriculture. But where lands are to be kept for the primary purpose of recreation and permanent public use and conservation they fall more logically into the Department of the Interior.
>
> I hope to offer a reorganization plan on this early in the next session.

When it came down to it, however, Roosevelt thought better of this intention, and he never submitted a reorganization plan covering public land jurisdiction, leaving Ickes to make do with transfer of the Bureau of Commerical Fisheries from Commerce and the Biological Survey from Agriculture.

Although most of the reorganization talk in the 1930's was about transferring bureaus from one department to another, Roosevelt seems to have at least toyed with a different sort of scheme. Ickes' diary under the date of March 25, 1939, contains this note:

> /The President/ referred to an old but very vague plan of his to set up an interdepartmental commission of three, on which Interior, Agriculture, and the Budget would be members, this commission to have general supervision of all forestry matters notwithstanding what department they might be in. He suggested that he was /not/ disposed to try this out until the next session of Congress. I made no comment at the time because I was afraid that an argument might deepen his conviction. . . .(Ickes, Vol. II, p. 603)

The First Hoover Commission

With the outbreak of World War II, the range reorganization wars subsided, and all was quiet on that front until the report of the first Hoover Commission in 1949. The Commission

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was far from unanimous in its views on natural resources: eight members recommended transfer of the Bureau of Land Management to Agriculture; one member favored transfer of the Forest Service to the Department of the Interior, where he wanted to combine it with the Bureau of Land Management; and three members advocated establishment of a Department of Natural Resources, where the Bureau of Land Management, the Forest Service, and certain research functions from Agriculture would be combined in a Forest and Range Service.

The eight Commissioners who recommended transfer of the Bureau of Land Management to the Department of Agriculture favored consolidation of the agencies mainly because they discerned "wasteful conflict and overlap between certain soil conservation, range, forest, and allied services due to the division of their functions between . . . Agriculture and . . . Interior." They found duplication in the management of grazing lands on the national forests and on the public domain; and, since many ranchers ran stock on both Forest Service and BLM land, the ranchers had to get separate permits from the two agencies, and two reviews of ranch management plans were necessary.

The majority commissioners said that a similar situation of overlapping and duplication existed on Federal forest lands, and they cited the management of the O & C lands in Oregon as a case in point. "Two sets of regional and local forest officers," they said, "carry on these duplicating programs." The conflict extended to revenue-sharing arrangements with local governments, with the Forest Service, according to the Commissioners, returning only 25 percent in comparison with the 50-75 percent returned by BLM. 1/

The majority of Commissioners did not argue at any length the question of why it was more desirable to transfer BLM to Agriculture than to transfer the Forest Service to Interior. Perhaps they thought it important to have the two public land agencies in the same department with the Soil Conservation Service.

1/ It is not clear from what they said whether the Commissioners understood that the difference in revenue-sharing arrangements between O & C and regular national forest lands had a statutory basis that would not have been changed by merely transferring BLM to the Department of Agriculture. Nor is it clear that they understood that the revenue-sharing provisions applicable to the so-called "controverted" O & C lands managed by the Forest Service were identical to those for the lands BLM managed. (Clawson and Held, p.83)

They noted that all three of their task forces on Agriculture, Natural Resources, and Public Works had recommended consolidation of "these agencies." There was, however, a difference of opinion between the task forces on Agriculture and Natural Resources, with the former recommending consolidation by transferring BLM to Agriculture and the latter recommending that it be achieved by transferring the Forest Service to Interior. (Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Gov't., Feb. 1949, pp. 24-26)

As far as this writer knows, the proposal of the eight members of the Hoover Commission to transfer the Bureau of Land Management to Agriculture and a proposal Commissioner Forrestal made in a footnote to the report to transfer the Forest Service to Interior were the last serious public proposals to transfer a single land management agency from one existing department to another. From 1949 on, all land management agency transfer proposals to come to the writer's attention were parts of larger departmental reorganization packages looking toward establishment of a Department of Conservation or of Natural Resources.

Indeed, this was the proposal of the minority of the first Hoover Commission. Commissioners Acheson, Pollock, and Rowe advocated transfer of the Forest Service to a new Department of Natural Resources, where they would have combined it with BLM in a Forest and Range Service. They also wanted to combine the Bureau of Reclamation and the river development functions of the Corps of Engineers in a Water Development Service in the same department.

Their separate report emphasized their contention that water and land resources should be managed in a coordinated way. "The public lands and the water resources of the Nation," they said, "have all been tied together by nature and the march of technology into a multiple-purpose resource development program. Only the Government insists on treating them separately." (Commission on Organization, March 1949, p. 63)

In a lengthy footnote, the minority Commissioners argued that the Forest Service had functions so unrelated to the main functions of the Department of Agriculture that it was a "completely autonomous unit in the Department." Apart from the Forest Service and some of the activity of the Soil Conservation Service, the Department, they said, was not a managing agency

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but a servicing agency. "Its traditional concept and pattern of organization are such as to provide services to its clientele and not to manage the resources itself." The three Commissioners said that in its soil conservation program, the Department of Agriculture was highly sensitive to local interests; and they contended that "the public's stake in conservation is often at variance with the individual's drive for immediate gain through more intensive exploitation of the soil resources." The three Commissioners thought that the functions of the Forest Service should be performed by an agency in a department charged also with "development of water resources for irrigation, flood control, power, navigation." Accordingly, they recommended establishment of a new Department of Natural Resources. (Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch, March 1949, pp. 65-67)

Except for Senator McClellan and Representative Manasco, all members of the Commission agreed that it was desirable to create some sort of central mechanism to review projects proposed by the Corps and the Interior Department (or its successor) and to advise the President, Congress, and the public thereon. Six of the Commissioners wanted what they called a Board of Impartial Analysis for Engineering and Architectural Projects, and five of them thought the Board should go into "the President's office." Herbert Hoover thought it should be in the Department of the Interior. These Commissioners were emphasizing review of projects for economic feasibility: As Hoover put it, "The device is proposed as a brake upon hare-brained projects from the departments and on the log-rolling of projects in Congress." (Commission on Organization, March 1949, p. 4) Forrestal agreed that there ought to be central project review, but he recommended staffing up the Bureau of the Budget so that it could perform the review function.

Commissioners Acheson, Pollock, and Rowe, who wanted a Department of Natural Resources, also recommended a Board of Review, as they called it, in "the President's Office;" but there was a strong suggestion in the three paragraphs they devoted to the Board that they wanted it to perform coordinating functions considerably wider in scope than the project review function the six other Commissioners had in mind. The minority said that

> no review and coordination machinery for resources programs will be effective unless it can bring

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> together the work of regional authorities, the resource programs of the Department of Natural Resources, and the views and participation of other agencies, such as Agriculture on irrigation development, and Commerce on transportation. (Commission on Organization, March 1949, p. 76)

"The Board of Review," they said in a footnote, "would not be confined to analysis of water resource projects. It should cover the field of natural resource development." (Loc. cit.)

Although President Truman is supposed to have accepted the idea of a Department of Natural Resources, and the Bureau of the Budget made studies looking toward such a department, nothing came of the land management recommendations of either the majority or the minority of the Hoover Commission, and the *status quo* prevailed.

The Reorganization Act of 1949

One reason for the administration's failure to move on land management recommendations of either the majority or minority of the Hoover Commission may have been the provisions of the Reorganization Act of 1949, which were not favorable to reorganization plans involving agencies with much capacity to mobilize resistance. In the consideration of the reorganization bill in the Senate Committee on Government Expenditures, an important question was whether various agencies, including the Corps, should be exempted from the operation of the Act, as was done in the Reorganization Acts of 1939 and 1945. Elimination of these exemptions was thought important by most of the Hoover Commission and the administration. Senator McClellan was chairman of the Committee, and he and Representative Manasco had dissented from the recommendation of all the other members of the Hoover Commission that the civil functions of the Corps be transferred to the Department of the Interior or Department of Natural Resources. Senator McClellan would have preferred to see the Corps explicitly exempted from reorganization under the reorganization act, but a proposal to do so was rejected by a close vote in the Committee. As an alternative to exempting the Corps, Senator McClellan then insisted that the Act provide for rejection of a reorganization plan by a vote of either House of Congress, instead of requiring a concurrent resolution, as did the Acts of 1939 and 1945. (Heady)

One effect of the single-House veto permitted by the 1949 Act was to make the Forest Service even more secure than it was before, which, of course was equally true of any other agency, including BLM, that had not been specifically exempted by the earlier reorganization acts. All subsequent reorganization acts have provided for the single-House veto, and it may, therefore, be fair to say that one result of the Hoover Commission's efforts in behalf of the Reorganization Act of 1949 was to make the status quo in Federal land management organization even firmer than it was before.

Proposals Since 1949 to Create a Single Resources Department

When the Eisenhower administration took office in 1953, there was a notable reduction in conflict between the resources agencies. The loud disputes between Commissioner of Reclamation Michael Straus and the Corps were succeeded by calm when Undersecretary Ralph Tudor, himself a former member of the Corps, took office in Interior. The administration paid some attention to ways of coordinating water resources development, and its hostility to TVA led it into the Dixon-Yates controversy; but did not actively push any scheme for major reorganization of natural resources management.

Mister Z's "Case for A Department of Natural Resources." The idea of a Department of Conservation or of Natural Resources had not died, however, but was lying dormant, ready to germinate when conditions became favorable again. To some people, the advent of the Kennedy administration seemed to provide such conditions, and an article appeared in the November 1961 issue of The Journal of Natural Resources, in which the author, under the pseudonym of Mister Z, made what he called "the case for a Department of Natural Resources."

Mister Z advocated a department organized under a Secretary of Natural Resources and six line assistant secretaries -- one each for Mineral Resources, Electric Power, Water Resources, Parks and Wildlife, Land Management, and Indian Affairs. The Assistant Secretary for Parks and Wildlife would supervise a Bureau of Recreation Planning and Research, the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, and the National Park Service. The Assistant Secretary for Land Management would supervise a Bureau of Land Surveys and Research, which would be responsible for local land use planning, land surveys, and studies of land economics; a Public Domain Administration, which would be responsible for watershed conservation plans and administration of soil conservation projects on private lands; a Forest Service, responsible for administration of Federal forest lands; and a Grazing Service, responsible for administration of Federal grazing lands.

The effect of Mister Z's article is unknown. However, the bills that Senator Moss subsequently introduced would have provided a Department of Natural Resources not dissimilar to the one Mister Z advocated. Senator Ribicoff included the entire Mister Z article in the record of the hearings that he held in October 1967 on Senator Moss's bill. And probably the article influenced others and generally helped to revive the idea of forming a new resources department.

The Moss Bills. In the 89th Congress, Senator Moss introduced a bill which would have changed the name of the Department of the Interior to the Department of Natural Resources and would have transferred to the new department the functions of the Forest Service, along with a number of other functions, including the civil functions of the Corps of Engineers, the construction functions of the Soil Conservation Service, and the air pollution control functions of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Senator Moss introduced a similar bill in the 90th Congress and again in the 91st. Although Senator Ribicoff's Subcommittee on Executive Reorganization held hearings on Senator Moss's bill in October 1967, as of September 1969, no version of the bill had been reported out of committee.

The Proposal to Combine Agriculture and Interior. It is understood that the Bureau of the Budget and the White House in 1965 seriously considered sponsoring a new Department of Rural Affairs or of Natural Resources that would have contained as subdepartments the existing Departments of Agriculture and the Interior. The model, obviously, was the Department of Defense, and the proposal to put Agriculture and Interior together in a super-department was probably motivated by a view of political reality similar to what held by the framers of the National Security Act of 1947.

What was said in the Executive Office discussions is not known, but it is likely that the scheme's proponents thought that if Congress adopted it, then Secretaries of the new department would be able to use amendments to the basic act and administrative means -- as Secretaries of Defense used them after passage of the basic National Security Act -- to gain control of the bureaus in the sub-departments and probably, in time, to reorganize them.

Neither is it known why the Administration decided not to go ahead with the proposal. One possible explanation is that the President and his advisors thought that an attempt to combine Agriculture and Interior would provoke a controversy that might interfere with enterprises of higher priority, particularly creation of the Departments of Transportation and Housing and Urban Development.

A Department of Conservation and the Environment. Mr. Z's "case for a Department of Natural Resources" did not refer to environmental quality. Perhaps the idea of quality control was implicit, but Mr. Z did not deal with it explicitly. Things had changed by 1967, however, and environmental quality control had become a prominent subject in most discussions of natural resources and was an important consideration to Senator Moss, whose 1967 bill, besides providing for transfer of water and land management agencies, would also have transferred air pollution and oceanographic functions to the new Department of Natural Resources.

Environmental quality control was central in S. 2312, a bill to establish a Department of Conservation and the Environment, which Senator Scott introduced on June 5, 1969, on behalf of Senator Case and other Senators, including Senator Moss. This bill would group BLM, the Bureau of Mines, the Geological Survey, and the Forest Service in a Land Resources Administration under an Administrator; and it would similarly put the Park Service, the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, and the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, along with a Highway Beautification Coordinator, in a Parks and Recreation Administration. There would also be an Air and Water Resources Administration, which would include functions authorized by the Clean Air and Solid Waste Disposal Acts, the Water Pollution Control Administration, the Environmental Science Services Administration, the Bureau of Reclamation, the Soil Conservation Service, and an Office of Noise Abatement.

The department would contain a Council of Environmental Advisers, equipped with an Executive Director and a staff.

The Council would receive complaints about Federal activities or expenditures of Federal funds thought to be harmful to the environment and would advise the Secretary thereon.

The bill would require the head of any Federal instrumentality to suspend any construction, issuance of a license, approval of expenditure of Federal funds, or (apparently) any other activity when notified by the Secretary of Conservation and the Environment that "the construction, program, policy, or activity may have an adverse effect on the environment." (If the Secretary should find the activity to be benign, the "instigating instrumentality" could go ahead, if otherwise authorized.) The suspensory veto would last for not more than 120 days, during which time the Secretary would file a detailed report with the President and Congress. After "120 days of continuous session of the Congress following the receipt by it of the report . . . the head of the instigating instrumentality /could/ if otherwise authorized" proceed with the harmful activity.

The bill, in other words, would charge a cabinet officer with responsibility for keeping track of what is happening to the environment as a result of Federal activity and/or expenditure of Federal funds and for putting the President, Congress, and the public on notice when the activity or expenditure is having or seems about to have a harmful effect. Like Herbert Hoover when he advocated establishment of a high-level board to review what he called "hare-brained projects from the departments," the authors of S. 2312 apparently believed that if the Secretary should find an activity to be harmful, the publicity attending the finding would constitute powerful ammunition against beginning or continuing the harmful activity.

S. 2312 makes some trades that the earlier Moss bills did not. The Corps would be left in the Department of the Army, although the bill would give the Undersecretary of Conservation and the Environment "the responsibility of approving all civil works projects of the Corps . . . ." Commercial Fisheries and Interior's functions with respect to oil and gas would be transferred to the Department of Commerce. Although the Forest Service and the Soil Conservation Service would go to the new department, Agriculture would get something in return in the form of Interior's power marketing functions and agencies.

The authors of S. 2312 are not the only ones interested in environmental quality control. At the end of May 1969, President Nixon issued an executive order setting up a cabinet committee called the Environmental Quality Council, with the President as chairman and the Science Adviser as executive secretary. When the Secretary of the Interior and the President's Science Adviser first announced the Administration's intention to establish the Council, Senator Jackson and other members of the Senate Interior Committee criticized the plan on the ground that the President would not be able to give the committee significant attention and that it was impossible for an interagency committee to provide the President with the kind of advice the environmental crisis requires. Advice on which an interagency committee can agree, one member of the Interior Committee said, is simply the lowest common denominator.

Senator Jackson had earlier introduced S. 1075, which would set up in the Executive Office of the President a Board of Environmental Quality Advisers and would authorize the Secretary of the Interior to study environmental problems.2/ The Senate passed the bill on July 10, and on September 23 the House passed a similar bill, HR 12549.

On August 7, the Senate Public Works Committee unanimously reported S. 7. In its report, the Committee said:

> If we do not begin a coordinated effort to repair the damage we have caused and prevent greater damage in the future, man may become an ecological orphan -- faced with an environment which cannot support simple human existence, much less the growing technology on which we have thrived.

The Committee reported its conclusion that an independent staff in the Executive Office was essential to environmental quality control and that President Nixon's interagency Environmental Quality Council could not be expected to engage in the critical and independent review of Federal actions that the situation required. As a remedy, Title II of S. 7 provided for an Office of Environmental Quality to be set up in the Executive Office of the President.

2/ In the hearings on S. 1075, a representative of the Department of Agriculture opposed the authorization for the Secretary of the Interior to study environmental problems on the ground that studies by Interior would duplicate those carried on elsewhere in the government.

Senator Jackson did not disagree with the Public Works Committee's conclusion about the ineffectiveness of President Nixon's Council, but the Senator already had his own measure providing for a Board of Environmental Advisers, and a similar bill had been passed by the House. Disagreement as to whether the terms of S. 1075 or those of S. 7 should prevail delayed S. 7 from coming to the floor and S. 1075 from going to conference. Finally, Senators Jackson and Muskie reached an agreement that would retain both Executive Office organizations but provided that Senator Muskie's Office of Environmental Quality serve as staff for Senator Jackson's Board of Environmental Quality Advisers. On October 8, the language of S. 7 was substituted for that of a similar bill, HR 4148, already passed by the House, and was adopted by the Senate 86-0. As this was written, neither Senator Jackson's nor Senator Muskie's measure had emerged from conference.

An Evaluation

Some reorganization proposals seem to have stemmed more from what might be called "general principles of sound organization" than from identification of specific deficiencies attributable to existing organization and thought remediable by reorganization. For instance, the Budget Committee of New York in a 1920 proposal for reorganization of the Federal Government stressed the importance of grouping similar functions in each department. The Committee's horrible example of failure to do so was the inclusion of the Coast Guard in the Treasury Department, where, according to the Committee, the Coast Guard was bound to get inadequate supervision because of the Secretary's preoccupation with the main business of the Department. The minority of the first Hoover Commission made a similar point about the presence of the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture.

The Budget Committee does not seem to have been complaining about anything the Coast Guard did or did not do, nor did the Hoover Commission minority complain about any action or failure to act on the part of the Forest Service: In both cases, the alleged failure of supervision was deduced, not observed, from the fact that the agency in question had a mission substantially different from the mission of most other agencies in the department. Both the Committee and the Hoover Commission minority seem to have subscribed to a "general principle" of administrative organization holding that, from the chief executive down to the lowest operating level, there should be "clear lines of authority," and nobody should escape supervision, if not by the chief executive, then by someone connected directly with him by a "clear line of authority." The limits of span of control made such supervision impossible if the agencies to be supervised were not only numerous, as they would be in a Federal department, but also heterogeneous in major purpose, process, or both. It followed, therefore, that agencies should be grouped according to major purpose, process, or some other basis of similarity that would make each group or department relatively homogeneous and bring it within the span of control of the supervisor. The high importance of supervision by the chief executive (in this case, the President) or by someone who could be shown on an organization chart to be connected with him by a "clear line of authority" was simply taken for granted and not argued.

Herbert Hoover made a number of statements when he was Secretary of Commerce, President, and Chairman of the first Hoover Commission that took off from general principles like this and argued that unspecified "overlaps," duplications, and waste could be overcome if only there were a proper grouping of organizations according to major purpose. Get like agencies together first, he said in effect, and then it will be possible to see how they should be consolidated and coordinated for maximum efficiency.

The Budget Committee made the same point in its 1920 report, saying:

> Reorganization is . . . something more than a mere transfer of agencies from one jurisdiction to another, or a more statutory shifting of lines of authority. Real reorganization means eliminations, consolidations, cutting down overhead, reduction of force, improvement of service. . . . the great obstacle in the way of . . . action of this sort lies in the heterogeneous character of the most important executive departments and in the statutory location in different departments of units whose work is similar, or at least in similar fields. . . .

> To obtain the benefit of real reorganization, all services operating in the same field, services conducting operations of a similar character, must . . . be placed under one general direction; and conversely, the field of each department must, so far as possible, be restricted to a single class of closely related activities. Reorganization can then follow naturally. Effective cooperative relations can be established between services engaged in analogous lines of work. Duplications of equipment, plant, and activities can be eliminated. Services whose work is sufficiently similar in character can be consolidated. Unnecessary services can be discontinued and duties more logically assigned among the working units which remain. (Graves, p. 309)

The authors of more recent reorganization proposals do not rely upon general principles of organization in quite the same way that Herbert Hoover and the President's Committee on Administrative management did, but they base their proposals upon premises that in their generality are similar to those upon which the earlier schemes rested. Mr. Z, for instance, says in his article, "The Case for a Department of Natural Resources," that there is a great waste of administrative energy in conflicts between resources agencies, and he implies that these conflicts would somehow cease if the agencies were brought into the same department. He says that "the result [of the form in which resource conservation and development planning takes place] is that the present public policy towards resources is indefensible if evaluated by [unspecified] economic, political, or social criteria." Although Senator Moss is more explicit than Mr. Z about the deficiencies that he expects his proposed reorganization to remedy, he, too, seems to start from a general assumption that there must be something wrong with an organization that puts similar agencies doing similar things in different departments.

Ever since Herbert Simon's Administrative Behavior was published, students of public administration have tended to shy away from "general principles." But the fact that a proposed reorganization rests mainly upon general considerations rather than upon a catalogue of specific evils that reorganization is expected to remedy does not necessarily mean that the proposal is not a sensible one. On the contrary, there is probably a good deal of merit to the argument that Herbert Hoover, the Hoover Commission, Mr. Z, and others have made to the effect that a "logical" grouping of agencies and activities will result in agency performance that will be an improvement in many respects over existing performance. Although ambiguities appear whenever an effort is made to organize upon the basis of something like major purpose or process, no case comes to mind in which it has been argued as a matter of principle that it is undesirable to group similar activities in the same organization or, to turn it around, that it is desirable to put Federal agencies performing similar functions in respect to the same or similar objects in different departments. True, some have said that there may be advantages in the fact that the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation are in different departments, since each agency is thought, as a result, to impose some check upon the other that it would not impose if they were in the same department. Marion Clawson has found merit in the competition between the Forest Service and the Park Service in providing outdoor recreation, and he has seen dangers of monopoly in consolidation of public land management agencies. But there is a question about the weight that should be given to such arguments, since they often sound as though they are attempts to find consolation in what strike the observers as anomalous situations about which they believe nothing can be done.

It is instructive to make the mental experiment of imagining that the Federal Government suddenly came into title to some 740 million acres of land and was faced with the question of how to organize to manage it. There might be justification for turning some lands especially suited to the propagation of wildlife over to an organization specialized in that activity. There would doubtless be justification for turning other areas peculiarly suited for landing fields and bombing and artillery ranges over to the military departments. If it were thought that the dominant use of certain lands ought to be recreational, a case might be made for turning them over to an agency specialized in recreational management. And there might be justification for turning some of the land, good for nothing else, over to the Atomic Energy Commission for use in its testing program. But for multiple use management of any kind it is exceedingly doubtful, if it is conceivable at all, that anyone in his right mind would advocate dividing up contiguous lands of similar character and assigning management of some of them to an organization located in one department and the rest to another organization employing similar technology located in another department. This course, however, would have to be adopted in order to produce the existing situation in which lands are divided between the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management.

If the Federal Government were starting from scratch to organize for land management, there can be no doubt that the sensible arrangement would be to have the lands now managed by the Forest Service and BLM handled by a single agency; and that agency would be grouped in that same department together with other, more specialized land management agencies, if establishment of such agencies were thought necessary. Since, however, the Federal Government is not starting from scratch, the question becomes one of how most economically to move toward the most sensible arrangement; and the obvious answer to this question is to transfer the Forest Service to the Department of the Interior and consolidate it there with the Bureau of Land Management. This would not put the management of all public lands within a single department, but it would go a long way toward doing so, leaving only about 19 million acres outside the jurisdiction of Interior, mostly under the military departments and the Atomic Energy Commission.

Another point to be made in favor of transferring the Forest Service to Interior is that it would increase the effectiveness of the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation. The Bureau's position in the Department of the Interior is somewhat anomalous, since it is a unit in a "claimant" department but is charged with promoting coordination of Federal outdoor recreation activities, more of which are performed by the Corps of Engineers and the Forest Service than by all the Interior agencies together. If the Forest Service were moved to Interior and consolidated with BLM, it would reduce by one the number of agencies of which BOR has to take account, and it would enable BOR to play a more direct coordinating role than is possible now with the Forest Service in another department. It should be noted, however, that transferring the Forest Service to Interior would not completely eliminate the anomoly of BOR's position, since the Corps' very large reservoir recreation program would still be in another department, subject only to whatever coordination BOR can provide through diplomacy. Transfer of the Forest Service would, nevertheless, make the situation less irregular than it now is and would highlight the peculiarity of the fact that the largest Federal outdoor recreation program, as measured in visitor-days, is carried on by an agency in a military department, which might be thought to have enough to do in discharging its military and civil construction functions.

Against the transfer of the Forest Service to Interior, it used to be argued (and will probably be argued again if such a transfer is proposed) that Interior, because of corruption and incompetence, was unequipped to handle land management and that there was an important symbiotic sort of relationship between the Forest Service and other bureaus in the Department of Agriculture. Whatever substance there may once have been to the argument that Interior was corrupt and incompetent, it has none today. As far as corruption goes, the modern record of the Department of Agriculture is inferior to that of Interior; and if the Forest Service were transferred, it would be taking its own competence with it.

Now that the Forest Service operates its own very sizeable research program, the argument there were advantages in having the Forest Service in the same department with the agricultural scientific research bureaus no longer has even the appearance of substance. The Department of Agriculture seems to have recognized this fact, with the result that the Forest Service is now under an Assistant Secretary for Rural Development and Conservation, along with the Rural Community Development Service, the Farmer Cooperative Service, the Farmers Home Administration, the Rural Electrification Administration, and the Soil Conservation Service. This arrangement reflects the shift in the symbiotic argument away from importance of relationships between the Forest Service and the scientific bureaus to an asserted relationship between the Service and the other bureaus in the Rural Development and Conservation grouping that are charged, in Secretary Freeman's words, with "the revitalization of rural America so necessary to the restoration of rural-urban balance." (Hearings on S. 886, 64)

In short, there seem to be no compelling reasons of an organizational character for not transferring the Forest Service to the Department of the Interior, and there are several good reasons for doing so. 3/ If the Forest Service were transferred to Interior and merged with BLM and if existing statutory authority were revised to permit the consolidated agency to manage similar lands in similar ways, at least the following benefits might be expected with a good deal of confidence:

1. Federal land use planning would be facilitated.
2. Federal-state relations would be simplified.
3. The existing diversity of policies and practices relating to the same activities or land uses could be much reduced or eliminated.
4. Overhead economies could be achieved.
5. There would be an overall improvement in Federal land management practices.
6. Congressional supervision of Federal land management could be facilitated.
7. The prospects for establishment of a Department of Conservation would be improved.

These possible benefits are discussed in more detail in what follows:

Facilitation of Federal Land Use Planning. Given the present arrangement with the Forest Service in one department and the other major land management agencies in another, there is no place below the level of the Executive Office of the President where there is the breadth of jurisdiction necessary to coordinate and systematize Federal land use planning. 4/

3/ It is recognized that it may not be possible to transfer the Forest Service without arousing a political controversy of some intensity and that some people may regard the prospect of such a controversy as a reason for not undertaking the transfer. This point is discussed in more detail below.

4/ Even if such coordination might be effectively done in the Executive Office, which is doubtful, the Office is at present quite unequipped to engage in it.

At present the Forest Service does its own planning for the use of the lands under its jurisdiction, without much attention to external factors. The National Park Service similarly plans separately for the use of its lands, substantial areas of which are contiguous to Forest Service lands. The Bureau of Land Management and the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife also engage in separate planning for the management of their lands, some of which are contiguous to each other and to Forest Service lands. The Bureau of Outdoor Recreation has a responsibility for coordinating recreational planning for Federal lands, but the fact that the Bureau is in the Department of the Interior complicates its relationship with the Forest Service and handicaps it in the discharge of its coordinating function.

It is not necessary to exaggerate the separateness of these planning activities in order to make a good case for creating a situation more conducive to coordination: There is, for instance, collaboration between the Forest Service and the Park Service in planning the use of national forest lands along the eastern boundary of Mt. Ranier National Park and in the Grand Teton-Yellowstone National Park area. And, no doubt, other examples could be found of informal ad hoc arrangements for inter-agency coordination. But, the exceptions notwithstanding, the picture is still one of marked separateness, with each agency going its own way except when specific, acute problems compel local coordination, which is in no way a substitute for systematic planning but is required because there is no systematic planning. The land use planning study made for the PLLRC shows how far the Federal Government is from having a mechanism for carrying on systematized planning that can regularly provide for complementary uses of lands and sensitively take account of interrelationships among uses.

Although some approach to this kind of planning might be possible short of putting all the land management agencies in the same organization, it will not be fully achieved as long as the Forest Service is in a department different from that housing the other land management agencies. Merging the Forest Service and BLM would almost automatically solve a substantial part of the problem, even without the development of more coordinative capability at the departmental level in Interior. Transfer of the Forest Service, moreover, might help to increase Interior's capability, since planning and carrying out the reorganization would highlight existing departmental deficiencies.

Grouping the land management agencies in the Department of the Interior would also facilitate land use planning by greatly simplifying the task of developing compatible information systems in the land management agencies. The PLLRC land use planning study points to the need among the land management agencies "for common definitions, units of measurement, and systems of classification." The study recommends standardization of

> information systems to include common definitions, units of measurement, systems of classification, sources of information, as well as procedures for collecting and disseminating information. Planning at all levels of government is dependent upon data. The more these data can be standardized, the greater the utility they will have, and the users can have the assurance of comparability among agencies . . . . If information systems can be standardized and data are more readily available, it will facilitate the types of testing including benefit-cost analyses of alternative plans, development and construction proposals. (Ruth Associates, XI-9)

Although consistency among the Federal agencies with respect to information systems does not necessarily depend upon reorganization, it would be far simpler to achieve such consistency if all the major land management agencies were under common direction.

Simplification of Federal-State Relations. In the present situation, the states find it more difficult than it needs to be to work with the Federal Government in statewide land use planning, generally, and in fish and wildlife habitat management and statewide outdoor recreation planning, in particular. Any state, for example, that contains a national forest, a national park or monument, and BLM lands has to deal with three agencies having different policies and practices and located in two different departments. If the state contains a game refuge, it has to deal with four agencies. And every state has to deal with the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation if it is interested in grants from the Land and Water Conservation Fund.

Simply transferring the Forest Service to Interior and merging it with the Bureau of Land Management would not, by itself, solve all the problems in Federal-state relations in land use planning and management. But for 21 states it would reduce by one the number of Federal agencies with which they have to deal, and the process of reorganization would open the possibility of departmental arrangements that could substantially ease other difficulties the states now encounter.

Reduction of Diversity in Policies and Practices. There are numerous differences in the policies and practices followed by the different agencies in managing timber, grazing, use and occupancy, water, outdoor recreation, and fish and wildlife. There are differences respecting trespass. Some of the differences in the way the agencies handle these matters stem from different statutory requirements. This is true, for instance, as between the Bureau of Land Management and the Forest Service in respect to sharing revenue from timber sales and in determining grazing fees. But there are other differences resulting from the exercise of administrative discretion that might be eliminated if all the land management agencies were under common supervision. In fact, it is highly probable that if the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management were merged, the statutes governing them would be reconciled as part of the process of merger, and a number of the most troublesome of the differences in policies and practices, whatever their cause, would be eliminated.

Overhead Economies. Marion Clawson in some of his writing has made light of the overhead economies that could be expected to follow such a reorganization as the merger of the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management. (Clawson, 1965) He says that overhead costs are more directly related to acres of land administered and to the number of operating employees than to anything else. He may be right, but even so, this does not mean that the savings that would result from consolidation of BLM and the Forest Service would be insignificant in an absolute sense, even though they might not represent a very high percentage of the combined budgets of the two agencies. It seems highly probable that there would be worthwhile savings in national headquarters and regional organization; and the recommendations of the 1966 Joint Management Improvement and Manpower Review Team for an increase in the average size of national forests and of ranger districts suggests that consolidation of the two agencies might produce substantial economies at sub-regional levels.

Improvement in Land Management Practices. Consolidation of the Forest Service and BLM should result in an overall improvement in administrative practices, planning, and treatment of the resources in the field. Studies done for the PLLRC give the impression that the Forest Service is superior to the Bureau of Land Management in planning -- including budgeting -- and in carrying on and making use of research. BLM practice may be superior to that of the Forest Service in respect to timber sale management; and, from the point of view of those who want increased public accountability, the Bureau's practice may be regarded as superior to that of the Forest Service in the extent to which it uses public hearings and other consultations in its decision processes. BLM, in other words, is probably better at some things than the Forest Service is, and the Forest Service practice is better in some respects than that of BLM. With consolidation and proper supervision, the better practices ought to prevail throughout the new agency.

Another point in this connection is that good practice is not always entirely dependent upon knowledge and skill: sometimes it depends upon political support. Although this judgment is based upon only a few cases, it seems likely that the Forest Service is better able than BLM to regulate grazing. BLM tends to cave in when stockmen object to reduction in the number of animals they are permitted to graze on BLM lands, while the Forest Service, although not insensitive to pressure, seems more successful at withstanding this particular kind. If the two agencies differ in this respect, as they seem to do, it is probable that an important reason for the difference is that grazing is not the most important concern of the Forest Service, and the agency is able to borrow strength to resist the stockmen from supporters of its other activities. As a general matter, it is probably true that the greater the range of interests involved in the work of an agency, the more capable the agency is likely to be in resisting the importunities of any one interest. If the Forest Service and BLM were consolidated, the new agency would probably have a capability to take steps thought desirable on technical grounds that would be superior to BLM's present capability and not inferior to that of the Forest Service.

It is possible, too, that if the Forest Service were transferred to Interior it might gain increased ability to resist pressures to engage in technologically unsound land management practices. There is not enough information to be sure about it, but there is a possibility that the Forest Service would be better able to resist pressure from the timber products industry, expressed in the effort to pass S 1832, the Timber Supply Act, if it were in the Department of the Interior, rather than in the relative isolation that it usually enjoys in Agriculture.

Facilitation of Congressional Supervision. The ability of Congress to supervise Federal land management would be increased by transfer of the Forest Service to Interior and its consolidation with BLM simply because the reorganization would reduce the number of agencies and Secretaries with which Congress has to deal. Beyond that, however, transfer of the Forest Service would probably raise questions about committee jurisdiction that ought to be considered. The present jurisdiction of the Committees on Agriculture (and Forestry, in the Senate) covers forestry in general, and the jurisdiction of the Interior Committees covers the public lands and natural resources, an ambiguous division of authority at best. If jurisdiction over forestry on the national forests (but not over state and private forestry cooperation) were transferred to the Interior Committees, this would simplify relationships between the land management agencies and Congress and would eliminate any possibility that a new agency resulting from Forest Service-BLM consolidation could play one committee against another.

In 1948, the late George B. Galloway, then Senior Specialist in Legislative Organization in the Library of Congress, outlined a general reorganization scheme for the Federal Government. He noted that reorganization of the executive branch and of Congress are two facets of the same problem, and his plan, therefore, suggested changes in committee jurisdictions as well as reorganization of the executive branch. Galloway suggested that functions relating to natural resources other than agricultural resources be given to the Department of the Interior and that a Committee on Natural Resources be established in each House of Congress with jurisdiction over the following matters:

1. Conservation and development of non-agricultural land and water resources.
2. Conservation and development of forest resources.
3. Conservation and development of mineral resources.

4. Conservation and development of fish and wildlife.
5. Recreational use of natural resources (Graves, 391-400)

The Prospects for Establishing a Department of Conservation would be improved. Depending on one's point of view toward the desirability of a Department of Conservation, this is either a good argument for transferring the Forest Service to Interior or it is a good one against it. Although transfer of the agency would not, by itself, create the kind of department that Senator Moss and those who agree with him have in mind, it would represent an important step in that direction and would highlight the presence outside of Interior of the civil functions of the Corps and the construction functions of the Soil Conservation Service. For that very reason, of course, transfer of the Forest Service is likely to be resisted by supporters of the Corps and SCS. More is said of this below.

Summary

In summary, the principal arguments for retaining the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture are that transfer might injure Forest Service morale and that (really a benefit-cost conclusion) it would be too much trouble and involve too much controversy to move the agency. If a proposal is seriously made to transfer the Forest Service to Interior, the argument will also be offered that its presence in Agriculture is essential to the "revitalization of urban America," but this is merely a refurbishment of the older argument dating back to Theodore Roosevelt that the Forest Service should be in the same department with the scientific bureaus, and it will not stand much serious scrutiny. In favor of the transfer is the probability that at least the benefits outlined above would result. Granted, reorganization would also have unforeseen effects, but they are as likely to be good as they are to be bad; and their prospect does not affect the balance of the case, which, on organizational or management grounds, seems to be clearly on the side of transfer of the Forest Service to Interior.

A Note on the Transfer of Bureaus from Interior to Another Department

The next chapter discusses transfer of Interior land management agencies to a government corporation; but, for the sake of completeness, if for no other reason, this chapter on proposals to transfer land management agencies from one department to another should include a word about transfer of Interior bureaus to another department.

It has been a good while since anyone seriously proposed this sort of reorganization. Probably the recommendation of the majority of the first Hoover Commission for transfer of BLM to Agriculture was the last such proposal. In his 1967 testimony on the Moss bill, Secretary Freeman did say that there were better reasons for shifting the Bureau of Land Management, the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, and the National Park Service to Agriculture than there were for transferring the Forest Service and the Soil Conservation Service to a Department of Natural Resources; but Freeman made it clear that he was only making a debater's point and did not really recommend transfer of the bureaus.

This kind of transfer, if it were made to Agriculture (and it is hard to see what other department could receive the Interior bureaus) would go some distance toward the creation of the super-department comprising Agriculture and Interior that was considered by the Johnson administration. True, important functions would still be left in Interior if the land management bureaus were transferred out, but such radical surgery would leave the Department considerably reduced.

The tendency has been to transfer functions relating to natural resources into Interior, rather than the other way around, the latest example being the transfer of water pollution control functions from HEW. This tendency might conceivably be reversed, but so far as is known there are no serious proposals to do so under consideration in either the executive branch or Congress.

CHAPTER II

A PUBLIC LAND CORPORATION

It was observed in the preceding chapter that many of the proposals for transfer of one or more bureaus from one department to another appear to have arisen from general considerations or principles thought to be reliable guides to sound organization. Although the kind of reorganization discussed in the present chapter would presumably have most or all of the advantages mentioned in Chapter I of any grouping of agencies on the basis of major purpose, it is based upon somewhat different considerations and tries to deal with rather specific shortcomings thought to be products of the existing organization. The chapter consists, first, of a discussion of a proposal by Clawson and Held and then a discussion of two possible variations on the Clawson and Held proposal.

The Clawson and Held Proposal

Clawson and Held in their 1957 book, The Federal Lands, suggested establishment of a Federal land corporation. They found that beginning in about 1951, revenues from Federal lands, including revenue from oil and gas leases and royalties, exceeded expenditures on the lands. By 1955, revenues had risen to $300-$350 million, while expenditures were about $150-170 million. Allowing for price increases, there was a five-fold increase in real revenues from 1945 to 1955, while real expenditures about doubled. This meant, according to Clawson and Held, that Federal land management had become "big business" that would, if the lands had been owned by a single private enterprise, have put it among the 100 largest corporations in the country.

The five-fold increase in revenues as against a doubling of expenditures at first glance looked like good business as well as big business; but Clawson and Held argued that if the figures were read that way they would be misinterpreted: What had happened, they said, was that revenues had, indeed, greatly increased, but expenditures had lagged substantially behind what they should have been if tested by the measure of whether an additional dollar of expenditure would produce an equal amount of revenue. For income producing lands, investments and operating expenditures, in other words, were substantially below the level that marginal analysis would justify, and funds were also seriously deficient for recreational management.

They argued that the trouble was with the Federal budgetary and appropriating process, a process in which Clawson later identified five specific shortcomings: (Clawson, 1965)

1. The "process is too slow and too inflexible to provide really good land management." Planning has to be carried on too far in advance of the time when the plans will be executed; and, even with the possibility of supplemental appropriations, the land managers often lack funds that would be highly desirable to meet emergencies or to take advantage of opportunities that could not be foreseen when the budget estimates were made.

2. ". . . investments are treated just as if they were current operating expenses . . . . The whole federal budgeting process seems to assume that capital does not exist. . . ."

3. There is a "marked tendency" for "federal budgets to lag behind changes in the government programs. The budget this year reflects the appropriation last year, perhaps more than any other single factor . . . ."

4. In the Federal budget process "Congress is asked to approve a single set of recommendations." The land management agencies do not provide information to show, and they "themselves often do not know," what would happen if alternative amounts, say 10% higher and 10% lower than the budget requests, were appropriated and spent.

5. The budget process is too much protected from public scrutiny. Although it is not entirely clear what Clawson means by this, what he seems to have in mind is that the relatively high level of confidentiality surrounding the budgetary process until the President makes his recommendations to Congress means that representatives of various groups interested in public land management lack an opportunity before decisions are made to argue the various alternatives they favor.

Mainly to overcome these defects of the budget-appropriating process, Clawson and Held suggested creation of a public land corporation to which would be transferred "the national forests, the grazing districts, other public domain, revested and reconveyed lands, submerged areas of the outer continental shelf, the entire national park system, wildlife refuges, and perhaps other miscellaneous areas." It would also take over the personnel of existing land management agencies. (Clawson & Held, p. 351)

An essential feature of the corporation would be its relative freedom from the limitations of the regular budgetary process. It would require initial working capital, probably provided by appropriation; it should have authority to borrow from the private money market and the Treasury; and it should have "power to fix charges for uses of Federal lands and to use revenues for management and investment . . . ." (Clawson, 1965)

The corporation should have rule-making powers at least as broad as those now exercised by the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior, and Clawson and Held suggest that the "charter should specify the way in which rules or regulations will be formulated, including such matters as public hearings, publication in the Federal Register, and the like." (Clawson and Held, p.353)

The corporation should have a board of directors, appointed and subject to removal by the President. The directors should be part-time, and the board might be representative of various interests. "The possibility that even members of the Congress might be named as directors of the corporation need not be ruled out." (Clawson and Held, p. 353) The policies adopted by the board of directors would be carried out by a general manager.

The authors do not say much about field organization - only, really, that the decentralized operations of the existing agencies would probably provide enough local flexibility, aided perhaps by regional advisory groups.

Clawson and Held see some difficulties with a land management corporation. One hazard they suggest is that if Congress became dissatisfied with the way the corporation operated, it might impose restrictions upon the corporation's use of its funds, "which would largely nullify the . . . advantages of the corporation." (p. 359) Although they discount the possibility, another danger the authors mention is that the corporation might become too commercial in its outlook and neglect "the noneconomic ends of federal land management."

Clawson and Held see a major problem in whether to transfer existing agencies whole to the corporation or to transfer only their land management functions. Here, they are referring to such activities as the Forest Service's research and cooperative forestry programs and to the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife's functions in law enforcement, research, and other areas not closely related to what would be the main concerns of a public land management corporation. Clawson and Held conclude that "whatever . . . the decision on this issue, some objection . . . would surely be found, and there might be as much turmoil stirred up over it as over major administrative reorganization." (p. 358)5/

Where should a public land corporation be placed in the organizational structure of the government? Clawson and Held take the position that it ought to be under supervision of an agent of the President, and that leads them to think that the corporation ought to be put in an executive department, probably in Agriculture or Interior. They observe, however, that an effort to put the corporation in either department would probably produce a major inter-departmental battle, and they wind up in a mood of pessimism about the

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5/ It could be argued that if a land management corporation were thought desirable, decisions about whether agencies should be transferred whole or split might turn on whether the action would increase or reduce opposition to the corporation and not upon the basis of some organizational principle. It might make sense to pay some price in the violation of administrative logic if that helped to obtain support.

feasibility of establishing a public land corporation in either department.

Possible Alternatives to a Departmental Corporation

Two conceivable alternatives not discussed by Clawson and Held would be to set up the corporation as an independent executive agency reporting directly to the President without any supervisory intermediary or to set it up as an independent commission reporting directly to Congress.

Both of these alternatives fly in the face of received administrative dogma. Ever since the 1937 Report of the President's Committee on Administrative Management criticized the proliferation of independent executive agencies and called the independent regulatory commissions a "headless fourth branch of government," it has been orthodox to deprecate both of these organizational forms. The deprecation comes from the basic premise that the Federal Government should be integrated under the overall direction of the President. The best way to do that, according to the President's Committee and those who have accepted its recommendations, is to organize everything into a relatively small number of departments. Non-departmental, independent agencies, reporting directly to the President are supposed to make it more difficult for him to exercise control; and the independent commissions, which have no formal administrative responsibility to the President, are, of course, in the light of the basic integrationist premise even less acceptable than independent executive agencies.

Not all political scientists have been orthodox on this issue. One of these is Charles Hyneman who, many years ago, criticized the integrationist doctrine of the state reorganization movement. In 1950, commenting on the reports of the President's 1937 Committee and the 1949 Hoover Commission, Hyneman wrote:

> It seems to me that these are times when we most need to have the President free from involvement in administration so that he can devote himself most fully to political leadership in affairs of greatest current importance to the nation. The concern of the President to exert an influence on what the Government of the United States actually does in respect to . . . affairs of greatest importance undoubtedly requires that he exercise a substantial amount of direction and control over administrative departments and agencies. But that same concern equally requires that he be not diverted from those affairs which are of greatest importance by a preoccupation with problems of administration that are of less importance.
>
> Any critical evaluation of the recommendations of the President's Committee and the Hoover Commission, it seems to me, must turn in large part on their relation to these basic considerations. Do the recommendations . . . contemplate that less important matters will win over matters of greater importance in competition for the time and energy of a chief executive who does not have enough time and energy for all of them? If the arrangements /proposed_7 would put obligations on the President which he cannot discharge, or will not undertake to discharge, what persons (individuals or organizations) may be expected to assume these obligations, making decisions and issuing instructions in his name? If there is a high degree of probability that the authority which either or both of these plans proposes for the President will be fact be exercised by someone else, would the nation not be happier if all or a part of that authority were exercised by Congress instead? (Hyneman, pp. 256-257)

Lynton Caldwell, one of Hyneman's colleagues at the University of Indiana, recently made a similar point in an unpublished report to the President's Advisory Committee on Recreation and Natural Beauty. Caldwell wrote:

> . . . The complexities of the Executive Office of the President and the ability and necessity of the President personally to focus on only a few compelling national issues leaves many important questions to be decided by persons unknown to the Congress or to the people generally. Conventional political science thinking in the United States has been obsessed with augmenting the Presidential power and office. But increasing the workload of the President, in fact, probably means increasing the power of second and third echelon staff personnel in the Bureau of the Budget and the Office of Science and Technology to make Presidential policy.

From the point of view of someone concerned about the ability of the President to discharge the important responsibilities of his office that only he can discharge, his formal responsibility for administration of the public lands is a good deal like his formal responsibility for the postal service in that neither adds any element of strength to the President, yet both have some potentiality for causing trouble and embarrassment. In Theodore Roosevelt's day, perhaps even in Franklin Roosevelt's, there was "a program of the President" in which land management was important and into which the activities of the land management agencies needed to be coordinated. Today this is not true. The President is already overloaded with the many critical matters to which he must give his personal attention, and, as Edward Corwin once said, he cannot serve as a kind of "boss of the works" for the executive establishment. Formal responsibility for public land management adds nothing to the President's capacity to do the job that only he can do.

The objection may be made that from now on, the issue of environmental quality control is likely to claim an increasing part of the Presidential attention and that it will once more become genuinely important to "the program of the President" what the public land management agencies do or permit to be done on the lands under their jurisdiction. Therefore, it may be argued, it is important to retain public land management within the regular executive establishment in order that the President may control it.

One answer to this objection is that although there is considerable probability that Presidents will have to worry increasingly about the quality of the environment, that is not to say that the old fashioned integrated organization advocated by the President's Committee on Administrative Management and others, which was pretty good for fighting the depression and World War II, is necessarily the best kind of organization for controlling environmental degradation. Perhaps the best things the President and the Executive Office can do for the quality of the environment is to think less about defending prerogatives and increasing the formal responsibilities of the President and to do more to invent and establish new forms of organization more capable of dealing with the environment than the existing executive organization, even if these new forms violate the principle of integration.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, it is improbable that establishment of a public land corporation either as an independent executive agency or as an independent commission would create problems so serious that they would clearly outweigh the advantages of grouping the public land management agencies in a corporate form of organization. The coordinative benefits that have been mentioned as probable results of putting all the public land management agencies within a single executive department would presumably be as likely to accrue if the agencies were grouped in a corporation or commission. The independent corporation or commission could be given the same advantages as the executive corporation in respect to freedom from the regular budgeting-appropriating process. And there would be the same advantage of being able to provide a degree of representation on the board of directors of the corporation or on the commission that is difficult to provide in a regular departmental organization.

The main advantage that an independent executive corporation might have over a departmental corporation is that its establishment would not provoke a fight over which executive department it should be in. An advantage that an independent commission reporting directly to Congress might possibly have over other forms of organization is that Congress might be more willing to grant to such a commission, not only financial flexibility, but a discretion wider in other respects than it has been willing to confer on executive land management agencies. True, the existing agencies do have a considerable discretion, but it is probably not as wide as it should be in order to permit the agencies to take proper account of changing circumstances and regional differences and generally to provide optimum management. Congress might be willing to grant this wider discretion to an independent commission, since it would be directly responsible to Congress and since there is a precedent in the establishment of the independent regulatory commissions for delegating considerable discretion to a commission form of organization. Congress might also believe that a commission would be more amenable than an executive agency to instructions to proceed as far as possible upon the basis of rules made in advance and publicly announced.

Summary

Establishment of a public land corporation of any kind to discharge the land management functions of the Forest Service,BLM, the Park Service, and the Bureau of Sports Fisheries and Wildlife would, like the transfer of the Forest Service to Interior, have the advantages of facilitating Federal land use planning, simplifying Federal-state relations in land management, reducing the diversity of land management policies and practices, achieving overhead economies, improving Federal land management practices, and facilitating Congressional supervision. In addition, if Clawson and Held's arguments are accepted, freedom of the corporation from the constraints of the regular budgetary process would enable Federal public land managers to take advantage of opportunities and meet emergencies with a flexibility that the present process does not permit. They would be able to make economically justifiable investments in the public lands, and they would be able to manage them at more nearly an optimum level of intensity than is possible now. And the board of directors could have a representative quality not possible in a regular executive establishment.

In addition to these advantages, which would presumably accrue to any corporate form, whether a part of the executive branch or not, an independent public land commission reporting directly to Congress might be given a degree of discretion to take account of regional variations that Congress would be unwilling to give to an executive corporation.

One possible disadvantage of any form of corporation, managing public lands according to criceria of economic efficiency, is that investment and management in order to produce non-quantifiable benefits might be slighted in favor of investment and management that could be justified in quantifiable terms. The Bureau of the Budget is likely to argue against a public land corporation as an independent agency or as a commission reporting directly to Congress on the ground that to establish either would be to take a step away from integration in a government in which centrifugal tendencies are already too strong. (Seidman)

CHAPTER III

A REGIONAL LAND MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION

Neither Congress nor the executive, as far as this writer knows, has ever seriously considered the possibility of improving Federal public land management by thoroughgoing decentralization to regional organizations of authority to make all decisions not clearly involving a national interest. Possibly the Hoover proposal of 1929 to turn substantial portions of the public domain over to the states and the more recent proposals by the livestock industry to do the same thing might be described as decentralization proposals of a sort. Their aim, however, was not to improve Federal public land management but to get rid of it.

Perhaps we may hear more proposals for thoroughgoing decentralization now that a kind of disenchantment with centralized Federal bureaucracy has become widespread among those concerned with urban affairs and environmental quality control in general, many of whom appear to have concluded that tolerable environments in urban areas and elsewhere are not likely to be maintained unless the locus of decisions is brought a good deal closer to the scene than Washington and yet not so close that only the trees and not the forest are in sight. Those who take this point of view, have thought of decentralizing many Federal functions affecting the environment either to the states or to new regional organizations.

It is true that all the land management agencies now have field organizations, and in the Forest Service, at least, there is a considerable measure of decentralization of decisional authority to the Regional Foresters. But neither the agencies' regional boundaries nor their headquarters coincide; and, what is more important, the delegation of decisional authority to roughly corresponding levels of field organization varies considerably from one agency to another. The result is that offices in different agencies having jurisdiction over lands in the same area may be separated by substantial distances; and one office may have the authority to make a decision about a matter that the corresponding field office of another agency has to refer to Washington. The lack of coincidence of field unit boundaries, the dispersion of field offices, and agency differences in delegation of decisional authority to field offices combine to create a good deal of inconvenience for States and private users of the public lands in their relations with Federal land management agencies and make it virtually impossible to effect any but the most limited coordination of the management of related public lands under the jurisdiction of different agencies. The situation would be much improved if the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management were combined, but such consolidation would fall a good way short of solving all the problems of regional coordination so long as the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, the National Park Service, and the new agency resulting from consolidation of BLM and the Forest Service maintained separate field organizations. No amount of shifting agencies at the Washington level, whether into a Department of Natural Resources, a Department of Conservation and the Environment, or whatever, would remedy the problems at the regional level so long as the agencies, themselves, were left in existence with their present separate vertical organizations running from Washington headquarters down to the ranger districts, grazing districts, wildlife refuges, and national parks and monuments.

Possibly the field services of the separate agencies could be pressed into a single mold, but a more promising innovation that might not be much more difficult to achieve would be to eliminate the separate agency field structures and provide for direction and coordination of the management of all Federal public lands by a single office in each of several public land management regions, which, together, would cover the whole country.

A Schematic Illustration of a Land Management Region

For the sake of illustrating a possible new kind of regional organization, suppose that at least the land management functions of BLM, BSFW, the Forest Service, and the Park Service were transferred to a Federal public land management corporation of some kind, under the general control of a representative board of directors and headed operationally by a General Manager. Suppose, further, that the country were divided into Federal public land management regions, with each region in charge of a Regional Public Land Manager, responsible to the General Manager. There might be, for example, a Pacific Northwest Land Management Region, with headquarters in Portland and having jurisdiction over all Federal public lands in Oregon, Washington, and western Idaho. The Pacific Northwest Regional Public Land Manager might have under him several principal subordinates -- perhaps three to five -- who would divide responsibility for overseeing on all Federal lands in the region, forestry operations, mass recreation, wilderness or primitive recreation, historical and natural areas management, grazing, fish and game management, and the accomplishment of any other purpose served by Federal lands in the region and requiring management.

The internal organization of land management regions might -- almost certainly would -- differ according to the different kinds of Federal lands within the various regions, the differing demands made on the lands, and perhaps according to other differing circumstances. The regions would necessarily be alike only in that responsibility for management of all Federal public lands in each region -- national parks, national forests, national seashores, national recreation areas, wilderness areas, and so on -- would be lodged in the Regional Public Land Manager, who would have the status of an assistant secretary of an executive department and who would be the only regional officer directly supervised by the General Manager or by anybody else in Washington.

Some Requirements for Effective Control by the Regional Manager

Real control, real coordination of regional operations by the regional manager would not be possible if the existing Federal public land management organization in Washington were continued. The Forest Service could not remain, as it is now, outside the principal public land management

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6/ This example is intended only to be illustrative in a rough way. If Federal land management regions were set up, it would be necessary to face many difficult organizational problems not even suggested here, among which would be how to administer the laws governing mineral claims and mineral extraction on the Federal public lands.

department of the Federal Government, nor could the Washington organizations of BLM, BSFW, the Forest Service, and the Park Service continue to perform their present management functions. If they were retained at all, these agencies would have to be reduced to planning and technical organizations and kept in a strictly advisory relationship to the head of the department or corporation.

However difficult such dismantling of existing agencies might be, effective regional coordination of Federal public land management would require that it be done, if experience in other fields is any guide. The wartime Office of Price Administration was an organization similar to the kind of organization being discussed here, at least in the fact that it was the intent of the OPA designers to put the major weight of the agency in the regions. What happened in OPA is what C. P. Snow calls "a cautionary tale."

OPA was headed by a Price Administrator in Washington, who bore overall responsibility for issuing and enforcing regulations imposing price controls, rent controls, and commodity rationing. He was assisted by Deputy Administrators for Administration, Price, Rationing, and Rent and by a General Counsel. The country was divided into regions, each under a Regional Price Administrator, who had formal responsibility for supervising a Regional Price Executive, Rationing Executive and Rent Executive, plus a Legal Officer. Each region was supposed to be a little OPA, run by the Regional Price Administrator, who was to take orders only from the Price Administrator in Washington.

What happened was different from the intention of those who set up the organization. From the beginning, the regional executives and legal officers, with the active encouragement of the staffs of the Washington deputy administrators, regarded themselves as administratively responsible as well as functionally related to their respective deputy administrators or, in the case of the legal officers, to the General Counsel. Possibly a Regional Price Administrator here and there occasionally managed to exert some control over his nominal subordinates in his region, but for the most part the regional executives and lawyers were in such direct relationships with their functional Washington counterparts that they were largely beyond the Regional Price Administrators' control.

The reported experience of American ambassadors trying to make reality out of formal designations as chiefs of mission would seem to reinforce the lesson of the OPA experience. So powerful is the pull of specialization, and especially of specialized organizations in which careers can be made, that if specialists are left in positions of power in Washington, they and their counterparts in the field are almost irresistably attracted into relationships that subvert the authority of regional directors.

The Problem of Asserting National Interests

However popular decentralization might become among locally or regionally powerful interests it would not be a useful form of public land management organization nor could it be expected to endure for long, unless it were possible reliably to identify and assert national interests in regional land management. For this, at least two prerequisites would have to be met: One would be that national operational responsibility for Federal public land management be concentrated in a single organization -- a Department of Natural Resources, Public Land Management Corporation, or whatever. The other prerequisite would be sufficient delegation of authority to regional managers to free the secretary or general manager from the distraction of local and regional problems and allow him to concentrate on genuinely national interests and to make sure that the national point of view prevailed whenever it conflicted with regional biases. Another way to put this is to say that decentralization of land management functions of the sort discussed above could not succeed unless it were accompanied by an equal centralization of power to look out for national interests. Freedom to decide regional questions on regional grounds would, in the long run, require accurate and sensitive identification of national questions and their decision on national grounds, with enough vigor at the center to make the national point of view prevail over the regional in cases of conflict.

Possible Alternatives in Central Organization

Decentralization of Federal public land management might be carried out under any one of several different kinds of central organization, the minimum requirement being that the central organization be vested with the land management authority of BLM, BFSW, the Forest Service, and the Park Service. The central organization might be the Department of the Interior, a Department of Natural Resources, or a Department of Conservation and the Environment, with public land management headed by an undersecretary and each regional organization headed by an assistant secretary responsible to the undersecretary. Or, as contemplated in most of the discussion above, the land management functions of the agencies mentioned might be transferred to a corporation, which might be housed within an executive department, set up as an independent executive agency, or established as a commission with direct responsibility to Congress. If the central organization were corporate, operations would be headed by a General Manager or some such officer, and each region would be headed by a regional Manager.

Some Possible Advantages and Disadvantages of Thoroughgoing Decentralization

Decentralization of the sort discussed here should provide an opportunity to improve existing capacity to manage the Federal public lands with regard to the varying requirements and circumstances of different regions. If this kind of decentralization were undertaken, an effort should be made to improve upon the present method of taking account of regional differences, which seems to consist, for the most part, of ignoring them in legislation and silently conferring a good deal of discretion unfettered by law and limited only by the exercise of similarly unfettered discretion by departmental secretaries and by the countervailing influence of other agencies. The writer is not able to offer a specific remedy for the situation, but it would be worth considering whether improvement might not be sought in the direction of making formal delegation of authority in law, accompanied by standards as specific and clear as possible. It has recently been argued with a good deal of persuasiveness that serious difficulties might have been avoided if some of the urban legislation passed since 1964 had provided clear standards instead of delegating unguided discretion, unfettered by law, to local groups and agencies. (Lowi) For similar reasons, in decentralization of public land management, it would not answer simply to transfer discretion unguided by legal standards from existing agencies to the chief of the new land management organization and the heads of the land management regions.

Decentralization should bring the advantages discussed in Chapters I and II in connection with proposals to transfer the Forest Service to Interior and to establish a public land management corporation. It will be recalled that these included facilitation of Federal land use planning, simplification of Federal-state relations in land use planning and management, reduction or elimination of bureaucratically derived diversity in land management policies and practices, and achievement of overhead economies.

All these benefits that could reasonably be expected from thoroughgoing decentralization can probably be subsumed under the probability that elimination of the existing land management agencies and distribution of their powers between the national chief of the land management organization and the regional heads would make it possible for the first time in the history of this country for all the Federal public lands to be managed as regional systems, with regard to ecological relationships rather than bureaucratic jurisdictions. 7/ Freedom to manage Federal public lands as regional systems might lead to new relationships with the states and ultimately to coordination of Federal and private land uses. No one, of course, can be sure where this kind of decentralization, once begun, might lead; but it seems probable, or at least possible, that the direction

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27/ It may be worth re-emphasizing that no amount of transfer of existing agencies from one department to another or to a public land management corporation would permit this kind of ecological management unless the agencies' existing field organizations were also eliminated and their headquarters reduced to technical and advisory functions.

of such decentralization would be toward the kind of new regional organization that many people who are primarily concerned with environmental quality believe must be invented.

The principal danger in thoroughgoing decentralization would probably be a risk that the heads of the land management regions might form alliances with regional interests, especially those deriving economic benefits from public land use, with the result that regional heads would become hard to control in cases in which the national chief might believe that national considerations should override regional ones. It is highly probable that, at the least, there would always be some tension between interests asserted by groups within the region and those outside it.

Another risk might be that regional managers would tend to overemphasize maximization of economic returns from the public lands. This risk would be most serious, probably, if the organizational form were that of a corporation, freed from constraints of the regular budgetary process and charged with management according to criteria of economic efficiency. Perhaps the changes would not be so much that recreational uses of public lands would be slighted as that recreational enterprises like the proposed Disney Mineral King development would tend to be favored in place of a lower order of development, management for more primitive kinds of recreation, or the maintenance of what is called de facto wilderness.

Conclusion

The reorganization discussed in this chapter is more radical than any of those discussed in Chapters II and III. It is possible, however, that it also holds more promise of meeting the more serious problems of Federal public land management, which are not really those of "illogical" organization, intermittent or weak supervision over the Forest Service by the Secretary of Agriculture, or "bureaucratic rivalries." To be sure, these problems are not insignificant, but they do not compare in importance to the inability of any of the agencies, or all of them together, to manage all the Federal lands in a region with regard to all their interrelationships -- economic and political relationships, as well as those of a geological and biological character. Even so extensive a reorganization as that which S 2312 would provide by setting up a

Department of Conservation and the Enviromnent would not, by itself, open the way to true ecological management of all the Federal public lands. Probably, that kind of management will become possible only through something like the kind of decentralizing reorganization discussed in this chapter.

CHAPTER IV

SOME POSSIBLE OBSTACLES TO REORGANIZATION

Any discussion of alternative ways to organize Federal public land management that pretends to be realistic must say something about political and other obstacles that may have to be overcome in the implementation of one or another reorganization plan. Anticipation of difficulties of this sort is a highly speculative enterprise, and almost any prediction is very likely to be wrong. In recognition of this fact, what follows in this chapter is offered with seemly hedges about probability of error, likehood of under or over statement, absence of any claim to omniscience, etc.

The General Case Against Reorganization

There is usually a good deal to be said in favor of leaving an existing organization alone. Reorganization requires those affected by it to learn new ways of doing whatever it is they do, and this relearning involves costs both for those who have to do it and for the organization to which they contribute their services. If the personnel of an organization have developed any marked *esprit de corps*, reorganization risks its destruction and may result in numerous and costly resignations.

Reorganization involves other costs for individuals and groups that benefit from existing arrangements. In respect to land management, Clawson points out that

> . . . the present rules of the game are known to the federal agencies and to the various interest groups, and all prefer the known problems to the unknown ones. The division of labor among the various agencies, and to a lesser extent the division of territory among them, is accepted by all. The present system works at least tolerably well, or better, depending upon your personal viewpoint. Different people will criticize different aspects, but the basis of criticism will differ, and there can hardly be agreement upon a single line of change. (Clawson, 1965)

In any policy area characterized by much controversy, the existing pattern of organizations and jurisdictions represents a political settlement, a sort of equilibrium. The parties to it know how to work the settlement; and the argument can be made that even if they are not doing very well in one or more respects, the situation is bearable and better than other situations that can readily and almost certainly will be imagined.

Anyway, the general argument against reorganization goes on, the certain trouble in the American political system of getting acceptance of major reorganization is greater than the conjectural benefits that may flow from it. Clawson quotes someone as saying that trying to bring about major reorganization in the Federal Government "is like shooting grasshoppers with a machine gun -- the commotion is all out of proportion to the results." (Clawson, 1965)

Transfer of the Forest Service

The considerations mentioned above are general ones that relate to almost any reorganization and not particularly to that of land management. More specific arguments have, however been offered, and will probably be offered again should the occasion arise, against transfer of the Forest Service to Interior or to a successor department.

When the Senate Subcommittee on Executive Reorganization held hearings in 1967 on Senator Moss's bill to create a Department of Natural Resources, Secretary of Agriculture Freeman appeared and testified against the bill. He said that before the forest reserves were given to Agriculture in 1905 and were under the jurisdiction of Interior, they had been treated like mines, a statement scarcely reconcilable with Secretary of the Interior Hitchcock's objection to permitting any commercial exploitation of the reserves. Secretary Freeman referred favorably to Gifford Pinchot and to multiple use and concluded that separation of the Soil Conservation Service and the Forest Service from the other agencies of the Department of Agriculture would divide an important whole, a whole which should be maintained in order to deal with the problems of rural America and check the migration to urban areas.

Except for the argument about maintaining a viable rural America, Secretary Freeman's case for keeping the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture differed little from the one that has been repeated by the Department and the Forest Service ever since it was first stated in President Roosevelt's message to Congress of December 6, 1904, in which he said:

> All of the forest work of the Government should be concentrated in the Department of Agriculture. . . where all problems related to growth from the soil are already gathered and where all the sciences auxiliary to forestry are at hand for prompt and effective cooperation. . . .

In 1936, this argument was expanded into the fullest expression it has ever had in a chapter of a 620 page report the Forest Service made to the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry as part of the campaign against Secretary Ickes' efforts to transfer the Forest Service to Interior. The report, called The Western Range, argued the essential unity of the land management problem. In the west, it said, the public lands are intimately related to agriculture, and management of public lands must take account of the management of private lands and vice versa. Management of the public forest and range lands was "inseparable from /management of/ other lands in developing a national agricultural program," which, according to the report, the Federal Government had an obligation to do.

The report went into some detail to show that in the Department of Agriculture the Forest Service had an important symbiotic relationship to other bureaus of the Department. The report called the roll of these other bureaus, noting some of their functions and observing that "forest and range management is dependent on all these lines of work in addition to the special silvical, biological, economic, and industrial research peculiar to its own field."

The report displayed a chart showing that 13 bureaus of the Department of Agriculture, including the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, performed "technical services in conservation . . . intimately related to the activities connected with the public forests and ranges." The chart showed that only three of the nine bureaus of Interior performed such intimately related services and the conclusion was that management of the public forests and ranges should remain in the Department with the highest number of supporting bureaus.

The report concluded that the proper division of function between Agriculture and Interior was on the basis of organic and inorganic resources, with management of the former properly in Agriculture and of the latter in Interior. (The Western Range, 467-473) 8/

Should new efforts be made to transfer the Forest Service, that agency and the Department of Agriculture are likely to respond with arguments against transfer essentially similar to those made in The Western Range. The arguments will, however, be brought up to date, as Secretary Freeman brought them in his 1967 testimony, by pointing to the fact that under an Assistant Secretary for Rural Development Service, the Farmer Cooperative Service, the Farmers Home Administration, the Rural Electrification Administration, the Soil Conservation Service, and the Forest Service, bureaus which, will be said, it must be kept in the Department of Agriculture in order to wage the fight for a viable rural America.

These arguments and perhaps some others will be the ones advanced publicly; but privately the degree of autonomy the Forest Service enjoys in the Department of Agriculture may weigh more heavily with Forest Service officials than the arguments against transfer that they may make publicly. The Forest Service is the only land management agency in Agriculture; and it is, like the Army Corps of Engineers, in a department containing no other bureaus performing very closely related functions. The freedom the odd agency enjoys in this sort of situation was pointed out nearly 50 years ago by the Budget Committee of New York and, in connection with the Forest Service, more than 20 years ago by the minority of the first Hoover Commission. The Secretary of Agriculture is kept busy with multitude of problems having nothing to do with the Forest Service, with the result that the agency, adept as it is at staying out of

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8/ There is some historical interest in the fact that the section of the report dealing with organization was written by a team under leadership of Clarence L. Forsling, who was then director of the Appalachian Forest Experiment Station but who later became director of Grazing in the Department of the Interior.

trouble, is rather free to write its own ticket, a situation the leaders of any bureaucracy are almost certain to regard as highly desirable.

It is doubtful that the Forest Service could continue to enjoy its present autonomy if it were in the Department of the Interior, a Department of Natural Resources, or a public land management corporation. Reduced autonomy would result simply because the business of such an organization composed of land management bureaus would be land management, which is not the main business of the Department of Agriculture. The head of the organization -- whether Undersecretary for Land Management, Assistant Secretary for Land Management, or General Manager -- would be preoccupied with land management and would give the Forest Service a degree of attention that a Secretary of Agriculture is unlikely to give in a continuing way.

Forest Service officials might also have what might be called an ideological reason for objecting to transfer to Interior. It was no accident that Gifford was a name approximately as common among the children of the first generation of Forest Service officials as Dewey was among children born in 1898 and 1899. The pinchot tradition is probably by no means dead, and it is possible that suspicion of the integrity of Interior might, however unreasonably, still be a factor influencing the Forest Service to resist transfer.

It is not unreasonable to reach the tentative conclusion that the Forest Service and the Department of Agriculture are more likely than not to oppose any effort to transfer the Forest Service out of Agriculture. If the Forest Service and the Department should object to transfer, one can be reasonably sure that they have the capacity for strenuous resistance, even if such resistance might ultimately fail. Secretary Freeman said in his 1967 testimony on the Moss bill that "there are at least four programs in every county in the United States administered by the Department of Agriculture," which, as he may well have intended it to be, is an indication of the Department's ability to mount a campaign against the loss of one of its major bureaus.

The ability of the Department and the Forest Service to resist transfer of the Service might be strengthened by the assistance of a variety of groups inside and outside Congress which have no particular interest in the Forest Service, as such, but do have a great deal of interest in protecting the Corps of Engineers from loss of its civil functions. As Ickes perceived clearly, transfer of the Forest Service to Interior would strengthen the case for a Department of Natural Resources, which, to deserve the name, would have to include the water management functions of the Corps. The Corps and its supporters can reasonably be expected to agree with Ickes and to oppose transfer of the Forest Service.

Much of what can be said about the attitudes supporters of the Corps would probably have toward transfer of the Forest Service can also be said about attitudes of supporters of the Soil Conservation Service, the functions of which under the Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act have been marked by Senator Moss and others for transfer to a Department of Natural Resources. If transfer of the Forest Service to the Department of the Interior would strengthen the case for a Department of Natural Resources, including the civil functions of the Corps, it would simultaneously help the case for transferring Soil Conservation Service functions. Supporters of the Soil Conservation Service could, therefore, be expected to enlist in defense of the retention of the Forest Service in Agriculture. 9/

Transfer of Interior Bureaus to Agriculture

A majority of the first Hoover Commission proposed in 1949 that BLM be moved to the Department of Agriculture, but not since the 1930's has there been any real effort to transfer land management functions out of Interior. As was noted in Chapter I, above, the tendency has been to transfer

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9/ Senator McClellan did not attend the 1967 hearings on the Moss bill, but he had Senator Ribicoff submit a list of questions to Secretary Freeman. The phrasing of the questions strongly suggested that Senator McClellan opposed transfer of the SCS functions.

functions into Interior, rather than out; and it is probable that any attempt to transfer one or more Interior bureaus would meet substantial opposition from all those who want to establish a Department of Natural Resources, a Department of Conservation and the Environment, or something of the sort. An effort to reduce the jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior at this particular time when so many people are concerned about environmental deterioration would almost certainly cause a public response more widespread than an effort to transfer the Forest Service would be likely to evoke. Whether the response and the leadership it would receive from some Senators and Representatives would be enough to defeat an effort to transfer functions out of Interior is hard to say, but it seems unlikely that such an effort would succeed, particularly in view of the fact that considerations of economy in reorganization would argue for transfer of functions into Interior rather than the reverse. In order to consolidate land management functions in Agriculture, it would be necessary to move BLM, the Park Service, and the land management functions of the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife. In order to consolidate land management in Interior, it would be necessary only to transfer the Forest Service.

A Public Land Management Corporation

If an effort were made to establish a public land management corporation in an executive department, the first question would be which department should house it. Presumably, it would be either Agriculture or Interior. Whichever it might be, the proposal would presumably evoke opposition similar to that to be expected from any effort to transfer functions from one department to another, since it is not readily apparent why the Forest Service and its supporters or the Interior bureaus and their supporters would be any happier if the transfers were to be made to a public corporation in another department than they would be if the transfer were to be simply to the department, itself.

One possible alternative to housing a public land management corporation in Agriculture or Interior would be to set it up as an independent executive agency, directly responsible to the President, without any supervisory intermediary. Another possibility would be to establish an independent commission, with corporation-like characteristics, directly responsible to Congress and without any formal responsibility to the President. Except for the Bureau of the Budget, those concerned would probably have about the same attitudes to one alternative as to the other; so, for the most part, the two alternatives are discussed below as though they were the same.

The Secretary of Agriculture would probably oppose losing the Forest Service, but if the President were persuaded to favor an independent corporation, he could probably control the Secretary. The Forest Service would be another matter because it would not be so readily subject to Presidential control of its lobbying. The Forest Service, however, might not oppose transfer to a corporation as much as it would oppose transfer to Interior. It might see itself as the inheritor of the Bureau of Land Management; and its ideological opposition to transfer to Interior, if any of that remains, would be irrelevant to transfer to an independent agency. On the other hand, the Forest Service could not expect to enjoy as much autonomy in an independent agency as it has in the Department of Agriculture. The Corps of Engineers, the Soil Conservation Service, and their supporters might be less inclined to oppose transfer of the Forest Service to an independent agency than its transfer to Interior, since an independent public land management corporation could plausibly be seen as a step away from a Department of Natural Resources or Conservation.

What about the Interior agencies? No one has tried very hard to move the Bureau of Land Management, the Park Service, and the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife out of Interior; so there is no record like that of the attempts to transfer the Forest Service upon which to base a judgment. But it can probably be assumed that the Park Service favors establishment of more parks and other areas under its jurisdiction, most of the land for which would have to be acquired from the Forest Service or by purchase. It is just possible that the Park Service leadership might think its chances for land acquisition from these sources would be better than they are now if it were in an independent land management corporation along with the Forest Service and with the opportunity to draw on the corporation's revenues from oil and gas leases. On the other hand, such possible advantages might seem to be outweighed by the dangers of getting into a position where somebody would insist on assigning monetary values to Park Service activities and including them in some kind of balance sheet.

What is a good deal more certain than speculation about the attitudes of Park Service officials toward transfer to an independent public land corporation is that Park Service supporters in the conservation organizations would oppose transfer of the agency to an independent corporation on the ground that the transfer (as well as the transfer of the other two Interior agencies) would handicap the effort to create a Department of Conservation. They would also fear that if the Park Service were in a corporate agency, it would lose out because the corporation's leaders would tend to emphasize management of revenue producing lands. And conservationists would have a similar worry about the kind of management a corporation would provide for Forest Service and BLM lands that lack commercial importance.

The Bureau of Land Management might oppose transfer on the ground that the Forest Service would swallow it. On the other hand, a good many BLM personnel might welcome what would probably be, in effect, a transfer to the Forest Service. One might expect stockmen using BLM lands to oppose transfer on the ground that they now have more influence on BLM policies and actions than they would have upon those of a new organization combining BLM and the Forest Service, the clientele of which would approach national proportions.

The wildlife organizations would probably oppose transfer of BSFW, partly because they would expect its effectiveness to be diminished if game refuge management were separated from other Bureau activities, partly because they would fear a commercial orientation on the part of the corporation, and partly because the transfer would be a movement away from a Department of Conservation. A small number of stockmen would probably favor transferring game refuge management to a public land corporation on the ground that a corporation would probably be more hospitable to grazing on the refuges than the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife is.

The Budget Bureau would probably oppose establishment of a public land management corporation as an independent agency on the ground that it would be a step away from integration and would add to the already too heavy coordinative burden of the Executive Office. The Bureau's opposition to a corporation set up as an independent executive agency would, however, almost certainly be much less than its opposition to an independent public land management commission, directly responsible to Congress. Ever since the Report of the President's Committee on Administrative management criticized the independent regulatory commissions and called them "a headless fourth branch of government," it has been orthodox to deprecate independent commissions even more than independent agencies reporting directly to the President.

In the past, this hostility to independent commissions has been part of the Bureau's ideology, and there is no reason to think that the Bureau has changed in this respect. In the case of an independent public land management commission reporting directly to Congress, the ideology would reinforce the Bureau's self-interest in maintaining the land management bureaus as executive agencies.

The significance of Budget Bureau opposition is that establishment of a public land management corporation either as an independent executive agency or as an independent commission would require Presidential support, or at least Presidential acquiescence. Public land management reorganization of this sort would not, however, be very central to the concerns of a contemporary President; and the views of the Budget Bureau and its recommendations to the President would, therefore, probably count for a good deal.

Regional Land Management Organization

If an effort were made to implement the highly decentralized reorganization discussed in Chapter III, it would probably meet opposition more formidable than any other reorganization scheme would meet. There would be the various sources of opposition discussed above to putting the bulk of Federal land management in a single organization, whether the Department of the Interior, a Department of Natural Resources or Conservation, or a public land management corporation of some kind. Then, since the Federal land management regions would be unlikely to succeed unless BLM, the

Forest Service, and the Park Service were stripped of land management authority, there would be opposition stemming from the basic bureaucratic "instinct" of organizational self-preservation. More than any other readily conceivable form of reorganization, decentralization of land management to land management regions would be a venture into the unknown; and interest groups reasonably satisfied with existing arrangements might be expected to oppose such a reorganization even more vigorously than they would oppose a mere shift in the departmental locus of the bureau in which they were interested. In short, the opponents to a decentralization that would involve stripping the existing agencies of their land management functions ought to be able to mount a very formidable campaign.

Where might support for this sort of reorganization come from? It is not impossible that stockmen and the timber products industry would favor it in the belief that they could exert more influence upon regional managers than they can upon the Washington offices of the Forest Service and BLM, in particular. If there seemed to be assurance that the national head of the land management organization would be able to assert the national interest, it is possible that a variety of people who are persuaded of the importance of ecological land management might support a regional management scheme. And it is possible that the field staffs of the existing land management agencies might be less opposed than the headquarters officials, whether or not the field staffs would give significant positive support.

Estimation of the opposition and support that might be evoked by an effort to decentralize land management warrants even more hedging than the similar efforts above to predict opposition to other organizational alternatives. As far as this writer knows, nothing like the kind of reorganization discussed in Chapter III has ever been publicly proposed, much less seriously pushed; and there is, therefore, no record upon which to base a judgment about the reactions of those who would be concerned. It seems probable, however, that if it were attempted at the same time to consolidate the bulk of Federal public land management in a single organization and also to decentralize it, the effort would probably fail in the face of massive opposition. But there is the possibility that if a serious attempt, with the agreement of the Executive Office, were made to transfer the Forest Service to the Department of the Interior or a Department of Conservation or Natural Resources, it might succeed. There is, after all, some support for this sort of reorganization, and that support is likely to grow as more and more people become aware of an environmental crisis. If the public land management agencies could be grouped in a departmental subdivision, then it might be possible later to move on to decentralization.

Controversy over Reorganization Regarded as a Cost

Frank Smith, who was a Member of Congress and is now a Director of TVA, regards the high intensity of the political conflict that he believes would be provoked by a serious attempt at major reorganization as an argument against undertaking it. He says,

> National planning and national action are the only answers to most of the /conservation/ problems ahead. Ideally, the old concept of one single department of conservation and resource development, responsible for all federal planning and action in the field, might still work if it could be achieved by waving a magic wand. It simply cannot be achieved, however, without a bloody, bone-shattering fight, which would leave the landscape so scarred that the conservation cause would be lost in the critical years immediately ahead. (Smith, 306)

Clawson seems to agree and says that the vision of carrying out major land management reorganization is like a mirage.

> Mirages can bedevil or trap the unwary, who do not understand them. In my judgment it would be most unfortunate if any conservation group should make much of an issue over federal agency reorganization. A lot of time, energy, and goodwill could be directed toward a cause that probably could not win and that would probably produce little gain it if did succeed. (Clawson, 1965)

Arguments like these are important, not because they are necessarily correct in their assertions about what would happen if a serious attempt at reorganization were made, but because they provide those who are not anxious to disturb the status quo with the comfortable feeling that their inactivity is an exercise of statesmanship. A contemporary President, who is certain to have on his mind many matters more important than land management reorganization, is likely to take the position that engaging in serious effort to reorganize would provoke so much ill-feeling that it might impair his ability to achieve other legislative goals that are more important. The Bureau of the Budget, although some staff members may be persuaded of the importance of reorganization, is likely to be so beset by other and unavoidable problems that arguments like Smith's and Clawson's may be accepted as embodiments of the highest political wisdom.

If the controversy that would be provoked by an effort to transfer the Forest Service to the Department of the Interior or to carry out any of the other kinds of reorganization discussed above were to turn out to be as severe as Smith and Clawson think it would be, then it is not unreasonable to regard such controversy as a cost in the sense that the energy and obligations expended in the effort to implement reorganization could not be used for other purposes and that hostilities might be provoked that would prevent achievement of other goals. This is the kind of view that a substantial number of people accept, although they are aware, at the same time, that not all is as it should be in Federal public land management. They would welcome some solution that would enable them to avoid controversy and also to improve Federal land management. It is worthwhile, therefore, to ask whether some such course of action is not possible, and it is to that question that the next chapter addresses itself.

CHAPTER V

SOME POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO REORGANIZATION

This chapter discusses some possible alternatives to reorganization that might provide some of reorganization's benefits without having to pay its costs. The approaches discussed here have in common the characteristic that they leave the existing land management agencies as they are but propose the performance by either a new or an existing organization of analytical and/or planning functions that might help to guide and coordinate Federal public land management.

A Federal Land Review Board

One possible substitute for reorganization was suggested by Clawson and Held in 1957 in their book, The Federal Lands. Their preferred form of organization was a Federal public land management corporation, but they foresaw such serious political obstacles to the establishment of a corporation that they sought an alternative that might provide some of the benefits they saw in a corporation without actually setting one up. They called their alternative a "federal land review board," which, they said,

> would gather facts about federal land management from the federal land agencies directly, but also from other federal and state sources, and in some instances perhaps even from members of the general public. . . It would try to persuade the various agencies to keep their records and tabulate their data in ways that would be most revealing for economic analysis. The cooperation of the Bureau of the Budget and of the Congressional committees would be needed in this endeavor. Great emphasis would be placed on uniform methods between agencies so as to permit consolidated statements for all federal lands. . . It would probably. . . be desirable to think in terms of comparable analyses for each state, or at least for the states with relatively large areas of federal land. The authors hazard the guess that the board would find it more difficult to make this type of analysis for any state than for the nation as a whole -- the differences in agency records would become more

> bothersome at the local level. . . . The board might also undertake the study of various special problems, on its own initiative, or they might be referred to it by the agencies themselves, by the President or one of his staff agencies, by the Congress through one of its committees, or even by an interest group or the general public. Almost any type of land management problem might be studied. . . but one major focus of the various studies would be the economic one, with particular emphasis upon the economic margin -- what would be the effect upon revenues and costs of any particular program, method, or procedure? The board would need a substantial degree of freedom to decide for itself what studies to undertake, how to carry them out, and what presentation of the results to make.
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> A useful device of the board would be the federal land fund. This would be a mere accounting fund, not an operating one. It would include on the one side all of the revenues collected by the federal land managing agencies. . . and on the other side it would list all the expenditures out of revenues, including payments to states, counties, and the Reclamation Fund, and also all expenditures on the federal lands, from whatever source. If the agencies could provide it with adequate data, the board might well include in the fund an allowance for changes in the value of federal land, including timber and minerals. Consideration should also be given to the amount of investment in federal lands, and to the interest charges on such investment. The fund would thus in time become a financial balance sheet for the federal lands, in total and for each type, in the sense that the best private business firms prepare financial balance sheets. An analysis of changes in revenues and expenditures, and of the factors underlying the changes would be a most useful tool for the board to employ in studying and dramatizing the land management problems. The board would surely wish on occasion to make projections or forecasts of future revenue, under most probable conditions or on the basis of specified assumptions.

Since the board would have no direct administrative powers its influence would depend very largely upon the competence and relevance of its analyses. It could not command, but it might lead. It would give wide circulation to its findings in most cases, although on occasion it might direct its reports only to one or more of the agencies concerned. The board would be authorized to recommend on such matters as appropriate level of budgets, appropriate level of fees and charges, and the like; but the major emphasis would be upon letting the facts speak for themselves. The fund would probably become the central core of its analysis, even though it was purely a bookkeeping device. Every major administrative or legislative policy would have its effect upon the fund, and analysis of this effect would be a useful means of emphasizing the importance of the various programs and policies.

If a permanent federal land review board were established, how should it be organized and to what part of the federal governmental structure should it be attached? Why should it be a board, rather than a regular division or branch of an established agency? To these and other questions, various alternative answers are possible. If it were part of the Executive Branch, it rather clearly could not be a part of a federal land managing bureau, or even of one of the two major federal departments with land management functions. Since these are the major objects to be studied by the board, objective study from a new viewpoint would then be unobtainable, in addition to which the present division of activities between several bureaus and two departments would create impossible difficultires if one were given power to study and report on the others. The board might be attached to the Bureau of the Budget, but, after all, Budget's actions in the land management field should also be subjected to objective scrutiny.

It is possible that the board might be attached to the Congress. Some might even argue that its functions could be taken over by a regular committee and its staff. However, a Congressional committee is not a study group in the sense that this board is expected to be. Moreover, the board should be in a position to criticize Congressional action and to propose

> changes. There is no obvious place where such a board might be attached to the Congress.
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> A third alternative would be to make the board largely independent, with members from various sources -- some named by the President, perhaps including some from the Executive Branch but at least some from the public, and perhaps some named by the Congress. There might even be provision for direct nomination of members by some of the major interest groups. The precise make-up of the board might not be too significant, as long as its freedom to ascertain and publicize facts was not impaired. A board of diverse interests might have many advantages.
>
> In any case, a board would function through its full-time staff, and the competence and creativeness of that staff would largely determine the results and public acceptance of the board. It would not be necessary to have a large staff. The board's independence, and hence possibly its effectiveness, would perhaps be enhanced if it received its funds in some automatic fashion -- possibly one-tenth of one per cent of gross revenues from federal land, or in some other more or less automatic fashion. In this way, the board would have assured funds and a chance to see what it could do. . . . (Clawson and Held, 376-78)

The General Accounting Office

Clawson and Held did not mention the possibility of assigning the continuing analysis of Federal public land management to the General Accounting Office. Whether the GAO could be expected to perform such a function satisfactorily or whether its entrance into land management analysis would make more trouble for the managing agencies than the benefits would justify is a question that should be examined without prejudice and without relying for an answer upon the orthodox stereotype descending from the report of the President's Committee on Administrative Management and The Controller General, the supporting study that Harvey Mansfield wrote for the Committee. There have been some changes in the General Accounting Office since Controller General McCarl presided there, and it might be worth considering whether the Office could not make a worthwhile analytical contribution to Federal public land management. The functions Clawson and Held suggest for their Federal land review board are not totally dissimilar from the GAO's work in accounting and financial reporting, and the office also does special studies. Since the GAO is not part of the executive branch, it is free to criticize executive agencies, and often does so. It is not, however, in a position to criticize Congress, as Clawson and Held think the Federal land review board should be; but this is not a difficulty that need detain anybody, since no government agency is in a position to criticize Congress. Any government agency, however, including the GAO, can make recommendations to Congress and recommendations rather than criticism, are what is needed, anyway.

The Water Resources Council

If it were thought that functions similar to those Clawson and Held suggest for the Federal land review board were worth performing, an alternative might be to assign them to the Water Resources Council. The Council now has a somewhat analagous responsibility for studying and making assessments of the adequacy of regional and national water supplies, and one of its interagency work groups has been developing a data-gathering and analysis system for the purpose of making the assessments. The Water Resources Planning Act of 1965 might be amended to direct the Council to prepare and keep up to date the sort of Federal land balance sheet Clawson and Held recommend, to undertake studies of Federal land management, and to include public land management plans as part of the comprehensive river basin plans the Act directs the Council to oversee. The name of the Council might even be changed to the Water and Land Resources Council.

Alternatively, the Water Resources Planning Act might be interpreted as already giving the Council authority to perform such functions. Such an interpretation would apparently require a rather broad definition of "related land resources," a term the Act repeatedly uses without defining it. Theodore Schad and Elizabeth Boswell in their History of the Implementation of the Recommendations of the Senate Select Committee on Water Resources say that S.1111, a predecessor of the Water Resources Planning Act considered by Congress in 1963,

> used the phrase "water and related land resources" in its title and at numerous other places through the bill to indicate the broad approach to comprehensive planning. However, in several instances, the draft bill used "water resources" as a shorter form. Interior recommended that the "water and related land resources" phrase should be used throughout to avoid the appearance of an unintentioned distinction. The suggestion was accepted in Public Law 89-80.(Schad & Boswell, 33)

The Council seems to define "related land resources" in a broad way. In its first national assessment of the adequacy of water supplies, it says:

> Management of water and related land encompasses the management of water supply, distribution, and use; water quality and health aspects; floods and flood plains; watersheds and watercourses; and beaches and shores. The factors. . . are closely interrelated. . . and all must be considered in comprehensive water resources development and management programs.(Water Resources Council, 1-17)

The first assessment, called The Nation's Water Resources, contains four chapters dealing with land, which include data on Federal public lands and contain no suggestion that the Council really excludes any land from the category of "related land resources." Indeed, given the facts of the hydrologic cycle, it is hard to see how any land could be excluded on the ground that it was not related in any way to the condition or management of water resources. A brief review of the legislative history of the Water Resources Planning Act does not, however, reveal evidence that Congress was thinking in such broad terms.

The fact that the Water Resources Council is a going organization already engaged in work somewhat similar to that visualized by Clawson and Held for the land review board is a point in favor of enlarging its responsibilities to include functions such as maintenance of a land management balance sheet. The Water Resources Council, however, does not meet Clawson and Held's criterion that it be independent of the land management agencies and the Bureau of the Budget. The Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior are members of the Council, along with the Secretaries of the Army, HEW, and Transportation and the Chairman of the Federal Power Commission. The Director of the Bureau of the Budget is not a regular member but has the status of "observer." Under the Act, the President can designate any of the members as chairman, but both President Johnson and President Nixon appointed the Secretary of the Interior to serve in that capacity.

As these facts show, the Council, although an "independent agency" outside the departmental structure, is not independent in the sense that Clawson and Held argue it should be. This difficulty, however, may not be very serious. The two Secretaries with the major responsibilities for land management are a minority of the Council. The Executive Director, who heads the Council's permanent staff, is appointed by the Council and is responsible to all the members, although it is true that he has more relationships with the Chairman than with the other members. The Council's rules provide that the staff shall reflect

> . . .Spread and balance of training and experience in the several relevant professions -- engineering, economics, hydrology, forestry, law, political science, landscape architecture, recreation, soil conservation, irrigation, urban and other land planning, fish and wildlife, biology, etc.
>
> . . .Diversity of prior Federal agency identification and experience, both planning and operating and in Washington and in the field.
>
> . . .Inclusion of personnel with prior identification and experience largely with States or local government or private enterprise and university teaching and research.

The first Executive Director came to the Council from the Office of the Secretary of the Interior. The Acting Executive Director is an engineer who was with the Corps for many years. The Assistant Director for Planning had long experience in the Economic Research Service of the Department of Agriculture. The first Assistant Director for Policy came from the private practice of law, although he had at one time been in the Department of Agriculture. The Assistant Director for State Grants is a forester, with experience in the Forest Service and as Conservation Director for the State of New York. The rest of the staff of 24 have a similarly varied background.

The Council adopted its personnel policy because it seemed important that the water resources agencies, whose suspicions of each other sometimes make the mutual suspicions of the land management agencies look like loving confidence, be given some assurance that the Council staff would not become the preserve of any one of them. The policy has worked out as expected, apparently, and there is no sign that the WRC staff regard themselves as anything but employees of the WRC.

The Water Resources Council staff may be neutral as between the management agencies, but that does not mean that it is independent of the Bureau of the Budget. The Director of the Bureau is an observer on the Council, but what is more important is that a representative of the Bureau participates in many of the Council's committees and working groups. Limited observation suggests that the views of the Budget Bureau representative do not necessarily prevail; but it is probable that the Bureau does participate more in Council affairs than in those of most agencies. This participation is, of course, in addition to the influence the Bureau exerts through its review of Council estimates.

Clawson and Held want their land review board to be independent because they want it to be free to give publicity to facts about public land management that one or another of the land management agencies, the Bureau of the Budget, and/or a Congressional committee might want to keep confidential. It is fairly clear that the Water Resources Council is not now able to perform any such functions in respect to water resources development, but there are some differences between water resources development and public land management. Water resources development is carried out through projects, proposals for which are supported by cost-benefit analyses. The cream of such projects has been skimmed, and it is getting increasingly difficult to find new ones that can be justified without underestimating costs and loading the benefit side of the analysis with questionable figures. One result of this has been that the water resources agencies have been hostile to any well-staffed, independent, and public appraisal of the project justifications; and the Water Resources Council is not in a position to make such a review. But this inability does not necessarily mean that the Council would not be able to perform the balance-sheet kind of analysis of public land management that Clawson and Held advocate. Compared to water resources development, public land management is an area of relatively low temperature. Land management agency jurisdictions are rather stable, and management does not proceed upon the basis of large-scale discrete projects that independent review may show to be what Herbert Hoover called "harebrained."

Although the Water Resources Council would certainly be circumspect in publicly criticizing land management actions of agencies under supervision of Council members, it should be able to prepare something like Clawson and Held's balance sheet without great political difficulty. It could work toward uniformity in agency information systems, and it could study special land management problems on its own initiative or as they were referred to it. What the Water Resources Council probably would not be able to do that a completely independent land review board might be able to do would be to make public recommendations about levels of appropriations. (It could, however, make its views known to the BOB.) Nor could it publish information in such a way that it would seem to be taking sides in controversial public land use questions such as the proposed Disney development of Mineral King.

The Water Resources Council has been criticized as being "just another interagency committee." Those who make the criticism usually want to see some central coordinator set up in the water resources field with authority to give orders to the agencies and with the ability to get them obeyed. Clearly the Council is not such a coordinator if, indeed, one is possible in this political system. But the Council's interagency character might be an asset in performing much more modest functions in respect to public land management. The Council's apparatus comprises a number of interagency committees of a continuing character and a number of ad hoc work groups. These committees and work groups provide a structure within which staff members from the agencies can interact, and the frequency of this interaction is surely higher now than it has ever been before. Anyone who has had experience with interagency committees knows that it is often a task of the greatest difficulty to get them to do anything at all. But despite this, interagency committees are as much of a necessity in very large-scale organizations as money is. If the Water Resources Council were explicitly given responsibilities in relation to public land management, its apparatus could be expected to facilitate relationships between the land management agencies; and participation by the land management agencies in the committees and work groups containing representatives of water resources agencies might result in the land management agencies' being less often surprised than the PLLRC planning study says they are now by water resources development projects involving their lands.

The River Basin Commissions

Another possible advantage in charging the Water Resources Council with review and coordinating functions in Federal public land management is that the river basin commissions authorized by the Water Resources Planning Act might be utilized, not only in Federal public land use planning, but also in linking the planning for Federal lands with planning for other lands, both non-Federal and private.

The Water Resources Planning Act authorizes the President to establish a river basin commission for any river basin or group of basins, provided the Water Resources Council and at least half the states involved concur. (For the Upper Colorado and Columbia Basins, three-fourths of the states must concur.) A river basin commission consists of a chairman appointed by the President, a representative from each Federal department or independent agency which the President determines to have a substantial interest in the work of the commission, and a representative from each state involved. Each commission has its own professional staff under the direction of the commission chairman.

The Act gives the river basin commission two principal duties: one is to coordinate all governmental and private plans for the use of water and related land resources of the area under its jurisdiction, and the other is to "prepare and keep up to date. . . a comprehensive, coordinated, joint plan for Federal, State, interstate, local and nongovernmental development of water and related resources" in its area. The Act says that this plan is to include "an evaluation of all reasonable alternative means of achieving optimum development of water and related land resources of the basin or basins."

Because of the delicacy of state and Federal relations in the water resources field, the Water Resources Planning Act specifies a procedure that makes the river basin commission an organization that in one way resembles a Congressional conference committee. The Act directs the state representatives on a commission to select a vice-chairman from among their number. He then "coordinates" the state representatives and "represent/s/ the State governments in Federal-State relations on the commission." The chairman "coordinates" the Federal members and similarly represents the Federal Government. In other words, the state representatives, on the one hand, and the Federal representatives, on the other, are to agree separately among themselves and then come to agreement with each other. There may be voting of a sort within each of the two groups of representatives, but just as in the congressional conference committee, nothing is to be decided by majority vote of all the members of the commission.

To avoid deadlock, the Act gives the chairman, after consultation with the vice-chairman, authority to make decisions about times and places of meeting, due-dates for reports, and "other procedural matters," a term left undefined. The Act guarantees each commission member an opportunity to present his individual views and have them recorded, and, as noted above, it directs the commission to include in its comprehensive plan an evaluation of all the reasonable alternatives.

So far, only four commissions have been set up. These are Commissions for the Pacific Northwest River Basins, the Souris-Red-Rainy Basins, the Great Lakes Basin, and the New England River Basins. According to Henry Caulfield, the first Executive Director of the Water Resources Council, some of the governors of states in the Missouri River basin and in the Ohio have asked for the establishment of commissions, "but the number of requests or concurrences so far, in each case, is insufficient for establishment." Caulfield says there have also been discussions of the possibility of setting up a Pacific Southwest River Basins Commission, "but no official proposal. . . has yet been made. Also certain states in the Upper Mississippi River region are actively considering a possible commission as are certain others in the Southeast region." (Caulfield)

The Council's policy has been to get the unanimous consent of the states involved before setting up a commission; and this is not always easy to do, partly, probably, because many state officials are suspicious of Federal and other state officials and partly because participation in a river basin commission costs a state something, even though the Federal Government bears half of the expenses of each commission, and the Water Resources Council runs a matching state grant program to help states increase their planning capacity.

The Council has never said that it intended to set up a river basin commission for every major basin or related group of basins in the country. In various speeches, Caulfield has said that where adequate planning arrangements are already in existence, there would be no thought of setting up a river basin commission under the Act. The Delaware is an obvious example of a basin where no Water Resources Planning Act commission would be set up, and so is the Tennessee. It is less clear what the Council intends in respect to the Arkansas-White-Red and other basins and regions where the Corps of Engineers has been coordinating and providing technical assistance for broad "framework" studies and the more specific "Type 2" comprehensive studies of smaller areas.

Where there are Federal public lands within the areas under their jurisdiction, river basin commissions and the various ad hoc interagency coordinating committees will probably include them as part of the "related land resources" for which they plan. This was done, for instance, in a Type 2 study of the White River Basin that was coordinated by the Corps and recently reviewed and released by the Water Resources Council, several recommendations of which relate to uses of national forest and national wildlife refuge lands. The inclusion of Federal public lands in comprehensive river basin plans for water and related land resources would, however, be more certain as against possible foot-dragging by the Federal management agencies if the Council were specifically charged with the performance of analytic and coordinative functions in public land management analagous to the functions it is supposed to perform in respect to water resources and if steps were also taken to set up river basin commissions for the Arkansas-White-Red, the Missouri, the Upper Colorado, and the Pacific Southwest. If all that were done, there would then be in existence Federal-state regional planning organizations covering the contiguous states in which the bulk of the Federal public lands lie; and these organizations would have authority to take account of the uses of all lands, private lands as well as Federal and other public lands.

The fact that only one river basin commission, the Pacific Northwest, has been set up in the public land states suggests that at least some of them are cool toward the idea. Water politics is a lively and Byzantine art in some of the western states, and those involved in it tend to be suspicious of other states and of the Federal Government. Although these attitudes are not favorable to establishment of river basin commissions, those who hold them might become more enthusiastic if the Council and the commissions were given explicit responsibility for including Federal public lands in their planning. If that were done, the states would begin to play a formal role in Federal public land use planning, where they are now restricted to consultation, and even that, only at the discretion of the Federal management agencies.

The Bureau of Outdoor Recreation

The Bureau of Outdoor Recreation in the Interior Department has responsibilities in outdoor recreation somewhat similar to those of the Water Resources Council in water resources management. The Bureau is supposed to promote coordination in outdoor recreation among Federal, state, and local agencies, which it tries to do partly through long-range nationwide planning and through special studies, such as the wild rivers and national trails studies and studies of particular areas, such as the Allagash and New York Harbor. The Bureau was also intended to exert a coordinate effect at the Federal level by providing staff services for the interdepartmental Recreation Advisory Council and its successor, the President's Council on Recreation and Natural Beauty. In addition, the Bureau provides services for *ad hoc* groups such as the joint Agriculture-Interior North Cascades Study Team, of which the Director of the Bureau also served as chairman.

The Bureau's position is anomalous in that it is a unit within the Department of the Interior, responsible to the Secretary, and is, at the same time, charged with responsibility for exerting a coordinative influence upon agencies outside the Department that are to some extent competitors with Interior agencies. These agencies outside Interior include the Corps, the Forest Service, and the Land and Facilities Administration of the Department of Housing and Urban Development. It may be that the Bureau's position in a "claimant" department is no worse than a violation of "administrative logic," but, at the least, that location must impart a degree of delicacy to the Bureau's relationships with agencies in other departments that those relationships might not have if the Bureau were housed some place other than Interior.

If the reservoir recreation program of the Corps and the land management functions of the Forest Service are to remain for the indefinite future outside the Department of the Interior or some successor department, perhaps consideration should be given to the desirability of transferring the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation to a location which would not give rise to suspicion that it represented any management agencies. It might seem like pinning a horse to a tail to transfer BOR, with some 500 employees, to the very much smaller Water Resources Council organization; but something might be said for such a transfer, nevertheless. Both agencies have a responsibility to facilitate coordination of Federal resources management. Both have a responsibility to improve state planning capability, and both administer grant-in-aid programs that are entirely (in the case of the WRC) or partly (in the case of BOR) intended to promote state planning efforts. And, finally, both BOR and the WRC have a concern with the use of lands in non-Federal public and private ownership.

On the other hand, it might be argued that transfer of BOR from the Department of the Interior would be retrograde. BOR was established in Interior in the first place, not because the Department at that time was the most important Federal provider of outdoor recreation but partly because it was expected that sooner or later it would become so through transfer to Interior of outdoor recreational activities that in 1962 were carried on by agencies in other departments. If BOR were to be transferred cut of Interior, that would lessen the prospects of establishing a Department of Natural Resources or of Conservation and would reflect an implicit decision by Congress that no such department was in the cards.

On the whole, it would probably make the better sense to continue to accept the fact that the presence of BOR in Interior is an anomaly and to leave the Bureau where it is in anticipation of the possibility that some day agencies of Interior or a successor department will provide most of the outdoor recreational services furnished by the Federal Government.

Summary

Clawson and Held make a reasonable case for some sort of public land management review agency, with responsibility for maintaining a public land management account of some kind. The job Clawson and Held visualize might be done by the General Accounting Office or by the Water Resources Council. If the Water Resources Council were charged with such responsibilities, one effect might be to strengthen the Council by giving it functions easier to discharge creditably than the analagous functions it is now supposed to perform in the water resources area. If the Council were explicitly given review and planning functions in respect to Federal public land management, and if additional river basin commissions could be established to cover the states where most of the Federal public lands are situated, the country's capability for ecological land-use planning and management ought to be considerably enhanced. In short, vesting the Council and the river basin commissions with coordinative responsibilities for Federal public lands might be a way of buying at relatively low cost some of the benefits to be expected from major reorganization and perhaps also some other benefits,particularly in relating uses of public and private lands, that none of the reorganization schemes discussed in earlier chapters would necessarily provide.

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A P P E N D I X

B

THE USE OF ADVISORY BODIES IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE PUBLIC LANDS

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USE OF ADVISORY BODIES

Introduction

Political Scientists estimate that there are 500,000 to 800,000 elective offices in the United States, a plausible estimate considering that there are over 80,000 separate units of government, each with its own elected governing body. This widespread use of the elective concept is apparently inadequate to secure popular participation, approval and support for government policies, hence the appointment of what probably numbers several million citizens to various boards, commissions and councils. Some of these are actual decision-making and administrative bodies. But hundreds of thousands if not millions of Americans are also formally appointed to serve on *advisory* bodies to counsel both legislatures and administrative agencies.

The distinction between *advisory* boards and commissions and those which directly *make* and *take responsibility* for public policy decisions is not easily made. It is not to be found in the fact that that board is composed of private citizens who receive no compensation for their services. Indeed, some "advisors" are public officials with basic duties other than serving on an advisory board. Thousands of school boards and selective service boards share this characteristic of noncompensated service but actually make and carry out public policy. Planning and zoning commissions often are in the same category, and although their "decisions" may be frequently overridden by city councils, this does not mean they are basically "advisory" in nature.

Nor is the distinction to be found in the legal basis establishing the advisory body. This can vary from a specific legislative authorization to a formal executive or departmental order to a personal request from an administrator or legislator for advice from a select number of citizens.

Whatever their unique characteristics, the proliferation of these bodies may rest on several theoretical bases:

A. A first category may relate to the concept of representation.

1. The electorate itself may have a desire to supplement the fundamentally geographic basis of electing Senators, Congressmen, state legislators and members of county, city and district governing bodies. In America the voter generally must be officially represented according to where he sleeps, not where he works, studies or has special interests. A resident of New York City is as much a citizen-owner of the O & C lands in Oregon as is a resident of Coos Bay, Oregon. But the New Yorker, if he is a stockholder or employee of a lumber company heavily dependent on the sale of timber on "O & C" lands may even have a far more intensive interest in these public lands than a Coos Bay resident who happens to work for a fishing fleet operating out of Coos Bay. Since registration for voting is according to where one sleeps, this tends to mute the direct representation of basic economic and social interests. Advisory bodies have been created to

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provide a way of more formally recognizing the existence of these differences and of providing a form of "functional" representation. Viewed in this perspective advisory bodies have been described as an expansion of the democratic system:

> "The advisory committee provides a means of introducing the opinion of the governed at a highly strategic point. It is a device for encouraging democracy in administration. At the same time it aids officials in carrying their heavy burdens by offering counsel and criticism."[1]

2. This leads to a second aspect, the desire of the administrator to have an additional direct formal connection with the public complementing the representative role of the elected executive. From this perspective, the advisory body is a third channel from the public to the responsible administrator who realizes that the Congressional delegations and the elected executive have many different policy concerns competing for his attention and can devote only a very limited time to any one agency. Thus the initiative for citizen participation in this circumstance comes from the agency possibly prompted by a variety of motivations. As Herring observed, "The advisory board can guide the bureau chief along the lines of maximum usefulness and incidentally can support him when Congress threatens to cut appropriations."[2]

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[1] Pendleton Herring, Public Administration and the Public Interest (New York, 1936), p. 349.

[2] Herring, p. 352.

Professor Charles McKinley notes that:

> "...the principal justification for the use of formally constituted advisory groups by public administrators is the need to provide them with a forum broadly enough constituted to offset the ex parte presentations and pressures of a few powerful self-constituted special interest 'advisors'."[1]

B. A second objective may be the improved administration of public policy.

1. Advisory bodies can provide additional technical expertise from private sources which can at little or no direct cost expand administrative capabilities. This can serve "to concentrate the technical knowledge and insights of public and private professional people...or in the use of alternative technical attacks upon administrative problems."[2]
2. Public compliance with and support for agency policy is more likely when the public knows of and understands these policies as they exist and changes that are contemplated.
3. The dynamics of public policy administration require constant feedback from clientele groups in particular and the public in general. In this context advisory bodies can serve as a safety valve and/or lightning rod to minimize friction by providing opportunities for timely responses from the several concerned publics. "Advisory bodies have served to deflect from the shoulders of officials the full impact of disagreement among outsiders on the interpretation of the law."[3]

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1. Charles McKinley, The Management of Land and Related Water Resources in Oregon, Resources for the Future, p. 549.

2. McKinley, p. 547.

3. Herring, op cit., p. 356.

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Some dangers inhere in the widespread use of advisory bodies. Possible misuses include:

1. Institutionalizing special privilege by providing unequal access to information, advance knowledge of new policies and personal contacts which might intentionally or unintentionally result in preferred treatment. Professor David S. Brown has noted this danger by listing it as the first of six major criticisms by advisory boards. "They are often self-serving, sometimes to the point of conflict of interest."[1] This also has been a particular concern of Marion Clawson, former Director of the Bureau of Land Management who suggests:

   > "First of all, no advisory board or member thereof should be asked to advise in cases where his decision or recommendation as board member affects or may affect his financial or other interest as an individual."[2]

2. There may develop a confusion of responsibility by both the private citizens on the advisory bodies and the public administrators which could result in private decision-making with no public accountability. Advisory bodies may tend to forget that they are "advisory" only and to whom they should direct their "advice".

3. Advisory bodies may create the illusion of representation when in fact they will always be incomplete in their composition because of changes which cannot be foreseen,

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[1] David S. Brown, "Advice or Consent?", George Washington University Magazine, Summer, 1967.

[2] Marion Clawson, Uncle Sam's Acres, (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1951), p. 372.

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interests which cannot always be identified and the finite limits on the size of any such body. McKinley warns:

> "A balance must be struck which includes spokesmen for long-range as well as short-range goals, and spokesmen who express cogently the diffused and indirect public interest in program choices..."[1]

There have been hundreds of these citizen boards appointed to advise the federal government, and more are being created each year. The number, scope and operations of these bodies are almost beyond imagination. Congress has found it advisable to secure data on their operation through extensive surveys made for the House Government Operations Committee in 1955-6 and 1969.

A review of the scholarly literature reveals frequent references to such citizen advisory bodies in textbooks on Public Administration and on Political Interest Groups. Attention is called to their proliferation in times of stress which generate expanded governmental activities requiring public understanding, support and technical assistance. Naturally, this occurs especially in the periods of wartime and during the great depression. The concept of participatory democracy stressed by the War on Poverty has added new dimensions to the possibilities of the citizen's active role in government.

However, the literature reveals that the most pervasive, persistent and systematic use of citizen advisory boards is in regard to the administration of the public lands. Perhaps this is because government ownership is the exception rather than the rule in a society which places great trust in the "invisible hand" of the market place to protect the public interest. This may tend to generate an uneasiness about the adequacy of the normal elective controls over public policy channeled through Congress and the Presidency. The need for additional representation, sources of information, opportunities for "feedback" and technical assistance may be greater when government has a proprietary role.

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[1] McKinley, op cit., p. 549.

Advisory bodies concerned with public lands are generally attached to various agencies of the Departments of the Interior and Agriculture. A major part of this study reviews the experiences with these bodies. The extensive provision for advisory boards can be appreciated from this listing.

The Department of the Interior

A most comprehensive program of advisory boards is to be found in the Bureau of Land Management's hierarchy of grazing and multiple-use boards and the O & C Boards which include:

55 District Grazing Boards of from 3 to 12 members.
10 State Multiple-Use Advisory Boards of from to members.
1 National Advisory Board Council of members.
5 District O & C Boards (in Oregon only).
1 State O & C Board (in Oregon only).

The National Park Service has:

1 National Park, Historic Sites, Buildings and Monuments Board.
21 Individual National Park Advisory Boards.

In addition, there are various other ad hoc advisory bodies with some concern for public lands policy.

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The Forest Service (Department of Agriculture)

The Forest Service has an intricate pattern of advisory boards and councils:

1 Advisory Committee on Multiple-Use of National Forests (Secretary's Office).

17 Regional advisory bodies including research, road and general advisory groups.

65 National Forest Multiple-Use Advisory Councils (attached to individual national forests).

77 Grazing Boards concerned with portions of individual forests.

There are also some ad hoc bodies and miscellaneous advisory groups not listed above.

Even with the widespread use of advisory bodies, the requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act and other provisions safeguarding the citizen against arbitrary government, some critics believe that the citizen is not able to participate effectively in his own governance. The administrative apparatus which affects him vitally is so vast and imposing that, in fact, even interested and concerned citizens are at a disadvantage and will continue to be unless improved avenues of participation are developed.

One such critic draws his examples from the administration of the public forests as he perceives it. Professor Charles Reich of the Yale Law School has contended that there is presently no real way for the public to participate adequately in bureaucratic decision-making regarding the public forests. He notes that the several acts of Congress relevant to the federally owned forests give wide discretion to

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administrative agencies which in turn provide few opportunities for the general public to help shape the policies for their own lands. Administrative hearings are often optional and, since administrators seldom "explain" why they have adopted particular policies, may be futile in the eyes of the general public, if the general public even learns of them. Reich notes that decentralized administration does not necessarily provide any improvement because it may result in an over-concern with the immediate needs of nearby communities. Technical competence to participate in hearings may be largely the monopoly of administrators and special interests.

He sees little advantage in the advisory board systems presently used:

> "A device the agencies themselves have adopted to permit public participation is the advisory committee. Members of such committees are chosen by the agencies to represent mainly special interests. And there is no evidence that they provide any real check on agency action. Nor is the receptivity of the agencies to informally expressed views through advisory committees a substitute for clear-cut rights."[1]

Karl Landstrom, a highly placed career employee of the Department of the Interior and former Director of the Bureau of Land Management "replied" to Professor Reich.[2] He noted that if there is confusion in public land policy, it stems basically from Congressional unwillingness to establish uniform legislation to replace the "many statutes reflecting mutually conflicting policies...available for discretionary application

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1. Charles A. Reich, "Bureaucracy and the Forests", (Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions: Santa Barbara) 1962, p. 11.

2. Karl A. Landstrom, "Citizen Participation in Public Land Decisions", (9 Saint Louis University Law Journal)

to the same tracts or areas."[1] Congress is the primary forum for citizen participation. Certain administrative procedures do provide relevant opportunities for expression of public interest, according to Landstrom:

open records and documents

public notice of proposed rule changes and decisions

right of protest

public advisory boards

public information services

cooperative agreements

Landstrom feels that at least in the BLM

> "...citizen participation leading up to decision making occurs to a much greater degree than is generally recognized. Opportunity exists for improvement and reform, but open and fair procedures are much further incorporated in public land decision making than is understood by many people."[2]

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1. Landstrom, op cit., p.

2. Ibid, p.

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INTERIOR DEPARTMENT

Grazing Boards

The most formal and institutionalized arrangement of advisory bodies in the public lands area is to be found in the grazing boards advising the Department of Interior's Bureau of Land Management under the Taylor Grazing Act and subsequent legislation. The literature on this arrangement is the most extensive to be found on the use of advisory groups.[1] Those interested in very detailed reports and evaluations of the grazing boards should consult:

Phillip O. Foss, Politics and Grass

Wesley Calef, Private Grazing and Public Lands

Charles McKinley, The Management of Land and Related Water Resources in Oregon

Summaries of particular finds will be used later in this report. The bibliography will present a more complete listing of resource materials.

An overview of the history of these boards might begin with the vision of John Wesley Powell, author of the 1878 Arid Lands Report, who advocated the creation of self-governing grazing districts headed by elected grazing boards in a manner comparable to those which have developed in irrigation districts. The need to end overgrazing and the destruction of much of the public range land in the western states, the battle between and among cattlemen, sheepmen, homesteaders, nomadic livestock ranchers, those controlling the water supplies and many other groups provide the context of efforts to establish better range management. The desire to clarify public policy regarding the use and disposition of the public lands and to bring some order out of the chaos and destruction on the range in the 1930's included bureaucratic manuevering and inter-agency rivalries, especially involving the Departments of Agriculture and Interior. The Interior Department, under Secretary Harold Ickes, who promised to administer the new legislation at a minimal cost funded by fees adequate to support a minimal staff and with close cooperation with user interests, was assigned responsibility for the program outlined in the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934:

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[1] Note: other students of politics and public administration have found occasions to analyze, describe, report on or describe the use of advisory bodies in general or in a number of short term situations. But there is seldom more than a paragraph or two about any one type or more than a chapter on the entire institution. See Herring, Public Administration and the Public Interest (New York: 1936), Chapter 21; David B. Truman, The Governmental Process; Grant McConnell, Private Power and the American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966).

> "The passage of the Act (Taylor Act) was a major piece of legislation. It was intended to reverse policy completely with respect to the unreserved public domain from free, unregulated, common use to leased, regulated, exclusive use."[1]

The first administrator of the Grazing Division of the Department of the Interior, F. S. Carpenter, did make extensive use of local stockmen in developing and carrying out this program:

> "Officials of the Department of the Interior, in initiating control over the public lands, were most anxious to win the confidence of the stockmen and to gain their cooperation in improving the range, undoubtedly having in mind the many criticisms that both cattlemen and sheepmen had directed at the practices of the Forest Service."[2]

This seems to have been in keeping with legislative intent. Bills requiring participation by range users had been introduced as early as

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[1] Wesley Calef, Private Grazing and Public Lands, p. 57.

[2] Paul W. Gates, History of Public Land Law Development (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 615.

1928 and provisions specifically establishing such participation appeared in some versions of the Taylor bill, although it was deleted from the final version of the act as passed:

> "From the standpoint of the western stockmen probably the most satisfactory part of the entire Taylor Grazing Act was Section 9, which instructed the Secretary to make regulations for 'cooperation with local associations of stockmen' in the administration of the districts. The section also authorized the Secretary to accept 'contributions toward the administration, protection and improvement of a district.'"[1]

There were administrative reasons for consultation, given the arrangement made by Ickes. The ranchers were often the only source of information available to the agency in the absence of detailed maps and accurate records regarding historic use of the range lands. Such information was absolutely essential to the implementation of the Act. And these were defects that would not be soon remedied since the budget and staff were to be minimal. Also, any efforts to impose a totally new order on the use of the range which would substantially alter the existing pattern would have been politically impossible and physically dangerous to would-be administrators who may have arrived at policy decisions that could have destroyed the economic basis of many ranching operations already suffering from the Great Depression.

The pattern that emerged in the 1930's, then, was one of consulting with representatives of the cattle and sheep ranchers on the boundaries, conditions of the range and customary and proposed uses of the public lands. Also, the "user" viewpoint was enhanced by the employment of federal graziers to administer these lands. The Civil Service Commission was prevailed upon to require actual experience in livestock ranching as a qualification:

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[1] Calef, op cit., p. 55.

> "The Division of Grazing was to stand out among new Federal agencies in that its appointees were not drawn from the major universities and law schools. Its chief officers were selected from men who had been residents of public land states at least a year before receiving their appointments."[1]

Calef adds "The field men in particular were selected for their knowledge of the western range country, including some experience with range livestock ranching and ability to work and negotiate with the ranchers."[2] Thus from the mid-1930's on for many years, former (because they were unsuccessful?) ranchers, often with limited formal education, were the "public" servants employed to preserve and restore the badly devastated public range lands.

Establishment of Grazing District Advisory Boards

The pattern of seeking the advice of permittees, those stockmen who would be allowed to run their stock on the public lands covered by the Taylor Grazing Act, was evident from the beginning. In 1934, F. S. Carpenter, administrator of the Division of Grazing, conducted in each state a series of public meetings of users of the public lands and had them elect state committees to help determine boundaries of grazing districts. District advisory boards were then elected under provisions of Circular I of the Division of Grazing. Carpenter said this was patterned after Colorado School Law for third class school districts. He also likened it to the Selective Service Boards of World War I.

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[1] Gates, op cit., p. 614.

[2] Calef, op cit., p. 76.

"The plan that took effect under the Taylor Act was in fundamental outline the same which the early New Deal was applying in business with the NRA and in agriculture with the AAA and other measures."[1] Those elected took the regular oath of office required for federal officials. Some 33 districts were established and 383 advisors were elected, usually with cattle and sheep men in equal numbers. This did not mean that mutual trust and confidence were automatically insured:

> "Some of the hearings were tense, explosive, rough; rumor circulated that the Department of Interior representatives were to be run out of town by local ranchers. Ranchers appearing at the hearings issued belligerent statements that they would shoot anyone trespassing on "their" range and declaring that they were not going to have their ranching operations run by any government man."[2]

In these first years it was not always made clar that the District Advisory Boards were "advisory" in character. A close relationship between some Interior employees in the field and the users of public range lands developed because of the need for mutual cooperation, the common experience of ranching often shared by the government employee and the natural isolation from other Departmental and professional influences of the employee because of the remote location of the grazing lands. This plus their direct role in establishing district boundaries, determining priorities and allocations and adjudicating disputes, created a pattern wherein some advisors concluded that they actually were "elected" to administer the Taylor Act rather than to advise:

> "There can be no doubt that the first director of the Grazing Service gave the stockmen the understanding that the program

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[1] Grant McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), p. 203.

[2] Calef, op cit., p. 57.

> was theirs and that his organization was ready and willing to do what the livestock men want. While that position could not continue in any federal department, the organized stockmen have exerted persistent effort to make it a reality and have vented their displeasure when thwarted."[1]

Fearing that these boards might be disestablished by the Secretary of Interior and administration would eventually be in the hands of non-local, "professional" graziers, Senator McCarran of Nevada introduced, and Congress passed, in 1939 an amendment to the Taylor Act officially recognizing the district advisory boards. The boards were to be constituted of five to twelve local stockmen in each district plus a wildlife representative who was to be appointed. The boards were to give advice on a number of matters including rules and regulations for the administration of the Taylor Act, the establishment of districts and their boundaries, the seasons of use and the carrying capacity of the range. The Secretary ordinarily was to seek the advice of the board before he changed any rules and regulations affecting the district:

> "The users of the range apparently came to believe that they were to administer the program through the advisory boards, and it does not appear that the language of the amendment of 1939, giving the boards advisory authority made any particular impression on the stockmen."[2]

The District Boards, 1934-39, were usually composed of equal numbers of cattle (and horse) men and sheepmen (and goat keepers). They were elected by the users of the range in their districts, apparently by precincts, with each permittee having one vote regardless of the size of his operation, but a rancher with permits in different districts

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1. Charles McKinley, Uncle Sam in the Pacific Northwest, p. 267.

2. Phillip O. Foss, Politics and Grass, p. 129.

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could vote in each. The term was three years. In 1939 as noted a wildlife representative was added by appointment and the "election" of the stockmen process was continued, re-enforced by the McCarran amendment. The wildlife representative was sometimes a state game commission employee, a practice terminated in the 1950's. The Interior Department now solicits nominations from various wildlife agencies and groups. In 1969 there were 55 grazing districts.

Current practice is for the State Director of Bureau of Land Management (The Grazing Division became the Grazing Service in 1939 and was merged with the General Land Office in 1946 to form the BLM) to set the number to be elected by each class of users in each district. "Elections" can be in person or by mail. Foss noted a marked increase in the number of votes cast when the mails were used in Oregon grazing districts in the mid-1950's. He also noted a low turn-over in membership. These "elections" are technically "recommendations" for appointment by the State Director to a one year term but members are considered for reappointment for three years total. This places the membership more in line with the directives of President Kennedy's Executive Order 11007 of February 26, 1962, establishing uniform terms and procedures for all federal advisory committees.

Note should be made of the reference to these bodies in the statutes of the ten western states wherein grazing districts are situated. In 1936 fifty per cent of the federally collected grazing fees were returned to the states, a figure reduced to 12½ per cent in 1947. State legislation in Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, Oregon, Utah and Wyoming generally earmark this fee for the improvement of the range in a manner *determined by the district advisory board*: "To begin with, it must be clearly understood that grazing fees are negligible from the viewpoint of the total federal revenue."[1] But, there have been times when these funds under the *control* of an "advisory" board were essential to the budget of the district:

> "The dependence of the district graziers for most of the improvements in their districts upon the largesse of the state and district advisory boards in spending the 50 per cent money cannot help but place the administrative staff under a special obligation to the stockmen. The substitution of these funds for Congressional appropriations to pay administrative salaries and expenses during the fiscal year 1947 of course increased that dependence."[2]

Note only dependence but also some interference with normal federal budgetary practices could result from the mixing of advisory and allocation roles and the combining of federal and state funds. As McKinley reports,

> "Today, however, the District Range Manager prepares and presents the budget pleas for the expenditure of those funds simultaneously with his pleas for the BLM appropriated funds for soil and moisture and range improvements."[3]

(BLM has come to accept this, but BLM has to reveal its budget request before it goes to the Bureau of the Budget and Congress!)

The several case studies published describing the operations of district advisory boards have all focused on the mixed blessings such boards entail. Usually the problem involves user resistence to efforts to reduce the number of livestock grazing on the public lands or efforts to raise the fees whether to the market value of the forage or to cover increased administrative costs, both policies subject to farily objective verification. That is, the ability of the range to provide forage for a certain number of animals can be determined by scientific study and the costs can be ascertained by comparing the market price of comparably situated and managed lands.

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[1] Calef, *op cit*., p. 72.

[2] McKinley, *op cit*., p. 267.

[3] McKinley, p. 291.

Phillip Foss wrote about "The Battle of Soldier Creek," a unit of federal grazing district 3 in southeast Oregon.[1] He reported the domineering attitude of one district advisory board member, who served from 1936-1956 on the board (and also on the state and national boards at various times) and who was able to make private use of district equipment, to keep meeting locations convenient for himself, and apparently to bring about transfers of district managers too bent on reducing the number of animal units per month (AUM's) to the actual grazing capacity of that range. The board was also a focal point for pressure on Congress and national Interior Department officials to approve policies for the Soldier Creek unit that were contrary to good range practice and probably the Taylor Grazing Act. The inference to be drawn from this aspect of the Foss' study is that the pressure of the district advisory board rather than assisting actually prevented "proper" public policy decisions over a period of many years.

Observing district advisory board meetings in 1955 and 1956, Foss found the procedures lax, the terminology used imprecise, agendas non-existent. He observed,

> "If the primary function of the board is considered to be public relations, then the procedures outlined above may be adequate.

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[1] Foss, op cit., pp. 140-170.

> However, if the information and advice of the board are genuinely desired, such methods are not likely to produce it."[1]

Furthermore, Foss found

> "The range manager did not depend upon the board to supply him with information. He did look to the board for opinions, suggestions and ideas. He used the board primarily to make decisions that he may have been disinclined to make or take personal responsibility for...(T)he board believed it was making the decision when it passed upon a proposal. The board, when asked its advice, did not feel that it was giving advice, but that it was making a decision. It was essentially correct in this belief, because the range manager had overruled the board's 'decision' only once during eight years as district range manager. In one other case he broke a tie vote."[2]

Wesley Calef spent five summers from 1949 to 1958 in the field studying the land management under the Taylor Act. The results are published in his 1960 volume, Private Grazing and Public Lands, which dedicates his work to five district graziers with this inscription following their names:

> "Sometime district graziers in the Middle Rocky Mountain basins, who, during the lean and difficult years of the Grazing Service, badgered by politicians, ignored by those they were supposed to regulate, unsupported by their department, and neglected by the electorate, nevertheless carried on their work with intelligence, energy, and, astonishingly, with enthusiasm."[3]

His work is a detailed account of five areas in the middle Rocky Mountain region, their geography, economy and polity relevant to grazing. Among his findings are these comments:

> "The record of BLM in the Shoshone-Wind River Basin has been discouraging. 'The impotency of BLM officials to enforce legally the range rules and agreements against trespass on the lands that the federal government has placed in their custody is disgraceful.

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1. Foss, op cit., p. 112

2. Ibid., p. 113.

3. Calef, op cit., p.

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> Because of the political weakness of the bureau and the weak enforcement clauses in the Taylor Grazing Act, it is difficult for the BLM unaided to control a recalcitrant rancher.'"[1]

In this basin, ranchers had opposed cuts in their allotments by every possible means, including hiring lawyers as spokesmen, lobbying Senators, contacting the Wyoming members of the National Advisory Board Council and trying to postpone or thwart BLM action by denying BLM's findings and calling for new surveys.

Regarding the Rawlins District:

> "Grazing competition in the pre-Taylor period was intense in this area, but range allocation was solved in a manner satisfactory to the local ranchers; consequently they have always resisted attempts by the BLM to establish regulations on use of the open range. Their obduracy has made the process of adjudication so slow and difficult that much of the basin land is still in a fairly anarchic state of administration and regulation."[2]

Regarding the Bridger Basin which is similar geographically to the Rawlins District, Calef notes that cooperation among ranchers preceded the Taylor Act. "These grazing associations are progressive and efficient, they have satisfactory relations with the BLM, and seem to represent a workable solution to problems of range management in an area of complex land tenure."[3]

The Upper Green River Basin also has a record of private rancher associations cooperating with BLM in a rather satisfactory manner. While the BLM does not enforce the trespass laws by assessing fees for damages, the "goodwill" and cooperation are otherwise found in this district.

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1. Calef, *op cit*., p. 143.

2. *Ibid*., p. 180.

3. *Ibid*., p. 214.

In the Big Horn Basis after over two years of Taylor Act administration:

> "Overgrazing has been widespread, has sadly depleted the range in many areas, and induced serious erosion problems. Thus far it has proved extremely difficult to bring about reductions in the intensity of range use, but some progress has been made recently. A large quantity of superfluous range rights are still retained by Big Horn Basin permittees by continually taking non-use. The complex land tenure pattern makes range administration and management difficult and ineffective, but the BLM has had almost no success in simplifying it."[1]

Another detailed case study of the role of district advisory boards is the "Sisley Creek Allotment Adjudication and the Baker District Advisory Board" in Charles McKinley's The Management of Land and Related Water Resources in Oregon. This was completed in 1961 and updated to 1963. Here, McKinley reviews the scope of the problems peculiar to this institution:

1. the lack of educational qualifications of the district range manager, a former rancher.
2. the confusion of "advisory" with "administrative" responsibilities.
3. the unwillingness to rely on scientific data in determining carrying capacity of the range.
4. the holding of secret executive sessions of the Board from which the BLM was excluded but a lawyer-lobbyist for the livestock interests was not.
5. nepotism.
6. board pressures on the new BLM district manager and efforts to go over his head not only to the state BLM office but to the Congress and to the state and national advisory boards and his resultant transfer.

McKinley concludes:

> "The Sisley Creek situation also throws light upon the administrative utility of the District Advisory Board system. In listening to the

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[1] Calef, op cit., p. 248.

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> sessions and scanning the reports of Board action, the writer has been impressed by the net negative value of this Board as an aid to the administration of the public domain lands."[1]

Additional Facets of District Advisory Boards

The origin, method of selection and some examples of the operations of district advisory boards have been noted. There have been various administrative directives governing the operation of the boards. Department of the Interior circulars and the Department Manual over the years reflect the growing concern to keep the boards "advisory", to specify their methods of election and the procedures to be followed at meetings. Certain Presidential Executive Orders and Memoranda are also relevant.

Executive Order 11007 of February 26, 1962 requires all departments and agencies of the Government to follow certain practices including generally:

> all meetings to be held only at the call of a full-time government employee
>
> all meetings to be conducted by or in the presence of a full-time government employee
>
> minimal records but not verbatim minutes shall be kept by a full-time government employee

A Presidential Memorandum, May 2, 1963, spells out the application of "conflict of interest" laws to special government employees. This has been interpreted by the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior to mean that members of the district advisory boards, since they are "elected" and take an oath of office, are "federal" employees and subject to the conflict of interest laws. This would apply to both livestock and wildlife representatives on all district, state and national boards. The Department has long had the rule that persons on district advisory boards would not sit in adjudication of cases in which they had a personal interest.

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[1] McKinley, The Management of Land and Related Water Resources in Oregon, p. 333.

The selection of board members has been a concern from time to time. The original pattern of selecting equal numbers of cattlemen and sheepmen (with horsemen and goatkeepers occasionally involved) had the effect of reducing charges of bias that might have been levelled against the board by either group. But they are not always found in equal numbers and the suggestion to shift the category to "livestock" rather than "cattle" or "sheep" representatives came from the Oregon board in 1964. The BLM Washington office replied that although a change in regulations to permit this specifically would be unwise, there was felt to be enough "flexibility" in the present regulations to permit this if the state BLM director thought it advisable. It was noted that the Secretary at that time had rejected a request to use Section 15 lessees as livestock representatives from the Casper, Wyoming area. (Section 15 of the Taylor Act pertains to grazing on public lands not inside grazing districts.)

In summation, the district advisory boards were anticipated some years before the Taylor Act of 1934 and were established by the first administrator of the Grazing Division with Secretarial support as a practical and politic device to inaugurate the new policy for grazing on public lands. The compromise between public responsibility and private interest could be labeled either a step toward democracy or an expedient sacrifice of the public interest. That is, the boards provided an avenue of citizen participation in addition to Congressional representation and the Presidency, a possible step towards democracy. On the other hand, it seems generally agreed the public grazing lands had almost been ruined by overgrazing and other abuses. Could some of those ranchers who had contributed to this depleted condition now be expected to advise against the continuation of these practices by themselves and others when the same intense economic pressures of a depression era were being experienced? It must also be asked if it would have made any difference if a number of "public" non-rancher members were on the boards from the beginning?

When the boards were given a specific statutory base in 1939, the pattern of representation was perpetuated, perhaps unnecessarily. That is, while the state and national advisory boards since 1961 have been multiple-use boards by administrative order, the district boards remain unchanged since to do so would require Congressional action. Whatever the early justification based on the need for ranchers' expertise and knowledge of local practices, this information now has long been available to the BLM. So, too, has a supply of professionally trained range managers. Yet accounts of the district boards harassing and abusing managers have been presented by nationally reputable scholars. This is not to imply that political pressures would be non-existent otherwise. But to have a "public" administrator thwarted by special private interests who are officially convened as a *public* advisory body gives pause for consideration. The issue is whether or not in the case of the Taylor Act district grazing boards if the disadvantages outweighed the advantages it was due to the basic idea of advisory boards or their imperfect application? One change the Interior Department from time to time has considered is the need for statutory amendment to make the district advisory boards multiple-use boards, but this remains to be accomplished.

State Advisory Boards

Multiple-Use Advisory Boards: State-wide meetings of elected representatives of users of the public range were called in 1934. In this sense, the state bodies preceded the district organization. But there seems to have been no continuity from the 1934 meetings until 1949 when the Secretary of Interior established them as advisory to him (Circular No. 1736, August 31, 1949). Thus, for some eight or nine years the state boards existed but had only unofficial status. These state advisory boards were, from 1949 to 1955, composed of one cattleman and one sheepman from each district "elected" by the cattle and sheep men respectively in each district. In 1955, one wildlife representative elected by the district wildlife representative was added. Presumably these ten state boards played their various roles in advising the BLM state director, and through him, the BLM Director and the Secretary of the Interior.

The Federal Range Code was modified December 7, 1961 (43 CFR 4114) to make these state boards multiple-use boards with membership expanded by a number not to exceed seven. In most states livestock membership still constitutes a majority. These other members may represent county or city government, businessmen, outdoor recreation, mining or education and research interests. Indeed, any state with more than three grazing districts will have such a majority automatically. If a state board has a maximum of seven non-livestock members, yet must have two livestock members from each district, any state with four or more districts will have at least an 8-7 majority of livestock over non-livestock members.

agendas were grazing fees, the range codes, trespasses and other matters closely tied to grazing. The NABC was a very conservative body and did not hesitate to label bills before Congress that it did not like as "communist" and "vicious" or to oppose all proposals for valley authorities such as a CVA for the Columbia River. Most NABC resolutions were reported in the minutes as "carried" although some close votes of 8-8 or 7-10 were recorded. Sometimes the minutes were printed verbatim, occasionally running over 350 pages.

Composition of NABC membership was considered on several occasions, for example the addition of wildlife representatives and whether or not they could be state employees. When the membership was expanded the subsequent agendas reflected these new concerns. In 1961 the new Secretary of the Interior, Stewart Udall, attended in person and announced that he had appointed himself co-chairman and that he hoped the advisory board system would find a proper balance between what he considered the extremes of dominating administrations and making no contribution at all. At a second 1961 meeting reports of opposition to the expanded membership and the co-chairmanship were received from many groups. But the expansion took place anyway and the agendas have broadened accordingly. The NABC after 1962 had not only livestock and wildlife members but also persons from these fields: county government, oil and gas, outdoor recreation, conservation, soil conservation, forestry and urban/suburban development.

The National Advisory Board Council (NABC)

Although the Grazing Division had on occasion summoned some district advisors to "national" meetings to consider the range code, the National Advisory Board Council began as a private organization in 1940 after such an "official" gathering. As a user group it was established to further its members' interests. Foss reports that the then Director of the Grazing Service was wary of this new body lest it preempt the prerogatives of the national administrator of the Grazing Service.[1] But within a year the Grazing Service had met with them. By 1949 the National Advisory Board Council and the state boards were officially coopted by the Secretary of the Interior (Circular No. 1736).

The NABC is composed of a cattleman and a sheepman from each state selected by cattle and sheep men on each state board, each of whom therefore also serves on district and state advisory boards. In 1955, the wildlife representatives from each state selected one from each state, expanding the NABC to 30 (43 CFR 4114). The total membership was expanded to 42 in 1961 by adding one person from Washington and Alaska, and ten from interests other than livestock or wildlife. These are, in practice, members of the state boards. Thus the membership, if not the name, is meant to reflect the multiple-use emphasis.

A review of the minutes of the NABC reflects the changes in both the western livestock industry and the BLM. In the early 1940's the concern was with wartime matters such as draft exemptions for farm workers, rationing, price controls, etc. Continuing issues on the

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[1] Foss, op cit., p. 121.

However, the significance of this may be ambiguous since the state level board has no "operating" role comparable to the district boards. One can infer they do play a role in expressing and shaping public opinion which may affect state legislation as well as national policy. In any event they have been considered important enough to have their membership altered and citizens are interested enough to devote some time to serving on them.

These state bodies meet semi-annually and select cattle, sheep and wildlife representatives to the National Advisory Board Council. (In Oregon the state multiple-use board meets once a year with the state O & C Advisory Board and once a year alone.) Thus there is some overlapping membership with district and national advisory bodies. There are BLM multiple-use advisory boards in: Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah and Wyoming.

The O & C Advisory Boards (In Oregon Only): In 1916 Congress revested title to the Oregon and California Railroad grant lands because that railroad company and its successors had violated the terms of the grant. About two and one-half million acres of these heavily timbered lands in Oregon along with the revested Coos Bay Wagon Road lands and certain other public lands ultimately were brought under the administration of the Bureau of Land Management. These lands are thoroughly intermingled with private and other government lands.

In 1937 Congress passed another "O & C" Act which established the policy of permanent forest production and sustained yield management. Again, Secretary Ickes had been a leading proponent of public land legislation which enhanced the role of his department. The Secretary of the Interior was authorized to consult with various private groups and public agencies in formulating necessary rules and regulations.

Consultation with an ad hoc group occurred in Portland in early 1938. Later that year there was created a seven member O & C Advisory Board. This was done upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of Public Lands but with the advice of the Interior Department Solicitor that no public monies could be paid for expenses of members. The appointments were signed by the Secretary.

Lack of demand for timber in the late 1930's and concern for the war effort in the 1940's limited success in achieving the goals of the 1937 Act. In the early post war period, various conflicting interests made these goals of "permanent forest production" and "sustained yield" difficult to attain. Timber interests dependent on the purchase of federal timber from O & C lands understandably were more eager to develop the postwar market after years of depression than to support policies which limited the annual cut on a sustained yield basis. Also, in the rugged mountains of Western Oregon, it was more economical to harvest the timber with easiest and cheapest access than the more remote stands, making more difficult a comprehensive management program. The O & C Advisory Board met twelve times from 1938-1948 and had been of some assistance in developing rules and regulations of that period. The composition of the Board in this period was primarily of timber interests.

The intermingling of O & C and private lands had resulted in timber sales from the O & C lands usually going to owners of adjacent lands who were the only ones with direct physical access to the O & C timber. This situation not only resulted in low bids for the government timber but also threatened to freeze out lumbermen who, without owning their own timber lands, were dependent on the sale of government timber.

In 1948 a new policy with many complex features designed to stabilize the economy of the several communities in the O & C area was announced. Included was an enlarged advisory board whose eighteen members include representatives of labor, agriculture, recreation and other interests as well as the timber interests (i.e., timber owners, loggers and sawmill operators). Five district boards of six to fifteen members were also established with similarly broad representation. The BLM representatives would serve ex officio on each of the six boards and a BLM employee would be the secretary.

The reconstituted state O & C Advisory Board made extensive use of more compact subcommittees in the late 1940's. After that a broader range of concerns is evidenced both by items brought to the board by the BLM administrator and supported by the expanded board. The Board helped develop and secure acceptance for a number of proposals central to the goals of the BLM in achieving the objectives of the 1937 Act as well as presenting suggestions reflecting concern of private groups, which had not occurred to the BLM staff. The minutes show that prior to 1948 there was almost no concern for watershed protection and other non-market considerations.

The Board members were considered to be in an important position by the industry and efforts to secure favorable action by the Board were not uncommon. However, other lines of political communication were not neglected and the usual moves to reach more directly higher

Departmental officials and Congress continued.

The record of the O & C Boards understandably reflects greater activity and concern at the time of major policy changes. Thus, in the 1948-52 period extensive board activity was evident as details of a new policy were being adjusted. A comprehensive review of this period is to be found in Richard Brown, "The O & C Advisory System - A Case Study in Public Administration".[1]

Marion Clawson notes that "A program of timber sales for a year ahead is drawn up and discussed with these boards."[2]

McKinley reports that the O & C Boards also play a role in determining locations of roads and the development of recreational facilities and that district O & C advisory boards vary in their composition depending upon the possibilities of recreation and other uses of the land reflecting an effort to keep in contact with the relevant publics.

The state O & C Board meets once a year with the BLM's Oregon State Multiple-Use Advisory Board, a pattern inaugurated in 1968. This is usually a field trip.

In Oregon, then, the BLM has two statewide advisory boards, one O & C and one Multiple-Use (who "advise" on different lands), five O & C district advisory boards in the western part of the state and five grazing district boards in eastern Oregon. The possibility of overlapping or confused jurisdiction must be considered. An as yet unpublished case study of the 1964-1965 controversy between former BLM

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[1] Richard Brown, "The O & C Advisory System - A Case Study in Public Administration" (unpublished B.A. Thesis, Reed College, Portland, Oregon, 1952).

[2] Clawson, op cit., p. 249.

Director Charles Stoddard and former BLM State Administrator Russell Getty, which resulted in both leaving the federal service, notes that the Oregon Multiple-Use Advisory Board discussed the implementation in Oregon of the 1964 Classification and Multiple-Use Act, but that it was not discussed by the O & C Board.(This latter point is disputed by the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior.) The Interior Department proposed to exchange pursuant to a 1962 law certain western Oregon public domain forest lands (not O & C lands, but administered with them in determining the annual "allowable cut"), which are a small but intermingled part of the federal timber holdings, for lands needed to establish the Point Reyes, California, National Park. If these public lands passed into private hands, the base upon which the allowable annual cut is determined would be reduced and lumber interests dependent upon federal timber would be adversely affected. Without going into the complicated details of this issue, when public "exploration" (as distinguished from the "hearings" that would be required if a formal land transfer was proposed) of the tentative land swap was deemed desirable, a joint meeting of the O & C and Oregon State Multiple-Use Advisory Boards was held amid intensive publicity. Differences between the principal personalities, the various competing interests in Oregon and growing national concern had by then involved the Oregon Legislature, the Governor of Oregon, the Oregon Congressional delegation and the highest Interior Department officials.

The role of the advisory boards in this atmosphere was limited compared to these other political channels. But over the years, the O & C boards, at least on the state level, have been concerned with many of the main issues of land management.[1]

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[1] An appendix provides a summary of actions of the O & C Advisory Board over a 27 year period.

National Park Service

An August 21, 1935 Act of Congress "to preserve for public use historic sites, building and objects of national significance for the inspiration and benefit of the people of the United States" provided in Section 3 for the "Advisory Board on National Parks, Historic Sites, Buildings and Monuments". The statute provides that the Secretary of Interior should appoint to serve at his pleasure not more than eleven persons "including representatives competent in the fields of history, archaeology, architecture and human geography..."

This Board, augmented by a non-voting "Council" composed of ex-Board members has met regularly since 1936. By 1968, there had been 59 meetings in those 33 years. The minutes of recent meetings summarized and with attachments run some 100 pages. The Board, operating through committees which include Council members, appears generally to respond favorably to proposals made by the National Park Service staff. Actions include endorsing proposals commending those responsible for furthering the several projects, re-endorsing proposals not implemented following earlier endorsement and, occasionally, advising against certain requests. It is not clear from the minutes that this is in support of or contrary to the recommendations of the National Park Service staff. If there were dissenting votes in arriving at decisions, such were not recorded in the minutes reviewed for this study, although occasional references to "unanimous votes" and "consensus" might suggest otherwise. Dozens of specific proposals are considered and some field visitations are made by the advisory bodies.

Legislation establishing particular national parks or for specific policy areas sometimes specifically provides for advisory bodies to be established to advise the Park Service. Thus, there are 36 advisory bodies involved in this way. They range from the Washington National Monument Society, established in 1848 and appointed by the President, the Historic American Buildings Survey Advisory Board, set up in 1933 with five of its nine members being named by the President of the American Institute of Architects. It is not uncommon for the group affiliation of members to be specified in the laws creating them.

Several of the advisory commissions established by statute since 1960 have been scheduled for termination after a ten year period. They are: Cape Cod National Seashore Advisory Commission, Fire Island National Seashore Advisory Commission, Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore Advisory Commission, Ozark National Scenic Riverways Advisory Commission, and Pictured Rocks National Lakeshore Advisory Commission.

The Interior Department has a number of other advisory bodies, some of which are concerned directly with certain uses of the public lands and a few only peripherally involved.

AGRICULTURE DEPARTMENT

The Forest Service

The administrative structure of the National Forest System in the Department of Agriculture forms a hierarchy including four levels: Chief Forester, Regional Foresters, National Forest Supervisor and District Rangers." "Station Directors" and "area Directors" of the Forest Service rank with the Regional Foresters.

Advisory bodies are found at each of the first three levels and there are a few *ad hoc* groups as well. Thus, there are:

1 Secretary's Forest Service Advisory Committee on Multiple-Use of the National Forests

3 Regional Advisory Councils

10 Research Committees

4 Road Committees

62 National Forest Advisory Councils

78 National Forest Grazing Advisory Boards

plus several other groups.

National Forest Grazing Advisory Boards

Although the Forest Service held meetings with local stockmen who used the national forests for grazing as early as 1906 and 1915 respectively, the formal establishment of advisory boards came with the Granger-Thye Act of 1950. McKinley attributes the passage of this portion of the Act to "the agitation by the two major national livestock associations...to rivet into Forest Service administration the counterpart of their recognition with the Bureau of Land Management..."[1]

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[1] McKinley, *op cit*., p. 261-2.

The Granger-Thye Boards are of two types: G-7 (so called are provided for under CFR 231.7) and G-10 boards are described as non-statutory and total entitled to be notified of proposed actions which affect them. They could become G-10 boards if the permittees so desire, although they actually operate very similarly to G-10 boards. Forty-three of the sixty are Forest-wide in scope while the other seventeen are concerned with only portions of a given National Forest.

The G-7 boards are described as non-statutory, that is CFR 231.7 authorizes the Chief of the Forest Service to cooperate with local livestock associations which enable them to better manage the range, to discuss plans with Forest officers and to express their wishes. Recognition of an association is granted by the Forest officer if the members are a majority of the permittees. Association officers are elected by a majority of the members under a constitution and by-laws approved by the Forest officer. Recognition of the association can be withdrawn if it fails to function. Clearly, the G-7 board is dependent on the Forest officer to a large extent.

The G-10 boards are more directly provided for by the Granger-Thye Act and have from three to twelve members elected by the grazing permittees. A wildlife representative may be appointed by an appropriate state agency (unlike the BLM decision not to have state employees serve on boards). Nineteen of the thirty-three boards are operated on a Forest-wide basis and fourteen for an area within a Forest.

The G-10 boards, in contrast to G-7 boards, are set up under 231.10 "To provide the National Forest System grazing permittees a means for expressing their [emphasis added] recommendations concerning the management and administration of National Forest System grazing lands, an advisory board shall [emphasis added] be constituted..." Under the Granger-Thye Act, any party affected may require the Department of Agriculture to refer to a G-10 board for advice and recommendations any matter pertaining to "(1) the modification of the terms, or the denial of renewal of, or a reduction in a grazing permit, or (2) the...modification of an individual or community allotment." If the advice is overridden, reasons must be given in writing.

Ruth, in a study for the Public Land Law Review Commission, notes that the Forest Service found the organization of permittees into associations and close cooperation with them desired by the Forest Service.[1] McKinley's case studies of the Silver Creek, Beaver Creek and Ochoco Forest reveal the mixed results of this kind of arrangement. Although the Forest Service personnel found permittees unwilling to consider reductions in grazing allotments, they often relied on the permittees to help finance range improvements and would "sub-let the actual day-to-day range management function."[2]

In another case study, McKinley reviews the complex appeal procedure which is open to a permittee who disagrees with the allotments made by the Forest Service.[3] The advisory board may have such a case referred to it. The appeals process tends to place the local forest

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[1] Ruth & Associates III, pp. 88, 150-153.

[2] McKinley, op cit., pp. 262-268.

[3] Ibid., pp. 270-276.

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supervisor at a disadvantage compared to a well-financed permittee. Hence, securing the support of the permittees or avoiding their opposition makes life easier for Forest Service personnel.

Clawson notes that the Forest Service advisory "boards often do not consider such matters as the carrying capacity of the range, the proper season of use, the allocation of grazing privileges among applicants, the annual or other periodic review of grazing permits, and the like."[1] He attributes greater hostility toward the Forest Service than towards the BLM on their different uses of advisory boards, the Forest Service using them in a more restricted way.[2] However, a favorable opinion by the livestock industry need not mean a better (or worse) public range policy.

Foss notes that the range fees for the Forest Service lands were higher, 1936-60, than BLM lands.[3] The discrepancy still exists, although charts relating fees tell little of the quality of the range supporting the AUM's. The higher fee for Forest Service lands reflects the fact that the Forest Service had long collected fees for grazing whereas the BLM lands had been used without charge until the Taylor Act. The fee schedule is, then, very involved with historic charges, the relation of the fee to the costs of administering the range lands, the several other sources of funds for improving the public range and, perhaps, the political support and opposition of different agencies. From time to time the BLM has used the fee differential to support proposed increases in their charges. The complexity of the fee structure is dealt with in considerable detail in a 1969 study for the Public Land Law Review Commission entitled _The Forage Resource_.

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[1] Clawson, op cit., p. 287.

[2] Ibid., p. 291.

[3] Foss, op cit., p. 190.

Calef reports opposition by livestock interests to merging the Forest Service and the BLM since they fear the Forest Service would control grazing and "control of grazing on national forest allotments has always been tighter and more restrictive than control on the Taylor lands."[1] He cites a variety of reasons for this including the western orientation of BLM, close personal ties, the original scheme of administration of the Taylor lands, and the different character of national forest lands compared to the public domain lands.

The Forest Service response to the House Government Operations Committee's 1969 questionnaire typically describes the work of these boards as:

> _G-7 boards_ -- "Within the past three years the Committee has considered and made recommendations to the Forest Supervisor concerning matters of interest to range permittees on National Forest."
>
> G-10 boards -- "Within the past three years the committee has reviewed and made recommendations to the Forest Supervisor on a wide range of questions concerning the use of grazing and related National Forest resources."

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[1] Calef, _op cit_., p. 264.

NATIONAL FOREST GRAZING ADVISORY BOARDS (G - 7 BOARDS)
SUMMARY TABULATION

Number: 44

Total number of members: 370

Number of meetings per year: Once a year: 31
Two: 12
Three: 1

Estimated expenditure:
under $200: 37
over $201: 7

Number of members:
members: 3 - 1 Board
4 - 2
5 - 4
6 - 8
7 - 6
8 - 3
9 - 6
10 - 2
11 - 1
12 - 3
13 - 1
14 - 1
15 - 2
16 - 2
17 - 1
18 - 0
19 - 0
20 - 1

Wildlife representatives listed for 8 of the 44 Boards (Arizona, 4; California, 3; Wyoming, 1)

Year of origin:
1969
1968
1967 = 1
1966 - 1
1965 - 3
1964
1963
1962
1961
1960 - 2
1959 - 2
1958 - 3
1957
1956 - 1
1955 - 2
1954 - 2
1953 - 2
1952 - 2
1951 - 2
1950 - 2
1949 - 1
1948 - 2
1947 - 1
1946 - 4
1945 - 1
1944
1943 - 1
1942
1941
1940 - 2
1939 - 1
1938 - 1

1934 - 1

1915 - 1

1906 - 1

NATIONAL FOREST GRAZING ADVISORY BOARDS (G - 10 BOARDS)
SUMMARY TABULATION

Number: 33

Total number of members: 273

Number of meetings per year:
Once a year: 27
Two: 5
Three: 0
Four: 1

Estimated expenditure:
under $100: 33 (all at $75

Number of members:
members: 4 - 6 Boards
5 - 2
6 - 4
7 - 2
8 - 6
9 - 3
10 - 4
11 - 3
12 - 1
13 - 2

Wildlife representatives listed for 17 of the 33 Boards (Arizona, 1; Colorado, 8; New Mexico, 2; Oregon, 3; Washington, 1; Wyoming, 1)

Year of origin:
1967 - 1
1966
1965 - 1
1964
1963 - 1
1962 - 2
1961 - 1
1960 - 3
1959
1958 - 2
1957
1956
1955 - 3
1954 - 1
1953 - 2
1952 - 6
1951 - 7

1948 - 1

1944 - 1

1936 - 1

National Forest Multiple-Use Management Advisory Councils

The Forest Service prefers to use the term "board" to refer to the statutory (Granger-Thye Act) grazing boards and "council" or "committee" for other advisory bodies. There are some sixty-two National Forest Multiple-Use Management Advisory Councils which have been established since 1948. Membership varies from four to eighteen and they meet once or twice a year. These are created by a letter from the Chief of the Forest Service authorizing the particular council for a two year period. While the Forest Service encourages National Forest Supervisors to use such councils, they are not required in all forests. The Supervisors have considerable discretion apparently in the selection and function of their councils. Membership includes a wide variety of occupations and professions and members are to be selected for their personal capabilities and alternates are not permitted.

Meetings usually include one field trip a year. A review of all of the minutes on file for the Gifford Pinchot National Forest reveal matters of local concern are discussed in the one-day meetings, although these may be local applications of regional or national issues such as the use of motor bikes, land exchanges, conservation education and the like. The agenda was usually presented beforehand and one member, a high school teacher active in "conservation" groups, had solicited opinions from his associates prior to the meetings.

Other than reviewing the brief minutes of council meetings and interviewing participants, there are no known "case studies" of the work of these councils. It seems that the councils do exist, do provide some additional lines of communication between the National Forest Supervisors and parts of the "public". In response by Forest Service officials to the House Government Operations Committee's 1969 questionnaire, the work of these councils was usually described in this phrase: "Within the past three years the committee has reviewed a wide range of policy issues dealing with a broad spectrum of multiple uses." A few added: "Council members achieved a better understanding of multiple use activities between user groups, thus increased the opportunity to make all resources contribute in fuller measure to the public good" or there was discussion of a "...spectrum of multiple uses, including expansion of occupancy, use in scenic zones, land exchange classification, and type conversion."

Occasionally ad hoc bodies within a national forest, in addition to the regular council, are used. For example, a special committee to advise the Supervisor of the Mt. Hood (Oregon) National Forest on the merits of a proposed aerial tramway in the Columbia River Gorge was convened.

Regional Advisory Bodies

Although there are nine regional offices of the Forest Service, only three have Regional Advisory Councils: California, Pacific Northwest (Western Washington, Oregon), and Inland Empire (Eastern Washington, Northern Idaho). These are the three regions with the largest timber sales, hence the ones with more intense user interests. The councils vary in size from nine to thirteen members and meet two or three times a year, one being a field trip. The membership represents a wide range of professions, occupations and geographic locations. There is no necessary linkage between the individual National Forest Advisory Council and the regional body. Agenda items are varied and not part of any organized upward or downward network. Regional interests are reflected in the Forest Service's report on the operation of all its citizen advisory boards to the House Government Operations Committee in 1969:

> "The council has considered such key issues as the critical timber supply situation and the establishment of 'pioneer' areas as a management unit between wilderness and normal full management..." [Inland Empire Forest Regional Advisory Council]

> "Within the past 3 years the committee (sic) has reviewed important policy issues such as the North Cascades National Park proposal and winter sports development program..."
> [Pacific Northwest Forest Regional Advisory Council]

NATIONAL FOREST ADVISORY COUNCILS
(including three Regional Advisory Councils)
SUMMARY TABULATION

Number: 65

Total number of members: 680

Number of meetings per year: Once a year: 7 Councils
One or two: 38
Two: 19 (includes 2 Regional)
Three: 1 (a Regional Council)

Estimated expenditure:
$100 - $200: 47 (includes 1 Regional)
201 - 300: 13 (includes 1 Regional)
301 - 400: 3

800 - 900: 1 (a Regional Council)

$5500 : 1

Number of members:
members 4 - 1 council
5 - 1
6 - 5
7 - 5
8 - 4
9 - 11 (includes 1 Regional)
10 - 17
11 - 2
12 - 7 (includes 1 Regional)
13 - 6 (includes 1 Regional)
14 - 3
15 - 2

18 - 1

Year of origin:
1969 - 2
1968 - 2
1967 - 3
1966 - 2
1965 - 1
1964 - 9
1963 - 2
1962 - 2
1961 - 3
1960 - 6
1959 - 4
1958
1957 - 1
1956 - 3
1955 - 8
1954 - 4
1953 - 2
1952 - 3 (includes 2 Regional)
1951
1950 - 2
1949 - 1
1948 - 2 (includes 1 Regional)

The Regional Advisory Councils are: California, Inland Empire (eastern Washington, Northern Idaho) and the Pacific Northwest (western Washington, Oregon).

Research Committees

There are ten Research Committees advising the various research experiment stations around the nation. Some years ago individual substations might have had separate advisory bodies, but these seem to have been consolidated, at least in part. The membership varies from fifteen to twenty-six, and often includes one to four government employees as members. Members are persons with considerable technical competence including university personnel, private industry officials and employees of state and federal natural resource agencies including Bureau of Land Management staff members! Meetings are annual or biannual. The committees consider the range of research activities to be undertaken, indicate preference for various priorities and suggest topics for investigation.

Possible sources of tension are differences between the "pure" science objectives of some silviculturalists and the need especially felt by commercial interests to find immediate solutions to problems with direct economic consequences. Also, there may be a national tendency for the Forest Service to develop projects of peculiar interest to the national forests to the neglect of problems facing other forestry operations. Although the Forest Service administers the experiment stations, they are Forest (not merely National Forest) Experiment Stations. Another possible difficulty could be the reluctance of some private industry representatives to share company-financed research with competitors.

In the past two years (1968 and 1969) four Road Committees have been established to advise the Regional Foresters in the four regions affected. The location, design and relation of roads to the multiple-use of the forest is presumably the concern of these bodies.

Other advisory bodies include a Condor Advisory Committee established in 1965 to advise in the protection of these birds in California; the Pacific Crest Trail Advisory Council established pursuant to the National Trails System Act of October 2, 1968; and the Advisory Committee on State and Private Forestry, in the process of establishment since 1968. A number of government and industry (or industry and government) committees function to coordinate efforts at fire and pest control for which close cooperation is imperative. These are not technically "advisory" bodies established to advise a government agency but are bodies to which government agencies belong because of their proprietary interests.

National Advisory Committee

The Secretary of Agriculture has a Forest Service Advisory Committee on Multiple Uses of the National Forests. This was established in 1961 and met twice yearly through 1968. One meeting was usually a field trip to several points in a region. By the end of 1968 the terms of twelve of its fifteen members had expired, leaving only three members and they had not been called to meet by September of 1969.

According to the Forest Service responses to the 1969 questionnaire of the House Government Operations Committee, this advisory committee

> "reviewed a wide range of policy issues dealing with a broad spectrum of multiple uses of the National Forests, including planning and management of these areas, user-fee study for livestock, mineral resources on lands reserved from the public domain, wildlife, recreation, conservation education, timber cutting practices, use of motorized equipment, and public safety."

Committee membership reflects a national distribution with considerable representation of university personnel and non-commercial users. The minutes reflect a willingness to consider a range of specific problems and the broadest implications of basic public policy. The agenda can lead to a wide-range discussion. For example, consideration of public safety on logging roads can lead to a discussion of gun control, a controversial topic then being considered by Congress but not directly the concern of a body advising a department on national forests.

NATIONAL FOREST SERVICE - MISCELLANEOUS ADVISORY COMMITTEES

Research Committees

Total number of Research Committees: 10
Total number of members: 158 including 19 government employees
Size of Committees:

Total number	Government employees	Non-government employees
15	2	13
15	1	14
10	1	9
13	1	12
13	2	11
16	2	14
17	2	15
11	4	7
22	4	18
26	0	26

Meetings: 6 meet once a year; 2 meet every two years; 1 meets irregularly; 1 meets every two or three years.

Estimated expenditures range from $500 to $1400. (average: $880)

Road Committees

There are four Road Committees, two established in 1968 and in 1969.
Each has a budget of $1400.
Each meets twice a year
The memberships are: 10 total (4 government, 6 non-government)
10 total (4 government, 6 non-government)
11 total (6 government, 5 non-government)
7 total (3 government, 4 non-government)

Forest Service Advisory Committee on Multiple Use of the National Forests

(Secretary's Office)
Established in 1961.
Meets twice a year.
Estimated expenditure: $7500.
Membership: 15 originally. Terms of 12 expired in 1968, leaving 3 members in August, 1969.

Advisory Committee on State and Private Forestry

Established in 1968.
Membership: 15 have been cleared for membership.

NATIONAL FOREST SERVICE - MISCELLANEOUS ADVISORY COMMITTEES
(continued)

Condor Advisory Committee

Regional Committee established in 1965 with three non-government and two government members.
Estimated expenditure: $280.

Pacific Crest Trail Advisory Council

National Trails System Act of October 2, 1968, provides for trail committees.

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SUMMARY OBSERVATIONS

This review of the use of advisory bodies by agencies administering the public lands indicates a mixed record. On the positive side are these aspects:

Several thousand citizens are brought in closer contact with administrators responsible for implementing public policies for the public lands. While this does not eliminate or supersede the other contacts with the Congress and the executive branch, it does expand the channels of communication.

Government agencies have received information and technical advice not otherwise available. The agencies have also received "feedback" on existing and proposed policies which indicates to some degree citizen reactions to those policies. By this device agencies have had occasions to review their own work and to determine critical issues and potential responses, thereby considering ways of securing more understanding and possibly more public support and voluntary compliance with necessary regulations.

A number of shortcomings in the advisory system also emerge:

1. uneven application
2. unconnected and overlapping structures
3. inflexibilities and rigidities
4. uncertain roles.

1. Uneven application: The overwhelming majority of advisory boards is concerned with grazing. Historic factors provide an explanation for the creation of these boards, but the total dollar value of grazing whether in terms of receipts from the use of public lands or even relative to the livestock industry itself raise questions. If advisory

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boards are useful in grazing and forests, should comparable boards not prove useful also in minerals, petroleum and gas?

2. Unconnected and overlapping structures: The different responsibilities and internal structures of the cabinet departments, bureaus and agencies concerned with the public lands need not be reviewed again here. Since the advisory bodies are established to advise administrative agencies, their divisions and overlappings will found also in the advisory arrangements. This may result in a person, corporation or association serving on both Forest Service and BLM advisory groups. Even within one agency's advisory system, there is often no interconnection. Only the Taylor Act board system has a required linkage between the district, state and national advisory boards memberships, if not agendas. There is no such connection between the Forest Service G-7, G-10, National Forest, Regional or Secretarial committees or the National Park Service boards or the O & C boards of the BLM. Thus systematic and comprehensive consideration of public lands policy alternatives cannot occur through the present arrangement of citizen advisory groups.

3. Inflexibilities and rigidities: Most inflexibility appears to stem from too specific provisions in enabling legislation and administrative regulations. The Taylor Act district advisory boards as constituted perhaps do not even serve the livestock industry well, let alone provide a forum for the various publics concerned with the many and changing uses of the public lands. The state and national boards have been converted to "multiple-use" boards by administrative action but

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Congressional action and probably state legislative action in over a half-dozen Western states may be required to change the district boards. The Granger-Thye Act has locked in the same limited representation in the G-7 and G-10 boards of the Forest Service. Rigidities, then, are found in the specification of membership on several different types of advisory bodies and the implications this has for citizen participation in the determination of the best uses of the public lands.

4. Uncertain roles: It is not always clear what role an individual citizen is to play on an advisory body, what matters an advisory body is to consider, to whom the advice is directed, and what use or weight should be given the advice. Is the citizen to represent himself personally or the view of one segment of the public that has a certain order of priorities? Is the advisory board to follow rather closely an agenda prescribed by the statute or the agency which called it into being or any matters of concern to the members? Is advice given to the administrator for consideration by him and/or his superiors or should an advisory body also urge Congress to act? And if advice is given, need the administrator explain why he has not followed such advice in terms other than that he is the legally responsible authority?

The delicate nature of the role of citizen advisory bodies is suggested by the questions raised above. Citizens should participate and administrators need their advice. A careful balancing is required if the public nature of this relationship with the personal and almost private nature of giving advice by those not legally responsible for the consequences of such advice.

SOME ALTERNATIVES

The creation of citizen advisory bodies must rest upon the assumption that the advice of some private citizens will be of value in:

helping to arrive at a choice of alternative policies.

securing ideas for new policies.

developing public understanding and compliance.

Presumably this could be of benefit to all public land agencies at their several levels. The exact mixture of these and other purposes cannot be prescribed by law nor can legislation insure wise counsel or sensitive administration. However, a review of some alternative systems, alternative legal foundations, alternative operational arrangement and alternative procedures could assist in constructing more optimal arrangements of citizen advisory bodies.

Alternative Systems of Advisory Bodies

1. Continue the present system of a number of boards advising the several departments and agencies at the several levels, some interconnected, others not.

2. Create by statute one comprehensive system of boards to advise all agencies with public lands responsibilities of all types - minerals, petroleum, gas as well as grazing, timber and parks.

   a. One national advisory board could combine at least the present National Advisory Board Council of the BLM, the National Park Service Advisory Board and the Forest Service Advisory Committee on Multiple Use of the National Forests (Secretary's Office).

This new body could advise at the Departmental and Congressional level on broad general policies and would probably require a small staff of its own.

b. Several regional boards could combine and replace some of the present bodies and create some additional ones to provide complete geographic coverage.

c. Local or operating unit boards could be created by combining and replacing many existing boards.

d. Ad hoc advisory bodies could be created at all levels on a temporary basis as the need arose.

3. Create one national advisory council with comprehensive responsibilities and probably a small staff (comparable to 2a above). Regional and local bodies would remain unchanged although the possibilities of reducing, combining and coordinating them would be vigorously explored.

4. Require by statute that departments modify their present system to systematize within their departments and interrelate beyond their departments a coordinated advisory system.

Alternative Legal Foundations

1. Statutory provisions may be mandatory, permissive, non-existent or, theoretically, prohibitive. Administrations are told by Congress they "shall" have advisory boards under the Taylor and Granger-Thye acts. These statutes go on to spell out details of membership, selection and operation.

Statutes can provide that an administrator "may" establish advisory bodies. In this case, no further details may be provided, or, the administrator may be closely guided in the details of membership, selection and operation.

Unless prohibited by law, an unlikely circumstance, administrators presumably can establish advisory bodies at their discretion. Once again, general statutes could prescribe their membership, selection and operation if such bodies were created.

Thus, statutes can and do play a role in the initial establishment and/or in the details of operation. It its creation is mandatory, the advisory body does obtain a permanence and a status that seems to enhance its authority. This can insure a continuity through a change of administrators and guarantee to the citizenry and to the Congress that certain voices will have a chance to speak, if not to be heeded.

On the other hand, this permanence may lock in certain undesirable features if the statutes are too specific, for example in listing the "interests" to be represented on the boards. The several uses of the public lands may change more rapidly than Congressional recognition through amendments. The emergence of the hobby of "rock hounding" or the desire for vacation homes in the desert could not be anticipated in the 1930's or 1940's.

In providing for any of the alternative advisory systems listed above, Congress could include itself in the formal reporting process by requiring that minutes and other actions be filed with a Congressional officer or committee.

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2. Administrative regulations. In all cases bodies advising an administrative agency, whether provided for specifically by statute or not, are governed by administrative regulations. Certain rules apply to all departments, most notably Executive Order 11007. This pertains to almost every phase of the operation of advisory groups: appointment, terms of service, the role of public employees in the conducting and recording of the meetings, the agenda and the role of these bodies as advisory to the administration. Similarly, the applicability of conflict of interest regulations to the members of advisory groups must be considered.

Departmental orders, circulars and manuals also provide important legal foundations for advisory groups. Some orders create or reconstitute advisory groups to meet changing circumstances and to implement new policies. Examples include the 1948 orders of the Interior Department reconstituting the state O & C board and creating district O & C boards, the addition of non-livestock members to the state and national advisory boards to the BLM regarding the grazing lands resulting in their becoming multiple-use rather than grazing advisory boards, and the scores of national forest multiple-use advisory bodies.

The flexibility of administrative action can be bought at the price of impermanence. A case in point appears to be the Secretary of Agriculture's Advisory Council on the Multiple-Use of the National Forests, which if not a casualty of the change of administrations, has lost some momentum by not meeting thus far in 1969. The goal should be to provide a legal basis with the solidity of a Congressional statute and the flexibility of an administrative order.

Alternative Operational Arrangements

1. Membership of an advisory body will depend upon what is perceived to be the basic purpose of the body. If it is to give technical advice, e.g., Forest Research Advisory Council, the qualifications for membership could be stated objectively with relative ease. Well-organized interests will by definition make their views known to the several branches of government with or without special representation on advisory boards.

Membership can be prescribed in detail by statute or left to the discretion of the administrator. In present practice, some advisory board members are "elected" by specified user interests, some are appointed to "represent" a particular viewpoint and others selected largely for their personal qualifications. Not only must the several categories of "interests" be recognized but so too must regional, political and even partisan interests of the President, his cabinet and the Congress be taken into account.

Whatever the formal affiliations of the citizen member of an advisory body, he must decide for himself to what extent he is to use his own judgment or to represent an interest. If he is "elected" by a user group he may feel an obligation to be their spokesman for several reasons: because that is "why" he is on the board, because he too shares their interests or because he may fear not being "re-elected". The same would apply to the member who is publically identified as a board member representing a certain interest, even though not nominated formally by them. Membership composed largely of persons with such an "interest" commitment may merely institutionalize conflict and deadlock the advisory body, if not the agency, in doctrinaire and fruitless debates.

An especially delicate issue could be the appointment of staff members of trade or user associations to advisory bodies or state employees such as of fish and game commissions. On the one hand is their technical expertise which is often unparalleled. On the other is the possibility that such paid spokesmen may create "trouble" or exaggerate differences in order to convince their association members how crucial the continuation of their particular association may be.

The search for "public members" as distinguished from "user" members ("user" need not be merely the commercial user but could include sports fishermen, hikers, rock hounds, summer home owners and the like) often leads administrators to seek local government officials or educators. County commissioners seem to be a favorite source of "public" members. While such officials are often elected to county office on local issues unrelated to public land policy, they at least have been elected and have had their views more or less inspected by the public. And, just as the livestock man who is "elected", the county official has reason to give thought to the best interests of the county as a whole even if it is seldom completely a single, narrow interest.

Educators can be as narrow as any representative of a user interest. But, again, there is the probability that by training and profession and the source of immediate livelihood will give the educator a somewhat broader perspective in many instances.

Another aspect of membership is the tie-in or lack of it between different levels of boards. The BLM National Advisory Board Council includes some grazing representatives who are on state and district boards as well. There is no comparable carry-over from the local to regional levels in the O & C boards or the Forest Service committees. Thus the members, except as the administrators or the interest groups to which they belong inform them, may be unaware of issues being considered at the other levels. This could result in the loss of additional judgments and perspectives that would be useful to the agencies.

If the intelligent, concerned but inexperienced citizen is to be recruited for useful membership, some provision for his orientation must be made.

2. Orientation. The proper use of advisory bodies is an art and a science. There is no one pattern administrators or board members should follow to utilize the advisory system effectively. However, some things can be learned, perhaps especially about what not to do. Therefore, it would seem that administrators who might profit from the availability of an advisory body should be prepared in this field.

In-service training for administrators could enable those skilled in their use to share their experiences and insights. This could provide specific and systematic training for those who are assuming greater administrative responsibilities (these persons will likely have already attended advisory meetings when in a junior capacity).

Intra-departmental programs would not only enrich the perspective of those traditionally using such bodies but could open the possibility of the expanded use of this device of citizen participation and administrative enrichment into other areas, for example in the oil and gas activities of the Interior Department.

Inter-departmental in-service training at the national, regional and field levels would also be of considerable benefit. Presently some citizens serve on both BLM and Forest Service committees. Both agencies are concerned with very comparable problems of finding appropriate representation, technical advice and public understanding. Perhaps by contracting with a university or other nonprofit institution related agencies could provide a common training experience without the duplication of programs or subordination implied if one department or agency conducted the program.

Orientation of the citizen member of advisory bodies is also a requisite to their success. This is important for new members and especially so for non-user, "public" members who often lack the technical competence to participate effectively in meetings. Rather than devote valuable meeting time to this orientation of the new members (and there are almost always new members), special orientation sessions should be scheduled. Again, as one way of avoiding the charge of "indoctrination" and of saving some time for agency personnel, this could be done nationally or regionally by a university under contract with the agency to provide this service.

3. Staff Assistance. If advisory bodies are to be little more than mere "rubber stamps" approving rather uncritically all that is served up by the agency, there is little point to having them. On the other hand, to exercise independent judgments requires a basic knowledge

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of the technical aspects of the policies involved. Representatives from well-financed and established interest groups may already possess the basic information or be able to obtain it privately, an unsure guarantee that the public interest will thereby be served. Perhaps the members representing the "general public" will be adequately informed by witnessing the sparring among the well-informed. But not if the well-informed don't happen to be in conflict and are even acting in concert under a "sweetheart" arrangement. For example, labor and management could be united in support of a timber policy and conservation groups have been dominated by electrical utilities.

To provide regular, or "on request", technical assistance to advisory body members without creating more confusion of responsibilities or expanding the ranks of government employees may be difficult. One possibility might be something comparable to the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress. Another might be to secure assistance from the staff of a national public lands advisory board. A carefully planned survey of members of existing advisory bodies could reveal something of the depth of the need.

4. Meetings. The frequency of meetings must be the result of experience that balances the limitations on time that can be donated by the citizen or expended by the agency. Emergencies have increased the number of meetings such as when regulations are being revised and have, on other occasions, caused cancellation such as when forest fires preempt the administrator's attention. While rather casual in scheduling, the present boards seem to enjoy adequate flexibility in scheduling.

Although twice a year seems a minimum, if membership of local, regional and national groups overlap, some citizens will have to donate a considerable amount of time.

The length of meetings will vary. National bodies will meet for longer periods if less frequently. Some local groups meet only for three or four hours a year, perhaps long enough, but the burden of proof would be on the convener of such a meeting to prove that significant exchanges of views took place.

There seems to be no particular effort to notify the public at large of meetings of these _public_ advisory bodies. This may be a missed opportunity to develop public awareness and understanding. However, a gallery packed with one interest may make "advising" difficult if not hazardous. As noted earlier, the giving and receiving of advice is a delicate operation.

5. The Agenda. Agenda-making at present seems to involve various degrees of consultation. Some matters may be prescribed by law (proposed rule changes, appeals), others will be routine and recurring matters (e.g., range allotments). Even if the agenda is completely in control of the administrator, discussion can bring in other matters, by accident or design. The skilled administrator must draw the line between keeping the agenda moving on matters appropriate to a body advising an administrative agency and stifling free discussion that may include some unwelcome but deserved criticisms. The advisors may have to be reminded that they are _not_ administrators themselves and that they are _not_ advising

Congress, state legislators, or other agencies. The channels of communication must be kept clear.

Agendas should blend in national, regional and local concerns. The public lands belong to all of the people and policies must be considered in this light. Concern for a single use of the prosperity of local communities should not dominate nor should grandiose schemes good for all mankind but harmful to all specific persons. It is rather simple to state this point, difficult to carry it out in practice. The need for some inter-connection between the several levels and several agencies is thus once again illustrated.

Alternative Procedures

What form does "advice" to the administrators take? One obvious form is to vote approval and support for actions already taken or decisions actually, if not formally, arrived at. Another is to give the advice by simply discussing the several aspects of the issue from the perspectives of the advisors. In this situation, "votes" would not be taken and "motions" seldom made. Again, the administrator's personal style will be the controlling factor on whether votes, a consensus or sense of the meeting decision is arrived at or no effort at an agreed-on conclusion is sought. Whatever the style, members should feel their views have been heard and considered. It must be clearly understood that however the advice of the body is expressed - vote, consensus, general discussion - that the administrator is responsible and may accept or reject the advice given.

The public record of the meetings of advisory bodies need not be a verbatim account under present regulations. However, something more than a report that various items "were considered" or were discussed is needed. This will aid the public in general, new administrators assuming their posts and new advisors. That there may be additional costs involved or that years may pass before anyone reads the records are not persuasive reasons for overly brief summaries. Differences of opinions are to be expected and should be recorded. An atmosphere of friendly dissent should prevail so that detailed minutes will not embarrass dissenters into silence. A too-often unanimous advisory board should be looked at carefully.

The distribution of minutes should be to members, other levels of the Department involved, cognate departments, organizations known to be interested, private persons requesting them and the several media of communication. Very possibly members of local and regional advisory bodies should receive the minutes of those higher than theirs to help understand better the context within which they operate.

The suggestion earlier that orientation sessions for new members be held regionally or nationally recommends that occasional (infrequent but regular) meetings of all advisors be held. At the present time well-organized and financed interests meet and, no doubt, the tax laws encourage this. Since administrators also necessarily gather frequently this leaves only the general public (non-specific user) members without the opportunity to gather, exchange ideas and formulate plans to support programs they deem "advisable". This is not to presume simplistically that a community of interest of non-specific users would emerge -- or

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should. But it is to suggest that the federal government in effect (and perhaps inadvertently) encourages pressure group activities, even subsidizes them, and that an extension of the same privilege is in order. Provisions for "orientation" by non-governmental institutions such as universities would help guard against the development of a "kept" lobby to some extent.

There are various answers to the question of what is done with the advice once it is given. The Granger-Thye Act which requires an explanation in writing of the reasons for rejecting certain advice provides one possible model. But once again is raised the entire question of the value and purpose of an advisory system. If the advice is regularly ignored or rejected, why have advisors? If the advice is always heeded, is the administrator abdicating his responsibility to a private group? Or is he cleverly manipulating them by having them advise him to do what he was going to do anyway? What if the administrator is eager to carry out the suggestions of his advisors but finds his supervisors or Congress to be the obstacle? Should he then encourage his advisors to pressure these other decision-makers, or would this be insubordination?

There are no final answers to these questions. There is no one set of choices among the alternatives listed that will always be preferable. The advisory board concept is as dynamic as the American democracy and has comparable potential for good or ill.

ATTACHMENT A

Executive Order 11007

PRESCRIBING REGULATIONS FOR THE FORMATION AND USE OF ADVISORY COMMITTEES

WHEREAS the departments and agencies of the Government frequently make use of advisory committees; and

WHEREAS the information, advice and recommendations obtained through advisory committees are beneficial to the operations of the Government; and

WHEREAS it is desirable to impose uniform standards for the departments and agencies of the Government to follow in forming and using advisory committees in order that such committees shall function at all times in consonance with the antitrust and conflict of interest laws:

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes, and as President of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. The regulations prescribed in this order for the formation and use of advisory committees shall govern the departments and agencies of the Government to the extent not inconsistent with specific law.

SEC. 2. As used herein,

(a) The term "advisory committee" means any committee, board, commission, council, conference, panel, task force, or other similar group, or any subcommittee or other subgroup thereof, that is formed by a department or agency of the Government in the interest of obtaining advice or recommendations, or for any other purpose, and that is not composed wholly of officers or employees of the Government. The term also includes any committee, board, commission, council, conference, panel, task force, or other similar group, or any subcommittee or other subgroup thereof, that is not formed by a department or agency, but only during any period when it is being utilized by a department or agency in the same manner as a Government-formed advisory committee.

(b) The term "industry advisory committee" means an advisory committee composed predominantly of members or representatives of a single industry or group of related industries, or of any subdivision of a single industry made on a geographic, service or product basis.

SEC. 3. No advisory committee shall be formed or utilized by any department or agency unless

(a) specifically authorized by law or

(b) specifically determined as a matter of formal record by the head of the department or agency to be in the public interest in connection with the performance of duties imposed on that department or agency by law.

SEC. 4. Unless specifically authorized by law to the contrary, no committee shall be utilized for functions not solely advisory, and determinations of action to be taken with respect to matters upon which an advisory committee advises or recommends shall be made solely by officers or employees of the Government.

end of each subsequent two-year period to continue the existence of such committee thereafter. For the purpose of this section, the date of formation of an advisory committee in existence on the date of publication of this order shall be deemed to be July 1, 1960, or the actual date of its formation, whichever is later.

Sec. 9. The requirements of this order shall not apply:

(a) to any advisory committee for which Congress by statute has specified the purpose, composition and conduct unless and to the extent such statute authorizes the President to prescribe regulations for the formation or use of such committee;

(b) to any advisory committee composed wholly of representatives of State or local agencies or charitable, religious, educational, civic, social welfare, or other similar nonprofit organizations;

(c) to any local, regional, or national committee whose sole function is the dissemination of information for public agencies, or to any local civic committee whose primary function is that of rendering a public service other than giving advice or making recommendations to the Government.

Sec. 10. (a) Each department and agency utilizing advisory committees shall publish in its annual report, or otherwise publish annually, a list of such committees, including the names and affiliations of their members, a description of the function of each committee and a statement of the dates of its meetings: *Provided*, that the head of the department or agency concerned may waive this requirement where he determines that such annual publication would be unduly costly or impracticable, but shall make such information available, upon request, to the Congress, the President, or the Attorney General.

(b) A copy of each such report shall be furnished to the Attorney General, and all records and files of advisory committees, including agenda, transcripts or notes of meetings, studies, analyses, reports or other data compilations or working papers, made available to or prepared by or for any such advisory committee, shall be made available, upon request by the Attorney General, to his duly authorized representatives, subject to such security restrictions as may be properly imposed on the materials involved.

Sec. 11. This order supersedes the directive of February 2, 1959, entitled "Standards and Procedures for the Utilization of Public Advisory Committees by Government Departments and Agencies," and all provisions of prior Executive orders to the extent they are inconsistent herewith.

John F. Kennedy

The White House,
February 26, 1962.

[F.R. Doc. 62-2073, Filed, Feb. 27, 1962; 11:34 a.m.]

Published in 27 F.R. 1875 - February 28, 1962

SEC. 5. Each industry committee shall be reasonably representative of the group of industries, the single industry, or the geographical, service, or product segment thereof to which it relates, taking into account the size and function of business enterprises in the industry or industries, and their location, affiliation, and competitive status, among other factors. Selection of industry members shall, unless otherwise provided by statute, be limited to individuals actively engaged in operations in the particular industry, industries, or segments concerned, except where the department or agency head deems such limitations would interfere with effective committee operation.

SEC. 6. The meetings of an advisory committee formed or used by a department or agency shall be subject to the following rules:

(a) No meeting shall be held except at the call of, or with the advance approval of, a full-time salaried officer or employee of the department or agency, and with an agenda formulated or approved by such officer or employee.

(b) All meetings shall be under the chairmanship, or conducted in the presence of, a full-time salaried officer or employee of the Government who shall have the authority and be required to adjourn any meeting whenever he considers adjournment to be in the public interest.

(c) For advisory committees other than industry advisory committees, minutes of each meeting shall be kept which shall, as a minimum, contain a record of persons present, a description of matters discussed and conclusions reached, and copies of all reports received, issued, or approved by the committee. The accuracy of all minutes shall be certified to by a full-time salaried officer or employee of the Government present during the proceedings recorded.

(d) A verbatim transcript shall be kept of all proceedings at each meeting of an industry advisory committee, including the names of all persons present, their affiliation, and the capacity in which they attend: *Provided*, that where the head of a department or agency formally determines that a verbatim transcript would interfere with the proper functioning of such a committee or would be impracticable, and that waiver of the requirement of a verbatim transcript is in the public interest, he may authorize in lieu thereof the keeping of minutes which shall, as a minimum, contain a record of persons present, a description of matters discussed and conclusions reached, and copies of all reports received, issued, or approved by the committee. The accuracy of all minutes shall be certified to by a full-time salaried officer or employee of the Government present during the proceedings recorded.

(e) Industry advisory committees shall not be permitted to receive, compile, or discuss data or reports showing the current or projected commercial operations of identified business enterprises.

(f) In the case of advisory committees other than industry advisory committees, the department or agency head may waive compliance with any requirement contained in subsection (a), (b) or (c) of this section when he formally determines that compliance therewith would interfere with the proper functioning of such a committee or would be impracticable, that adequate provisions are otherwise made to insure that committee operation is subject to Government control and purpose, and that waiver of the requirement is in the public interest.

SEC. 7. The head of each department or agency sponsoring an advisory committee may prescribe additional regulations, consistent with the provisions and purposes of this order, to govern the formation or use of such committees, or the appointment of members thereof.

SEC. 8. An advisory committee whose duration is not otherwise fixed by law shall terminate not later than two years from the date of its formation unless the head of the department or agency by which it is utilized determines in writing not more than sixty days prior to the expiration of such two-year period that its continued existence is in the public interest. A like determination by the department or agency head shall be required not more than sixty days prior to the

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ATTACHMENT B

CONCLUSIVE ACTIONS OF THE O&C ADVISORY BOARD
FEBRUARY 11, 1938 -- MAY 14, 1965

[From Interior Department Files]

The following is a summary of the recommendations and proposals of the O&C Advisory Board since its creation as the O&C Advisory Committee in 1938. Omitted are expressions of satisfaction with work programs and the programs on continuing actions; for the most part, only final recommendations are included. Not all of the O&C Advisory Board meetings were held in Portland, but no meeting held away from Portland yielded any of the proposals included herein.

At the February 11, 1939, meeting the committee recommended an eight-point policy with respect to grazing on the)&C lands. Specific proposals included recommendations that grazing be regarded as incidental to continuous timber production in the commercial timber stands of the coastal area, while those lands with little forest cover or unsuitable for afforestation be surveyed with the view toward developing them for grazing if practicable.

Following the act of Congress of July 31, 1939, providing for exchanges of O&C lands for Federal, State, county or private lands, the committee at its September 23, 1939, meeting drew up a recommended policy to be presented to the Department concerning regulations to be prepared under the exchange act. The proposals included: (a) that until the O&C administration had adopted a permanent program of sustained-yield management the present acreage should be retained, (b) that one of the major considerations should be the maintenance of established, dependent communities, (c) that exchanges for scenic or recreational lands should be made only when such lands are related to the general forest management of the area, and (d) that exchanges for watersheds should be limited to those townships in which the O&C administration retained the odd-numbered sections of land.

The committee proposed a method of rating certain factors to be considered in arriving at any formula for use in allocating the future timber supply, at the January 5, 1940, meeting.

On September 20, 1940, the committee met to consider the Department's proposed regulations governing the exchange of O&C and Coos Bay lands; it recommended approval of most of the regulations proposed (a few with minor changes), but decided to redraft several completely.

attach. B cont'd.

A statement of the guiding policy to be followed in developing sustained-yield management agreements within master units was proposed at the committee's meeting of March 28, 1942, and it was agreed that this policy statement should be included together with an outline of the policy on all O&C management activity so the entire program could be considered as a whole. With relation to the proposed Siuslaw Sustained Yield Forest Unit, the committee recommended that since the management plan in the beginning would be concerned only with O&C properties within the forest, emphasis should be placed on the productivity of O&C areas rather than for the unit as a whole.

At the meeting of November 30 and December 1, 1944, the committee made suggestions and recommendations as to the Department's proposed standard form of agreement for use in establishing cooperative sustained-yield management on O&C and intermingled forest lands.

The committee recommended to the Department that it proceed with the establishment of the Siuslaw Master Unit, at its March 22, 1946 meeting. The committee also agreed that local people should be informed of the plans for O&C lands, and so expressed to the Western Forestry and Conservation Association its belief that a special meeting would be helpful and contribute to the furtherance of public understanding of the sustained-yield program of the Forest Service and the General Land Office.

At its January 17, 1948 meeting, the committee developed and recommended a standard for a cooperator under any cooperative agreement and defined what would be required, in O&C timber contracts, under primary processing, including a provision that processing might be permitted in a nearby marketing area so that the marketing areas combined would contain at least two competing plants. In addition, the committee recommended that the State legislature provide for a better distribution of O&C receipts following certain O&C land exchanges.

The reconstituted O&C Advisory Board, at its November 5, 1948 meeting, approved minimum standards for prospective cooperators, approved a proposed amendment to the timber sale regulations with regard to schedule of payments, and recommended to the Department that it join with other agencies in a program for the control of the spruce budworm. In an attempt to solve the problem of the timber buyers' access to the checkerboard O&C lands, the board recommended that the Bureau adopt a policy whereby the owner of a road system who granted to the government the right to permit use of his road system would be accorded the option of oral auction sales in the areas in which the road system was located.

attach. B cont'd.

On March 8, 1949, the board approved a new timber sale procedure whereby an annual program of timber sales would be formulated prior to the beginning of each year for each administrative unit in each district, and agreed that this plan should be put into effect as soon as possible. The board approved a resolution requesting Congress to approve more adequate funds for the administration of the O&C lands and for carrying on cadastral surveys; it also passed a resolution to the State legislature and approved several Federal legislative amendments, including a proposal to authorize acquisition of rights-of-way and acquisition and construction of timber access roads. Certain exchange proposals were approved, but the board would not endorse a provision for the exchange of timber for land.

At the meeting of October 7, 1949, the board declined to approve the proposed right-of-way regulations, but rather agreed to defer final recommendation until after the upcoming meeting of the joint committee of the West Coast Lumbermen's Association and the Pacific Northwest Loggers Association. An attempt, which failed, was made to remove requirements, under)&C mining regulations, (a) of describing the claim by legal subdivision when filing, and (b) that a mining claim locator obtain a permit before cutting timber.

The board approved the right-of-way regulations as drafted by the Bureau and revised by the board's subcommittee, at its November 29, 1949, meeting.

On July 7, 1950, the board made suggestions as to bidder qualifications, urging that penalties for contract violations be strengthened and that more vigorous enforcement actions against trespass cutting of timber be instituted.

At the December 19, 1950 meeting, the board agreed that a new approach to cooperative agreements, involving the negotiation of a joint agreement between the Bureau and the owner of intermingled lands on a ten-year timber development program, appeared worthwhile, and recommended that the Bureau determine its feasibility.

On March 22, 1951, the board endorsed in part and made recommendations in part to the proposed amendments to the O&C Act of 1937, and also approved proposed amendments to the 1939 O&C Exchange Act. The board also recommended that no cooperative sustained-yield agreements which were negotiated prior to promulgation of the June 2, 1948, statement by Assistant Secretary Davidson be approved or put into effect without further hearings in the affected communities.

Fires in 1951 and an epidemic infestation of beetles influenced the actions of the next two meetings. On June 3, 1952, the board recommended that the method of budgeting for fire protection be revised so as to anticipate increases in the cost of protection and to provide a method for reimbursing contracting agencies for the present and future deficits. The board also recommended that the Department be advised of the importance of moving ahead with salvage operations, and made several specific recommendations as to modification or elimination of right-of-way, marketing area, and time restrictions with respect to salvage sales.

At its January 5, 1953 meeting, the board made further recommendations in regard to salvage sales, including waiver of access requirements and authorization of the regional administrator to negotiate smaller sales of salvage material. Again the board resolved that the Bureau of Land Management request enough money in its budget to keep up with the cost of fire protection and to repay previous deficits.

The board recommended that the forester in charge, when he felt competitive interest was lacking, be permitted to sell up to a certain quantity of timber or materials on public lands, at its November 9, 1953 meeting. Here and also at the following meeting of January 20, 1954, the board was concerned with the method of tree measurement; first, a resolution was passed that cruising should be the form of measurement in the pine region, while scaling should be used for all sales in the Douglas-fir region. However, at the latter meeting, a policy statement was drafted to the effect that the Bureau of Land Management would utilize either cruising or scaling, according to which would be the most economical in each case, but that the advantages and disadvantages of each precluded the adoption of either method exclusively. The board also proposed a new definition of salvage timber and changes in regulations as to marketing areas.

At the meeting of January 6, 1955, the board approved for submission to the Bureau the proposed regulations on O&C logging road rights-of-way.

On August 24, 1959, the Board recommended (a) that 10-15 percent of the rehabilitation fund be set aside for reforestation research, with particular reference to protection from animal damage, (b) that the program of cadastral surveys be speeded up to alleviate trespass problems and assist public and private landowners, and (c) the repeal of that portion of the Small Business Act which authorizes the setting aside of government timber for exclusive bidding and sale to "small business" operators as impractical and not able to accomplish the intended result.

The board at its October 19, 1961 meeting, endorsed the action taken by the State Director in computing the allowable cuts of the public domain and the revested lands on a combined basis. The board also went on record as favoring the plan for recreation and scenic recognition in Rogue River. In addition, the board expressed satisfaction with present work standards on O&C lands, and urged that the Bureau of Land Management continue the employment of professional forest engineers for forest road location work.

With the advent of the role of the Bureau of Land Management recreation, the board recommended modifications in access road agreements to relieve the timber buyer of the allocation for recreation, at its February 28, 1962 meeting. Expressing commendation for the work along the Rogue River corridor, the board recommended that funds be provided for similar recreational development work in other Bureau managed areas.

On January 8, 1963, the board recommended that the Bureau be allocated public work funds for access roads to expedite salvage of windblown timber.

At its meeting of May 6, 1963, the board endorsed amended regulations (which had gone into effect April 18, 1963), providing that sales of windblown timber might be made on the scale basis rather than cruise, after defeating a proposal that this regulation be extended to give discretion to the Bureau to permit third party scaling in a general mortality salvage program.

The board on December 16, 1963, recommended that the Bureau provide funds and manpower for a better showing of progress in maintaining monumentation or remonumentation of survey concern within the O&C area and for an effective land exchange program designed to consolidate or "block-up" the O&C lands. The board also agreed that a study of O&C management be undertaken by outside experts for the purpose of defining long-range goals, objectives, and potential from both an economic and socio-economic viewpoint.

The board urged the Department to provide adequate funds for combating the Douglas-fir bark beetle, at its meeting on November 18, 1964, and recommended that the research program on the Douglas-fir beetle be developed at a high level and continued until some final resolution could be obtained. The board also approved the Bureau's objectives for the maintenance and construction of permanent roads on O&C lands, making several recommendations as to keeping maintenance uniform and low in cost and for releasing operators from responsibility for construction of roads in connection with timber sales contracts after inspection and approval within a reasonable period of time.

attach. B cont'd.

The board recommended on May 14, 1965, that the Department reaffirm its publicly announced policy that the O&C and public domain lands in western Oregon be managed as one under a common standard for permanent forest production and under principles of sustained-yield and multiple use.

ATTACHMENT C

Advisory Board Opinion Survey
A Preliminary Report
Donald G. Balmer

The creation of citizen advisory boards continues at an impressive rate in spite of the occasional sharp criticisms by the few scholars who have done intensive research into their operation and in the absence of any systematic study of the views of participating administrators and citizen members. The Public Land Law Review Commission study of the use and role of advisory boards required recent, relevant and reliable information on the actual operation of advisory bodies. At the suggestion of the Director of the Public Land Law Review Commission, three sets of questionnaires were developed and sent over his signature to 624 members of citizen advisory bodies, 145 private organizations and 199 federal administrators, respectively. An excellent response was received and returns were tabulated from 436 members, 92 private groups and 159 administrators. Attention in this report is focused primarily on the views of administrators and members since they have the most actual experience with advisory boards. Copies of the questionnaires for all three groups are attached. These shoe the proportion of responses in each category for each question.

The responses represent replies from:

Interior	Members	Administrators
National Park Service	3	
National Board	3	
Local Park Boards		
Bureau of Land Management		
National Advisory Board Council	19	
State Multiple Use Boards	46	8
State O & C Board	5	
District Grzing Boards	141	53
District O & C Boards	49	5
Unidentified	1	
	267	66
Agriculture (Forest Service)		
Secretary's Advisory Board	11	4
Regional Research Advisory Boards	14	12
Nat'l Forest Multiple Use Advisory Boards	108	41
"G-7" Grazing Boards		2
"G-10" Grazing Boards	1	5
"Grazing" (not distinguished between "7" & "10")	18	10
Unidentified	12	
	164	92

The overwhelming thrust of the responses is supportive of the use of advisory boards and councils. Both members and administrators feel these bodies serve a useful purpose and that they operate in a satisfactory manner. The questionnaries were not quite identical for each of the categories since certain questions were deemed unique to each group. However, about two-thirds of the questions were identical and some interesting variations can be discerned. The information presented in the following discussion is based on answers to the questionnaires.

Membership

Membership in advisory bodies varies depending upon statutes, regulations and customs. These are reviewed in the main study, The Use of Advisory Bodies in the Administration of the Public Lands. Some 67 percent of the members had been appointed since 1961, most know why they were appointed and most received written notice of their appointment or reappointment.

Most (over 80%) administrators solicit suggestions for nominees, although most (67%) also report they are not given suggestions unless they ask private groups for them. Most do not feel unduly limited in their choice of members. "Public" members are most often sought from the ranks of noncommercial users associations, local government officials, or educators, in that order.

Both administrators and members agreed that reappointment is likely unless the member moves or misses meetings. Nonreappointment does not seem to be related to clashes with the dominant interests on the advisory board or with the administrator's policies.

A curious item relates to the matter of orientation to the work of the agency being advised. Only 30% of the administrators reported holding a special orientation session and 55% reported holding none. However, 86% of the members felt they had received an adequate orientation.

Significant differences of opinion emerge regarding who or what the member is to represent. Members felt they should represent people with similar occupational interests rather than their own personal views by a 54%-30% margin with 13% checking both. Administrators, on the other hand, were evenly split, 49% for the personal view and 47% for the occupational view. A further analysis shows that a significant split comes from the BLM district grazing board members who favored the "occupational" over the "personal" viewpoint 113-22 while the Forest Service National Forest Multiple Use Advisory Councils (for individual forests) split 53 for the "personal" view to 39 for the "occupational" interest. A great deal of history is reflected in these data! The role of advisory boards in establishing the rules for grazing on BLM grazing districts when they were first established clearly has had an influence on the members' view of their role.

Differences are also seen in the response to questions on "limitations" on appointments. Members opposed broadening membership, 24% to 69%, while administrators opposed inclusion of groups not now on by only a 49% to 47% margin. If membership were broadened, members favored residency requirements by a 78%-14% margin while administrators opposed this 53% to 44%.

Thus, while membership is valued and some would restrict it, most members generally reported they were only "occasionally" contacted regarding their work on advisory bodies by people in their own occupation, the news media, or anyone, for that matter. However, 79% of the members claim to make efforts themselves to contact others about their work and 50% of the administrators claim that they "frequently" inform the news media in advance of the advisory meetings.

Meetings

Most advisory bodies meet twice a year, although there are variations as noted in this report. The administrators believe the present pattern is adequate by an 86%-11% margin and members are only a little less enthusiastic, 70%-27%. Both groups tend to favor public meetings with members somewhat less divided, 54% to 38% compared with administrators 53% to 46% support. Both agree non-members should be permitted to participate, with members (67% to 28%) slightly less enthusiastic than the administrators (72% to 19%). However, a sharp split occurs on the encouragement of participation by non-members. Members would encourage such participation 47% to 34.3% while adminstrators oppose such encouragement 61% to 29%! Now in a question asked only of administrators regarding the presence of non-members, 39% felt this impaired the meeting, 39% replied this enhanced the meetings and 17% saw no effect.

There seems to be general agreement by both members and administrators that the agendas be open to suggestions before the meetings and during the meetings. Members feel that background materials are provided well in advance (60% "frequently"; 32% "occasionally"; 5% "never") while administrators feel they are somewhat less involved as a supplier of such material (33% "frequently"; 59% "occasionally"; 8% "never"). Administrators feel that most members (68%) or all members (12%) have the background to contibute to the agenda while 67% of the members believe that "occasionally" "some members" do not have the technical competence to participate effectively in the meetings. There is generally a

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limit to the amount of "homework" a citizen will do, but these data could mean that there is a need for more "orientation".

Members believe that the meetings deal frequently (84%) with issues of central importance to the agency in a process of partnership wherein the administrators lead and the members more often "add constructively" than merely "go along" with the administrator. The manner in which the "advice" of the advisory body is arrived at is perceived almost identically by the administrators and the members with 54% of the administrators and 55% of the members agreeing that "frequently" the procedure is to seek a "consensus" or "sense of the meeting". The members more frequently report that votes are taken (59%) than do the administrators (43%). There seems to be general satisfaction with the form and content of the minutes of the meetings.

Role of Advisory Bodies

There were identical sections of eleven questions in the survey on the role of advisory bodies which called for responses of: 1) strongly agree, 2) agree, 3) no opinion, 4) disagree, 5) strongly disagree. All of the questions found the members and administrators in general agreement. However, there were some differences that are of interest. For example, 97% of the members saw advisory bodies as "useful additions to the process of representative government" while 89% of the administrators agreed. But administrators were less willing than members to call them "window dressing" by a 4% to 15% margin.

Both groups agreed that both administrators and members were important to the success of the advisory system. Understandably, each sees its own role as somewhat more important. Administrators stressed the importance of the skills of the administrator 84% to 72% of the members. The importance of the members was stressed by 84% of both groups, but 39% of the members gave a "1" ranking while 27% of the administrators gave the "1" ranking to the role of the members. The same agreement and slight differentiation is found in the responses to the question on the role of advisory bodies in reinforcing the "public" character of government agencies.

It was also agreed that they help the administrators anticipate public reactions to alternative policies, that the meetings of the advisory bodies are occasions requiring public agencies to review their programs, and they are no substitute for other channels of communications with government including contacts with Congress. On this last point the administrators are more emphatic than the members by a 94% to 81% margin.

A very interesting variation is that 75% of the administrators feel that advisory bodies are actually used in choosing among alternative

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public policies compared to 60% of the members. It may be because of this that administrators and members disagree so drastically on whether or not advisory bodies should be required by law. Members favor such a requirement 69% to 25%, while administrators oppose it 66% to 27%. This is an important point when considering the future of advisory systems.

Conclusions

The long established channels of participation in the governing process, which are reflected by the 500,000 to 800,000 elective offices in America, will remain the backbone of our constitutional democracy. But the appointment of millions of citizens to advisory boards represents a recognition of the need for a continuing effort to improve the democratic process. Too often this has been done haphazardly with little thought for a serious expansion of the democratic process or for providing a flexible instrumentality of government. The Selective Service System and some of the anti-poverty program efforts are currently under attack for failing to do this.

It can be expected that the public lands will receive increasing attention from the noncommercial using public, a public which is clearly capable of asserting considerable power over public policy. The intelligent use of advisory bodies can contribute to the constructive efforts of "old" and "new" groups, which will not be content for long with mere facades. They are demanding real and effective participation.

To discover what constitutes and contributes to a successful citizen advisory system for the public lands is an important task. The data now in hand can contribute to that understanding.

Unfinished Analyses

Much of these useful data remain to be analyzed. For example, this report indicates that there are significant differences of opinion between BLM grazing board members and Forest Service multiple use advisory board members. An analysis that separates out members and administrators by agency is a first step in establishing a composite picture of the different types of members and administrators. Further comparisons can also be made of members' attitudes, for example, between Forest Service and BLM "grazing boards", O & C boards and other Interior Department boards, multiple-use boards of the BLM and the Forest Service, and local, regional and national boards. The same can be done for administrators in the above combinations. Another set of comparisons could check the perceptions of members and administrators of the same types of boards.

A review of the responses from private groups may also prove informative. Generally, their responses tend to agree with the main points outlined in this report. On issues where administrators responded differently from members, the private groups seemed to fall in between . Because of the variety of types of groups returning questionnaires, some sorting out of respondents may be warranted; for example, the views of mining groups or differences between cattle and sheep associations or the differences among "conservation" and "outdoor recreation" groups may be of interest.

NOTE: FIGURES DO NOT ALWAYS ADD UP
TO 100% since some did not
respond to a particular
question.

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PRIVATE GROUPS AND ASSOCIATIONS

A. Regarding MEMBERSHIP in advisory bodies (please use a separate form for each type of advisory body if you wish to reflect different views on the different types):

1. To what type of advisory body do your answers below apply:

____

____

2. Does your group have a member on this type of body now:

68% yes 30% no;

in the past: 60% yes 23% no.

If yes, was he a 13% paid staff employee, 53% member,

or 8% both. 26% - none checked

3. Do you consider the size of the ____________ council/board/committee to be:

90% about right 8% too large 2% too small

4. Do you consider the composition of the membership to include:

28% too few from your area of concern

20% too many of one type of interest

8% too many with no special interest or reason to be on the body

Other comments on the composition of the membership: ____

____

____

5. Regarding the technical competence of the membership:

72% generally adequate

11% too often inadequate

General comments about the type of member likely to make the least contribution to the work of the advisory body and the agency:____

____

____

6. Should elected state or local officers be on such bodies?

39% yes 32% no 28% rarely

7. Should salaried employees of state or local government be on such bodies?

33% yes 31% no 27% rarely

8. Should salaried employees of trade associations be on such bodies?

47% yes 35% no 14% rarely

9. Is membership sought after by any groups you know of:

43% yes 45% no

10. Is the fact that a person is a member of an advisory body widely known by groups with which he is associated?

59% yes 29% no; by other people or groups? 40% yes 39% no

11. What type of member is least likely to be reappointed?

35% indifferent 53% hostile to the agency

10% hostile to dominant interests

B. Regarding MEETINGS of advisory bodies:

1. Are meetings frequent enough?

   51% yes   1% too frequent   33% not frequent enough

2. Are meetings adequately publicized?

   60% yes   27% no

3. Are the agendas for the meetings known to your group in advance?

   56% yes   29% no

4. Are the meetings public?

   48% yes   33% no

5. Should they be public?

   56% yes   23% no

6. Does your group have a representative other than a member of the advisory body present at meetings?

   24% frequently   33% seldom   25% never

7. Is this representative a staff person 17% or a member 24%

   or both 18% ?

8. Is he allowed to participatein the discussion even if not a member of the advisory body?

   45% yes   13% no

9. Should participation in the meetings by nonmembers generally be permitted?

   81% yes   12% no;   encouraged? _____ yes   _____ no.

10. Do the agendas deal with the real issues?

65% frequently 17% seldom — never

11. Is advice genuinely sought by the agencies?

57% frequently 23% seldom 4% never

12. Should advice be given 35% via the discussion itself or

17% via a vote on specific issues?

33% both checked

13. Is the advice, however given, followed by the agencies?

53% frequently 25% seldom 1% never

14. Do you expect members of your group who are on such advisory bodies to consult with your group on relevant issues before the advisory body?

90% yes 15% no

15. Do you keep your membership at large informed of the work of the advisory body?

68% yes 19% no

16. Do you keep your executive committee informed of the work of the advisory body?

76% yes 5% no

17. Suggestions for improvements of advisory body meetings:

____

____

____

____

C. Regarding the ROLE of advisory bodies:

1. Place before each of the statements below the number which most closely fits your opinion of advisory bodies: 1 strongly agree, 2 agree, 3 no opinion, 4 disagree, 5 strongly disagree

1	2	3	4	5	
73%	23%	1%	2%	—	They can be useful additions to the process of representative government.
9%	19%	13%	37%	18%	They are mainly window dressing.
28%	57%	3%	9%	1%	Their usefulness depends heavily on the skills of the administrator.
45%	41%	9%	4%	1%	Their usefulness depends heavily upon the personality and skills of the members.
32%	53%	6%	9%	—	They tend to bring into the open some of the diverse interests favoring differing public policies.
39%	43%	8%	1%	1%	They can reinforce the "public" character of government agencies that might have a tendency to become "in-bred" or tied too closely to specific interests.
18%	60%	15%	3%	—	They help the administrator anticipate public reactions to alternative policies.
3%	29%	19%	37%	11%	They actually decide among alternative courses of action.
22%	67%	3%	2%	3%	They at least require the agency to gather its thougts, review its work and prepare for questions from the "outside".
47%	44%	2%	3%	—	They do not substitute for or reduce the need for other contacts with governmental agencies including Congress.

NOTE: FIGURES DO NOT ALWAYS ADD UP TO 100% Since some did not respond to a particular question.

PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D. C.

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR ADMINISTRATORS

A. Regarding MEMBERSHIP in advisory bodies:

1. What is the title of the advisory body?

____

2. What is the size of this advisory body?

__________ present size __________ optimal size

3. Do you solicit suggestions of nominees formally or informally for membership?

28% formally 28% informally 20% both 19% don't solicit at all.

If so, from whom? ______________________________

____

4. Do private groups suggest names to you without your asking?

28% yes 67% no.

5. Do you consider officials (employees) of trade associations for membership?

48% yes 42% no.

6. Which of these limit your range of choices for appointments to advisory bodies? (check all appropriate items)

38% statutes

53% administrative regulations

26% technical competence

27% availability of citizens with "free time"

7. Do limitations of traditions and precedents limit your range of choices for appointments to advisory bodies?

13% definitely yes 28% somewhat 55% no

8. Should there be limitations on appointments to advisory bodies?

14% yes 39% no

If so, should there be residency requirements? — yes — no;

a prohibition on some classes of people? — yes — no,

and if so, what classes?____________________

9. Should the membership of the present advisory body be broadened to include representation from groups not now on the body?

47% yes 49% no

If so, what groups? ____________________

10. Do you "clear" appointments with:

41% state or regional supervisor

14% Washington, D. C. office

— congressional delegation

36% – none

11. Rank from 1 to 4 the sources from which "public" members are selected according to your practice: (most = 1, least = 4)

1	2	3	4	none checked	
18%	11%	7%	17%	48%	local government officials
8%	19%	16%	9%	48%	educators
4%	8%	13%	28%	37%	media (press, TV)
35%	8%	9%	9%	38%	non-commercial users association members or staff

12. In your view, a member is to (check one):

47% represent a particular interest or point of view of users concerned with your agency.

49% represent his own personal judgment as an intelligent informed citizen

13. Reasons for lack of reappointment:

No longer in the area (moved, died, etc.)

9% frequently 65% occasionally 3% never

Non-attendance at meetings

4% frequently 54% occasionally 16% never

Loss of interest

4% frequently 43% occasionally 27% never

Need for different views

6% frequently 38% occasionally 25% never

Ineffective participation even though regular attendee

2% frequently 39% occasionally 31% never

14. Members appointed are:

Formally notified in writing of their appointment 93% yes 3% no

Formally notified of reappointment 75% yes 9% no

Given a special orientation session 30% yes 55% no

B. Regarding MEETINGS of advisory bodies:

1. Frequency of regularly scheduled meetings of this advisory body.

18% annual 65% 2 a year other 16%

56% = annual

2. How many of these meetings are field trips? 19% = none

3. Are you satisfied with the frequency of regularly scheduled meetings?

86% yes 11% no should be _____ meetings per year

4. How many hours, other than field trips, are spent in meetings?

_____hours per meeting _____hours per year

5. Are you satisfied with the time available for meetings?

94% yes 5% no should be _______________

6. Are you satisfied with attendance at the meetings?

83% yes 17% no

7. Are the meetings public? 53% yes 46% no

8. Should they be public? 52% yes 43% no

9. Should attendance by nonmembers be encouraged?

48% yes 49% no

10. Should participation by nonmembers be encouraged? 29% yes 61% no

permitted 72% yes 19% no

11. What impact does (would) the presence of nonmembers have on the effectiveness of an advisory body?

39% impair 39% enhance 17% no effect

12. Are the news media informed in advance of your meetings?

50% frequently 32% occasionally 17% never

13. Are the news media informed of what happened at the meetings?

48% frequently 44% occasionally 6% never

14. Who usually presides over the meetings?

35% agency representative 51% citizen member

C. The AGENDA of meetings:

1. Do members have the background to contribute to making the agenda?

68% most do 12% all do 20% most do not

2. Do you ask for suggestions for the agenda before the meeting? 83% yes 16% no

3. If yes, do members respond?

31% frequently 53% occasionally 1% never

4. Are items not on the agenda brought up for discussion by members during the meetings?

48% frequently 51% occasionally — never

Example from past three years:____________________________

____

5. Are background materials sent out with the agenda before the meetings?

33% frequently 59% occasionally 8% never

6. Does the agenda deal with
national policies as well as regional/local

33% frequently 61% occasionally 6% never

the broad range of agency activities

51% frequently 44% occasionally 4% never

one or two pressing items

55% frequently 39% occasionally 3% never

D. Arriving at the advice to be given the administrators:

1. Are votes taken on agenda items?

43% frequently 30% occasionally 26% never

2. Is the procedure to seek a consensus or "sense of the meeting: agreement?

55% frequently 33% occasionally 9% never

3. Is the procedure to have the presiding officer summarize the proceedings without implying agreement?

26% frequently 50% occasionally 20% never

4. Which do you prefer?

33% voting

33% seeking a consensus

24% summarizing all views

5. Do the minutes

51% reflect the meeting's range of opinions or

40% simply summarize actions taken.

6. Are the minutes usually sent to state/regional offices?

78% yes 15% no

national offices?

22% yes 63% no

7. How often do you have to remind members of the advisory group that it is an advisory body, that decisions are the responsibility of the administrator?

6% frequently 68% occasionally 25% never

8. How often do you have to remind the members that they are to advise your office, not Congress, the state government or some other level of administration?

3% frequently 32% occasionally 63% never

E. Regarding the ROLE of advisory bodies:

1. Using this scale -- 1 strongly agree, 2 agree, 3 no opinion, 4 disagree, or 5 strongly disagree -- place before each statement below the number which from your experience most closely describes advisory bodies:

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	
35%	54%	6%	4%	—	They can be useful additions to the process of representative government in preparing for and conducting meetings.
1%	3%	3%	51%	41%	They are mainly "window dressing".
24%	59%	6%	9%	—	Their usefulness depends heavily on the skills of the administrator in preparing for and conducting meetings.
27%	55%	2%	12%	1%	Their usefulness depends heavily on the personality and technical competence of the members.
27%	64%	2%	8%	—	They tend to bring into the open some of the diverse interests favoring differing public policies.
23%	66%	4%	6%	1%	They can reinforce the "public" character of government agencies that might have a tendency to become "in-bred" or tied too closely to specific interests.
27%	64%	5%	3%	—	They help the administrator anticipate public reactions to alternative policies.
13%	62%	9%	14%	1%	They are actually used in choosing among alternative courses of action.

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	
25%	66%	5%	4%	1%	They at least require the agency to gather its thoughts, review its work and prepare for questions from the "outside".
41%	54%	3%	1%	–	They do not substitute for or reduce the need for other contact with governmental agencies including Congress.
9%	38%	13%	26%	14%	"Public" members are usually less well-informed on the issues than user-group members.

2. On balance, considering the staff effort required, they are

23% extremely valuable

56% valuable

19% of some value

2% of little value

3. Have you used ad hoc advisory bodies? 30% yes 67% no

If yes, explain why the regular advisory body was not used:

____

____

____

4. Should the establishment of this advisory body be required by statute?

27% yes 66% no

5. Do you believe that there are adequate statutory and regulatory guidelines concerning the purpose and use of this advisory body?

______ yes _____ no

NOTE: FIGURES DO NOT ALWAYS ADD UP TO
100% since some did not respond
to a particular question.

PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D. C.

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR MEMBERS OF ADVISORY BODIES

A. Regarding your MEMBERSHIP on an advisory body:

1. On what board do you now serve?________________________

2. When were you appointed to the body on which you now serve? ________(year) 60% - 1965-69
20% - 1961-64
13% - 1956-60

3. Which government official appointed you? ______(office) 8% (I don't recall)
30% - supervisor
15% - dept. or bureau chief
26% - elected
18% - state director

4. Did you receive written notice of your appointment?
95% yes 2% no

Of your re-appointment?

91% yes 8% no

5. Do you know why you were selected for this appointment?

89% yes 9% no

Comments:____________________________________

____

____

6. As a member, do you try to (feel you are expected to) represent (check one)

50% your own personal view as an informed private citizen or

54% people with similar occupational interests.

15% checked both.

7. Should members generally be selected to represent people with similar occupational interests?

71% yes 25% no

8. Should there be limitations on appointments to this advisory body?

82% yes 16% no

If so, should there be residency requirements?

78% yes 18% no;

a prohibition on some classes of people?

30% yes 59% no; and

if so, what classes? ____________________

____

9. Should membership of the present advisory body be broadened to include some representation from groups not now on the body?

28% yes 69% no

If so, what groups? ____________________

____

10. Do you know if the advisory body on which you serve is established (check one)

32% by a specific statute of Congress.

34% by the Department Secretary.

14% by the local administrator.

16% none checked

4% checked more than one

11. How often are you contacted regarding your work on the advisory body by the agency? (other than regarding regular meetings)

27% frequently 63% occasionally 8% never

by others in your same occupation

24% frequently 61% occasionally 9% never

by the general public or news media

10% frequently 52% occasionally 32% never

12. Do you make specific efforts to contact others regarding the work of the advisory body on which you serve?

79% yes 18% no

If yes, comment:

13. When you were contacted re an appointment, were the specific "advisory" functions made clear to you?

83% yes 14% no

If not, was it ever made clear to you?

15% yes 5% no

14. Did you receive an adequate orientation to the work of the agency which you are to advise?

86% yes 11% no

Suggestions:

1	2	3	none checked	15. Reappointment is most unlikely if one (rank 1, 2, 3)
55%	8%	6%	31%	misses meetings.
14%	15%	11%	58%	clashes with the dominant user groups.
7%	13%	20%	60%	clashes with the views of the agency.

B. Regarding MEETINGS of the advisory body of which you are a member:

1. Are the meetings held frequently enough?

   70% yes 27% no

2. Do field trips take too much time?

   4% yes 91% no

3. Are the meetings public?

   54% yes 38% no

4. Should they be public?

   55% yes 35% no

5. Should participation in the meetings by nonmembers be permitted?

   67% yes 28% no;

   encouraged?

   47% yes 34% no.

6. Do the meetings require a technical competence not achieved by some members?

   8% frequently 67% occasionally 20% never

7. Do the meetings require "homework" by members in preparation for the specific agenda items?

   15% frequently 69% occasionally 15% never

8. Are adequate background materials provided well before the meeting?

60% frequently 32% occasionally 5% never

9. Do the members spend too much time listening to administrators explain on-going programs?

10% frequently 49% occasionally 37% never

10. Is there an invitation to propose agenda items before the meeting?

50% frequently 33% occasionally 15% never

11. Is the agenda open so that members can bring up for discussion matters of concern?

84% frequently 14% occasionally — never

12. Does the agenda deal with issues of central importance to the agency?

84% frequently 14% occasionally — never

13. Does the agency provide leadership with the members adding constructively to the agenda?

83% frequently 14% occasionally 1% never

14. Does the agency provide the leadership and the members then "go along" with the agency?

15% frequently 63% occasionally 18% never

15. Do some persons on the advisory body "caucus" before the meeting?

10% frequently 49% occasionally 37% never

16. Is the procedure to seek a consensus or "sense of the meeting" agreement?

54% frequently 27% occasionally 10% never

17. Are votes taken on agenda items?

59% frequently 25% occasionally 13% never

18. Are the meetings forums for vigorous discussion?

69% frequently 28% occasionally 1% never

19. Do the more aggressive members dominate?

27% frequently 52% occasionally 17% never

20. While generally accurate, do the minutes "gloss-over" disagreements?

10% frequently 40% occasionally 44% never

21. While generally accurate, do the minutes reflect the actual happenings?

87% frequently 8% occasionally — never

C. Regarding the ROLE of advisory bodies:

1. Using this scale -- 1 strongly agree, 2 agree, 3 no opinion, 4 disagree, or 5 strongly disagree -- place before each statement below the number which from your experience most closely describes advisory bodies:

1	2	3	4	5	
76%	20%	1%	—	—	They can be useful additions to the process of representative government.
9%	11%	13%	39%	29%	They are mainly "window dressing."
22%	50%	5%	15%	4%	Their usefulness depends heavily on the skills of the administrator in preparing for and conducting meetings.
39%	45%	3%	9%	2%	Their usefulness depends heavily upon the personality and technical competence of the members.

1	2	3	4	5	
30%	60%	3%	1%	1%	They tend to bring into the open some of the diverse interests favoring differing public policies.
37%	48%	5%	3%	1%	They can reinforce the "public" character of government agencies that might have a tendency to become "in-bred" or tied too closely to specific interests.
29%	58%	5%	4%	-	They help the administrator anticipate public reactions to alternative policies.
11%	41%	20%	15%	3%	They are actually used in choosing among alternative courses of action.
33%	55%	6%	1%	1%	They at least require the agency to gather its thoughts, review its work and prepare for questions from the "outside".
37%	44%	8%	3%	-	They do not substitute for or reduce the need for other contacts with governmental agencies including Congress.

2. Should the establishment of this advisory body be required by law?

69% yes 25% no

3. Do you believe that there are adequate guidelines in law or agency regulations concerning the purpose and use of this advisory body?

D. If you would like to add additional comments on these aspects of citizen advisory groups, please feel free to do so on the attached page. Of special interest would be your views the role of such bodies, membership and meeting procedures.

If you feel that citizen advisory participation in Federal public land matters can be improved, please feel free also to make any suggestions you may have.

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A P P E N D I X

C

ON THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING POLITICAL:

Traditional and Program Budgeting in the Allocation of Federal Recreation Resources

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ON THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING POLITICAL:

Traditional and Program Budgeting in the Allocation of Federal Recreation Resources*

The federal government now spends $439 million for recreation. How do we know whether this is the right amount or whether it is used for the best purposes? We have no way of providing definitive answers to such questions. And it is important that we understand why we can't answer them in order to appreciate the problems faced by decision-makers in these fields.

We could begin to answer the question if we had agreed-upon criteria for determining the mix of expenditures and mechanisms translating them into policy outcomes. But we do not have them. The reason is partly that it is difficult to create appropriate criteria--how much is a view of unspoiled Redwoods from a highway worth compared to a hiking trail--and partly because different people have different preferences on these matters. Even if criteria for recreation commanding respect could be developed, it would still be necessary to determine the worth of those expenditures compared to others for welfare, safety, transportation and a host of others competing for governmental funds. We are face to face with the ancient problem of the inter-personal comparison of utilities. There is no welfare function, no agreed-upon criteria for determining the value of different programs for the varied citizens that make up a society.[*]

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*This paper is a product of the work of several people who made indispensable contributions. David Chadwick-Brown provided the basic material on the history of program budgeting in the Department of Agriculture as it affects the Forest Service and the Soil Conservation Service. Ehud Levy-Pascal provided the material on trends in justifications and measures for recreation, and Jay Starling did the same for land and recreation activities. Brown and Nienaber spent the summer in Washington where they conducted extensive interviews in the Departments of Interior and Agriculture. I also conducted many interviews in regard to program budgeting. The work was sponsored by the Public Land Law Review Commission. We are grateful for the financial support we received and the splendid cooperation of many governmental officials. But we must absolve them from all responsibility for what we have done.

In the absence of appropriate criteria, and in the presence of disagreement over those that exist, one is led to seek answers to fundamental questions of resource allocation in the processes of decision. If one cannot specify proper outcomes, one may retreat to discussion of the processes through which the decisions leading to these outcomes are made. Patterns of expenditure are appraised not by reference to their substantive impact but rather to the way in which they are made.

Presumably the first test of a good outcome in a democratic society is that it accords with majority (or at least plurality) rule. It would be hard to justify allowing minorities to determine governmental policy. Yet, there are problems. Most people do not have opinions on most issues most of the time. It is, therefore, impossible to say what a majority would prefer; the best one can usually do is to talk of different small minorities. Yet the preferences of small interested publics may be challenged on the grounds they lack relevant information, and might change their minds if they knew better. Even when a majority preference may dimly be ascertained, there arises the question of the intensity of preference: should an indifferent majority prevail over an intense minority? Should elites in love with white-water canoeing through virgin wilderness, for example, prevail over the mass that likes paved roads through national forests?*

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[*] For a discussion of these probems, see Aaron Wildavsky, Politics of the Budgetary Process, (Boston: 1964), pp. 127-133.

It is apparent, then, that decision-makers must operate most often without accepted criteria for decision or knowledge of the preferences of the majority of the citizens. When a critic says that bureaucrats are not doing the right thing that usually means that he is part of some minority who does not like the fact that other minorities are getting their way or that he prefers one criteria in contradiction to other criteria currently in favor with the decision-makers.

Does this mean that one allocation of resources is as good as any other? Not quite. Some allocations violate the preferences of more people than do others. Some allocations can be justified on the basis of better evidence concerning their contribution to national income or public enjoyment than can others. The point is that the kind of information presently available and the theories concerning their manipulation are partial, incomplete and suspect. They may be (and often are) better than nothing. But they do not, by themselves, resolve the most serious questions. While it may be possible to avoid the worst, no one can be quite sure he knows what is best or that others agree with him. Modesty, in these circumstances, is important.

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*For a discussion of conflicts over aesthetic preferences, see Aaron Wildavsky, "Aesthetic Power or the Triumph of the Sensitive Minority Over the Vulgar Mass: A Political Analysis of the New Economics," Daedalus, Vol. 96, No. 4, Fall 1967, pp. 1115-1128.

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Our purpose is to describe, compare, and appraise two processes of resource allocation--traditional and program budgeting--in the field of recreation. The loci of this study are three Federal agencies most involved in providing outdoor recreation for the American public: the Forest Service, the National Park Service, and the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation insofar as it administers the Land and Water Conservation Fund, which provides money for the acquisition of land for recreation purposes.* On the premise that understanding must precede judgment, we begin with description; there never has been a detailed, step-by-step, account of precisely how recreation (or for that matter any) budgets are made in the Executive Branch.** The introduction of the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS), and the fact that it functions side-by-side with the traditional budgetary mechanisms, presents an unusual opportunity to see how different procedures devoted to similar purposes operate in the same context.

While we believe it worthwhile to discuss improvement in the process of resource allocation, we stress the necessity for political choice, creativity, and risk. When choices become too painful, it is tempting to suggest that a change in procedure or technique will alleviate the symptoms of distress. So it is understandable that attention has recently been focussed on whether traditional budgeting or program budgeting will provide the answers to the nation's ills.* We know that neither will. So we end our paper with a discussion of the political requirements for solving the major policy problems (acquisition of park lands, maintenance of existing facilities) with which those who allocate resources in recreation have been concerned.

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*The main source of information for this study comes from over one hundred interviews with officials in these three agencies, in the Bureau of the Budget, and the Departments of the Interior and of Agriculture. We also utilized Appropriations sub-Committee Hearings, Interior Committee Hearings, Agency and Departmental documents and memos, and newspaper articles.

**Wildavsky, A., The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston: 1964), does not describe how any specific budget is made; it deals with domestic budgeting in general.

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* For a description of traditional budgeting see Wildavsky, *ibid.*; for a description of program budgeting see Allan Schick, "The Road to PPB: Stages of Budgetary Reform," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. XXVI, No. 4, December 1966, pp. 243-58.

I. TRADITIONAL BUDGETING: The Ambivalent Political Climate

There is an important analytical, as well as practical, distinction to be made in budgeting for recreation. The distinction between budgeting for "routine" needs as against"extraordinary" programs became apparent after having sifted through, and pondered over, the data. Routine budgeting involves management, maintenance, and operations costs, while the non-routine activity includes expenditures for construction, development, and land acquisition items. We begin, therefore, with a discussion of routine budgeting in the Park and Forest Services, and then move on to the non-routine aspects of recreation budgeting. A separate discussion of the Land and Water Conservation Fund follows, since there are a number of problems unique to this program.*

The National Park Service and the U.S. Forest Service share common problems with respect to budgeting for outdoor recreation. During the period 1965-70, recreation-oriented agencies have had a relatively hard row to hoe, in terms of getting an annual appropriation equal to what the agencies feel they need. A Department of Agriculture official summed up the dilemna in this way: "It's a fact of life that in a tight budget situation, recreation doesn't fare very well." Recreation programs have had to compete for funds at a time when the nation's priorities and commitments have been elsewhere; numerous Agency officials mention that the Vietnam war was drawing funds away from their activities and that once the war was over, "you'd see a large increase in federal spending for recreation."

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*The material will be included in October when additional information will be available.

All civilian agencies have shared the burden of defense spending, which in the 1960's has curtailed their activities; recreation agencies, however, have also frequently faced hostile or critical audiences who control, in part, the purse strings of government. One government official explained the Park Service's financial problems like this: "The poor Park Service--first, recreation was considered a 'frill'; now its programs are considered a 'middle-income subsidy'." A Department of Agriculture officer mentioned, too, that a factor militating against a large(r) recreation budget is that "the general public and Congress in particular have a sort of negative attitude towards recreation as a valid activity." This seems to be particularly the case with the Forest Service's recreation budget; within the Agency, recreation competes with other uses of the Service's land--the multiple use concept of land management--and some Congressmen have taken a dim view of this Agency's rather substantial entree into the recreation business. In reporting out its Fiscal Year 1968 Appropriations Bill, the House Sub-Committee on Appropriations stated: The Committee does not agree with the priority rankings of certain agencies, and it is "apprehensive as to whether or not sufficient consideration is being given to what might be called 'fundamental activities' of certain agencies which are currently giving indications they may be interested in expanding their activities to what might be considered more glamorous pursuits at the expense of their basic fundamental activities."

Budget items for recreation also appear to be more vulnerable to changes and to review by Congress than are other items. Dollars spent on "recreation" are reviewed very carefully. Within the Forest Service's budget, for example, there are a number of items that never get changed by Congress from what the Agency requests; these items might be identified as either the more technical or more economic-oriented programs in which the Forest Service engages--activities such as "Range Resource Management," "Mineral Claims," "Timber Resource Management," etc. The "Recreation-Public Use" and "Recreation Research" items are not so immune from Congressional action, however. Between FY 1966 and FY 1969 there is no instance where the Agency's budget request for these two items went unchanged through the House and Senate appropriations Committees. Some years Congress gave the Forest Service more than it had requested (FY 1966 and FY 1967); other years the House and Senate cut back on recreation spending--every year since FY 1968, for instance. Thus, because recreation items are easily understandable (non-technical), readily identifiable in the budget, and perceived by many as an activity that can generally be deferred or postponed, the recreation budget is a vulnerable one.

While nearly everyone--Agency, Departmental and Bureau of the Budget staff, Congressmen, and vacationers trying to find five square feet of space in Yosemite Valley to park their campers--recognizes that public demand for, and consumption of, outdoor recreation is rising at a fast rate, appropriations have not kept pace with the increasing demand. Not only is there a small budget for new construction and development projects (one of the Regional Offices claimed to have received "zero dollars" for FY 1969 construction and development in its area) these Agencies also face what has been termed a "Maintenance and Rehabilitation deficiency" of apparently serious proportions. Recreation agencies are finding it increasingly difficult to adequately maintain, manage, and rehabilitate their existing recreation areas with the funds allotted to them for these activities--let alone construct new camp, picnic,swimming and other sites. The lack of an adequate base--an annual appropriation sufficient to maintain and operate existing recreation areas according to such Agency standards as cleanliness and overcrowding--has noticeable effects on the strategies and calculations that constitute budgetary life in the Agency. For example, in 1968 the Park Service warned Congress and the Executive that if it did not get a larger 1970 appropriation to meet its basic activities, it would have to "close down some areas altogether, and operate others on a less than seven-day week, during the peak visitor season." And Forest Service officials in the regions partially combat the maintenance deficiency by reprogramming funds from certain projects to maintenance items.

The first requirement of recreation budgeting is to secure funds with which to operate existing facilities--historic sites, monuments, wilderness areas, parks, and so on. This normally is a routine procedure within the agency. In the Park Service's budget, the three main line-items are: Management and Protection, Maintenance and Rehabilitation, and Construction. The first two items are those reflecting the base, and are further broken down into sub-items:

1. Management and Protection
    - a) Management of parks and other areas
    - b) Park and recreation programs
2. Maintenance and Rehabilitation
    - a) Roads and Trails
    - b) Buildings, Utilities, and other facilities

Why, one may well ask, do these items constitute the base? The first priority of agencies with a responsibility to provide recreation opportunities is, obviously, to keep the plant in operation. The necessity to do this has been traditionally reflected in the budget categories specified above--Operations costs being essentially maintenance, management (salaries and administrative costs), and rehabilitation (replacing a worn-out picnic table) expenses. These items, moreover, usually increase incrementally from year to year; a modest yearly increase in these appropriation items is thought to be normal and necessary due to such "uncontrollables" as inflation, increased visitor use, Federal pay-cost increases, and the like. Looking at it in this way, then, recreation budgets need not show any great fluctuations in their funding level from year to year. The agencies have their fixed needs and fixed resources, and budgeting for them is simply a matter of making an annual justification to the Department, to the Bureau of the Budget, and to Congress for the continued operation of the parks at an acceptable level. From FY (fiscal years) 1966 to FY 1970, for example, the Park Service's appropriations for the base increased $2.5 million yearly, except for 1970, a subject to which we will return.

Chart 1:

Operations Appropriation for the National Park Service, 1966-70

	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970
			(in millions)		
Management/Protection	$32.4	35.9	40.7	43.0	49.0
Maintenance/Rehabilitation	24.7	26.7	29.9	32.1	40.0

These items show a steady but not startling rise, and the increase is generally attributed to inflationary costs and the increased workload with which the Service has had to contend, due to the "boom in recreation demand."

Program budgeting for this aspect of the recreation activity makes little sense, then, if a main objective of this method is to "lay out and analyze the alternatives," by first "stating the objectives, and then by trying to quantify the outputs." It makes little sense because many of the real decisions which might have involved the analysis of alternatives have already been made--like where to locate a national park, what its boundaries will be, what sorts of facilities and activities will be offered. Once there is a Yosemite National Park, for example, there will be a fairly constant annual need for funds to manage and operate that park. Once these big decisions have been made, a substantial part of an Agency's budget for recreation becomes amenable to routinization, and more or less immune from political, policy, or program decisions. There is, of course, always the possibility that Congress may decide that America no longer needs a national park and forest system and therefore refuse to appropriate funds to manage and maintain these areas, but decisions such as this are unlikely. The fact that the recreation "base" is largely a reflection of past commitments and decisions on the part of the government places an important constraint on the stated aim of program budgeting--which is to rethink and re-assess objectives in terms of the allocation of funds.

To illustrate the procedure by which the base in a recreation budget is determined, let us follow one item through that complex and often confusing activity called "the budget process." There are a number of steps to that process, and the total picture comes out looking like a three-ring circus in which the next show begins when the previous one is about two-thirds through--budgeting is not a totally linear process but is characterized by a simultaneity of activity and a multiplicity of actors.

Yet there is some order to the process; the principal actors and the necessary stages can be located. One knows, for example, that Agency estimates are reviewed by the Department and by the Budget Bureau before the final request is sent to Congress. Also, a general characteristic of both the organization and the budget structures of a recreation-oriented agency such as the Park Service is that it is decentralized: the estimates for a routine item such as Maintenance and Rehabilitation more or less begin "on the ground." There is a filtering-up of information from the park or recreation area, via the six Regional Offices, to the Washington administration of the Service. In Washington, the Agency interacts with the Departmental level of organization, the Bureau of the Budget, and of course, Congress. A reasonable place to slice into the budget process, therefore, is at the local level, and then to proceed with this item up through the organizational ladder.

The Maintenance and Rehabilitation item reflects real jobs to be done on the ground so that the parks may remain operational. The maintenance item is a consolidation of two sub-items, "Buildings, Utilities, and other Facilities," and "Roads and Trails." It reflects, obviously, the maintenance aspect of the Park Service's operations which includes jobs such as removing snow from roadways within the park, emptying trash cans, mowing lawns, repainting signs, etc. These jobs are not done in Washington or at the Regional Office but in the park by Park Service personnel. Thus, the necessity for some budget information to originate there.

How then does the Park actually put together its Maintenance and Rehabilitation estimate for the coming year? The Budget Officer for the Park gets together with the Division Chief of Maintenance and they take stock of the roads, trails, buildings, utilities, and facilities which need to be maintained within the park. A separate budget estimate is made for the two sub-items which comprise the maintenance item: a "Roads and Trails" estimate and a "Buildings, Utilities, and other facilities" estimate are sent separately to Washington. Generally, the estimates are based on a numerical count of the physical items to be maintained: to estimate maintenance and rehabilitation costs for the "Buildings and Utilities" sub-item, for example, a count is made of the number of units to be maintained by type of unit, number, square feet, acres, or by a similar unit of measurement. An inventory is made of the number (with the relevant measurement unit) of park facilities such as amphitheaters, campgrounds, public use buildings (bathrooms), historic structures, water systems, telephone and radio units, ad infinitum. Once this inventory of the physical plant is taken, an estimate is made of the manpower positions necessary to carry out all this maintenance work, and of the supplies and equipment the Maintenance Division will need to keep the Park operable. The estimate of manpower positions is based on a Service-wide formula which reflects the Park Service's experience with an average "man-year" workload. The three main components of the "Maintenance and Rehabilitation" estimate are, then, (1) number of units, (2) positions, and (3) operating expenses (equipment).

Obviously it is not necessary--indeed, foolish and a waste of time--to actually go out yearly and compute the length of a fence or count the number of roadway-miles contained within the Park. Initially done, the Administrative Officers of the park have that information, and it is relayed to the Regional and Washington Offices in the form of what was maintained the previous year --in other words, the base. On each form which the Parks are requested to transmit upwards (about thirteen in all), there are two parallel columns for each unit or item (see sample form, page 15). The first column is called "19--FY Proposed Program"; it reflects the park's Maintenance and Rehabilitation budget that has already been okayed by the Agency and is being proposed to Congress for the coming fiscal year. (If sent in on December 15, 1969, these figures would reflect what the Agency was requesting from Congress for FY 1970.) The other column is called "19- FY Preliminary Estimate" and is used in the Agency's calculations for the next (i.e., 1971) fiscal year. Thus, last year's budget is reflected in the figures in the "Proposed Program" column, while the new estimates are sent in around December and are called the park's "Preliminary Estimate."

Chart 2

Form 10-381A
(July 1963)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE

BUILDINGS AND STRUCTURES ESTIMATE (3221)

Region	Park	State

ITEMS (1)	19____ F.Y. PROPOSED PROGRAM		19____ F.Y PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE	
	UNITS TO BE MAINTAINED BEGINNING JULY 1, 19____ (2)	DISTRIBUTION TO MEET CEILING (3)	UNITS TO BE MAINTAINED BEGINNING JULY 1, 19____ (4)	ESTIMATE OF ACTUAL NEEDS (5)
1. Adm. & Public Use Buildings Maintenance (3221 1A)	No. Sq.Ft.	$	No. Sq Ft.	$
2. Historic Structures Maintenance (3221.1B)	No. Sq.Ft.	$	No. Sq.Ft.	$
3. Buildings, Other Maintenance (3221.1C)	No. Sq.Ft.	$	No. Sq.Ft.	$
4. Quarters Maintenance (3221.1D)	No. Sq.Ft.	xxxxxxxxxxxxxx	No. Sq.Ft.	xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
5. QUARTERS EXPENSES (575.1)	$	xxxxxxxxxxxxxx	$	xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
6. Less Income (Rentals)	$	xxxxxxxxxxxxxx	$	xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
7. Supp. Appr. Funds Req. (Not to exceed 50% Isol. Ded.)	xxxxxxxxxxxxxx	$	xxxxxxxxxxxxxx	$
8. Adm. & Public Use Buildings Operations (3221.2A)	No. Sq Ft.	$	No. Sq.Ft.	$
9. Historic Structures Operations (3221.2B)	No. Sq.Ft.	$	No. Sq.Ft.	$
10. Buildings, Other Operations (3221.2C)	No. Sq. Ft.	$	No. Sq. Ft	$
11. Prehistoric Ruins (3221.3)	No.	$	No.	$
12. Other Structures (3221.4)	xxxxxxxxxxxxxx	$	xxxxxxxxxxxxxx	$
13. Amphitheaters, Campfire Circles	No.	xxxxxxxxxxxxxx	No.	xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
14. Piers, Wharves, Etc.	No.	xxxxxxxxxxxxxx	No.	xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
15. Others, (List)	No.	xxxxxxxxxxxxxx	No.	xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
16.	No.	xxxxxxxxxxxxxx	No.	xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
17.	No.	xxxxxxxxxxxxxx	No.	xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
18.	No.	xxxxxxxxxxxxxx	No.	xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
GRAND TOTALS (3221)	xxxxxxxxxxxxxx	$	xxxxxxxxxxxxxx	$

Remarks:

DUE IN WASHINGTON OFFICE DECEMBER 15 EACH YEAR

33413

In addition to the forms which list each facility in the park and contain estimates of its annual maintenance costs, the park also supplies the Washington Budget Office with Form 10-564: The "Itemization of Proposed Increases or Decreases for FY --". This form lists the changes proposed by the park staff one year in advance of the fiscal year (forms completed in 1969 for FY 1971); it itemizes the changes that would result in an increase or (rarely) a decrease over the amount received--or expected to be received--for the previous fiscal year. The 10-564 form in effect summarizes all the information contained in the itemized forms and presents to the Regional and Washington office the crucial information: what the parks are requesting above what they got the previous year. While each park supplies these offices with both the estimate of Maintenance needs and the itemization of increases, it is this latter form which reflects the parks' hopes and aspirations for an incremental increase above last year's budget. The other information is largely supporting data, and the annual inventory of the park's maintenance operations amounts in practice to deciding on what to propose as necessary increases in next year's maintenance budget.

Normally, the Parks' "10-564 requests" are modest in nature: Park officials do not "ask for the moon" because they know that they will not get it. Much of what they request by way of an annual increase for maintenance and management items is the result of the items over which park personnel have little or no control--wage rate increases, increased visitor use, and inflation. Chart 3 shows what one park requested as increases for their 1969 Fiscal Year Program, with priority numbers, for the "Buildings and Utilities" sub-category of the Maintenance item:

Chart 3

	Broad Category of Increase	Priority Number	Amount for each priority assignment
1)	Wage rate increases	(automatic)	$4,846
2)	Operation and Maintenance of new facilities: 3 new comfort stations	2	7,500
3)	Increased Workload: a) General maintenance expenses due to increased visitor use (visitors: '64 CY 2,276,248; '65 CY 2,289,387; '66 CY 2,349,149)	3	4,794
	b) Provide funds for operating sanitary landfills in accordance with provisions of Executive Order 11282 concerning Air Pollution Control	4	6,000
	c) Restore purchasing power lost due to increased prices of supplies and materials	6	570

Even these "necessary increases" in maintenance and management expenses have not been fully funded in recent years, however, and this situation constitutes the maintenance deficiency of which Agency officials speak. A few years ago Congress imposed manpower ceilings on federal agencies, and these ceilings are heartily disliked by both Park and Forest Service personnel at all levels of the organization. From the Agencies' standpoint, they are faced with increasing public use of their facilities; consequently they feel that this increased demand necessitates some growth in personnel in order to adequately manage and maintain the parks and forests. At the park level, employees are faced with increased workloads yet are constrained by the personnel ceilings against additional hiring. The Budget Officer at one of the national parks mentioned that "recently, when a position becomes vacant, the first directive from the Regional Office has been 'not to fill the position.'" In at least a couple of incidents, this offical put up an heroic fight against having the positions phased out. "The cuts stood for quite some time on paper," he said, but eventually he won out by what appeared to be a strategy of passive resistance combined with a stream of memos to the Regional Office to the effect that the positions were absolutely necessary. "When we have a need," he said, "we write honest memos to the Regional Office--until they respond to those needs, we worry them."

There is more or less continuous review of the parks' needs at the Regional level of the Service. Personnel in the Regional Offices make frequent trips out to the parks in order to see what is going on. They see their function as one of screening and assessing information coming in from the parks before it is sent off to Washington, and in the case of budget estimates, their principal activity appears to be one of cutting out the requests for increases they deem unnecessary.

How does the Regional official know what is an unnecessary request? "'X' Park has a request in its current budget for an airplane, and they need a plane like a hole in the head!" Again, why? "It's a small park, close to this office, and they just can't use a plane for much of anything."

Another example of an inflated request came from "Y" park: "This year they're asking for __ (number) of Park Rangers, and that is totally out of line--they couldn't fit that many Rangers into the Park all at once!"

The general criterion used by Regional officials for making such assessments is "knowledge of the area." Since the Regional Office is strategically situated (i.e., in close physical proximity to the parks), first-hand experience is what counts most in making budgetary decisions. An official elaborated: "Budget officers should have field experience before coming to the office--if not actual employment in the parks, they should at least have on-the-ground training. That's the way to get reasonable decisions." Each park is more-or-less unique, he said, and "you just can't apply across-the-board standards--you also have to know each park's unique requirements and needs."

The classic syndrone of headquarters-field relationships--each side feels the other is out of touch with its realities--comes across clearly in budgetary relationships. The men in the field believe that the Washington office "is pretty far removed from the field," and that consequently certain policies and programs adopted in Washington "may not be so good from our viewpoint or from that of the parks." An official with a number of years experience with the Agency stated the most common field grievance when he insisted that expenditures on pet projects and currently popular programs have resulted in an inadequate expenditure on the parks' budgetary base. → The parks' operating expenses keep going up, but the appropriation has not kept pace with inflation, pay-cost increases, and increased visitor use of the parks. Rather, the Washington office has appropriated money for "popular sorts of programs" that should have gone into "keeping the parks operational." This state of affairs creates the necessity for regional and park personnel to reprogram funds. A regional official gave this example: "Suppose you start with an Operations Budget (Management and Protection plus Maintenance and Rehabilitation) of $50,000 in 1965; by 1966 pay-act increases and increased use make a $5,000 increase in the base necessary; but then your total increase comes to only $4,000. The next year the same thing happens, and you're $2,000 in the hole. That money has to come from somewhere, so you start juggling funds around--from the less necessary programs to the essential ones." A park might then cut down on the Visitor-Interpretation Service, for example, to get more funds for clean-up costs. At this level of organization, as well as at the local level, it is thus the perennial inability-to-make-ends-meet situation that causes consternation in the ranks of park and regional personnel. In budgetary terms, it means an inadequate expenditure on the base. While park officials may feel that the Regional Office is not always responding to its needs, Regional personnel in turn feel that Washington is not allowing an adequate expenditure on the base.

The review procedure at the Regional Budget Office for the Maintenance and Rehabilitation item usually amounts to cutting out those unnecessary requests coming in from the parks; since this item covers expenditures for maintaining and rehabilitating park facilities, it may mean cutting out a request for an additional pick-up truck here or the repainting of an administration building there. These decisions are made on the basis of information on visitor use in the area, costs of supplies, equipment, and salaries, and previous years' expenditures on these items. Such decisions also take into account the park's own "priority ranking" of requests for increases. Both the park and regional offices are asked by Washington to rank their requests in terms of priority; those requests agreed upon as the most urgent are, of course, more readily granted.

The Regional Budget Office reviews all the forms filled out by each park in its area. This review procedure will sometimes include requesting advice from the Maintenance and Programs Divisions in the Regional Office as to what should be--or can be--allowed, and what cut. The Budget Office then makes its revisions; unnecessary requests are so designated by being crossed out with a red line, with the dollar amounts accordingly revised in red. Copies of these forms are kept in the Regional Office while two or three copies of each form are then sent off to Washington for final review there.

Once the Regional Office completes its red-line review procedure of the parks' budget estimates, copies of the forms are sent off to Washington. The Division (or Divisions) to which they are sent has varied considerably, a phenomenon apparently related to the Park Service's "penchant for reorganization." (The frequency of Agency reorganization was noted by many Park Service officials, and had almost attained the status of a joke within the Service). The budget documents for the "Maintenance and Rehabilitation" item normally are sent to two or three Divisions--the Budget Office, the Maintenance Division, and the Programs Division.

The Maintenance Division has been responsible for "collecting and consolidating the information coming in from the parks via the regional offices for their annual 'M and R' needs." A separate Grand Total for

Buildings and for Roads and Trails is arrived at by adding up all the parks' estimates of their maintenance needs--which may have been revised by the Regional Office--and then by adjusting the total slightly, usually upwards because that is perceived as being "good budgetary strategy." Agency estimates come in a little high because the Bureau of the Budget will usually cut the estimates before the final request goes to Congress.

Taking FY 1970 as an example, the final Budget Allowance for the "Roads and Trails" sub-item was $13,795,000--the figure okayed by the Department and by the Bureau of the Budget as the Agency's final request to Congress. This figure was arrived at by adding together all the parks' estimates for their "Roads and Trails" needs, which came to $13,594,000. The Division of Maintenance then added on $201,000 to "round off" the estimate, and that became the Park Service's agreed-upon "Roads and Trails" FY 1970 request.

Commenting on the Washington Division's role in preparing the budget estimates, an official noted that "if the park and regional people have done their jobs well, we don't have very much to do." He meant by this that if the parks haven't asked for the moon, and if the regional offices have cut out the "unnecessary" increases, then the Washington office's review procedure is routine.

When asked how they, in Washington, knew what was a high or low estimate, what was an unnecessary request, or what was out of line, this official said: "Experience." Having been with the Park Service since 1946, and in the Maintenance Division for over ten years, he mentioned that "with a few years' experience, we can tell right away what is out of line. We're all practical men," he said, "and the park superintendents and the regional officers know pretty much what will go. A modest percentage annual increase has been the norm for a standard operations item like Maintenance and Rehabilitation and if a certain park's request is out of line [from what it had been in past years], then we either phone up or write them asking for an explanation."

The description of the budgetary process up to this point might give one the general impression that budgeting for recreation is a rather simple, routine, and linear process whereby the parks make their requests and then have those requests reviewed and revised by the Regional and Washington offices--period. This impression is indeed correct insofar as it goes, but it must not be forgotten that there are other participants in budgetary decision-making, and that those participants in the Executive branch, include: the top-level administration of the Park Service (including the Director and his assistants, and the Budget and Programs Divisions); the Departmental Administration; and the Bureau of the Budget. It is with the inclusion of these participants that the process loses its simplified linear nature and assumes a more complex, indeterminate quality. In order to understand the budgetary process within the Executive branch, one would have to keep in mind two metaphors: it is in many respects like a linear, mechanical, step-by-step process, but significantly modified by an "ebb and flow" of interchange which cannot neatly be categorized. One official characterized the process as "like an ocean--constantly changing."

Perhaps the best way to describe the nature of the input to the process by the top-level decision-makers in Washington is to note that the parks, the Regional offices, and even the line Divisions in Washington (in our example, the Maintenance Division) formulate their annual estimates within policy and budgetary constraints that proceed from the top down. Prior in time to any final estimates "bubbling up" from the parks, the Washington office of the Park Service has sent down to the parks and regions a Preliminary Estimate or a Planning Allowance which usually sets the ceiling for what the parks will get. It must be kept in mind, however, that these ceilings are not just pulled out of the air either, but rather that they are based on past information from the parks as to what their Operations needs have been. Thus, it is not a "linear" process in either direction--either from the top down, or from the bottom up--but a circular process characterized by "feedback" from all sides.

Budgetary decision-making by the Washington Administration of the Park Service involves two procedures that operate simultaneously and on a continuing basis: the first is the collection and review of budget information coming in from the parks; the other is maintaining contact and discussions with the Department, the Bureau of the Budget, and Congress as to what is in store for the Agency in terms of preliminary budget estimates and Planning Allowances. Park Service officials in Washington thus have the responsibility of integrating the financial needs of the parks and recreation areas with the general climate and policy preferences as articulated by Executive and Congressional decision-makers. Clearly, this is not always an easy or simple task; formulating the Agency's budget request involves bargaining, compromise, and the development of strong justifications in support of those requests. Obviously some requests are easier to justify than others, however, and some are almost automatic, in the sense that funds must be appropriated annually to continue the operations of the park system. The Agency's Operations budget falls within this category, because everybody recognizes that maintenance, rehabilitation, and park management are must needs: if not funded for, the parks will simply close.

It therefore stands to reason that when the budget estimates come in from the parks for their Operations needs (the Operations budget is here used as a synonym for the base) they usually do not generate a great deal of controversy or discussion by officials in Washington. What the parks are requesting for the next fiscal year has been significantly limited by what they previously asked for, and discussion of the Operations budget in Washington centers around the size of the increase that will be requested by the Park Service for the coming fiscal year. It is generally assumed that the Park Service is operating on a "rock-bottom" budget, and that consequently what needs to be justified by the Agency is not the total Operations budget but only the incremental increase over the previous year. A look at the Park Service's Operations budget from FY 1966 through FY 1969 (see page 10) indicates that there is general agreement on this point: there have been no decreases in the Service's budgetary base during these years. Rather, there's been an annual increase of from two to five million dollars in its Operations budget.

Budget information from the parks arrives in Washington around mid-December, and this data contains estimates for both the immediately upcoming fiscal year and for the next fiscal year. For example, inasmuch as the FY 1970 budget--the parks' "Proposed Program"--is already determined, and is in the process of being included in the President's Budget for its January presentation to Congress, the Agency is primarily concerned with looking at the estimates for the next--i.e., FY 1971--budget. This information is found under the heading "19--Preliminary Estimate" on the forms which the parks send annually to Washington. Equipped with these initial estimates from the parks, Agency officials in Washington begin their work on the budget.

Prior to the introduction of the PPB system in the Park Service, which occurred around 1967, the budgetary process at the Agency level looked something like this: The parks sent in their preliminary estimates for the Maintenance and Rehabilitation item to the Division of Maintenance, which in turn consolidated the information onto large summary forms for use by the Agency. This information was then sent to the Service's Budget Office and became the field data around which Agency discussion of the budget for "M and R" revolved. The Maintenance Division would make recommendations to the Budget Office as to what should be proposed for the next fiscal year, for that item, and these recommendations were usually accepted. The process was described as "more-or-less perfunctory--they (the Agency) didn't change our estimates much." Initial Agency discussions of budget estimates were also characterized by their fluidity and informality. As one official put it, prior to the time when the Agency makes its budget requests to the Department (anywhere from March to June), "everyone has his finger in the pie," and there is no "strictly delineated communications flow."

Within the Service, budget meetings take place frequently; Regional Directors come into Washington to discuss their respective Region's needs, and Agency officials--the Deputy Director, Associate Director, or the Director of the Park Service himself--frequently travel to the field, and meet with at least half the staff there. Eventually each park's preliminary request would have been reviewed by the Washington office: on the basis of what the parks sent in as their preliminary estimates, plus what intra-agency meetings, Agency-Department meetings and contact with BOB and Congress have uncovered as to what the Park Service should be requesting, the Agency comes up with its budget request for the next fiscal year. This initial request is given to the Departmental Budget Office by mid-year or earlier, for review there. Again, with respect to the Agency's Operations budget, this procedure appears not to have significantly altered the estimates coming in from the field; so long as the parks' estimates were not out of line from what they had been in previous years, they were generally accepted as such.

Discussion of the budget by the Agency's top-level decision-makers is difficult to separate from its policy-making function; in other words, the Director and his staff rely on the Service's organizational structure to make sure that "X" Park hasn't asked for too much in its preliminary request. What the Washington Administration of the Agency is primarily concerned with, however, is the setting of general policy that eventually becomes reflected in the budget in terms of priorities and significant changes over last year's budget. For example: In the last couple of years the problem of policing the parks has been of prime importance to Agency officials both in Washington and in the field. Much discussion has taken place concerning the general policy that the Park Service should adopt in response to a visible increase in vandalism, middle-class litter bugs, the influx of hippies, over-crowding, etc., of the parks. At approximately the same time as the law and order issue became a national issue of major importance during the 1968 Presidential campaign the Park Service was discussing that very issue as it affected Park Operations. The result was that for the FY 1970 budget, the Agency requested a significant increase in its Management and Protection item in order to provide for greater policing of the parks. This Agency decision was made on the basis of information reaching Washington from the parks as to an increasingly difficult management and protection situation, letters from private citizens addressed to the National Park Service complaining of the Hippies' invasion of the parks, and an assessment by Agency officials that Congress, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Department of the Interior would be favorably disposed towards allowing an increase in the Service's budget for this purpose.

Budgetary decision-making at this level of the organization, therefore, is characterized not so much by the review procedure described earlier--although the Budget Office and the Maintenance Division in Washington do make their routine checks of the parks' estimates--as it is by a general policy-making process which focuses on the budget line-item as a collective unit. The pertinent questions are not normally the particular ones, like "Is 'X' Park's maintenance request out-of-line this year?", or, "Does 'Y' Park really need its roadway repaved?" Rather, Agency discussions in Washington speak of budget items as general problem, or policy, areas: "Should we be stressing 'Operations' or 'Construction' activities this year?"; "What should we do about increased visitor-use?'; and the like.

The real policy decisions at the Washington level of the Park Service--which consequently do become reflected in its budget requests--have recently involved a conflict between development and management. Many Park Service officers mentioned that the Agency has expanded greatly in the last ten or fifteen years, and that during the ten-year Mission '66 Project, about one hundred new National Park areas were authorized for acquisition and development. Also, with the inception of the Land and Water Conservation Fund, Park Service expansion is expected to proceed at a fairly rapid rate in the coming years, since it is the principal (though not the only) benefactor of the Fund. The Fund, like the prior Mission '66 Program, is geared towards purchase and development of new public recreation areas.

On this question of expansion versus management, there exist significant differences of opinion within the Park Service. Some Agency officials feel a need to curtail the acquisition-oriented phase of the Service's activities and concentrate instead on maintenance, management, and development of existing park and recreation areas. On the other hand, there are those who see the major problems facing the Park Service as involving land price escalation and the diminishing availability of land, due to a number of factors: a constantly expanding population, competing use of land, the diminution of our natural resources and the concomitant frenzy over acquiring land and preserving natural resources while they are still available. Conceptually, the distinction may be cast in terms of the "conservators"--maintain and preserve what we have!--and the "expansionists"--let's get more while it's still reasonably feasible and available!

A few years ago, however, a high official told us, the Agency "decided to meet the minimum operating requirements of the national parks, at the expense of a 'new construction' program." Thus the decision was made to first provide adequate maintenance and management at existing and, wherever possible, at newly authorized park sites. Another official noted that opting for a budget which "emphasizes our maintenance and management responsibilities at the expense of construction and new development has been the Director's philosophy, and we here all more or less subscribe to it." Given the "tight money situation of the last few years," he said, "you can't argue with that logic--once the [Vietnam] war is over, you'll see our construction activities expand." Another Agency official explained this decision by saying that it was "reasonable:" otherwise, he said, the Service would be faced with a "severe maintenance problem in a few years--in the long run, letting our maintenance activity slide would cost far more than an annual expenditure equal to the maintenance and management needs."

And in fact the Park Service's budget reflects this decision as to priorities: the Operations budget has increased over the last five years, while the "Construction" item has fallen from $26.2 million in FY 1966 to something like $7.6 million for FY 1970. A low priority for construction activities has not been confined to the Park Service's program, however: rather, it reflects a quite general orientation on the part of the entire federal government, and so the Agency's decision may have been largely a response to the political realities and climate in which it operates.

As the year progresses budget figures increasingly get firmed up; Agency, Departmental, and Budget Bureau estimates begin high and get shaken down somewhat as one gets closer to the time when the President must submit his annual budget to Congress.

In any given year a number of estimates will be made as the result of discussion and bargaining between the major actors in Washington: between the Agency, the Department, and BOB. To take FY 1969 as an example, Agency budget documents list the following revisions of budget figures for the "Maintenance and Rehabilitation" item:

Chart 4:

Revision of Budget Estimates for FY 1969, the National Park Service

Maintenance and Rehabilitation:

1. Appropriation, 1968	2. Planning Allowance	3. Preliminary Estimate
(8/28/67) $29,822,000	1969 $33,622,000	1969 $35,142,000
4. Final Estimate for 1969 Program	**5. Budget Allowance 1969**	**6. President's Budget Message**
(10/4/67) $33,123,000	(12/14/67) $32,830,000	(2/5/68) $32,990,000

These various estimates reflect the bargaining process that takes place among the participants. Generally, early in the year, budget discussions are intra-Agency matters; the circle then widens to include Agency-

Department discussions and meetings which result in a preliminary estimate for the Bureau; by summer or early fall the Budget Bureau has sent down a Planning Allowance or Final Estimate to the Department; and as a result of BOB's "Formal Review Period" in the fall, a final Budget Allowance is set for the Agency preparatory to inclusion in the President's Budget. Such a description is of course abstracted from what is in reality a quite fluid process of interchange among these groups, and it must be kept in mind that throughout the year the feedback process operates on an informal basis.

The Departmental Administration becomes directly involved in the budger process when the Bureau of the Budget issues a planning allowance or preliminary budget figure to the Department. This generally occurs by the middle of the year, and it comes in the form of a lump-sum, with little earmarking of funds. It is then up to the Department to decide how this initial allowance is to be allocated among the various Agencies comprising the Department. Dividing up this figure involves asking questions such as: "How much should the National Park Service get this year?", "How much for the Bureau of Mines?", and so on down the roster of Agencies and Bureaus comprising the Department.

This of course would be a monumental task replete with inter-Agency conflict were it not for the fact that the Department applies a general decision-rule to the allocation procedure: "We divide up BOB's allowance according to what the Agencies got last year." This becomes the base in subsequent discussions of the budget at the Department level; it is, according to one official, "the Department's fixed expenses--we use last year's budget to decide on this year's allocations." The Department first determines what the Department's total budget was for the previous year; it then compares this figure with BOB's preliminary allowance; if the allowance is larger than last year's budget (and it usually is), the Administration has to divide up the increase among the Agencies; and if it is smaller, the Department is faced with making cuts in the Agencies' budgets. By applying this guideline, the Department's main responsibility then becomes one of deciding how to allocate the increase or decrease which has been allowed by the Budget Bureau.

The more usual situation is the one in which BOB's preliminary allowance is greater than last year's total budget if only because preliminary budget figures are usually high and get shaken down later in the year. The Department then must decide how to distribute the increases among the Agencies.

In the Interior Department, this is usually done by a bargaining and discussion process which involves the six Assistant Secretaries, plus the Under-Secretary, plus the Office of Program Analysis which is directly under the Under-Secretary's office. Each Assistant Secretary in the Department has formal responsibility for a number of agencies which are functionally grouped around him; for example, the Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife, Parks and Marine Resources, has under him: the Office of Marine Resources, Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, and the National Park Service. Similarly, the Assistant Secretary for Water Quality and Research is responsible for: the Office of Saline Water, the Office of Water Resources Research, and the Federal Water

Pollution Control Administration. Equipped with information and figures from each of his Agencies, the Assistant Secretary, as a high official put it, "goes up and fights it out on behalf of his Agencies to get a high allowance (for them)."

The general procedure is this: Each Assistant Secretary is expected to make a strong case on behalf of the Agencies under him; to do this, he relies on Agency papers and figures justifying their requests for the coming year's budget. The Park Service, for example, will prepare documents justifying their request for a substantial increase in the "Management and Protection" function; and on the basis of papers such as these, the Assistant Secretary will bargain with the Department and his fellow Assistants.

With such heterogeneity of interests as exists within the Interior Department, it seems clear that "dividing up the pie" is not an easy task. We were told that many factors are taken into account, including: the urgency of the program in question; its utility in terms of number of people to be benefitted; the program's potential for revenue-raising; statutory requirements written into Departmental operations; the general policy thrust of the Administration; the political situation in Congress; the climate of opinion in the country, and a host of others not easily categorized.

What is certain, though, is that budget discussions at this level of Executive decision-making are intimately connected with policy discussions. If this is so at the Agency or Bureau level, it is even more the case at the Department level. The task here is to try and provide a Departmental focus to Agency programs, and to discuss policy in terms of priorities. Across-the-board increases in funding levels are generally frowned upon and perceived as poor budgetary strategy--this is so because it then appears as if Agency and Department officials have not closely examined their programs and have chosen an easy way out. Consequently, discussions of the budget at the Department level focus on decisions involving priorities among broad program categories. It goes without saying that particularistic and minute budgetary decisions are not made here; the Assistant Secretaries and the Under-Secretary do not sit around and talk about the maintenance budget at Yosemite National Park; but they will discuss the problem in terms of overall Departmental policy. It may be phrased in this manner: "Should the Department emphasize a 'development' program, or an 'Operations' one?"

Given the heterogeneity of the Department, → ← there doesn't exist an agreed-upon formula for making these preliminary allocations to the Agencies. There is, of course, "the base"--last year's budget--on which the Department relies; and across-the board increases are avoided whenever possible. Apart from these two decision-rules, however, it appears that decisions involving allocating BOB's allowance are made circumstantially, that is, they are dependent upon the personalities involved, the general thrust of the Administration, and the issues which have surfaced in the past year to become critical public concerns. One such issue in the area of recreation is the Operations deficiency, which was just recently uncovered by the Park Service.

With respect to budgeting for routine items, the Departmental Administration is not in a position to substantially alter budget requests. It is the Agency which must carefully review its own budget and prepare documents supporting its upcoming requests;

problem areas also are generally located at the Agency level of organization, and while the Department may try hard to focus itself by emphasizing certain programs and de-emphasizing others, this is in fact difficult to do given the independence, autonomy, and diversity of Bureaus within the Department. A further constraint on Departmental influence derives from the fact that the Budget Bureau and Congress review the budget on an Agency-by-Agency basis, and this appears to enhance the autonomy of the Agency vis-à-vis the Department. Within the Executive branch, therefore, it is the Budget Bureau--and not the Department--which does much of the reviewing and screening of the Agencies' budgets. In this regard, one official half-humorously remarked that "at times it seems as if the Director of BOB is running the Department, and not the Secretary."

The Bureau of the Budget plays a significant role in the budgetary process, and this has not escaped the notice of both Congressmen and Agency officials. (During a budget hearing in Congress, one exasperated committee member lamented the fact that BOB personnel did not have to come up to the Hill to testify, inasmuch as they seemed to have a great influence over Agency requests.) At least with respect to those Agencies involved in recreation programs, Agency officials increasingly seem to see their task as one of convincing the Budget Bureau of their needs, although Budget Bureau people maintain that the trend is in the opposite direction--i.e., towards accepting the Agencies' judgments.

The Budget Bureau is functionally divided into a number of Divisions, one of which is the Division of Natural Resources. The Departments of Agriculture and Interior correspond to this Division--as well as do the Corps of Engineers, the TVA, and other smaller agencies--and each Agency within the Departments is assigned a Budget Bureau Examiner. It is the job of the Examiner to maintain close contact with Agency officials throughout the year--to discuss problems as they arise, to keep them informed about the "general economic outlook" for the coming year, and, prior to the fall "Directors' Hearings," to have reviewed the Agency's budget in great detail.

Review of the Park Service's operating and maintenance budget is in terms of gross indicators provided by the Park Service itself. Thus the Budget Bureau Examiner will evaluate Agency programs by using generally the same criteria as are used within the Service and within the Department. He will, for instance, look at previous years' budgets and use them as the base; he will also have in mind the three levels of maintenance standards which the Park Service has developed in order to make its comparisons between parks more effective--the Examiner will want to know, in other words, at what level of maintenance (A,B,C) the parks are operating. Also, he is urged to spend about three weeks annually in travel to the field, to get first-hand experience with park operations and their problems.

The Budget Bureau also relies on issue papers and analysis prepared by bureau personnel in Washington--papers written by the Park Service, Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, and Forest Service staff on a number of topics but generally providing information on visitor use. Finally, and importantly, the Examiner is expected to be constantly aware of Administration priorities, and, as far as possible, to keep Agency programs in accord with Presidential wishes.

According to one Budget Bureau official, the general process by which an Agency's budget is reviewed is a fairly simple one--a process which in effect looks at the budget in terms of current Administration priorities. "We try to recommend to the President a balanced maintenance and operations budget each year." But, he said, "If the President wants a program area especially well taken care of, such as law and order, we try to make budget recommendations which reflect this." The general test BOB Examiners apply in reviewing agency requests is one of "reasonableness and of comparable conditions in comparable agencies in the Government."

Once in awhile, however, the President will want to single out an agency--or an issue--for special treatment. This was the case with respect to the decision to allow the Park Service's request for an increase in the 1970 budget. At a time when President Nixon was asking for agency cutbacks in their budgets, the Nixon Administration's budget "provided $6 million to open the parks at acceptable standards." The decision came after the Park Service Director stated that it was impossible to keep all the parks open all of the time under the restrictions on employment and funding resulting from the Revenue and Expenditure Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-364). It should be noted for future reference that this "open-the-parks" policy occurred at the same time as land acquisition funds and the park construction program were also reduced.

In general, the Budget Bureau's functions are dual: to keep budgets as tight and as trim as possible, and to focus them according to Presidential priorities. With respect to the first function, an Agency official remarked that "BOB's primary responsibility is to cut wherever possible, and when they find a soft spot, they really push hard." A "soft spot" may include any program or project which hasn't been carefully reviewed, examined, and discussed by Agency or Departmental personnel. For example, an Examiner may question whether the Park Service is requesting too much money for new construction programs; he will then phone up Agency personnel to see what sort of justification they can give for the request; if their justification material is non-existent or of a dubious nature, then the Examiner will recommend that that request be trimmed. The manner in which BOB personnel see their functions, however, is a little different--i.e., by making sure that the budget reflects the President's concerns: "His priority programs must be adequately funded," and "adequate for Presidential purposes may not always suit an agency's definition of the same need."

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Review of Agency budgets by BOB is of course an ongoing, rather than seasonal, activity, but the nature of the review procedure changes as the year progresses. The Budget Bureau exerts two main controls over Agency and Departmental budgets; ⟶ the first "guideline" (or "ceiling," as bureau personnel perceive it) comes in the form of a Departmental Planning Allowance or Preliminary Estimate.

As BOB staff stresses, it is intended to be a tentative forecast of possible funding levels, and is supposed to serve simply as a guideline to the Department. As one staff member noted of the FY 1969 allowance, "Last year we had A, A^1, B and B^1 budgets, based on no-surtax, a surtax, pessimistic GNP forecast, and optimistic GNP forecast. There are always uncertainties over the annual budget," he said, "uncertainties over the total budget for a given year, and uncertainties over what the President wants. . . . These things naturally fluctuate throughout the year."

With respect to the Planning Allowance, another BOB staff member said: "Most Agency officials know pretty much what it will be, even before it comes out or even if it's late in coming out." This is because Agency officials also keep up with Administration policy statements and are sensitive to Presidential priorities. Further, frequent informal meetings take place between Agency and Budget Bureau staffs during this time, which keep each party mutually informed as to what is "in the winds." The assumption is that nobody operates in a vacuum in Washington, and that there is not a great deal of secrecy involved in the budget process. Everyone is well aware of the fact that most budget changes take place at the margin, though occassionally the bite is severe, and that consequently Agencies can generally count on getting--from the Budget Bureau and from the Department--at least what they got last year.

The Budget Bureau's Planning Allowance, therefore, generally includes what the Agencies or Departments got last year, plus a percentage increase over last year--financial "room for maneuvering." The general carefully reviewed, examined, and discussed by Agency or Departmental personnel. For example, an Examiner may question whether the Park Service is requesting too much money for new construction programs; he will then phone up Agency personnel to see what sort of justification they can give for the request; if their justification material is non-existent or of a dubious nature, then the Examiner will recommend that that request be trimmed. The manner in which BOB personnel see their functions, however, is a little different--i.e., by making sure that the budget reflects the President's concerns: "His priority programs must be adequately funded," and "adequate for Presidential purposes may not always suit an agency's definition of the same need."

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The Budget Bureau's Planning Allowance, therefore, generally includes what the Agencies or Departments got last year, plus a percentage increase over last year--financial "room for maneuvering." The general rationale for issuing a high Planning Allowance is that it infuses a certain degree of "flexibility" into the budget process, by allowing Agency and Department officials to think about "what they'd do with more money if given more." This is especially true for Agencies which usually operate on a minimum budgetary base, like the Park Service. It appears that at all decision-making levels, including the Bureau of the Budget, there is general agreement that the Park Service is currently operating on a "tight" budget. One BOB staff member noted that "they could probably get more money if they pushed harder"--but that "the Director has attempted to recognize fiscal conditions, Presidential policy, and to be as responsive as possible to the needs of the President as well as to the clientele and constituency that the Park Service may represent." The Budget Bureau might recommend more money on its own except for the fact that it is always so difficult to find places to cut that they are reluctant to add to their difficulties.

The second control over Agency budgets comes in the fall during the Formal Budget Review Period. At this time the Budget Bureau reviews and examines Agency budgets after the Department has allocated its planning figure among the Agencies--and after the Agencies and the Department have concluded their bargaining over the allocation.

During the fall, "an oral review process within BOB takes place," concerning budget estimates. By September 30, a Bureau employee told us, "the Program Memoranda and Agency (budget) Justifications are in our hands;" and, "within areas in the, and try to illumine programs in terms of Presidential desires and expressions"--as, for example, the current Administration's concern with the "law and order" issue.

At this time meetings take place between the Budget Bureau, the Agency and the Department. We were told that these → meetings are "informal, and characterized by the Agency being allowed to tell BOB--or the Departmental officers present--just what they're doing wrong or what they should have done." The fall hearings are intended to be the final interchange on budget levels between the various participants--the Agency, the Department, and the Budget Bureau. By this time everything is pretty well set; "certain modifications or changes take place as a result of these hearings, but nothing totally revolutionary." We lack evidence on the changes, if any, made as a result of this review. Once → the formal review period is concluded, the President's budget is decided for the coming fiscal year. It goes to the Government Printer in December, and is presented to Congress in January. The cycle then begins again.

Budgeting for the Base in the U.S. Forest Service

As in the Park Service, providing outdoor recreation for the American public largely means funding a base in the U.S. Forest Service's annual budget. It could mean a lot more, like acquiring new land for use as national forests, developing the undeveloped land that the Forest Service (and the Park Service) already has, or constructing new recreation sites and facilities within the National Forest system. But during a "tight budget period", these activities apparently are not given high priority, and the agencies follow a strategy of "conserve and maintain what we have." From the perspective of the agencies, keeping the plant operational is the minimum that can be done in order to still meet their responsibilities in providing recreation areas for the public.

Within the Forest Service, Recreation has become the second largest program of the agency--second only to "Timber Production". The Forest Service, as distinct from the Park Service, is guided by the multiple-use concept of land usage; whereas the Park Service is solely a recreation-oriented agency (broadly defined, to be sure), the Forest Service has to be concerned with many facets of public land use, one of which is recreation. The → Service prides itself on the "simplicity" of its national forest system --primitive, or minimal, development is the goal. Therefore the Service generally tries to keep its maintenance budget down but this is a problem since maintenance and development costs keep going up--because of inflation, because the number of users is skyrocketing, and because users increasingly seem to prefer developed recreation sites. But, a Forest Service Official lamented, "the budget level for these items remains relatively constant." Summarily stated, recreation agencies see themselves caught on the horns of a dilemma in which use far outstrips funding; this operations deficiency is acknowledged in Washington among Agency officials, but it seems to be acutely felt by Foresters on the ground.

There are three or four items in the Forest Service's budget which finance the major portion of its recreation program. These are: 1) Recreation-Public Use and 2) Water Resources Development and Related Activities, under the larger appropriation category, Forest Land Management. Also under Forest Land Management, there is the third line-item, Acquisition of Land, Weeks Act, which may or may not be related to recreation - depending on the use to which the land being purchased is put. And under Forest Research, there is 4) Forest Recreation Research. The bulk of the budget activity for recreation comes under the "Recreation-Public Use" item, although the "Water Resources Development..." item is fairly important, too. This latter item has to do with meeting demands thrust upon the Forest Service by other agency developments--such as the building of dams by the Bureau of Reclamation and the Corps of Engineers--near or on the National Forests.

The major recreation appropriation for the Forest Service is the "Recreation-Public Use" item, however, and it is this appropriation which funds the base. As in the Park Service's budget, there are two functionnaly separable items which are budgeted for in the Forest Service's recreation budget. The breakdown of the "Recreation-Public Use" item is in terms of those items:

RECREATION-PUBLIC USE
(1) Operation and Maintenance (O & M)
  a) Developed sites
  b) Undeveloped sites
  c) Wilderness areas
  d) National Recreation Areas (now 4 of them)

(2) Construction and Development (C & D)
  a) Water pollution control
  b) National Recreation Area development
  c) Other area (a to c above) development

Three-fourths of the Service's "Recreation-Public Use" appropriation is consumed by the "Operation and Maintenance" needs; currently, about $30 million annually is spent on Operations costs and $10 million for "Construction and Development". Whatever's left of the "C & D" money after water pollution control costs are deducted (which "isn't much") is allocated to the forests according to a regional allocation formula developed by the Recreation Division in Washington. It is a rather complex formula which takes into account: (a) the participating population of the region, in millions; (b) National Forest acreage, in thousands; (c) a supply factor (e.g., total camping days within a Region); and, (d) special allocations, like to a National Recreation Area within a Region.

Congress may also earmark funds for use at a particular site or project. An example of this is in the FY1967 appropriation when the House reported out an additional $50,000 under the "Recreation-Public Use" item, for "engineering and recreational planning for the Lusk Creek Project in Shawnee National Forest, Illinois." Apparently, Congress is doing more and more of this earmarking of recreation funds, a development which is dimly viewed up and down the line in the Service. An official in Washington said in effect that such earmarking limits the Agency's flexibility: "Once an appropriation is in the budget, we're stuck with it." Therefore, "we've had to ask the Regional and National Forest people to be pretty damn certain about their projects before they request money from us." And the Recreation Officer on a National Forest, when asked if the plans, studies, and information emanating from his Division made an impact in terms of getting money, laughed and said: "Try Congressional influence. More and more, recreation funds come down as 'earmarked' money, to be spent on 'x' project or 'y' program."

The Recreation-Public Use appropriation has increased by about $12 million from Fiscal Year 1965 to FY 1970:

Chart 5: Recreation Appropriations for the U.S. Forest Service, 1965-70

	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970
Recreation-Public Use	$24.9m.	28.2m.	30.8m.	34.6m.	36.1m.	37.0m.

As noted above, "Recreation-Public Use" is a composite of "Operation and Maintenance" and "Construction and Development" costs, and these two items are computed separately by the Recreation Division in the Forest Service's Washington Office--as well as by the officers at the local* level. An official in Washington mentioned that most of the budget increase for "Recreation-Public Use" is consumed by the Operations sub-item: "There's been no significant increase in the development funds for the last three fiscal years." One reason cited for this is that "the use of recreation sites in the Forest system is increasing at a rate of 6-8% per year, and just to keep up with this increased visitor use we have to increase the 'O & M' item by that much."

The "base" in the Forest Service's recreation budget--that which has to be funded for in order to keep the forests open to the recreation-consuming public--is therefore reflected in the "Operations and Maintenance" sub-category of the "Recreation-Public Use" item. As in the Park Service, budgeting for operations costs is a more-or-less routine procedure.[*] It is characterized by a simultaneity of computation, in that the Washington Division of Recreation, the Regional Offices, and each National Forest independently calculate their Operations costs for the coming Fiscal Year. Like the Park Service, information on budget estimates flows to and from Washington and the Forests, via the Regions. Roughly the same formulae are used at the three levels, however, by which these costs are calculated. But what is interesting is that while there is a standard procedure whereby operations needs are computed in the Service, there is a significant difference in perspectives between these levels of organization. A comparison of "on-the-ground" perceptions and expectations with those in Washington yields some interesting results; the following discussion will consequently focus on the perceptual differences between Washington Forest Service Officials and the local Forest Ranger.

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* "Local" here means the National Forest level of organization.

At the Washington level, the Forest Service has tried to make budget calculations for Operations costs amenable to a standardized procedure that can readily be justified and explained. To calculate the Service's annual O & M needs, the Recreation Division in Washington proceeds in this manner: They first take the reported visitor use statistics from the preceding year and project them for the current year. (The projection takes into account the 6-8% annual increase in recreational use.) Then they apply an "average cost for a visitor day" to the visitor use figures. An official noted here that the average cost varies according to the area for which it applies. In other words, there is an average cost for each area in the Service's four-fold classification of recreation areas: (1) developed sites, (2) undeveloped sites, (3) wilderness areas, and (4) National Recreation Areas. This average cost is based on a Service-wide-formula that includes the standard operating costs like clean-up, maintenance, and salaries, and which is updated every few years.

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[*] Inasmuch as we have discussed the process step-by-step for the Park Service, it seems unnecessary to go over the same ground for the Forest Service. The following description will therefore be a telescoped and selective version.

Once visitor use is combined with average cost for each recreation area, the figures are added up for each region, and a "Regional Total", plus a "Grand Total", is thereby arrived at for "Operations and Maintenance" costs. The Washington Division of Recreation then sends out to the regions "Chart 6 - Tentative FY---O & M Allocations" (see page 49); this table is sent out around August for completion by the regions, for the coming fiscal year, and is due back in Washington in September. Each region is asked to fill in its proposed breakdown of the total "O & M" estimates, the totals having been worked out by the combined efforts of the Recreation and Programs Divisions, according to the visitor use/average cost formula. When the region's proposed breakdowns come in they are compared with the Washington Division's tentative breakdown; in case of conflict, "usually the regional allocations are used", an official in Washington said, "since they are closer 'to the ground'" and consequently get their information from the forests.

The Forest Service's budget request for an item such as Operation and Maintenance thus relies heavily on the visitor use/average cost formula; the calculations done in Washington, at any rate, utilize this formula which

Chart 6

Tentative FY1971 O & M Allocations

(Sent Out August--Due September)

[Regions fill in blank spaces]

	Region 1	Region 2	Region 3	Region 4	Region 5	Region 6	Region 8	Region 9	Region 10	ITF	TOTAL
Undeveloped Area Cleanup											
Developed Area Cleanup											
Maintenance of Developed Sites											
Wilderness Adminis-tration											
Adm. and Cleanup NRA											
VIS O & M											
TOTAL	1,575,000	2,250,000	2,062,000	3,975,000	5,250,000	3,675,000	2,925,000	3,009,000	367,000	19,000	25,107,000

is related to an information retrieval system called RIM--Recreation Information Management. An official in Washington said that RIM has been in use in the Forest Service for about five years, and that when the Service first began collecting information →
on this basis, they found that their previous visitor-use statistics "were pretty inflated". Prior to RIM, visitor-use was calculated solely at the National Forest level, i.e., on the ground. Each local Ranger estimated (or guessed) what the annual visitor use in his district had been, and apparently some Rangers were bad guessers, since with the introduction of information-collection à la RIM, it was decided that these earlier figures were inflated. While they might have been, the mental gymnastics that administrative officers on the ground have to go through points out a possible discrepancy between the calculations done in Washington and those done at the local level. Moreover, as noted above, while Agency officials in Washington do acknowledge the existence of an Operations deficiency resulting from skyrocketing use, the deficiency is acutely felt on the ground. This is the case for both the Park and Forest Services.

In the field there is a real feeling that the annual Operations appropriation is inadequate to properly meet all the management, overhead, and operations requirements that result from booming recreation consumption. A few quotes from a Memo written in the Superintendent's Office and circulated to the Ranger Districts on one of the National Forests highlight this funding deficit:

> Since the sign shop is no longer in existence, you'll have to plan for and purchase the signs you need from your allotment . . . .
> Plan to purchase and distribute litter bags. They help cut down on mowing costs . . . .
> Financially, we're no better off than last year. Considering pay-act increases, we're probably in worse shape. You should make every effort to cut costs . . . .
> Don't be afraid to turn people away when your campsites are full. The NPS is going to strictly enforce site design capacities. This will mean that we can expect their overflow on our areas . . . . Our maintenance costs are skyrocketing because of overuse . . . .

The budget officers of the Superintendent's Offices subtract a percentage from each of the operating budgets--specific programs like fire fighting, wildlife preservation, recreation area upkeep, etc.,--to meet the overhead costs of salaries and personnel expenses. The "plain and simple fact" to Foresters at the local level is that the forests are not being funded adequately, and therefore money has to be taken from project funds to meet overhead costs. This sort of reprogramming of funds is dimly viewed everywhere except at the forest level, perhaps because they are the only ones really aware of the extent of the funding deficit for O & M. A memo from the Regional Office to the Forest Supervisors(dated April 28, 1969) makes note of this:

> REPROGRAMMING OF FUNDS
>
> During the past several years we have mentioned our concern and the concern of the Appropriations Committees regarding the reprogramming of funds. . . . Some reprogramming of funds is essential but it should be limited to the minimum required to meet program objectives. Major shifts of project funds, which have historically involved the same functions each year, can no longer be tolerated. The functions involved generally are the same each year, i.e., from timber, wildlife, range . . . and fire to recreation, range management, and structural improvements. (Emphasis added.) Our accomplishments are now under closer scrutiny

> than at any time in the past. Our work planning becomes suspect when such major deviations are involved.
> Our budget estimates for FY 1970 contain considerably more detail on the planned use of funds. We are committed to those justifications, provided the funds are appropriated by Congress.

The Administrative Officers at the forest level universally agreed that their primary problem now is a financial one: the administration and management of the National Forests are being underfunded. What this means is that when the Forest's budget requests are sent to the Regional Office, go to Washington, and come back *below* what was requested (which was the only relationship one local Ranger could see between "what was originally requested by us and what we eventually got"), project funds are partially reprogrammed in order to meet overhead expenses. The Budget Officer at a National Forest asked, rhetorically: "What do you do when you figure out your 'minimum work schedule', and then don't get full funding?" He answered: "You cut back on activities", which is what the reprogramming procedure amounts to.

The reasons given for the existence of this Operations deficit vary. In Washington, an official stated that "we can't get an adequate appropriation for administration because Congress doesn't like to see bureaucracies expand." Another reason often cited was that the entire government has been operating under a "tight budget situation" for the last several years, and that consequently many programs have had to be postponed or not fully funded. To the local Forest Ranger, however, a principal cause of this funding deficit is of an administrative nature: The workload formula on which the Service bases its Operations budget requests is chronically out-of-date. As mentioned above, the workload calculations include all the daily operations that have to be carried out on the National Forests in order to keep them open--maintenance, cleanup, salaries, and administrative expenses. The trouble with this workload analysis from the point of view of the local Ranger is that the formula was calculated in the Washington office in 1963 (a five-year plan called the "Project Work Inventory") and that consequently the average workload figures "are hopelessly low". In other words, the local Forest Service Official has to apply a 1963 formula to work being done in 1968 or 1969--and this formula simply does not reflect the increased workload which results from mushrooming public use. The local Ranger in this situation has got a great deal more work to do which cannot be accounted for under the 1963 workload formula. (The formula, it should be noted, is to be updated in 1969 by the Washington Office, and therefore may be more realistic. But as a local official noted, the 1968 formula will be applied to FY 1971 work, and thus he expects the same situation to develop.) The local Ranger's summary of the situation was that "since the Forest has to make its workload analysis on figures that are chronically low, we never will get enough money to meet administrative expenses and to carry on the work projects planned for."

Thus to the local administrative officer in the Forest Service, the Agency has to decide between one of two options: either to fund the base more realistically (by providing more personnel to manage the forests), or to limit visitor-use of recreation areas. As it is now, the local Administration is making those decisions by reprogramming funds, turning away visitors when areas are full, etc.. What appears to be desired--at least by local personnel--is an Agency-wide policy on these questions, though they would object if they could not change to meet local conditions.

II. PROGRAM BUDGETING: Call It Whatever You Want

Federal Agencies and Departments have been wrestling with integrating the PPB system into the budget process for years now, and there is no reliable measure of the success of this endeavor. Neither is there any government-wide agreement as to what it is, nor how it ought to be done, nor whether there have been any significant changes resulting from it. Opinions voiced by government officials as to its utility vary from: "It's the best form of budget presentation I've run across", to "It hasn't gotten us a dime's worth more money, and that's my criterion for a budget system."

The divergency of viewpoint concerning program budgeting is striking. Within the Park and Forest Services, and at the Departmental levels, there are those who praise the system and those who damn it. And there are those who admit they don't really know what it is. One only knows that it is a force to be reckoned with, since Agencies, Departments, and the Bureau of the Budget do now attempt--more or less--to operate under a PPB system.

After having interviewed numerous officials on the subject, one cannot escape the conclusion that the appraisal of the PPB system is closely linked to one's "station in life"--so that whether you see program budgeting as a useful or useless system depends greatly on how you perceive the political process generally, and from what vantage point you are doing the perceiving. On the one hand, there are those who express cynicism over the introduction of PPBS. This camp includes (among others): (1) Government Officials who have been around a long time, and "have seen programs come and go"; (2) people in the more traditional loci of decision-making, like in the Budget Offices, where a standard remark would be, "It hasn't changed things much around the Department--maybe even made things more complicated"; (3) local or regional officials who either do not understand the complexities of PPBS or who do not see the applicability of the system to the "real-life" problems and decisions which they daily confront; and finally, (4) a cross-cutting category of people who are more or less disturbed by certain implications or by-products of program budgeting, such as: having to quantify the unquantifiable; standardizing Agency operations to the extent that "we can get the Service's budgetary base computerized so that we won't have to go back to the parks each year asking for the same information"; and formalizing the system with a greater centralization of decision-making than existed previously.

On the other hand, many officials appear enthusiastic and hopeful about program budgeting; they often scorn the old ways. This group includes: (1) the program analysts themselves (naturally) who perceive their role as one of "generating more and generally better data on which to make decisions"; (2) younger bureaucrats who look with dismay on the sometimes disjointed and inchoate bureaucratic organization and who want to infuse greater rationality and efficiency into the system; and (3) Departmental Officials who see an opportunity in the system to attain a greater coordination of Departmental programs and a larger information base for decision-making.

Given such differences of opinion it becomes exceedingly difficult to appraise the new PPB system in terms of its utility or its decision-making value. Certain structural modifications of the budgetary process have occurred as a result of PPBS, however, and it is to a discussion of these changes that we now turn--prefaced by a summary remark made by an agency official in which he noted that "The Agency is now putting a lot more effort and manpower into the review of the budget, and call it whatever you want, it is this time and energy expended on the budget that has changed our operations."

Program Budgeting in the U.S. Forest Service: The Horizontal-Input Model

Program budgeting was first introduced into the Forest Service in August of 1965. Within the Agency, responsibility for instituting the system was given to the Division of Programs and Special Projects. Formerly, this Division was in charge of: (a) developing new major program proposals, and (b) working in a cooperative way with other land managing agencies and departments. Prior to PPBS, "we really had nothing to do with *existing* programs and activities--this came as a result of PPBS." Thus as a result of PPB, the Programs Division was given coordinate responsibility for reviewing and appraising existing Forest Service programs, as well as continuing with its previous responsibility of developing and proposing new programs.

In effect, program budgeting brought new participants into the Service's conventional budget procedure. We saw earlier the manner in which a budget item like the Operations sub-item of the "Recreation-Public Use" one is formulated: local and regional officials make their requests and send them to the Washington Division of Recreation. Then budget meetings take place between the functional Divisions and the Chief and his staff and eventually an overall Agency budget request is arrived at and sent to the Department. Now, however, the Programs Division is included in the budget process, and they are included primarily in the early phases of the process. The Recreation Division now "works closely" with the Programs Division in coming up with an initial budget request for Recreation.

During the initial phases of budget preparation, the Programs people appear to have what can be called a horizontal input into the process; they don't have sole responsibility for preparing the Service's initial budget estimates, but rather their role is to work with each of the functional units in the Agency (like the Recreation Division) and provide these with additional, different, or even contrary information on budgetary matters. To illustrate this, one Programs official characterized his role in the Agency's budget bargaining sessions as that of "the devil's advocate": having no formal line responsibilities himself, he is able to ask the "hard" questions, and can be the disinterested voice which speaks outside of biases inhering in specific programs and projects. "Those with line responsibilities," he said, "sometimes find it hard to be objective about budget decisions," because, naturally, they're pushing their own programs. "I try to propose program changes other than those coming from the 'line' Deputies--this is especially true in the case of cuts."

Another Agency official noted that with respect to the intra-Service bargaining sessions there now are a number of early inputs to the budget process. "Last year," he said, "the Divisions came up with a budget level, the PPB staff came up with one, and a third group, FARR,* came up with still another estimate." The three estimates went into a working paper which looked like this:

	DIVISION	FARR	PPB	Remarks (Justifications)
Budget Item	Estimate	Estimate	Estimate	----------------------
"	"	"	"	" "
"	"	"	"	" "

Once the working paper was prepared, "we all went up to the Chief and his staff," and pleaded the particular positions. "Sometimes we won, sometimes they won," he said, noting also that all the figures "were usually a lot over what we knew we'd eventually get." This is so because the initial budget requests by an Agency are expected to be high--to reflect optimal programs rather than a "bare-bones" operating budget. As the year progresses, these figures usually get shaken down by the Department or by the Budget Bureau. But initially, anyway, hopes are high.

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* FARR stands for "Forests and Related Resources", an in-house study group.

The type of information on which the PPB staff makes its budget recommendations seems to be related to a set of general objectives that are more or less uniformly recognized as being the "PPB system in operation." Notwithstanding the fact that there is a diversity of opinion, still, on what PPBS "really is", a certain degree of structure has emerged, and Programs analysts in the Agencies and Departments discussed in this study do roughly similar things.

There is, first, "an attempt to bring economic analysis to bear on decision-making," primarily through the quantification of outputs--which permits the application of such techniques as cost-benefit analysis of alternative programs. As mentioned by a number of programs people, "the first thing we try to do is state the Agency's (or Department's) objectives," and then "analyze the alternatives." From the objectives (the Program Categories) there is an attempt to draw out the quantifiable or measurable outputs that derive from the goals. In the Forest Service, outputs are measurable units such as "board feet of timber","visitor day use", and "acre feet of water".

In a program area such as Recreation, the PPB staff in the Forest Service thus attempts to analyze this activity in terms of the cost-benefit model. Important factors in making decisions about the Recreation program are: 1) to precisely measure the demand for recreation; 2) to have information on capacity of recreation sites and areas; 3) to geographically determine where recreation needs are and are not being met; and 4) to get a clearer idea of what kinds of recreation are being demanded. One official summed up the PPB analysis of Recreation by saying, "There is a demand for it, and people are consuming it at a rising rate. We want to precisely measure the demand--and this involves making hypothetical trade-offs among various types of recreation. "We're really trying to determine," he said, "where to put campgrounds, and whether to spend for wilderness or ski resorts." This official also said, however, that the goals of program budgeting "should be viewed modestly--we have to realize we can't quantify everything."

Analytical progress in the area of Recreation has, however, been relatively slow. Professor Robert Marty in his study, "Federal Land Management Program and Policy Evaluation", found that the Department of Agriculture's budget documents for fiscal years 1968 and 1969 included two special analytic studies on recreation, but ". . . as in Interior no analysis of program alternatives was developed."* In other words, analysis of recreation programs has yet to grapple with the difficult problems which inhere in this program category--like how to measure the value of output in contrast to cost. As he notes, "Unlike forage, timber, and minerals, the recreation program results in outputs which are typically not marketed. Thus there is no easy appeal to a market mechanism for established economic values in this area."* Thus recreation program memoranda consist largely of lists of projects the agency would like to have, with a minimum of justification of existing programs and with little comparison of the relative utility of one project as opposed to another.

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* Robert Marty, "Federal Land Management Program and Policy Evaluation", prepared for the Public Land Law Review Commission, September 1969, p. 37.

Besides serving as the "economic analysts" of the Agency or Department, the PPB staffs at both these levels see one of their main functions as evaluating ongoing and proposed programs. "Evaluation is the main function of the PEP (Program Evaluation and Policy) Staff in the Department of Agriculture," said one official there. Another agency official said that PPB "amounts to an attempt to appraise and evaluate programs, and to collect data to do that."

Generally, two main criteria are utilized by PPB staffs in this evaluation procedure for the Recreation program (which is a sub-category of the Department's larger"Communities of Tommorrow" Program Category): the first is cost-benefit analysis and the second is a locational, or geographic, factor. With regard to this second criterion a PEP official remarked that "program analysis recently located a disparity in terms of the geographic distribution of recreation opportunities." He went on to say that "our goal in this (geographic) study is to locate on a map of the U.S. all the recreational opportunities (both public and private) that now exist." From this, one would be able to determine "exactly where deficiencies exist--this 'visual approach' might convince Congress and the public that recreation needs in certain areas are not being met--like in urban areas."

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* Marty, op. cit., p. 37.

That this is less analysis than it is propaganda--the graphic specification of vague needs that doesn't relate financial resources to opportunities--should be apparent here. At least in part, this type of analysis is responding to the political realities of the current situation. With respect to public recreation programs, two pincipal "political realities" immediately come to mind. One is the fact that there now exists a wide and general concern for urban problems, and recreation-providing bureaus and agencies have responded to that concern. The Department of Agriculture speaks of "shifting development funds from the West to the (urbanized) East", while the Interior Department talks of "going 2/3 urban" in its recreation development program. The second political reality is in the nature of a stumbling block to such decisions, and that has to do with the composition of the relevant congressional committees. They are, and have been, predominantly staffed by Western Congressmen who take a rather dim view of shifting recreation funds from West to East. The graphic presentation of recreation opportunities held out the hope that such a "visual approach" might convince Committee members of the "acute" need for an urban emphasis. That this hope is in the nature of a long-shot is apparent in the comment made by a program analyst when he said: "It's frustrating when you do program evaluation, and then don't get it approved by the Department, or appropriated for (by Congress)."

Because they are involved with long-range planning, the PPB staffs at both the Agency and Departmental levels are most interested in certain items of the recreation budget. Actually, all the participants in the budget process show an interest in where "Construction and Development" funds are being spent, and where new land acquisition money is going. We stated at the outset of this paper that a PPB system may be useful in illuminating some budget items, and of lesser or dubious utility in formulating others. This appears to be the case here. For routine items such as were discussed in the previous section--items like maintenance, management, the basic operating costs--a PPB format appears to have had limited impact. As one official put it, "There are only so many ways of looking at a budget," and the traditional line-item structure is one of those ways. Budgeting for routine, recurring costs is constrained by a number of factors: the "existing plant", prior large-scale decisions, and the like. To take care of the annual operating costs, a semi-automatic, semi-routine procedure has emerged.

This is not necessarily the case with the Construction and Development budget, or with the land acquisition program, however. Here the weighty decisions are still pending and consequently the participants in budgetary decision-making--Congress, agencies, departments, the Budget Bureau, and the President--all show an interest in where, when, and how much will be spent on new Recreation construction, development, and land purchases. It is with this type of budget decision that significant conflicts of opinion are likely to occur. This other side of the "recreation coin" is both more susceptible to program analysis (PPB), and to "political" decision-making.

Construction, development and land acquisition items involve the Agency in making requests for increases above what is the expected norm for operating the existing plant. Once you begin talking about developing a new park, acquiring more land for recreation purposes, or constructing new facilities on existing forest land, you're talking about the non-routine aspect of budgeting.

Actually, then, these items are not handled in the same manner as are the routine budget items. There isn't, in other words, a roughly traceable progression from the local park or forest Superintendent's office, through the Regional Office, to the Washington office of the Agency and Department, etc. These decisions are normally not made at the lower levels of the bureaucracy. While recreation planning is done at the local forest (or park) level, the impact on this portion of the budget appears to the officials there to be at best marginal--and certainly indirect and impossible to trace in a "building blocks" approach. "Most of our plans don't ever get funded for," one Forester said.

These decisions involving new recreation developments are made above--if not by the top level administrators of the Park and Forest Services, then by the Department; or by Congress; or the President. Consequently, it seems, a PPB system in reality merges into policy formulation, and it is interesting to note that the construction and development budget is both more amenable to an analytical approach and to the more traditional forms of political decision-making in which Congressmen significantly influence the flow of funds. As the less routine side of the recreation budget, planning for new projects and programs (which result in the Construction line-item) allows a

PPB system to play an important role. But here, too, "Congressional influence" plays a part; the fact that increasingly Construction funds come down as "earmarked money" attests to the openness or fluidity of this side of the recreation budget. Certainly the Agency or the Department would like to have the freedom to decide where they want to develop and construct recreation areas (and who do so via PPB analysis), but so too does Congress. An important function of the PPB system thus is, in practice, its ability to generate data that support agency or departmental goals and objectives. And that is no small function--nor is it meant to be necessarily a criticism of PPB.

We feel it necessary to make the above disclaimer for this reason: time and again Program Analysts refused to acknowledge that what they did had a political side to it. Program analysis appeared to them as free from bias and therefore as purely "objective analysis". Case in point: regarding the expenditures of the Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF), "politics" comes in only when Congress (or the Department, responding to outside pressure) starts wanting to have a say in where LWCF funds will be spent. Program analysis, however, which "unearthed" the urban recreation deficiency and which provides both the Agriculture and Interior Departments with supportive data on this deficiency, is not seen as "political". Only the blatantly political earmarking of recreation funds in certain Congressional districts and states is viewed politically--not the more subtle analysis of recreation deficiencies that was generated after five years of urban riots and a nation-wide concern with the problems of the cities. But again, to assert that program analysis does in fact respond to political pressures of a more or less general nature is not an *ipso facto* criticism of it--it is simply to say that the collection of data and its analysis does not exist in a vacuum, apart from the general political environment that generates the original concern for analysis and evaluation.

PPBS in the National Park Service: The Conflict of Forms

In this section we want to amplify the discussion of the structural modifications resulting from the application of the PPB System to the budgeting process. In the previous section two major changes were mentioned: its introduction into the Forest Service's budget process brought in new participants, and it appears to have somewhat changed the nature of the dialogue by emphasizing cost-benefit analysis, the economic evaluation of existing programs, and by stressing "alternative program analysis" (making trade-offs). These generalizations also hold true for the National Park Service's experience with PPBS.

Program budgeting has increased the numbers of steps required in the budget cycle (see accompanying charts 7 and 8). It has also generated more justification material within Agencies and Departments (Issue Papers and Program Memoranda). It has attempted to inaugurate multi-year programming and budgeting; and, according to a number of Agency and Departmental officials, the PPB system has pushed the crucial budget decisions into an earlier time phase of the cycle.

The way most Park Service officials explained the division of labor among the various participants in the budget process was in terms of a temporal cut-off point: the Agency's PPB staff (the Programs Division) is in charge of budget preparation from the beginning of the previous year up until the receipt of the Planning Allowance for the budget year. Once the Planning Allowance is received, the Agency's Budget Office has formal responsibility for the budget, until the time Congress has received and acted upon the President's Budget. The following schedule of the program-budget cycle was composed by the Park Service and is in use in that Agency. Steps 1 through

Chart 7

THE PROGRAM BUDGET CYCLE

NATIONAL PARK SERVICE


JAN.
FEB.
MAR.
APR.
MAY
JUNE
JULY
AUG.
SEPT.
OCT.
NOV.
DEC.
69 IDENTIFICATION OF FY 1972 ISSUE STUDY PROGRAM
70 ASSEMBLY + EVALUATION OF MYPFP + REVIEW BY DIRECTOR
OUTLINE OF ISSUE PAPERS AND PM
SUBMISSION OF ISSUE PAPERS + MYPFP TO DEPT.
DEPT. DRAFT PM TO SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE
① SPRING PREVIEW ESTIMATES TO SEC'Y. ② REVISE PM + PFP IN ACCORD WITH SECRETARY'S DECISIONS
DEPT. SPRING PREVIEW ESTIMATES SUBMITTED TO BoB
SELECT MAJOR ISSUES
① DEPT. RECV. TENTATIVE PLANNING ALLOWANCE ② DEPT. MAKES TENTATIVE DISTRIBUTION ③ NPS MAKES DISTRIBUTION RECOMMENDATIONS
5 YR. PLANNING PROGRAMS + 5 YR. DEVELOP. AREA CONSTRUCTION PROGRAMS + PRIORITIES
① DEPT. MAKES PLANNING ALLOWANCE ② REVISION OF PFP + PM
MYPFP INSTRUCT. TO FIELD AREAS
BUDGET ESTIMATES PREPARED FOR DEPT. AND SUBMISSION TO BoB
SUBMISSION OF MYPFP AND SUPPORT MATERIAL
BoB HEARINGS
BoB BUDGET ALLOWANCE
RD REVIEW, MYPFP ADJUSTMENT AND ASSEMBLY
RD, WASO, SEVICE CENTER + FIELD SUBMISSION TO WASO
ADJUST BUDGET ESTIMATE ACCORDING TO BoB ALLOWANCE
71 ① PRESIDENTS BUDGET TO CONGRESS ② PREPARG JUSTIFICATIONS ③ PREPARE DIRECTOR'S BUDGET STATEMT.
HOUSE APPROP. SUBCOMMITEE HEARINGS
PREPARE SENATE AMMENDMENTS
SENATE APPROP. SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS
HOUSE-SENATE CONFERENCE
PREP. APPORT. FOR BoB
① BUDGET ALLOT. ② PREP. OPER. PROGRAMS
CONTROL + ADJUSTMENT
72

Chart 8

DIVISION OF RECREATION - FS

CONVENTIONAL BUDGET PROCEDURE



DIVISION OF RECREATION - FOREST SERVICE

PPBS PROCEDURE


1
PREP FY 71-75 PROGRAMS
RESUME OF NEEDS TO DEPUTY CHIEF
8
9
COMPUTERIZE (ONE TIME JOB IN 1969)
FY 71 PROGRAM COORDINATION
W.O. SUMMARIZATION OF FY 71
11
12
DEPT PLANNING ADVICE
13
CHIEF'S ELEMENT AUTH
14
FY 71 PFP PREPARATION
17
COORDINATION
PROGRAM AND STUDY FOR HEARINGS
22
21
DETERMINE TENTATIVE ALLOCATIONS
TENTATIVE F.Y. 1971 ALLOCATIONS TO REGIONS
23
UPDATE FY 1971 REGION PROGRAMS
29
UPDATE SERVICEWIDE PROGRAM
24
COORDINATION BETWEEN P.B.&P AND DIV OF REC
25
CHANGE PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS IF NECESSARY
26
ADJUST PFP FY 71
27
DEPT HEARINGS
28
DEPT ALLOWANCES
30
UPDATE FY 72/76
33
W.O. SUMMARIZATION
14
REPEAT CYCLE
PREP FOR BOB HEARINGS
31
BOB ALLOWANCES
32
BEGIN CONVENTIONAL BUDGET PROCEDURE FOR ENSUING FISCAL YEAR
NO ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED
2
REPRESENTS A POINT IN TIME AT WHICH AN ACTION IS COMPLETE

FOREST SERVICE USDA

15 are the prerogative of the Programs Division; after that, responsibility shifts to the Budget Office:

CHART 9: Program Budget Cycle in the Park Service

1.	Identification of general study program needed to determine probable major program issues for 1972 fiscal year.	January 1969
2.	Study program to develop data for determination and support of major issues.	Continuous throughout year
3.	Selection of specific major issues for 1972 fiscal year.	July 1969
4.	Orientation and training sessions for regional and park staffs.	August 1969
5.	Submission of revised 5-year (1972-1976) planning programs and 5-year developed area construction priority programs to regional office by field areas.	August 1969
6.	Distribution of instructions for preparation of Multi-Year Program and Financial Plan for parks (based on approved planning and construction programs) by regional offices to parks.	September 1969
7.	Submission of Multi-Year Program and Financial Plan and supporting data by field areas.	November 1969
8.	Review, adjustment, and assembly of field submissions of Multi-Year Program and Financial Plan by regional offices.	November 1969
9.	Submission of regional, WASO (Washington Office), Service Center, and consolidated field area submissions to Washington.	December 1969
10.	Assembly in Washington of Service Multi-Year Program and Financial Plan and evaluation for selection of program emphasis and priority.	January 1970
11.	Review of Service Multi-Year Program and Financial Plan by Directorate with Regional Directors.	January 1970
12.	Outline of issue papers and first draft of national needs, objectives and goals for Departmental Program Memorandum (Recreation Category).	February 1970

13.	Submission of Service Multi-Year Program and Financial Plan with supporting annexes and other material to Department.	March 1970
14.	Submission of completed issue papers to Department.	March 1970
15.	Receipt of planning allowance for budget year.	August 1970
16.	Preparation and submission of budget estimates (schedules for President's budget and justifications) based on planning allowances.	September 1970
17.	Hearings before Bureau of the Budget examiners.	October 1970
18.	Receipt of Bureau of the Budget allowances.	November 1970
19.	Adjustment of schedules previously submitted to Bureau of the Budget based on planning allowances to the budget allowances.	November 1970
20.	Preparation and submission of congressional justifications and supporting materials.	January 1971
21.	Hearings before House appropriations subcommittee.	February 1971
22.	Preparation of Senate amendments following House action on appropriation bill.	March 1971
23.	Hearings before Senate appropriations subcommittee.	April 1971
24.	Preparation and submission of apportionment schedules for Budget Bureau approval covering funds provided in 1972 fiscal year appropriation act.	June or July 1971
25.	Allotment of funds provided in 1972 fiscal year appropriation act to organizational units.	July 1971
26.	Preparation and submission of Financial Plan-Operating Program and Operating Program covering allocations from operating appropriations.	July 1971
27.	Control and adjustment as appropriate of allotments during period of fund availability	Continuous throughout fiscal year.

Thus, within the Park Service, the introduction of a PPB system altered the flow of budget information within the Agency. It established a new

Assistant Directorship for Policy Analysis and Programming, who has charge of the Division of Policy Analysis and Programs. It is this group which serves as the PPB staff for the Agency and which has responsibility over the early phases of budget formulations. Formerly, the parks sent their budget estimates via the Regional Offices to the Washington Budget Office. Since the introduction of program budgeting, however, the earliest and initial information comes into the Division of Programs.

Understandably, the institution of a new system within an organization generates a good deal of confusion, duplication of work, and no doubt a lot of hard feelings to boot. In the Park Service, the transition from the traditional budget process to a program budget system has been accompanied by a series of agency reorganizations and a general confusion over the Forms to be used in collecting budget estimates and information. As of summer, 1969, the parks seemed to be preparing their budget requests according to both the new PPB format and the traditional method--though it was mentioned that the old forms were being replaced by the Multi-year Program and Financial Plans--the MYPFP's. It appeared as if the old forms were dying hard, however, since even with the advent of program budgeting much of the crucial information on park operations was still coming in to the Washington Agency on the standard format--i.e., the "10-564" forms": the Analysis of Increases and Decreases for FY--." While the multi-year forms (see attached sample copy) were intended to incorporate all this information in a manner susceptible to automatic data processing, their institution has not been to date as successful or as total as desired. A typical remark made by a Regional Agency official, was that "those forms are so difficult to understand that nobody (here) knows how to fill them out." He then mentioned that as of the fall of 1969, the MY forms have been superseded by the 10-237 forms (see Charts 9 and 10), which are "a sort of compromise between the old budget forms and the new programs ones."

While many Agency officials in Washington appear to be excited and hopeful over the possibilities of program budgeting, that enthusiasm has not seeped down to the park level of organization. The Park Service, unlike the Forest Service which confines multi-year programming and budgeting to the Washington Division, has attempted to include the local administrations in the planning-programming-and-budgeting system. "We are probably the first civilian agency to get program budgeting down to the local level," said one Agency official in Washington. What this means in practice is that with the inauguration of the PPB system, local Park administrators have been required to send in their annual budget requests (for all budget items) on the multi-year format. The objective in this endeavor was stated by one of the staff in the Washington office: "We are trying to find a system that will both cut out a lot of unnecessary detail and provide better, more relevant, information on which to make decisions." Another primary goal is to "push program budgeting down to the parks," so that at this level meaningful and substantive decisions will be made--and also, "so that the information coming up from the parks is more relevant to the decision-makers in Washington."

Everyone recognizes, however, that attaining these objectives in practice is more difficult than stating them. While the multi-year forms are in fact prepared at the park level, they are handled there in much

Form 10-232
(Nov. 1968)

Chart 9

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR - NATIONAL PARK SERVIC

PARK MULTI - YEAR PROGRAM AND FINANCIAL PLAN

PROGRAM WORKSHEET

PREPARED BY

TITLE

FOR DATA PROCESSING ONLY DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK									
CARD	YEAR	PARK ID	SC	CENS. DIVN.	LOCATION		M	CONG. DIST.	METR. AREA
					ST.	CO.			
1	3	4 – 7	8	9	11	13 –15	16	17	19

	LINE NUMBER	ACCUMULATED COSTS (1957 - 1967)	PAST YEAR (1968)	CURRENT YEAR (1969)	BUDGET YEAR (1970)	LEVEL 1	LEVEL 2			
						PROGRAM YEAR (1971)	PROGRAM YEAR (1971)	SECOND YEAR (1972)	THIRD YEAR (1973)	FOUR YEA (1974
	21	23 – 28	29 – 33	34 – 38	39 – 43	44 – 48	49 – 53	54 – 58	59 – 63	64 –
Management of Parks and										
Other Areas										
Management	0 1									
Interp. & Vis. Serv.	0 2									
Res. Mgmt. & Vis. Prot.	0 3									
Forestry & Fire Control	0 4									
B&U Maintenance	0 5									
R&T Maintenance	0 6									
Subtotal Operating Prog.										
Minus Nonrecurring Items										
Base Brought Forward										
Acquisition	0 7									
Construction for										
Existing Capacity										
Buildings & Utilities	0 8									
Roads & Trails	0 9									
Parkways	1 0									
Construction for										
New Capacity										
Buildings & Utilities	1 1									
Roads & Trails	1 2									
Parkways	1 3									
Subtotal Construction										
Forest Prot. & Util. *(Uses)*	1 4									
Total Program										
Reimbursable Operations Costs	1 5									
Net Program										

Page ______ of ______

PARK

DATE

TELEPHONE

FIFTH YEAR (1975)		LEVEL 3					REMAINING DEVELOPMENT COSTS
		PROGRAM YEAR (1971)	SECOND YEAR (1972)	THIRD YEAR (1973)	FOURTH YEAR (1974)	FIFTH YEAR (1975)	
69 – 73		23 – 27	28 – 32	33 – 37	38 – 42	43 – 47	48 – 52

Form 10-232
(Nov. 1968)

Chart 9

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR - NATIONAL PARK SERVICE

PARK MULTI - YEAR PROGRAM AND FINANCIAL PLAN

PROGRAM WORKSHEET

PREPARED BY

TITLE

FOR DATA PROCESSING ONLY DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK									
CARD	YEAR	PARK ID	SC	CENS. DIVN.	LOCATION ST.	LOCATION CO.	M	CONG. DIST.	METR. AREA
1	3	4 – 7	8	9	11	13 – 15	16	17	19

	LINE NUMBER	ACCUMULATED COSTS (1957 - 1967)	PAST YEAR (1968)	CURRENT YEAR (1969)	BUDGET YEAR (1970)	LEVEL 1 PROGRAM YEAR (1971)	LEVEL 2 PROGRAM YEAR (1971)	LEVEL 2 SECOND YEAR (1972)	LEVEL 2 THIRD YEAR (1973)	LEVEL 2 FOURTH YEAR (1974)	LEVEL 2 FIFTH YEAR (1975)
	21	23 – 28	29 – 33	34 – 38	39 – 43	44 – 48	49 – 53	54 – 58	59 – 63	64 – 68	69 – 73
Management of Parks and											
Other Areas											
Management	01										
Interp. & Vis. Serv.	02										
Res. Mgmt. & Vis. Prot.	03										
Forestry & Fire Control	04										
B&U Maintenance	05										
R&T Maintenance	06										
Subtotal Operating Prog.											
Minus Nonrecurring Items											
Base Brought Forward											
Acquisition.	07										
Construction for											
Existing Capacity											
Buildings & Utilities	08										
Roads & Trails	09										
Parkways	10										
Construction for											
New Capacity											
Buildings & Utilities	11										
Roads & Trails	12										
Parkways	13										
Subtotal Construction											
Forest Prot. & Util. (*Uses*)	14										
Total Program											
Reimbursable Operations Costs	15										
Net Program											

alternate 265

Chart 9 cont'd.

Page ______ of ______

PARK

DATE

TELEPHONE

	LEVEL 3					REMAINING DEVELOPMENT COSTS
	PROGRAM YEAR (1971)	SECOND YEAR (1972)	THIRD YEAR (1973)	FOURTH YEAR (1974)	FIFTH YEAR (1975)	
	23 – 27	28 – 32	33 – 37	38 – 42	43 – 47	48 – 52
Management of Parks and Other Areas						
Management						
Interp. & Vis. Serv.						
Res. Mgmt. & Vis. Prot.						
Forestry & Fire Control						
B&U Maintenance						
R&T Maintenance						
Subtotal Op. Prog.						
Minus Nonrecurring Items						
Base Brought Foreward						
Acquisition						
Construction for Existing Capacity						
Buildings & Utilities						
Roads & Trails						
Parkways						
Construction for New Capacity						
Buildings & Utilities						
Roads & Trails						
Parkways						
Subtotal Construction						
Forest Prot. & Util. (Uses)						
Total Program						
Reimbursable Operations Costs						
Net Program						

Form 10-237
(Sept. 1969)

Chart 10

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE

DETAIL OF PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS

FUNCTION OR ACTIVITY (1)	AMOUNT $ (2)	NUMBER POS. PERM. (3)	(Multi-year) MY PERM. (4)	NUMBER POS. TEMP. (5)	MY TEMP. (6)	AREA PRIORITY (7)	JUSTI
							DE
Park:							Date:

FICATION

TAIL (8)	TYPE (9)

Page ___ of ___

Form 10-237
(Sept. 1969)

Chart 10

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE

DETAIL OF PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS

FUNCTION OR ACTIVITY (1)	AMOUNT $ (2)	NUMBER POS. PERM. (3)	(Multi-year) MY PERM. (4)	NUMBER POS. TEMP. (5)	MY TEMP. (6)	AREA PRIORITY (7)	JUSTIFICATION	
							DETAIL (8)	TYPE (9)
alternate 246								

Park:

Date:

Page ____ of ____

the same way as the budget forms they were intended to replace--i.e., in a routine, incrementalist manner. A Budget Officer on one of the national parks described the multi-year forms as "not too different from the 'Preliminary Estimate Forms' [which they replaced]; I guess they sort of copied them in a way, except that they added on a couple of years."

The new multi-year format also required the parks to send in not one but three different budget programs: a minimum, proposed, and optimum program. The intention here was to implement, at the park level, a broad goal of PPB itself--namely, the identification of "alternative program mixes" through the process of making trade-offs between various program categories or budget items. The parks responded by "setting up our own program standards for the park. We set up classes A, B and C for each of the program categories." The minimum program is usually based on what the park got in the way of funding for the preceding year, or below (as in the case of "cutbacks" and a very tight budget situation); the proposed program is a more relaxed one which urges the parks to send in a budget that allows them "to operate all existing services and facilities at the pre-1969 cutback level and standard of operation"; and the optimum level (#3) is a program "in which all services would be brought up to the needed level for 1971 and then maintained on a basis of getting what is needed, when it is needed." The parks are further instructed by the Washington office not to "gild the lily" or to "ask for the moon and hope for half." In preparing the program levels, the parks are, finally, instructed not to come up with across-the-board increases: "It may be necessary to make trade-offs, holding or even decreasing some functions in order to strengthen others."

In preparing the multi-year budget forms, an administrative officer said that the way in which they proceed at the parks "is to reason out what would be the best deal." It was apparent that at the park level multi-year programming became integrated into the Administration's routine operations, and that the personnel there experienced no revolutionary or "mind-expanding" changes in their method of operations. They were in effect still thinking in terms of "average annual increases", and working from last year's base. Their real concern was not with how to fill out hypothetical optimum programs but rather with how to get around the personnel ceilings and cutbacks which have curtailed their operations for the past few years. As a local Forester remarked: "RIM [Recreation-Information-Management] and PPBS are great for Washington, but they can't be used here--we don't even get enough to meet our fixed expenses."

This remark is worth considering in relation to the implementation of program and multi-year budgeting in the Park and Forest Services. A PPB system cannot successfully operate at this level of organization given the restrictive fiscal climate within which the local park and forest administrators find themselves operating. Rather, the system requires a degree of psychological and financial freedom to manoeuver in order to really be effective or useful. If the PPB system is concerned with making trade-offs and producing alternative program mixes, then when the local agency official is faced with what appears to him to be a budget that doesn't even adequately find the necessary operations, there is not going to be much talk of alternative programs. In other words, program budgeting may require a certain amount of freedom or flexibility from fiscal constraints which the real situation does not allow; one cannot be frantically trying to keep one's head above water and at the same time be asked to think about what he'd be doing if he were not about to drown at any moment. And seemingly, at the park and forest level, this is the fix they're in; the only maneuvering they do is concerned with keeping the plant operational on what appears to them to be a severely restrictive budget.

At least in the case of the Park Service, however, this tight budget situation was partially ameliorated by the FY 1970 budget, and they were able to get a sizeable increase in their Operations budget at a time when the Nixon Administration was calling for cutbacks in all agency programs. To the Park Service, "this was the biggest news of the year (1969)." Coincidentally--or as a result--this was the first year that budget information on park operations came in to the Washington office on the multi-year format, and it was mentioned by a number of officials that "a serious Management and Maintenance deficit" had been located. It was sufficiently serious to warrant a statement from the Park Service Director that, unless the agency got a $9 million increase in FY1970, he would be forced to shut down some areas altogether, and operate other parks on a less than seven-day/week basis, during the peak visitor season. The Service was successful in getting an increase of about $6 million approved by Congress for their Operations budget--their Construction budget was cut back, however.

If we were to venture to reconstruct the sequence of events leading up to this much talked-about windfall, it would look like this:

1. The Fiscal Year 1970 budget requests were prepared for the first time by the parks in early 1968, and sent to the Regional Offices on the MY program forms; they were late in getting to Washington because of the new system.
2. Simultaneously, the Programs Division in Washington had been analyzing visitor-use statistics and found that recreation demand/consumption was increasing; it was further discovered that the Park Service has been plagued with an increase in vandalism. Since Park officials had been crying out about these matters for years, it is hard to regard the information as new. What was new was a top level decision to go after the money to deal with the problem.

3. The PPB system as it operates in the Department of the Interior requests preliminary budget justifications from each agency in the form of "Issue Papers". The Issue Papers are justification material which are sent to the Department's Office of Program Analysis (OPA) early in the year.

   The IP's for the Park Service were prepared, in large part, by the Programs Division, but were late in being completed because of the new system. They didn't get to the OPA until the summer of 1968; consequently, the Department sent the Park Service's requests for an increase to the Bureau of the Budget as "over-ceiling" items--i.e., over the Planning Allowance figures.

   It was explained by the OPA that if the Park Service had gotten their justification material in on time, their requests wouldn't have gone to BOB as over-ceiling, and consequently they would have gotten earlier approval from BOB for an increase. The Agency's Issue Paper on "Maintenance Funding for the National Park Service" was described by the OPA as "very sophisticated and convincing analysis". A frequently discussed part of this analysis was a graph showing that other Federal agencies spend a great deal more on "Unit Cost (per square foot) of Maintenance and Operation of Buildings". For example, the National Gallery of Art spends approximately $1.25 per square foot on maintenance, while the National Park Service spends about $.40. Whether such comparisons are meaningful is another matter.

4. In the meantime, within the Agency problem areas have been located and are being discussed. There was mention of the "development gap" that resulted from the new area acquisitions during the Agency's Mission 66 program; others mentioned the law enforcement problem facing the Park Service.

   The result of everybody getting together was, in effect, an Issue Paper that was put together by the Programs Division and cranked into the budget process in order to convince BOB of the need for greater law enforcement funding (which comes under the Management and Protection line-item). The same sort of procedure also characterized the coming-to-light of the "maintenance deficit". The Issue Papers are now critical to the budget process, officials said, and they are usually prepared prior to the issuance of BOB's Planning Allowance in the spring or early summer. But it was also noted that the decision-making procedure leading up to the writing of an IP is not at all clearcut. Analysis is not only useful in helping make decisions; it may be essential to justify them to others.

5. By the summer of 1968 serious problems were identified within the Agency. It was decided that a big increase in the Operations budget was needed, and the Programs Division was charged with writing the IP's to support the agency's request.

   The Washington Office then sent out requests for more information to the regions regarding the Service's operations deficit and it flowed back in.

   Also, once the Programs Division prepared the Issue Papers, other Divisions in the Agency began preparing the justification material for increases in sub-items such as "forestry and fire control" and "law enforcement" which would eventually go to Congress, for their review of the Agency's budget.

6. By the fall of 1968 the Agency's request is sent to BOB by the Department as "over-ceiling"; but in January of 1969 when President Nixon ordered a "revised Johnson budget" showing decreases in bureau and departmental budgets, the Park Service came forward with a request for an increase due to the "serious Operations deficit". This had been previously cleared through the Department. From the Secretary's Office came the query to OPA as to whether they were "absolutely certain that there was information to back up the (Park Service's) request for an increased appropriation". It was decided that there was.

7. The Bureau of the Budget noted that in the "Nixon April (1969) Amendments" to the Johnson budget, the Park Service's "Operations" items were singled out as being outside the general directive of "cut wherever you can". (The Service's Construction item was cut back, however, and the Budget Bureau was quick to point out that the Park Service didn't get uniform across-the-board increases in its FY1970 budget.)

8. Congress finally approved a $6 million increase for the Park Service, the original request by the Agency being $9 million though Agency officials said that the real deficit was in the order of $15 million, and that for the next couple of years the Service would be pursuing a strategy of "closing the maintenance gap."

Whether one can attribute this increase to the new PPB system is open to question. The Park Service knew about its Operations deficit without program budgeting. What does seem clear, however, is that within the agency "a lot more time and energy is now being spent on budgetary considerations", and that this situation is indeed related to the introduction of PPBS.

The Programs Division in the Park Service has in large part supplanted the Budget Office with respect to influencing budgetary decisions, for these reasons: "The earliest information comes into the Programs Division; Programs is responsible for the initial Agency requests to the Department and to the Bureau of the Budget which result in a Planning Allowance figure, and which has become crucial to Agency operations; and, finally, Programs has sort of a headstart over the Budget Division because they do five-year planning, and also because they exclusively handle the Construction budget for the Park Service (which, incidentally, has not fared very well in the last few years). A further non-structural indication of their favored position was that more often than not (and almost invariably) our interview questions were referred to the "Programs people"--they were the ones who, in the eyes of numerous Agency, Departmental, and even Budget Bureau officials, would "supply the detail", "have the information", or answer the unanswerable. And in fact this was the case.

We mentioned earlier that the new budgeting system altered the flow of information within the Agency. This seemed to be the case at the Departmental level as well. Paralleling the creation within the Agency of an Assistant Directorship for Policy and Program Analysis was the institution of the "Office of Program Analysis" in the Under Secretary's Office of the Department. The OPA was moved in September 1969 so that now it is under the Assistant Secretary for Administration.

The OPA has formal responsibility for the preparation of the Department's Program Memoranda, and in terms of the budget process these documents are intended to help the Bureau of the Budget set its initial Planning Allowance for each Executive Department. A Program Memorandum (PM) comes out annually for each Departmental program category, one of which is "Recreation Use and

Preservation". Component programs in this category include: "recreation planning, research, and assistance to states and local governments; the operation of the National Park System; the development of wild rivers, scenic roads and trails, and national recreation areas and seashores; the preservation of rare and endangered species of wildlife, of historic and cultural sites, and of wilderness areas; and the production of migratory birds, fish and other wildlife."*

As many people have pointed out, however -- including Program Analysts themselves -- the "Recreation Use and Preservation" program category is a difficult one to analyze. We noted above that PPBS in practice has largely meant "bringing economic analysis to bear on decision-making", but this means that program analysts have to attempt to quantify and to put a dollar value on programs which may be inherently unquantifiable. What is the "output" or "benefit to the nation", for instance, of Grand Canyon National Monument? Or how does one measure the pleasure derived from a scenic view of the Blue Ridge Mountains? Or, how do you value the preservation of Whooping Cranes? These are the sorts of questions over which government officials (and many of us as well) agonize--certainly not easy or simple questions to answer under the best of conditions.

But, because decisions have to be made, priorities have to be assigned, and budgets must be justified according to some set of criteria, the Program Analysts try to quantify what to them can reasonably be quantified. One therefore finds in the Interior Department's "PPB Handbook" the following "Selected Output Definitions" for the "Recreation Use and Preservation" category:

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* Robert Marty, "Federal Land Management and Policy Evaluation", September 1969. Public Lands Law Review Commission, mimeo., p. 36.

(1) OTU: one-time use (per person)
(2) Capacity OTU: synonymous with "design capacity".
(3) Visitor Days: Twelve visitor hours . . .
(4) Hunter and Fisher Days
(5) Bird Use Day: "A unit of capacity; the use of habitat by one bird for one day."
(6) Animal Unit Month: "A unit of carrying capacity; the browse or other natural feed to support 4½ deer for one month."

The objective, of course, in all of this is to provide decision-makers with "better, more relevant data" on which to make decisions--but, as one Departmental Program Analyst made clear, "there is no 'system' that will tell you how to make a trade-off between saving Whooping Cranes and educating Indian children." The best they hope for is "an informed judgment" on these matters. But there is no reason to believe they have one.

Together with the Programs Divisions in each of the agencies, the Office of Program Analysis works on the development of Issue Papers supportive of the overall Departmental goals. One such paper, being developed for the FY 1971 budget, is on the Interior Department's "Urban Recreation Program". This is the first year we've done an IP on Urban Recreation", an official said, and it is presumably being developed to support the Department's decision "to go 2/3 urban". It will serve to "focus the entire Department on urban recreation issues". With respect to the urban recreation Issue Paper, an official of the OPA emphasized that it is utilizing "cost-effectiveness analysis"--which amounted to this:

Cost benefit analysis = More people using it and having it available to them = urban recreation

Since there are no accepted criteria for analysis, it is possible that mere mention of key words is sufficient though cost data may be suspect and information on effectiveness totally lacking.

Once the Program Memos and Issue Papers are completed--by a joint effort of the OPA and the bureaus' Programs Divisions--they are sent off to the Bureau of the Budget, for review there. "Our work is not done at this point, however", said an OPA official. The next step is for us "to develop alternatives about how to allocate the Planning Allowance", once BOB issues it. Both the OPA and each of the Assistant Secretaries develop alternatives. "We do this separately", he said. Then the Assistant Secretaries, the Under Secretary, and the OPA "all get together and bargain over the differences."

According to an OPA official, there are no hard and fast rules by which the P.A. is allocated. "You first take care of the 'must' needs--those that have to be funded from year to year. "Then", he said, "you evaluate the priorities". This means they have no accepted criteria for determining priorities. Recommendations on these matters are made both by the OPA and the Assistant Secretaries; the OPA makes a "first-pass" on the allocation of the Planning Allowance which, we were told, is based "on the overall need and effectiveness of the programs within the Department". Such phrases are, of course, mere slogans.

Once the Planning Allowance is allocated, by the procedure described above, formal responsibility for the preparation of the budget shifts from the Programs Offices (at both the Agency and Departmental levels) to the Budget Offices. The Programs Divisions at this point then continue--or take up again--policy and program analysis, and also begin thinking about "next year's budget". The result is a budget process in which those who defend the budget before Congress do not have a hand in making it.

By having the agencies' programs and budgets pass through a review the Office of Program Analyses seeks to strengthen departmental influence over the agencies. At both the Agency and the Departmental levels, program budgeting tends to centralize the decision-making process heretofore characterized by a considerable degree of autonomy at the lower levels of organization. PPB would have a contralizing effect, that is, if top departmental officials supported it. But they do not. The Secretary does not make use of it and the Assistant Secretaries fight it when they do not agree. And since the OPA has trouble producing convincing analyses, their recommendations are easier to disregard. In the midst of our inquiry OPA was demoted and the budget office has since regained considerable autonomy.

Interviews with high departmental officials reveal that they had special needs not met by the program budgeting apparatus. The top men were quite willing to believe the Department had been corrupted by the Democrats and that they would have to establish their own control and priorities over the opposition of their subordinates. They were told on all sides that resources policies were inadequate and that the Department was somehow not meeting its responsibilities. Their mandate was to find new departures in policy that fit in with general Republican Party perspectives. Hence they were tempted to make use of new forces like the program unit. Yet they did not do so.

The first problem was that the program people were not new. Most of them had been in the department before and were therefore suspect. The second was that they appeared too glib, as if they somehow knew too much, so their briefings had the appearance of a snow job. Nevertheless, these difficulties might have been overcome had the program men actually been able to come up with new ideas. Naturally, they were better with criticism than they were with positive suggestions. Originality, that is, creativity and genius, are scarce commodities anywhere. Respecting, though not fully understanding, admiring (though made anxious and defensive by) quantitatively oriented analysis, the top officials were easily led to question its worth. The first few times they took advice they found that the program people were not sensitive to their personal political needs. The top men also found they had to mediate conflicts between the regular budget office and the special one. Yet, when they wanted good ideas for new policies, they found the program officials busy with suggestions for the existing budget. Not wishing to be troubled further, yet seeing value in somehow enhancing rationality, the big men put the PPB operation in a subordinate capacity, high enough to say they had it, low enough to be effectively out of sight. They gave it to the Administrative Assistant Secretary, who could at worst keep peace and at best sort out the proper level of operation among the budgeteers and programmers.

Our study of recreation budgeting thus far has focussed on the micro-level: each step in the process has been discussed together with the rules used to arrive at decisions. Consequently, the larger structural and conceptual aspects of program budgeting--the meaningfulness of the categories, the relationships of the program structure to the major organizational participants (bureaus, departments and the Budget Bureau), have not been stressed. For the purposes of a macro-analysis we need a larger arena, the Department of Agriculture, as it focuses on natural resources, so that we can answer questions like: Where did the program cetegories come from? Why did they take on their present form? How useful are they for analytic purposes?

III. PPB IN THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE: Who is the Client?

Orville Freeman announced the institution of PPBS on October 27, 1965, in the Secretary of Agriculture's Memorandum #1589, saying that it would (1) define program objectives in specific terms which were capable of being analyzed; (2) specify time horizons for accomplishment of objectives; (3) measure program effectiveness--"indicators" would tell how well things were going; (4) develop and compare alternative ways of attaining the objectives. Groupings of activities would cut across Agency lines in order to provide a program structure which would facilitate meaningful analysis. Thus the bureaus would be asking the following questions:

(1) "What do we do?" (program)
(2) "Why do we do it?" (objective)
(3) "How are we doing?" (output in relation to objectives--
    i.e., results)

To underscore the significance he attributed to PPBS, Secretary Freeman underlined his special commitment: "I will personally participate in the evaluation and approval of the Department's Program and Financial Plan." Within the Office of the Secretary, a staff working for the Under Secretary would put together special studies to help the Program and Budget Review Committee in its task of coordinating the review of Department policy. Howard W. Hjort, appointed Special Assistant to the Under Secretary, would work with selected bureaus (including the Forest Service and Soil Conservation Service) to develop approximate program categories. Bureau staffs, reporting directly to bureau heads, were to commence work on these categories on a full-time basis within the ensuing three months.

In response to the question "What do we do?", the bureaus submitted their lists of proposed categories. The Department responded by suggesting 14 program categories. Let us see how these general concepts (see Chart 11) affected the Forest Service.

The Forest Service

Program Category 1, Adequate Supply of Farm and Forest Products, which covered most of the Forest Service budget, was broken down so that planned accomplishments might be expressed in quantitative, but not necessarily financial, terms. The measures (see Chart 12) represented direct (or primary) outputs of Department programs. Yet these outputs were expressed in units that presented problems in analyzing possible trade-offs. The trade-off between miles of terraces and acres of irrigation, for example, requires a common unit for weighing, and that was lacking.

Throughout the Forest Service budget, the following items, together with proposed amounts of funding, fell within the definition of Program Category 1: forest protection and utilization ($222 million), forest roads and trails ($87.6 million), acquisition of lands for national forests ($1 million), cooperative range improvements ($700,000), access roads ($1 million), assistance to states for tree planting ($1 million), timber development organization loans and technical assistance ($1 million), and permanent appropriations, primarily to states ($60 million).

CHART 11

Original Program Categories in the Department of Agriculture

1. Adequate Supply of Farm and Forest Products (Includes conservation and development of land, water and forest resources; research designed to enhance our future capacity to produce farm and forest products; storage operations for adequate reserve stocks; etc.).

2. Protect and Enhance Income Position of Commercial Farm Families (Includes price support programs; programs designed to withhold excess productive capacity; and supporting research).

3. Improving Efficiency of Marketing System (Includes marketing research; market news; Commodity Exchange Authority, etc.).

4. Improve Quality and Variety of Farm and Forestry Products (Includes research to develop new products, new uses, improve quality, product grading, activities, etc.).

5. Improve Food Diets and Nutrition (Includes food distribution programs; nutrition research, etc.)

6. Protect Human Health (Includes meat and poultry inspection; pesticide regulation and research, pollution control; etc.).

7. Enhance Personal Development of Rural People (Includes Job Corps; extension education and development activity, including work with youth, low income families; research on human development problems, etc.).

8. Rural Community Improvement (Includes water and sewer systems loans; telephone and electricity; R,C&D: Rural Renewal; RCDS).

9. Provide Adequate Housing in Rural Areas (Housing loans, grants and related research).

10. Recreation and Natural Beauty (Forest Service recreation, wildlife and natural beauty programs; part of CCP and CAP--hunting, fishing, other recreation, etc.).

11. World Trade Expansion (Includes food fairs and other market development activities; Title IV of P.L. 480; international negotiations; supporting research).

12. Foreign Food and Development Assistance (Food and technical assistance programs and supporting research, etc.).

13. Non-Mission Oriented Basic Research (Residual category for research activities unable to allocate to above objectives).

14. General Administration and Program Support.

CHART 12

Measures for Category 1--Adequate Supply
Farm and Forest Products

1. Water resources development conservation, which would concern itself with additional acre feet of water storage by output units, reducing volume or weight of sediment per unit of streamflow, decreasing in depth to the permanent water table, seeking to improve BOD (Biological Oxygen Demand) rating, and increasing cubic feet per second of streamflow and the additional acres irrigated.

2. Land resources development and conservation would be expressed in acres limed, drained, fertilized, etc.; acres terraced, cleared; miles of windbreak; acres protected from flood hazard by levees, etc.; acres converted to pasture, fallow use, timber or other noncrop use; acres of reduced erosion; and animal unit months of forage provided for livestock.

3. Credit insurance output units would include acres, volume or weight of specified crops and number of firms insured by size class of firm; acres, volume or weight of specific crops and number of firms receiving operating loans by size class of firm; acres by type of farm or specific crop and number of firms receiving capital improvement loans by size class of firm and type of improvement; and acres by type of farm and number of firms receiving emergency loans by size class of firm.

4. Wood production output units would be board feet of sawtimber and veneer harvested on National Forests; cubic feet of bulk timber products harvested on National Forests; additional board feet of growth of sawtimber and veneer on National Forests; additional cubic feet of growth of bulk timber products on National Forests; and additional board feet or cubic feet of growth on private woodlands.

5. Maintaining standby sources of supply output units measuring additions to storage capacity by volume units and commodity, volume units of commodities stored, and number of firms by size class and commodity class participating in storage program.

6. Research and education.

7. A separate category might be necessary to handle mineral claims and certain special uses in National Forests.

The Forest Service was also supposed to conduct some of its activities under Program Category 4 , Improve Quality and Variety of Farm and Forestry Products. One sub-element of this category would be developing and improving new uses, products, and by-products of forest materials, which could be measured in output units according to their number, weight or volume. Developing and improving product quality would also be a concern, to be measured by increases in volume or weight of commodity output in desired grades or by the number of grading systems improved or newly developed. Finally, maintenance and guarantee of product quality would be judged in output units either of volume or weight of commodities inspected, or by increases in weight or volume of a commodity marketed on a grade basis. The Forest Service "crosswalk" (conversion) to its regular appropriations structure would be in terms of the "Forest products utilization research" line item of $5.9 million, though it was possible that the line item for marketing research might also come within this program category.

Wildlife Production, which could be included in Program Category 10, Recreation and Natural Beauty, would be placed in output terms according to the number of hunter or fisherman days or else in terms of visitor days. Visitor days would also be the chosen unit for the Outdoor Recreation Opportunities subcategory. Natural Beauty, a most difficult subcategory to which to assign output units, would be measured in terms of acres, areas, or miles of improved scenic environment, by the units of floral products, ornamental shrubs, trees and grass seed produced, or in terms of technical assistance and research provided to the private sector. If none of these seems closely related to natural beauty and its measurement, it is not surprising. The Forest Service line items proposed to be crosswalked into this program category were "Recreation--public use" ($28 million), "Wildlife habitat management" ($4 million), "Forest recreation research" ($500,000), and "Wildlife habitat research" ($700,000).

Here then was the original program category setup proposed by the Department of Agriculture, with special attention given to those categories into which Forest Service budget line items would be expected to fit. Thereafter a memorandum from the Planning, Evaluating and Programming (PEP) Staff Director Hjort called for meetings with each of the affected agencies in the Department to review the program elements assigned to them. Hjort's depiction of the categories involving resource agencies appears in Chart 13.

In considering its place in a new budgetary arrangement, each bureau naturally asks whether its activities will receive good treatment under the general categories and the measures proposed for giving them value. Each bureau seeks to have its activities included in as many categories as possible, so that it may justify them as contributing to the enhancement of as many valued goals as possible. If necessary, the bureau will request that new categories be created that reflect their special contribution to the public interest. To be left out of a category, or to fail to have a beloved one included, might signify the loss of organizational jurisdiction, leading to aggrandizement by one's competitors. The Forest Service may serve as an excellent case in point.

CHART 13

Categories Concerned With Natural Resources

Category 1. Adequate Supply of Farm and Forest Products
Includes action, research information, education and other supporting programs whose outputs directly and primarily enhance capability to provide adequate supplies of farm and forest products at reasonable prices or shift production to higher priority agricultural uses. These programs are designed to affect actual current production, capacity for future production or the maintenance of standby supplies or productive resources for emergency needs. One major group of programs is concerned with the growing and harvesting of forest products on both Federal and non-Federal lands. Another group aims at conservation measures to enhance or safeguard the capacity of land, for production of farm products, or to shift land to higher priority agricultural uses
← both now and in the future.
A third group includes programs oriented towards storing minimum reserve stocks of agricultural commodities or protecting agricultural industries and associated resources for emergency need.

* * * *

Category 4. Improve Quality and Variety of Farm and Forest Products
Includes principally research programs with outputs that primarily enhance the development of higher quality and greater variety of farm and forest products. Incentive programs to achieve these ends would be included here. One group of programs would be designed to develop new food products from farm products and to improve the quality and variety of existing food products. A second group of programs would be designed to produce new industrial products from farm and forest products and to improve the quality and variety of presently produced industrial products made from agricultural products.

* * * *

Category 10. Outdoor Recreation and Natural Beauty
Includes action, research, information, education and other supporting programs to enhance the supply of outdoor recreation and natural beauty through conservation measures and development of facilities and services.

Outdoor recreation includes hunting, fishing, camping, picnicking, hiking, swimming and similar opportunities on Federal and non-Federal lands.

Natural beauty programs are aimed primarily at upgrading the aesthetic appearance of U.S. natural resources and related public and private improvements. Examples are research to develop more attractive flora for urban and rural use, vegetation management to maintain aesthetic roadside, shore line and landscape zones and development of sites for viewing scenic vistas.

* * * *

The Forest Service submitted that conservation should not be "submerged" in the first category, Adequate Supply of Farm and Forest Products; instead, it proposed that resource conservation should be set up as a separate output category. The National Forest System activities of the Forest Service, together with its own conservation action and research functions and those of bureaus within the Department, were said to affect 75 percent of the nation's land and water surfaces. Conservation of water, soil, and scarce minerals, the Forest Service argued, would therefore come under a "Natural Resources Conservation" category. Not only would this classification recognize the leading role which the Department of Agriculture plays in this area, but it would afford an opportunity to consider conservation allocation at the highest level. Conservation outputs, while difficult to evaluate, are certainly no more unquantifiable than "natural beauty," but when placed along side the "hard" production activities of Category I, conservation outputs become "soft" in comparison. The whole concept of stewardship of national forests, so dear to the Service, would be lost when considered in the Category 1 setting of timber production.

In another attempt to protect its interests, the Forest Service claimed that Category 2, Protect and Enhance Income Position of Farm Families, should include the income effects resulting from forestry along with those arising from farming operations. Similarly in Category 8, Rural Community Improvement, it argued that emphasis should be broadened to include urban improvements from watershed management that benefited many cities through protection of their municipal water supplies. These attempts were in keeping with the unwritten rule of planning a crosswalk, namely, claim to be a piece of the action whenever it is possible, especially on a coming issue such as urban problems.

The Soil Conservation Service

In order to show that the reaction of the Forest Service is not unique, it is useful to consider the response of a similarly situated bureau. Following the meetings called by Hjort with the various agency staffs to review the program elements under the proposed 14 category headings, D. A. Williams, Administrator of the Soil Conservation Service, took issue with the proposed categories, calling them "unacceptable" to his Service. His major objection was that the categories did not reflect any integration with or appreciation of the program structure and categories of agencies beyond the Department of Agriculture. "For example, the proposed categories tend to obscure the important work the Department performs in the 'Conservation and Development of Natural Resources' category." As many departments and agencies could well be integrated and coordinated through the National Water Resources Council, he felt that top level staff should recognize this relationship. Equally unfortunate, Williams wrote, would be the burial of the Conservation and Development of Natural Resources item within one of the existing tentative categories, such as Rural Community Improvement or Adequate Supply of Farm and Forest Products.

Williams evidently felt that the proposed categories in the Department of Agriculture, with their lack of emphasis on resource conservation, would give the Department of Interior an advantage in the decades-old struggle to determine which one had primary responsibility for natural resources. So he wrote to Hjort on December 15, 1965:

> We think these categories fail to project in the present program structure that the Department is concerned with nearly all the private lands of this country and some 186,000,000 acres of public lands. No other Department has a greater role in the conservation and development of our land, water, and related natural resources, yet the present program categories fail to recognize this. The Soil Conservation Service feels sure this recognition will not be neglected by the Department of the Interior and others.
>
> Yesterday the Central Planning Staff implied that there would be great difficulty in measuring the outputs from a program category called "Conservation and Development of Natural Resources" or "Conservation and Development of Water and Related Land Resources..." We contend that this reasoning has little merit because in the total program structure these activities will occur at some level and it will be necessary to design input-output measures. It will make no difference whether the benefits are short term or long term. Each program aggregate will need to reflect its portion of the output contribution to some larger aggregate.

Williams suggested a Conservation and Development of Natural Resources program category which would include planning, research, education, technical and financial assistance, and the installation of appropriate measures directly affecting the use and development of water and land resources to meet demands now and into the foreseeable future. Included in this comprehensive group of programs would be the preparation of river basin and watershed plans. Individuals, groups, state and local governments, and other federal agencies, Williams insisted, must be drawn into the picture. As major objectives under such a category, he suggested that the aims include:

watershed protection, flood prevention, erosion control, sediment reduction (as well as pollution and chemicals abatement), reduction of the adverse effects of droughts and water excesses, fish and wildlife development, reserving scarce reservoir sites for future municipal usage, and contributing to the beauty of the countryside.

Williams was making a plea on the behalf of program categories that would preserve (and even enlarge) rather than decimate the clientele of the Soil Conservation Service. The great strength of the SCS has been the members of the soil conservation districts that are found throughout the country. By suggesting that the SCS was not part of the nationwide conservation movement, the proposed program categories robbed it of connection with a value important to many Americans. Not only was conservation an important value for political purposes, but the organizational implications of the categories were such as to cause concern that SCS might be afforded a lower place than it then had in national funding priorities. While some people may have thought that they were talking about program categories that would improve analysis, Mr. Williams, as Administrator of the Soil Conservation Service, understood that they were talking about policy questions affecting the health and prosperity of his agency.

The Bureau of the Budget

Alternate proposals from the agencies were not the only source of direction for the Department of Agriculture; the Bureau of the Budget suggested reduction to seven or eight categories as a means of sharpening the focus on the internal conflicts among the different programs. The BOB suggested, for example, that Categories 1 and 2 (Supply of Products and Farm Income) could be viewed as the same activity, first as a supply problem in an aggregate sense and then as an individual farm income problem. A "benefit" in the supply category might be a "cost" when looked at as affecting the individual farmer's income. To gain the benefits of a better fresh vegetable and meat supply through better management, the BOB observed, might inflict a "cost" on the farmer insofar as his income might become lower as a result of the more efficient market.

According to the Department of Agriculture, the greater the number of categories, the greater the chances of overlap, i.e., the more likely it was that an existing program would be viewed from various quarters as belonging somewhere on the list. Hence, the greater the number of categories, the fewer the conflicts created. Rather than confront a set of differing goals, it would be easier for the Department to create separate categories for them. For the Budget Bureau, however, that juxtaposition of different aims was the precise reason for the existence of PPB. If Agriculture were unwilling to arrange its program structure into a smaller number of categories that forced critical choices to be made among programs, then the Budget Bureau had to shoulder this responsibility.

Consider for a moment the impact of this type of thinking on PPBS. If this system of analysis were to be a departmental tool, for better or worse, it had to be a product of departmental thinking and needs. If Agriculture thought 14 categories were needed, should it not have 14? Of course, if BOB were designing the program structure for its own purposes, then possibly seven or eight would be a better solution. The basic question was: "For whom was the system created?" If the departmental contact with BOB occurred only at the conclusion of the PPB sequence, then the Budget Bureau would handle nothing more than the "B" of the PPB sequence. It would have no contact with departmental planning or programming but only with budgeting.

The fact was that, even in 1965 when Secretary Freeman introduced PPBS into the Department of Agriculture, the Bureau of the Budget was already transforming itself from a producer of guidance for the new system into its single largest consumer. Once the BOB had gained access to planning and program as well as budget level, the PPB system seemed to exist entirely for its convenience. It was not yet clear, however, whether the Bureau of the Budget was prepared to make PPBS serve its purposes.

Two years later, in order to determine whether it was being well served, the BOB staff prepared "A Year of Transition--PPB in the Department of Agriculture", an examination of the PPB process in 1967. It was a tough-minded and hard-hitting report. The staff found that inertia, a lack of credibility, and continuing disagreements over what constituted appropriate outputs had left the decision-makers disaffected with PPB. The staff asked basic questions: How realistic was it to expect line officials to make decisions on a five-year time frame? Was such long-range planning depriving officials and budgeters of the necessary short-term view so vital to the ongoing budget decisions? To ⟶

what degree did PPB structures preclude alternative program structures which might also provide evaluational insights?[*]

Outputs were appraised by the Budget Bureau as having absorbed an unusually high proportion of the energies of those involved. The sheer bulk of the PFP's and PM's (program and financial plans and program memoranda) was felt to have deprived departmental staffs of time which might better have been given to "thoughtful analysis." Nevertheless, the report stated, the Secretary and his Budget Policy Review Committee might benefit from the new categories, although their final decisions regarding the 1968 budget did not seem to reflect any significant changes, departing little from the previous year's submission. Regarding the strengths and weaknesses of the PM's, the report continued:

> With several exceptions--Timber Production, and Housing Programs--all of the PM's suffer from the deficiency of poorly stated objectives which are not explicit. In the case of at least one Department program--Crop Insurance--it is difficult to find any statement of objective whatsoever. Members of the Program Evaluation Staff have suggested that the Department analysts ought to stand off with a cold critical eye and question whether the Department of Agriculture ought to be administering certain programs--commodity programs, crop insurance, etc. -- at all.

The memorandum posed the following questions to the Director, and the answers are as little known today as they were then:

> Which decision maker is the PM designed to serve: BOB, Secretary, bureau head? Can one PM serve them all?
>
> Should the PM provide a means for presenting a set of programs to show input, output, etc., or should it instead consist of selected analyses which concentrate on a major question or issue and be aimed at a specific decision? If the latter, how does it differ from a

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[*] See Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston, 1964), and (Op.Cit.,) "The Political Economy of Efficiency," and "Rescuing Policy Analyses from PPBS," for analyses of why PPBS leads to these and other difficulties.

"special study?" If the former, would not the major proposals in the PM necessarily be backed up by special studies?

Do we really need a PFP, and if so, what form should it take to provide the information BOB will need for Director's Review purposes? The submission last year contained information that we did not need on the one hand, and did not go into enough detail on a bureau by bureau basis on the other hand to permit the Division to structure its Director's Review material in terms of the Department's program categories.

In closing remarks, the staff noted that Paul Feldman of the BOB Program Evaluation Staff had volunteered to take several of the proposed Department studies and prepare analytical papers which would array alternative study proposals. It was hoped that this work would be ready for the meeting of the Director with Agriculture's Secretariat.

Feldman's critique of the existing program structure concluded that "in producing their program memoranda and financial plans, they [the Department of Agriculture] have really failed to relate particular programs to each other and to the achievement of general goals"; that is, the Department had failed "to state its larger ogjectives in a meaningful way." He then made an interesting argument for determining the categories on the basis of the conditions that justify governmental intervention, such as monopoly, income transfer, and externalities. However, while Feldman's suggestions make a great deal of conceptual sense, they would, if their implications were followed, result in drastic changes in the activities of the Department of Agriculture. Feldman felt that program budgeting would not be useful either to the Department or to the Bureau of the Budget unless such major changes were made.

Responding to the Feldman alternatives, the BOB staff reported that he had certainly set forth one way of representing a useful basis for arraying the goals of Government. They doubted whether this was the "best" system for relating outputs and costs to objectives, or whether it asked the "right" questions, for they doubted that a "best" or "right" one existed. "Nonetheless," the BOB staff wrote, "Mr. Feldman takes the position that his proposed structure will provide a way of looking at the activities of USDA which will force the Department to ask and hopefully answer the right questions. The staff doubted that a best or right one existed. The right questions appear to be pointed in the direction of "why a Department of Agriculture?" The Feldman memo, according to the staff critics, neither implicitly nor explicitly recognizes the "art of the possible" in terms of seeking "short-range marginal changes in programs versus major order of magnitude changes."

Even if the Feldman questions had been the right ones, however, the staff concluded that it was not then the time to initiate more changes, for the past year (1967) had been the first for the Department under its newly negotiated program structure within its own agencies. To ask it to renegotiate its internal PPBS division would be unfair. In fact, many of the shortcomings of the 1968 submission were attributed to this prolonged negotiation process between the departmental staff and the agencies. The most important reason why the 1968 submission had little utility, the staff decided, was because of its analytical flaws. Hereafter, the BOB staff agreed that the push must be toward better analytical studies and toward their integration into the decision-making process.

The value of Feldman's memorandum lies not only in its thought-provoking economic argument, but in what its reception teaches us about why a powerful and consistent set of categories is unlikely to be adopted. The intellectual demands are formidable and, if even remotely obtained, would face the most severe political objections. The cost of modifying the new system, in terms of bargains renegotiated, procedures altered, concepts abandoned, and tempers frayed, would seem prohibitive. The short-run advantages of securing modest improvements in the near future would always seem preferable to vague long-term benefits from the proposed new set of categories. If the Bureau of the Budget was not interested in a set of consistent categories designed to rationalize choice in the Department of Agriculture, then no one was.

The years between 1965, when President Johnson initiated PPBS in the federal government and 1968, when the new Administration took over, showed that the Bureau of the Budget was not prepared to act as sponsor of the new way. No Director of the Budget was able to make use of the information the system conveyed to make difficult choices, or indeed, choices of any kind whatsoever. Day-to-day events drove out long-term policy considerations. The Director found it more convenient to make his hard choices in terms of the old line-item categories. While the program evaluation staff understood the spirit of the new order, many other members of the BOB staff did not. When it came to a crunch, the Budget Bureau found it more convenient to ask the departments what they wanted than to insist on what it wanted. For the most part, of course, the Budget Bureau did not know what it wanted other than good analysis, and it could not tell the agencies how to do it. With the Bureau of the Budget unwilling to assume the mantle of leadership, either the departments would run the show or it would not be run at all.

The Department of Agriculture soon learned some of the basic political lessons involving the choice of program categories. Because the categories involved policy preferences, they had to be negotiated with each and every bureau. Initially it seemed that the larger the number of categories, the easier the task of negotiation because the extent of conflict was minimized. Only later did the Department learn that it was possible to move in the opposite direction with even greater effect. For if the number of categories was reduced to a basic minimum--say three or four--they would become so large, include so heterogeneous a collection of elements, that they would not commit anyone to anything. It was only possible to get agreement on a set of categories either so numerous that they precluded comparison or so few as to lack specificity. Once that lesson had been learned, once the political nature of the categories had become manifest through experience, the Department set about using its program categories to build support for its policies.

Program Structure in the Department of Agriculture

It should be clear by now that program categories are not made in heaven. They are not simply out there in natural form waiting to be found; they must be invented by man. The form of the budget is not a minor technicality but an important policy move, for it helps determine the kinds of program comparisons that are made and therefore the kinds of decisions that are reached. If this were not the case there would be no reason to consider program budgeting at all because it pre-eminently involves a change of budgetary form. No one should be surprised, therefore, when agencies object to program categories that do not put them in the best possible light or that fail to provide measures for values they deem important. It is only a matter of time before everyone concerned begins to understand the essential strategic nature of the program categories.

A quick look at the program categories established in 1968 in the Department of Agriculture reveals essentially strategic functions. functions. It is with more than a small sense of excitement that one reads about "Communities of Tomorrow", "Dimensions for Living", "Growing Nations--New Markets", and "Income and Abundance". Only a hard-hearted man could turn down expenditures requested under these glorious rubrics, although "General Support" might be easier to resist.

The first thing to note about the current program categories is that no one could conceivably make decisions using them. How would one know whether to prefer "Communities of Tomorrow" to "Dimensions for Living" or "Income and Abundance" to "Growing Nations"? If they sound good, they have more than fulfilled their purpose.

Perhaps, then, it is not the program categories but the subcategories that can be acted upon for purposes of decisions? But this is not the case. One could not decide in the abstract to do something about the subcategory Farm Income or Agricultural Marketing and Distribution System, both of which are under "Income and Abundance". One might have ideas about the subcategory Resource Protection and Environmental Improvement, but that would not tell one whether to prefer the snow survey program element to the land acquisition program element, both of which are covered under this subcategory. I believe that virtually all those engaged in program budgeting would agree that, to the extent actual decisions are made in program terms, they are made almost entirely through program elements. One just might base decisions on program elements like National forest timber production or Food and nutrition research - or the Food stamp program .

Let us look, then, and see whether the current program elements (circa 1969) in the Department of Agriculture meet the requirements of PPBS. The basic idea is that individual programs should be compared with one another to see which ones contribute most to common objectives. The idea of comparison is central to program budgeting because its proponents claim that traditional line-item methods lead to duplication and obfuscation of activities that ostensibly serve common purposes. In Agriculture most existing programs are contained within single bureaus, whereas proper analysis would require comparison among programs covered in several bureaus. Table I shows that the vast majority of program elements are included in one and only one bureau, and most of the remainder are concerned only with relatively small research activities. Hence it is true to say that the bulk of analytic activity involves no comparison across bureaus (and therefore programs) and that that which does is relatively unimportant.

Table I

The vast majority of program elements cover only one agency; most of the remainder are concerned with small research activities.

Program Elements		Of the 46, how many involve research?
In one agency	In more than one agency	
119	46	27

If we look at the Income and Abundance category we see that 43 out of 53 elements are in one agency, and eight of the ten others involve research. Turning to the category that interests us most because it contains resource activities, "Communities of Tomorrow", we find that 37 out of 54 program elements are contained within a single bureau. Of the 17 remaining elements, 12 involve research. That leaves five potentially interesting programs that cover more than one agency. The first is a bit of a disappointment because the Outreach program is small and involves a good deal of traditional extension activity. "Timber disease and pest control" is a minor regulatory program. The three programs that appear interesting-- Flood prevention, Water protection and management, and Resource conservation and development --all involve the same two bureaus, the Soil Conservation Service and the Farmers Home Administration. All three are small and all involve incentives for regulating resource activity. From the looks of things, then, one would conclude that program budgeting as practiced in the Department of Agriculture is either equivalent to attempting analysis of individual programs within single agencies or is misleading if it suggests that the activities of the department as a whole are somehow being compared, contrasted, integrated, interconnected, coordinated, interfaced, or whatever.

At this point the question arises of whether program budgeting has led to any changes in decisions made within departments. Some people say "yes" and others say "no". Given the complex nature of power relationships, the fact that many decisions are not made so much as accreted, that events in the world such as racial conflict have an immeasurable impact, no one can say for sure. The previously cited analysis by the Budget Bureau's staff suggests that few, if any, important changes had come about. But perhaps officials directly concerned could cite some decisions that were profoundly affected by the program budgeting procedure. In order to bring a small amount of objectivity to the question, I have decided to look into the presentation of agency budgets to congressional appropriations committees. The idea is that any fundamental changes in agency programs or criteria for decision must ultimately end up in agency justifications even though the formal program structure may not be used. The argument is the more persuasive if we recognize that the program structure in its global terms is not and cannot be used by anyone. We are really asking whether anything has changed in the way individual programs are analyzed. The procedure adopted here has been to look at policies related to land and recreation, and to ask what kinds of justifications and measures have been used to support them over the years. Since a book might be written on this subject, we decided to use just three points in time and to accept only the most blatant trends as worthy of notice.

IV. RECREATION AND LAND MANAGEMENT: Trends in Justification and Associated Measures

This study deals only with continuity and change of two aspects of the outdoor recreation* budget process: (1) the different types and numbers of justifications** used by the various advocating agencies before the House of Representatives for their programs, and (2) the types and numbers of quantitative measures used by the various agencies in defending their programs. The period investigated covers 22 years, from Fiscal Year 1948 to FY 1969, and concentrates on three particular years: 1949, 1958, and 1969. The source of information was the record of hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. The Executive branch agencies covered were the following: National Park Service, Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management, Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, and the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife.

The number of different justifications used by resource agencies, Table II shows, declined somewhat in 1958 and rose sharply in 1969.

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* It would be edifying to present a common definition for outdoor recreation but none exists. One such definition describes outdoor recreation as a system of scarce or depletable resources, the allocation and distribution of which can be analyzed by using economic models. This definition could be used for all natural resources. In another kind of definition, recreation is considered a service system. A recent (1969) National Academy of Sciences Report on "A Program for Outdoor Recreation Research" views recreation as a ". . . social institution whose purpose is to enhance human life by offering satisfaction and by enriching human capital." Since such a definition can cover sex as well as a chain of ice cream parlors, however, we find it a bit too broad. We will do the best we can.

** The limited definition of justification, as used in this investigation, is any reason mentioned by an advocating agency for money to be spent on a certain project or service and, more particularly, why an increased appropriation is needed for recreational activity. The following plea from a Director of the National Park Service is a good example: "On Shasta Lake there was a terrible accident where two little girls were killed by a speedboat. We did not have enough personnel to patrol that lake. There have been other instances like that, and protection of this property has to be taken care of adequately. That is why we need more personnel."

Justifications such as the importance of the social, spiritual, and educational values of outdoor recreation to the entire population, particularly to urban youth, are relatively new. This type of justification, which follows recent trends in social thought, appeared only once in 1958 but ten times in 1969. The contention that outdoor recreational activities alleviate social problems in the cities (crime, riots, etc.) is even newer.

Table II

Sharp Increase in Number of Different Justifications for Recreation Activities Over the Past Decade

TYPE OF JUSTIFICATION	OCCURRENCES PER FISCAL YEAR			
	1949	1958	1969	Total
Expanded responsibility	3	1	4	8
Increased users pressure	6	5	7	18
Facilities and personnel inadequacy	10	3	6	19
Cost increase	1	2	2	5
Other agencies need help	2	1	2	5
Private inholdings menace	1	1	1	3
Uncontrolled disasters	1	1	4	6
Economic value	2	2	5	9
Planning, analysis, coordination	2	3	7	12
Resources conservation and protection	2	2	6	10
Social, spiritual, educational values	-	1	10	11
Alleviation of city problems	-	-	9	9
Total number of occurrences	30	22	63	115

and appears at high frequency (nine times) in the 1969 record. It is the agencies' counterattack to all the competing requests for additional money to solve city problems.

In general, the rough shape of the total frequencies of justifications over time (decrease in 1958 and increase in 1969) can be explained by the interaction of two types of forces: (1) the general attitude of Congress; (2) the growth in population, leisure time, and affluence that caused continuous increases both in use of outdoor recreation and in public opinion in favor of recreation.

An analysis of the Congressional attitude towards agencies concerned with recreation shows that in 1949 it was negative. The Republican majority of the House was in the midst of an economy drive. The relatively high frequency of justifications in 1949 occurred because the agencies needed as many justifications as they could think of in order to try (without much success) to recover their pre-war budget level. But by 1958 the situation had changed. The Republican Administration had given up on its early economy drive. The House Appropriations Committee had by then a sympathetic and receptive Democratic majority. During this period of budget growth (exemplified by "Mission 66" and "Project Outdoors") a large number of justifications were unnecessary, so their frequency dropped. By 1969 federal outdoor recreation had already achieved a high growth rate. Congress and the Administration were receptive but the competition for funds grew more severe because of the war in Vietnam and the problems of the cities. It may well be that the desire to keep pace with growth in recreation amidst severe competion for funds explains the use of a larger number of justifications in 1969.

Table III shows a continuous increase in the total number of quantified measures used in each fiscal year. The increase between 1958 and 1969 is much larger than that between 1949 and 1958. The type of measures, however, remained practically the same; the only new category observed is "National recreation economics data."

Table III

MEASURES CHANGE VERY LITTLE BUT THEIR FREQUENCY INCREASES CONTINUOUSLY

	TYPE OF MEASURES	PER FISCAL YEAR			TOTAL ALL YEARS
		1949	1958	1969	
a.	Standard expenditure comparison	10	14	28	52
b.	Development and planning	4	5	10	19
c.	Service output statistics	2	6	10	18
d.	Other units of measurements	3	4	10	17
e.	Visitors statistics	1	4	12	17
f.	Additional areas data	1	2	7	10
g.	Individual areas expenditure	2	2	3	7
h.	Crime statistics	2	2	1	5
i.	Disaster damage cost	1	1	2	4
j.	Obligations comparison	3	2	1	6
k.	New area studies	1	1	8	10
l.	National recreation economics data	-	1	4	5
	TOTAL	30	44	96	130

a. Traditional line-item categories such as salaries, travel, materials, etc., and major activities with their detailed breakdown: construction, administration, maintenance, protection, etc. presented in a table form comparing the basis or the previous year appropriation with the amount asked for the present year and showing the difference between the two.

b. Data pertaining to development of specific new areas and larger overall plans for the future. Such data includes cost of access roads, utilities, construction, maintenance, protection, and planning itself.

c. Service output statistics pertains to accomplishments such as new areas developed, family units, campsites, miles of roads and trails, buildings, etc.

d. 1949—dollars, visitors, miles of roads and trails; 1958—same as above plus family unit; 1969—same as above plus visitor days, camper days, square foot of buildings, parks area, visits per acre, visits per road and trail mile, visits per campsite, visits per $1,000 of maintenance and rehabilitation funds, visits per $1,000 invested in buildings and utilities, number of beaches, campsites and picnic tables.

e. Visitors statistics show the number of visitors per year and indicate the increase from previous years and future estimates. Many times it is followed by the sum of revenues collected.

f. Every year additional recreation areas were given to the agencies and their number and requirements are delineated. A continuous growth in frequency is indicated (three-and-a-half-fold for 1969).

g. Tables breaking down the various expenditures for each area are brought up every year and comparisons are made between the present and previous years.

h. Statistics about the amount, type, and disposal of crimes committed in the parks, forests and recreation areas.

i. Some kind of disaster or emergency occurs about every year and statistics are shown about its frequency (such as number of forest fires) and the cost of the damage.

j. Data is shown for every year in table form about the different recreation area acquisition and construction contractual obligations and their financial status.

k. More new areas are added each year than the agencies can develop. Studies are made to decide which to develop and accurate estimates must be made of development costs.

l. Its aim is to show the importance of the recreation activity in the nation's economy and its part of the gross national product and revenue. It includes the contribution of recreation to gross national product, taxation, and the transportation and hotel industries.

The introduction of PPBS may be responsible for the development of a larger number of measures. The emphasis on quantitative analysis seems to lead directly to a quantitative increase in the number of measures used.

The great jump in the number of units of measurement in 1969 demonstrated an increase in the quantity of analyses, but not a change in the types of analysis. No use of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System was observed in the record, although many expenditure breakdowns by program (as compared with classification by activity) were evident in

1969. Elements of analysis still lacking include definitions of benefits or effectiveness, quantitative goals, specifications of problems, investigation of alternatives, and, therefore, broad range trade-off analysis between one program and another.

The relationships between recreation measures and recreation justifications raises an intriguing question. If the same measures are used but the justification changes, a lot of motion is going on to hide the fact that little behavior has altered. In order to look into the matter, three points in time were again chosen using Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management, and Park Service hearings before the House Appropriations Subcommittee for Fiscal Years 1948, 1957, and 1968. This time all resource policies covered by these agencies were considered. The basic approach emerges from Appendix IV in which, from one time period to the next, justifications and their associated measures are placed side by side.

While some overall increase in the resource agencies' stated interests has occurred, Table IV shows that the employment of quantified measures has sharply increased since 1957. Table V refines this connection by indicating that, though the rhetoric alters over time, established units of measure are much less likely to change than the justifications associated with them. Since 1948, there have been many more new justifications than new measures for old programs. Programs have evidently been updated not by changing the measures that determine their value but by altering the rhetoric in terms of which they are explained to others.

Thus many of the shifts of justification found in the hearings may be chimerical. A perspective pales before the power of its associated

Table IV.

There have been larger increases in the number of measures used than in the number of justifications used from 1948 to 1968.

	1948	1957	1968
No. of justifications	11	11	14
No. of measures	48	37	86

Table V.

More Justifications than Measures have changed from a FY 1948 Base of 10 Justifications and 26 Measures.*



*Only one (1) justification and no (0) measures changed from the 1957 Base through 1968.

calculus. It matters little whether an appropriation request is justified in terms of campground sanitation or recreation services if the measure predominantly employed is "visitor days per unit of time". Similarly, what does it matter if the rhetoric speaks in terms of timber research or reforestation and forest genetics programs if the calculus is "board feet cut/board feet produced per unit of time".

Conflict Between Budgeting and Program Units

Discussions of program budgeting, including my own, are notoriously vague and abstract. There is confusion among practitioners about the meanings of the terms "planning-programming-budgeting system." Amidst all the controversy it is difficult to discern real men trying to make program budgeting serve their purposes. Through the welter of details one discerns the intimate connection between the political needs of the agencies and the original analytic purposes of the program categories. The response to Agriculture's efforts by the Bureau of the Budget brings into sharp focus the unresolved question: which clientele is PPBS supposed to serve--bureaus, departments, the Bureau of the Budget? Once the Department sensed that it was the client, it took steps to make the program categories politically attractive. It seemed wise, therefore, to take a look at actual changes in policy rather than surface movement in budgetary definitions, terms, and classifications. A survey of changes in justifications, and in the measures used to support them, in recreation and land policies suggests that change in policy has been more apparent than real. PPBS apparently leads to the development of many new quantifiable measures to support old justifications.

The introduction of PPBS has set off a wave of conflict between traditional budget officers and the new program budgeting groups. The program budget units have become de facto budget officers. The result was that their original reason for being--namely, the production of good policy analysis--was increasingly sacrificed to the necessity of meeting daily crises.

Whether or not program categories are useful is subject to debate. Whether different or better decisions are made is not known for certain by anyone. What is abundantly clear, however, is that budget preparation has largely been turned over to program units. The bureaus now make their original submissions in terms of existing program categories, or rather, essentially in terms of program elements. Bureau decisions, as well as department planning allowances, are supposed to be made on a program basis. Indeed, the most important step in the whole process has become the planning allowance (the target figure for total departmental expenditure) that is sent down from the Budget Bureau.

The Department budget office takes over only after all the important decisions have been made. Its staff converts ("crosswalks") program decisions into the traditional budgetary format and then has the happy task of defending a budget it has not made before Congress. In some bureaus the program head and the budget head sit side by side through meetings, neither one knowing exactly who is responsible for what but each watching the other. If one is given formal responsibility, the other is always courteously invited along and consoles himself with the thought that he has not been thrown out altogether. At the departmental level it has been the practice for the program unit to report to one assistant secretary and the budget unit to another. Hence there is no official who is able to allocate roles among the competing units.

The rationale for program budgeting is that it will lead to more and better analysis of policies. Every practitioner to whom I have talked has stressed, when asked about the output of program budgeting, that it must result in better analysis. Good analysis is hard to describe and even harder to do. There are large intellectual problems involved that no one may know how to solve. The organizations involved may not wish to ask certain questions lest they be discomfited by the answers. Most organizations, whether public or private, do not undertake studies that might lead to the abolition of their most cherished activities. Where good analysis is possible, however, it must be a product of talented men who have been given time to take a reflective view of their subject. Existing organizational arrangements, however, undermine this basic requisite of good analysis.

Program people who are supposed to be doing policy analysis have become the de facto budget officers of their bureaus and departments. Analysis suffers from the day-to-day involvement of the program staff in dealing with emerging political problems. It is quite difficult to do good analysis in its own terms. If this analysis is immediately subjected to the needs of the moment, the chances are that what will be produced is neither good politics nor good analysis.

One way to resolve the problem would be to abolish the budget unit and replace it by the program unit. This would certainly bring in people

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with more interest in economic criteria for public policy. After several years, however, there would be little distinction between what they would be doing, as dictated by their positions, and what the previous budget office had done. The new program budget officers would also begin to get impatient with analytical types who do not understand the importance of the dictates of the moment.

We do not believe that policy analysis involving significant departure from past practice is likely to be done when the work is handled by people who are forced to pay attention to hour-by-hour events. If an analysis becomes part of the budget operation, budget people will have an investment in it. There will be a tendency to accept bad measures of results because they are all that is available to make the justification. Since good, new, and original analyses are exceedingly difficult to come by, presumably analysis of other kinds will be substituted if they must be used. The alternative would be to convert the program procedures into a parody of the most criticized features of the old line-item method. It would always be possible to take last year's program element or category and to add or subtract a few percent in order to make the decisions.

It would be far better in my opinion to follow the practice in the Defense Department under Charles Hitch when both the budget unit and the program unit reported to the same high official.*

This high official could pick as budget officers those people whose sensitivi to the immediate political situation, and whose knowledge of the department and the amount of work each agency is likely to accomplish, fit them for making daily choices. He could also choose for the analytic unit people whose interest is in longer-range analysis. He would keep them from the understandable temptation to involve themselves in everything that happens today at the expense of providing good advice for tomorrow. But when he found what he considered a good piece of analysis he would try to sell it in the department and would insist that the decisions based on this analysis be reflected in the following year's budget.

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*After the first draft of this paper was completed, the Interior Department placed its program and budget units under its Administrative Assistant Secretary.

With the best departmental will in the world, analysis will still languish if it does not get a sympathetic hearing in Congress. Funds will be denied. Analysis will be ridiculed. Worse still, they will be ignored. Yet Congress, through its specialized committees, could be a major source for the introduction of outside analytical perspectives into agency affairs.

At the present time, it is safe to say, most Congressmen look upon analysis with disfavor. To some, it may appear to be a way of replacing Representatives with experts, or it appears to be a way of committing Congressmen to projects whose implications they do not understand and whose consequences might do them harm. But none of these conditions need exist if key Congressmen would take the lead by commissioning analysis for their own purposes to meet their own needs. By working with analysts on their major committees, Congressmen could learn how to set terms and conditions under which analysis will be performed. Over a period of time, these legislators could learn how to interpret the results of analysis and to suggest, for example, that a new analysis be conducted that might do better by values they hold dear. They cannot, in any event, hold out forever against evident applications of intelligence to the problems with which they are entrusted. They can only hope to guide the process of analysis so it will become responsive to public men.

Even if more Congressmen sponsor study of individual policies, the need for analysis will not be met throughout the governmental apparatus. Each bureau, department, and Presidential staff will want to do analysis on the policies it cares about most. Analysis inevitably has political implications. It must be attached to a political center that wants and needs it and that is ready to take the consequences of proposing and adopting it. It would be helpful, however, to have analysis performed in similar institutional arrangements throughout the executive and legislative branches.

Toward this end, and following the rationale laid down in the discussion of program budgeting, **we recommend**

that policy units be established apart from budget units, though both report to the same high official who is interested in sponsoring the analytic work.

> 1. There should be an analytic unit established within the Executive Office of the President on a par with the Bureau of the Budget. The Executive Office policy unit should perform analyses on major issues of interest to the President. Immediate concerns of the Bureau of the Budget, its action orientation, have led to a neglect of analytic work. Units should be headed by a Director of Domestic Policy who would report to the President, as does the Director of the Budget.

2. Departments and bureaus should be encouraged to parallel the Executive Office arrangement with one of their own, separating policy from budget units and having them report to the same high official.

3. All appropriations committees would retain their traditional relationships with bureau and department budget offices. Substantive legislative committees would, however, maintain a liaison with the policy units in the departments and the Executive Office. These committees would sponsor analyses of their own and have a staff member or two devote themselves to the task of evaluating the output of the policy units in the Executive Branch.

The purpose of these institutional changes would not be to produce the one correct analysis, but to promote better work in the policy centers of the Executive Branch. While the various sides will continue to advocate their favorite policies with fervor, the conflicts and disputes hopefully will be conducted at a higher level. If all contenders make more sense than in the past, the public can hardly lose. It is, of course, still up to the analyst to produce this better work and up to the universities to train these men to do it. But in the last instance support and guidance must come from political men.

The understandable temptation to wish away the political process must be resisted. Certainly it is true that governmental agencies (possibly organizations of all kinds) resist changes in traditional programs. If this were not the case to some degree, there would be no guarantee of sufficient stability to get work done; uncertainty would become unmanageable. Nevertheless, if one were to wait for internally inspired change, he might have to wait a long time. Outside influences must be brought to bear. Ultimately, however, policy proposals, no matter where they originated, must be mediated through the political process.

It is Hard Budgetary Choices and Not Budgetary Techniques That Matter in Determining Resource Policies

While we have made recommendations concerning the organization of budgeting and analytical activities, no one should believe that these alone will make a significant impact on resource policies without the leadership of political men who are determined to make hard choices. We conclude, therfore, with a discussion of critical resource problems--acquisition of new park lands, insufficient funds for maintenance of parks, that can only be resolved by acts of political will and creativity.

Consider, for example, the problem of finding money to buy land for public recreation. Everyone knows that the price of land is increasing rapidly and that opportunities lost now are unlikely to be regained. The difficulty is that the political discount against large outlays of funds is very high, especially when the clientele for the proposed parks is unlikely to exist before their acquisition. Every budget director knows he ought to lay out more money to buy land, but he has many other pressing demands and finds it all too easy to sacrifice parks that would aid only the future generations. When word goes out that the budget must be reduced, it is tempting to cut $50 or $100 million that might otherwise have been used for land purchase as a relatively painless way of limiting expenditures.

Since the ordinary political process militates against these land-purchase expenditures, Congress decided to depart from its general principles against the earmarking of funds and to use revenue derived from offshore oil leases for a Land and Water Conservation Fund. But the desire to hold down expenditure has meant that the full allotment rarely gets spent. While analysis could certainly indicate that land costs will be huge in the future, it is no substitute for the political will to make the necessary decisions today.

The basic problem is that the political arena contains imperfections that do not allow it to function properly in regard to purchases of new lands for public parks. When economists speak of market imperfections, they mean that the market does not function properly because various buyers and sellers lack information, because some participants impose costs on others who are not recompensed, and so on. Governmental intervention is, then, justified in order to "rig" the market to come out better than it would under the free play of economic forces. A certain sign that the political arena suffers from imperfections is that knowledgeable actors know what a better decision would be but continuously find themselves unable to implement it. In such a case, it would not be out of place for the government to rig the political market by compelling itself to act correctly in the long run because it knows it will not do so in every immediate case. The Land and Water Conservation Act has not functioned as it should because the executive is given the choice of limiting yearly expenditures. One way to resolve this dilemma would be to require that the Fund's full $200 million per year (or some larger sum) be spent for its intended purpose. Of course, it would undoubtedly be better to retain flexibility by showing that the normal political process will generate demands sufficient to guarantee expenditure of $200 million a year or more for purchase of park lands. Since this appears unlikely in the nature of things, however, it is desirable to gather political strength once and for all and to mandate the necessary spending.

A similar analysis can be made of the major dilemma faced by the National Park Service between maintenance of existing facilities and acquisition of new ones. Its success in acquiring new parks and expanding old ones has meant that funds for administration have fallen steadily below reasonable levels. One result is that moneys appropriated for other purposes (construction, etc.) are continually transferred to ordinary maintenance. Another is that the men at the parks who do the day-to-day work opt for a more conservative strategy that will enable them to feel better about the service they provide currently at the sacrifice of future aspirations. Workload analysis might contribute to small efficiencies in the parks; a larger-scale economic analysis might give us a better grasp of the future cost of acquiring park lands and enlarging facilities. But no analysis will compel political men to take hold of the problem in a forceful way.

There is no way to get good economic value for recreation other than withdrawing the federal government from the field and allowing private entrepreneurs to offer it at market prices. This we are not and ought not to be willing to do.

The answer cannot be to place recreation entirely in the private economy, because a fundamental decision has already been made that the federal government shall provide some recreation services directly to its citizens. The relevant questions then become political ones: Which activities should be subsidized? How much are citizens willing to spend for recreation from their tax monies?

It turns out that they are willing to spend some but not enough to maintain existing facilities and to provide for expansion. Here the possibility of user fees assumes prominence, for if one takes the view that taxpayers already support the parks and therefore should have to pay nothing other than a nominal charge for use, the result would be deterioration of service and a dearth of new facilities. What is needed is not a new quantitative study of recreation costs and benefits but rather the development of new criteria concerning who should pay for what service. And this is an essentially political judgment requiring massive political support.

It is easy enough for conservation groups to demand that there be better facilities in national parks. It is even easier for them to insist that maintenance be improved at the same time the park system is being expanded. Their members enjoy the parks and pay only a fraction of the costs necessary to maintain them. Their claim is that the parks should be maintained by the general taxpaying public and that as members of this group they have a right to enjoy the facilities. Such a position may seem sound to them, but it has extremely unfortunate effects on maintenance of our national parks. If the idealism which is said to animate the conservation movement has any meaning at all, its adherents should understand that the park system requires not only acts by the government but sacrifices by themselves. They must take the lead by contributing to the park system on their own. If those who benefit and care the most give no more than a bare minimum, why should anyone else? Political leaders should not hesitate to throw the ball back to conservation groups and ask them what they are prepared to do for their cause.

Our view is that all taxpayers pay to have parks available for short visits but that those who wish to use them intensively, for vacation purposes or overnight camping, should be asked to pay for that privilege. An economist might call that a two-part tariff: all taxpayers pay a charge for the option of using the facilities but those who actually do use it pay a charge that varies with use. User fees should be set high enough to bring substantial additional income into the parks.

Now we come to a budgetary problem that is of critical importance, and yet neither traditional nor program budgeting are relevant for the purpose. Park personnel must be given incentives to collect the user fees. If their park's appropriations are reduced commensurately with their collections, they will resent the imposition of the extra work caused by the fees and will fail to collect all they could, expecially in places of difficult access. If the user fees remain in the park where they are collected and if park personnel see how their collections add measurably to their discretionary funds, however, they are likely to devise all sorts of ingenious ways to collect every dollar that is due. They will also stop diverting funds from construction and other purposes in order to pay personnel for maintenance because there would no longer be reason for them to do so. To improve park facilities, Congress must either raise appropriations dramatically or must enable the parks to raise their own money. If it fails to do either, the current state of drift will continue. But it will be a political failure, not a budgetary one.

The two problems we have just considered do not highlight sufficiently the difficulties involved in obtaining and criticizing analytic studies in making governmental policy. Let us turn briefly, therefore, to problems of subsidizing range lands, which do bring out these dilemmas.

The problem of range lands reveals a different dimension. It would be difficult, in our opinion, to justify range lands expenditure in economic terms. Whether one uses a rationale based on direct benefits to users or on indirect aid by alleviating poverty, the economic benefits are bound to be small because there are only a few people out there. While keeping people on the land is increasingly seen as a worthy cause, as one way to mitigate our urban difficulties, there are not enough people on the western range to justify much expenditure today or in the foreseeable future. Here is a case where analysis could tell one a great deal but the political men involved, the Washington representatives of the Western states, are not interested in it precisely because they know what the results would be: that further expenditures on range lands are not economically justified. They know the political cost of distressing their far-flung constituents. If program budgeting were used to surface the economic issues directly, it would create a political hassle which they do not want. The federal structure of the Senate, which guarantees Western states a larger representation than their population would otherwise justify, is a more important determinant of range policy than any budgetary arrangement.

In his analysis of the program memoranda on forage on the western range in Interior and Agriculture, Robert Marty has put the situation so well that he deserves to be quoted:

> Forage programs represent a very difficult technical and political problem . . . . Subsidized use of public range has been a well established fact of life in the West for many decades. Much public range is in high country and is well suited to supply summer grazing for nearby valley ranches. A system has evolved of assigning range use rights to dependent ranch properties on a long-term and continuing basis. Use charges have been only about one-third of the value of the grazing at most. The net value of these grazing rights has added substantially to the value of the allotment holder's ranch property. Allotment holders and their political representatives traditionally have been adamantly opposed to any increase in grazing fees or reduction in grazing rights.
>
> The result has been a continuous overgrazing of much of the public range, causing a cumulative deterioration in the resource both with regard to its range and watershed capabilities. The Bureau of Land Management, the principal public land manager, classified only 16 percent of its rangelands as in good or excellent condition; some 31 percent as in poor or bad condition. And 14 percent of its range even now is declining in condition. Interior's program proposal for fiscal year 1969 called for an increase in expenditures from 9.2 million dollars in fiscal 1966 to 24.4 million dollars in fiscal 1973. This program would raise the animal unit months of grazing available from 15.1 million in 1966 to 15.8 million in 1973. Most of the increased expenditure is needed simply to make it possible to maintain current grazing levels on badly overused range allotments, by uneconomically heavy investments in range reseeding, fertilization, fencing, and other treatments and improvements.
>
> It is unlikely that substantially larger appropriations for range management will soon become available. It is also unlikely that public land agencies will soon be able to reduce grazing pressures significantly. The result is likely to be an increasingly grave deterioration of the public ranges. There is something in the PPB system which does not allow this kind of a dilemma from being put forward forcefully.*

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* Robert Marty, *op. cit.*

It is not surprising that program memoranda do not raise the basic question--should there be forage or range improvement programs at all--because the relevant political men do not want to hear the answer. In order for analysis to be worthwhile in this field, the initial steps would have to be taken by other political leaders. These men would have to either signify their willingness to abandon the programs or, more likely, to set out the terms within which they would be interested in analysis.

Suppose it were taken for granted that the people now there would be kept on range lands. Suppose it were also assumed that their existing levels of benefits would not be reduced. It would still be possible to ask interesting questions regarding the alleviation of rural poverty. Perhaps different arrangements would result in a more equal distribution of income or in getting funds to those whose decisions to remain on the land would actually be influenced by the amounts received. It is one thing to recognize existing political realities and another to insist that these demand no change in unsatisfactory programs. There must be a political client for analysis, however, before any potentially useful work can be done.

If these (and other) changes in resource policy we have discussed have not occurred the blame is easily placed on the agencies. Their resistance to change is evident; their first task is preservation. In a period of declining resources and expanding services, they naturally chose to hold on to what they had. Few would forgive them (they would not forgive themselves) if they let the parks deteriorate to obtain new areas they would also have to neglect. They chose, in effect, the expanding constituency that now uses the parks (and complains when services are poor) over future users. Program budgeting could not change their time orientation. The program people could not alter the resources picture so as to create scope for analyses on the allocation of nonexistent future funds for the benefit of nonexistent future people. The PPB men gave away their one presumed advantage--time and ability to take the larger view--by becoming regular budget officers whose main task is putting out fires on a day-to-day basis. If PPBS has failed to bring about innovation, as have other efficiency movements before it, we may ask, does this mean that agencies carry with them an inherent bias against change?

The question we have raised assumes a standard of innovation against which to judge whatever amount does come from the agencies. But there is no such standard; indeed, there is no agreement on how large a change has to be to constitute an innovation or even precisely how one talks about change. Is there more or less change when old practices are combined in new forms or when new practices are administered through old organizational containers? How important are variations in the amount of resources devoted to certain purposes compared to alterations in the way these purposes are accomplished or the kinds of people who seek to carry them out? People will, and, of course, do disagree on whether change has taken place and, if it has, whether it is for good or for ill.

The Park Service grew from an appropriation of $25.3 million in 1947 to $87.9 million in 1969 and the Forest Service from $68.6 million to $126.8 million. Some citizens may find that record one of signal achievement while others will say that it is too little and too late and hardly represents a change worth considering in view of national needs.

Few people are in favor of change for its own sake; they would not, we suspect, consider abandonment of federal responsibility for national parks and forests desirable, though it would be one of the most important changes one could imagine. Most of us are prejudiced in favor of the changes we desire. So it is change plus direction of policy and not mere departure from the status quo that is at stake. By "direction of policy" is often meant the "right policy as we now see it." While we are often uncertain today about our preferences tomorrow, we are better able to say what the agencies should have done ten years ago to satisfy our desires today. Thus in view of the gathering momentum of the ecology movement one is tempted to criticize the agencies for not doing (and spending) nearly enough; it is also possible, however, to visualize a different future in which wild federal bureaucrats would be condemned for vastly excessive spending. The proper criterion for evaluation, of course, is not the present climate of opinion and state of knowledge but that prevailing at the time various decisions were made. There is little evidence to suggest that the essential combination of appropriate knowledge and a favorable political climate existed a decade ago to do what is demanded today. It may be instructive, however, to inquire how a change we now suspect we like--the increase in appropriations for parks and forests--came about.

The considerable success of the National Parks and the Forest Service in increasing their appropriations for recreation can be ascribed to their adoption of the advocate's role. Their personnel believe deeply in the worth of their activities and they try to get as much as they can. They did not ask whether other purposes of expenditure might be more desirable, but simply insisted on the worth of their own operations. They were assisted by the general increase in tax revenues and by the fact that the relevant appropriation subcommittees in Congress were over-loaded with men from western states and with beliefs in their programs. The Park Service made its bid in a ten-year program called Mission 66, which was designed to improve facilities in national parks by 1966. The Forest Service's answer to Mission 66 was "Operation Outdoors." For some time the Forest Service had a rather ordinary $3 million program with the uninspiring name of "Recreation-Public Use" in budgetary documents. In 1957, however, the Service made a special field survey, occasioned, it said, by increased public use of its facilities. It was determined that additional funds were urgently needed and a revitalized program, Operation Outdoors, carried a proposed $85 million price tag to be raised over the next five years. By 1960 the Forest Service had succeeded in more than tripling the usual appropriation for this activity.* In an analysis of 36 domestic agencies from 1947 to 1962, Fenno shows that the Park Service was fifth (with an average rate of 14.9% per year) and the Forest Service was tenth (with an average rate of 11.5%) in rapid increase of appropriations.**

This brief discussion of change which most of us would now regard as desirable, shows that it came about as a result of factors--blatant agency advocacy, over representation of effected interests on Congressional committees, competition among agencies--usually condemned as leading to wrong decisions. Competition is seen as wasteful and encouraging duplication; advocacy is viewed as neglect of public interest and lust.for increased dominion: bias on Congressional committees is viewed as giving advantages to special interests. Yet lack of competition, lack of bias in Congress, and lack of advocacy would virtually insure that departures from prevailing norms did not take place. Other examples could, of course, be cited to show that these features of national policy making have led to bad decisions such as the range program. Economists are used to talking about costs of alternatives: yet these concepts are rarely applied to the political arena where it is also true that policies we like may be bought at a cost of policies we dislike and where there are few processes that do not have the defects of their virtues.

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* The last four sentences are taken from Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process, op. cit., p. 121.

** Richard Fenno, The Power of the Purse (Boston, 1966), p. 392.

If we wish to inculcate a bias toward change into the federal bureaucracy, it would seem desirable to act counter to prevailing wisdom on a number of points concerned with the structure of decision-making. There should be more competition among agencies rather than less. Since few organizations will presently re-examine their own premises, it is desirable to confront them with the policies of others. Agency desire to differentiate their product in marginal ways should be encouraged rather than discouraged. The thrust of agencies to diversify their output, so they will not be caught in a declining market for a single service, should be applauded; let the old agencies performing these services compete for funds by showing they can do a better job. Instead of talking about wholly objective analysis, emphasis should be placed on securing a multiplicity of analytic perspectives. That is why Congress should be urged to sponsor more of its own research and why the new Domestic Council of the Nixon Administration should be urged to solicit analysis, a good part of which should come from outside the Government. These steps will not do what sometimes seems to be desired, that is, provide guarantees against errors we would realize only decades in the future. But they would help bring out more of the interests and values than can presently be conceived. They would help create an environment with incentives not merely to meet existing needs but to create constituencies for future ones. They would give us a chance to mobilize more of our political and intellectual resources, so that we can be a little wiser than we otherwise might be.

Great [illegible] paper

APPENDIX

D

FEDERAL LAND MANAGEMENT PROGRAM AND POLICY EVALUATION

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FEDERAL LAND MANAGEMENT PROGRAM AND POLICY EVALUATION

I - INTRODUCTION

This brief paper reviews the accomplishments of several Federal land management agencies in applying systematic analysis to their programs as a part of the budgetary process. As we shall see, their success in this complex endeavor has not been a complete one. One fundamental, and two transitory difficulties exist. On the remedial side, information systems now in being and available to budget analysts are clearly inadequate for the job at hand. In almost every instance where program analysis has been attempted it has required a special information gathering effort. Then too, the methods of applying systematic analysis to public programs are not yet well developed. There is a considerable difference of opinion about the evaluation approaches and methods to be used. Also, there are a relatively small number of persons skilled in this activity to whom agencies can turn.

These limitations -- inadequate information systems, few persons experienced in public program analysis, and the lack of evaluation procedures of tested merit -- all can be remedied in time. A more durable difficulty is the anomalous position of the analyst as a member of the government unit he scrutinizes. Program analysis for the most part has been carried out at the bureau and department level. This placement of analysis makes it quite difficult for analysts to take a fully objective viewpoint. In practice the scope of program alternatives considered has been quite narrow, usually being limited only to those activities and options now undertaken by the bureau or department. Evaluation of the most farreaching and broad policy alternatives generally have not been undertaken.

In what follows I will illustrate some of these difficulties through a review of evaluations recently carried out by the Department of Agriculture and the Department of the Interior for their timber, recreation, range and minerals programs. These program evaluations took place within the executive branch Planning-Programming-Budgeting System. A resume of the basic elements of this system are included in the next two sections. Detailed reviews of program evaluation efforts then follow, and two final sections provide a survey of opinions of participants and others with regard to program and policy analysis, and some recommendations for augmenting and improving Federal land management planning procedures.

II - THE PPB SYSTEM

PPBS stands for Planning-Programming- Budgeting System, the official name for the executive branch budgeting procedure. PPBS is an application of the more general approach to govermental decision-making known as program budgeting.

The System in Theory

Government-wide instructions for establishing PPBS first were promulgated by the Bureau of the Budget in October of 1965, and have been revised slightly subsequently. Heads of all executive departments, such as Agriculture and Interior, and many independent agencies like the Tennessee Valley Athority now are required to initiate and develop the PPB system of budgeting within their organizations. Agency PPBS staffs report directly to the agency head or his deputy.

The primary objective of the system is to provide a more factual basis for public program and policy decisions, both within the operational agencies and in the executive office of the President. This is done in part by undertaking systematic analysis of public programs. Three essential steps in program analysis have been set forth:

--Determine the objectives of agency programs and group together programs aimed at the same goal.

--Identify alternate public actions, or non-public means, for achieving each objective.

--Systematically compare the costs and benefits to society of each alternative.

Program evaluations, and the program decisions which result from them, are reported in one of the system's two principal documents--the program memorandum. Program memoranda are prepared for each of the agency's major objectives or programs. They contain the agency's appraisal of the current situation including a statement of national needs, the agency's program recommendations, and a summary of the data and analysis upon which these recommendations are based. Additional documents, called special analytic studies, may be appended, and report supporting analyses more completely. They also are used to respond to issues letters prepared by the Bureau of the Budget which define major program issues to be addressed in current analysis.

The budget is the financial expression of the program plan, and is reported in the system's second major document called the program and financial plan. It presents in tabular form a complete and athoritative summary of both the financial cost and the quantity of output anticipated for planned programs. The program and financial plan shows program costs and output estimates for at least five subsequent years, as well as cost and output history for the three years immediately past. It is continuously updated.

The Deficiencies Remedied

This new system is meant to remedy certain deficiencies in Federal government budgeting methods used before 1965. Where it is fully implemented PPBS does indeed lead to some major improvements, chief among which are:

- --Integrated planning for all agency activities designed to fulfill the same objective, even though these activities may be carried out by different bureaus.
- --Explicit consideration of efficiency in developing programs to achieve public goals.
- --Estimation of the budget impact of programs several years into the future, rather than for only a single subsequent year.

As Schick has pointed out, PPBS is not a revolutionary development[1/]. Rather, it is the continuation of a long-term trend toward more efficient government operations that began about 1920. Schick identifies three major stages in Federal government budgetary reform:

- --Expenditure control (1920-1935) established through the adoption of a standard accounting system utilizing the "object of expenditure" approach, and designed primarily to insure that appropriations are expended for the purposes intended.
- --Operations management (1935-1955) achieved by the institution of cost accounting, job load analysis, work accomplishment reporting and other information systems designed to measure and monitor the efficiency with which day-to-day activities are carried out.
- --Program planning (1955-   ) now to be obtained via PPBS, and meant to provide coordinated and comprehensive forward planning of government operations.

[1/] Schick, Allen. 1966. The Road to BBP: The Stages of Budget Reform. Pub. Adm. Rev. 26:243-258

III - SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS

Defining Objectives

Program evaluation begins with a definition of the major objectives of agency programs. Goal definition is a most instructive process. Participants soon learn that, in may cases, agency goals have not been clearly defined or specifically enunciated. And there appears to be some advantage to the agency in being purposely vague in this regard. In any event, the process soon becomes one simply of listing the various products and services that the agency is in the business of providing. Program objectives always come down to this--the provision of specific goods and services. These agency outputs must be defined sufficiently so that they can be measured. And measurement is one key to the question of when goal definition has proceeded far enough so that it is operational. Another aspect of goal definition is the identification of the target group or potential clientele toward which the program is directed.

A part of the conventional wisdom now associated with PPBS is that there exists a hierarchy of goals or objectives of government action. For example, some land management agencies have timberlands, and timber stumpage is one of the products or outputs provided. But it is true to say that the economy does not want or "need" timber per se, but some kind of raw material for construction, for paper products, for furniture and so forth. And manufacturers who now use wood would for the most part be quite happy to change to some other raw material if it seemed to their advantage. More ultimately still, Governments may not be so much concerned with providing certain classes of goods and services as they are in promoting economic and social welfare. The production of specific outputs is simply a means toward that end, just as the production of timber is simply one of many ways the economy can provide for its raw material needs.

The logical conclusion of all this is that government bureaus can be viewed simply as so many business firms, each with its particular "line of products". Bureaus "sell" their services to department secretaries, to the President, and to Congress, all of whom act as purchacing agents for the public at large. PPBS helps to rationalize this market place by making apparent the cost of each good or service, from each bureau or source that provides it, If additional outdoor recreation facilities are on the congressional shopping list PPBS should be able to identify the best source, and this cost or price should help the participants reach some conclusion about how much more, if any, is wanted. One cannot clain that this market model of government is an accurate, or even a desirable one in all cases, but it has proven a remarkably helpful notion in many instances none the less. It is the essential logic of PPBS.

Program Evaluation

Almost all formal program evaluations have used some form of economic analysis as their basis. Whether simple or complex, these analyses attempt to determine the value of additional program output, and the most efficient meams of providing the addition. In the process some evaluation of program scale often is attempted.

The specific analysis procedure most adaptable to evaluating public natural resource programs is benefit-cost analysis. This analysis procedure is hueristic in nature, examining only a few of all possible program alternatives. Thus it is relatively inexpensive in terms of the quantity of information required, and so is more often feasible than other methods. In addition, benefit-cost analysis was developed out of the problems surrounding the provision of public goods, and has evolved more recently through application to public water resource projects. Thus it has come to treat explicitly many of the problems peculiar to government program evaluation in the natural resources area.

A government program or project is deemed desirable in benefit-cost analysis if the present value of incomes benefitors would be willing to forego for having it, exceeds the present value of incomes required to compensate those who must bear the cost. Although this formulation sounds straight forward enough, there are all sorts of practical difficulties involved. With regard to the enumeration of costs and benefits, most programs or projects have imperfectly understood production functions often involving significant external effects. That is to say, there may be considerable uncertainty about the physical outcome of the project. And in addition, the project may change both the technological and price situation for many businesses and households. This external impact often is difficult to trace, let alone to predict in advance.

With regard to the evaluation of inputs and outputs, once enumerated, analysts must amend current market prices, or augment them, to take into account non-marginal effects, market imperfections, taxes, price and production controls, the utilization of otherwise unemployed or underemployed resources, collective goods effects, intangibles, and the future. The process of summing the stream of costs and benefits so derived, incomplete and inaccurate as it may be, is further made uncertain by the necessity of choosing a rate of discount which simultaneously represents the current efficiency of capital in alternate employment, and thesocial rate of time preference for the program output in question. Finally, the analysis assumes away any difference in the marginal utility of income among those affected by the program.

In spite of all these difficulties this sort of program evaluation can be reasonably accurate and helpful, particularly when relatively small additions to the output, of a product or service with a well established market, are in question. Here, analysis for government differs only a little from the kinds of cost projections and market forecasts regularly made by business corporations in the process of reaching their investment and operating decisions. However, when the planning horizon is extended, when intangible costs and benefits are important, and when the program or project is a large one with far reaching external effects, then benefit-cost analysis is a weak crutch at best.

The Environment for Analysis

The ultimate unit of executive branch activity is the public program. Each program results in a recognizable product or service, which is of direct benefit to a group of persons who form the program's clientele. Clientele have representation in the legislative branch, and legislators tend to view favorably programs that benefit their constitutents. Strong programs are those which provide a substantial and recognized benefit to a well organized and vocal clientele with sympathetic congressional representation. Note that this triangle of political power--bureau-clientele-Congress--does not necessarily include the President or his cabinet secretaries. Notice also that support for a particular program does not necessarily require that the program be efficient in the sense that it provides greater value then its cost; only that value is in excess of cost for the recipient group-- the clientele.

There are other powerful influences at work that also tend to give systematic analysis something less than the final word in program planning. First, bureau personnel long associated with particular programs no longer always can view them dispassionately. There is almost always a laudable emotional commitment that, however, can seriously hinder consideration of program changes because change so often is viewed as tantamount to an admission of past error.

Secondly, there is very frequently a strong feeling of professionalism with which to contend. Professionals administer most public land programs, and they bring professional standards to their work. Professionalism, although generally a great strength in government, also can result in too myopic a view, typified by program goals, and standards of technical acceptability, that ignore the cost involved in their achievement.

Finally, there is the brute fact of organizational survival to consider. Other things being equal, or even if they're not, most bureau employees feel that a bigger program is a better program. Largely this stems from their feeling that there are plenty of unmet "needs" in their program area, and that these things are "worth doing".

IV - THE EVALUATIONS

How helpful is PPBS in improving executive branch decision making? This is a question which is extremely difficult to answer on the basis of objective observation. One would have to identify changes in programs and policies which have resulted from PPBS, and then determine their ultimate utility. Instead of identifying and valuing changes due to PPBS in this way, I will instead review some of the documents that have resulted from this new system, and contrast their content with the information made available before. If differences exist in the information provided they will indicate at least the possibility of different decisions resulting. No budgeting system alone can produce better decisions. What a better system can do is to limit less the scope and range of alternatives and factors taken into account in the final judgments of the merits of programs and policies.

PPBS was initiated in the Fall of 1965. Bureaus and departments already were beginning work on fiscal 1968 budgets at that time, since these had to be ready for presentation to the Bureau of the Budget the next Spring, and by the President to Congress in the budget message the following January. This appraisal of PPBS program analysis is based on documents for fiscal years 1968 and 1969. These are the first two years in which the system operated, and so the level of achievement is less than is the case today. What follows, then, is a snapshot of PPBS program evaluations at an early period in the system's development.

Budget Structure

PPBS wrought great change in the fiscal structure for budgeting within the public land management agencies. Table 1 shows the congressional appropriation structure for fiscal year 1967, used for budgetary decisions in the executive branch as well prior to PPBS, for each of four bureaus. Table 2 shows the PPBS program structure for fiscal year 1969.

There are two striking differences in these categorizations of government activity. The pre-PPBS budget breakdown, still used by Congress, relates to bureaus and is oriented to activities. The PPBS structure relates to departments and is output oriented. The PPBS structure shown in table 2 is more inclusive than the congressional structure shown in table 1, but essentially they are two ways of cutting the same pie. Yet they are very different. The congressional budget facilitates review of the efficiency with which bureaus carry out land management activities. The PPBS budget orients at some level to outputs rather than activities. Instead of showing only expenditures for land management and road construction, for example, it shows expenditures for for timber production and recreation. It is similar to the

Table 1.--Congressional Appropriations Structure, Public Land Management Agencies - FY 1967.

BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, USDI

- Management of lands and resources
- Construction and maintenance
- Oregon and California grant lands
- Public land development roads and trails
- Range improvements
- Permanent appropriations (revenues)

FOREST SERVICE, USDA

- Forest protection and utilization
- Cooperative range improvements
- Forest roads and trails
- Access roads
- Acquisition of lands for national forests
- Assistance to states for tree planting
- Permanent appropriations (revenues)

GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, USDI

- Surveys, investigations and research
- Lead and zink stabilization program
- Payments from proceeds (revenues)

NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, USDI

- Management and protection
- Maintenance and rehabilitation of facilities
- Construction of facilities
- Parkway and road construction
- General administrative expense
- Other appropriations

Table 2.--PPBS Program Structues, Departments of Agriculture and Interior - FY 1969.

US DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

- I. Income and Abundance
    - B. Agricultural production capability
        - 13. Management of federal range lands
- IV. Communities for Tomorrow
    - D. Resource protection and environmental improvement
    - E. Recreation, wildlife and natural beauty
    - F. Timber

US DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

- 3. Minerals Exploration, Production and Supply
    - 6. Information, support and management functions
        - 9. Classification, leasing and sale
        - 12. Mineral surveys - wilderness
- 4. Land, Forage and Timber
    - 3. Land classification and disposition
        - 10. Realty transactions - federal
    - 6. Earth study and measurement
        - 21. Cadastral surveys
    - 12. Land utilization, protection and restoration
        - 9. Watershed conservation and development
    - 15. Timber production
    - 18. Livestock forage production
    - 21. Transportation system
    - 24. Fire protection
- 6. Recreation Use and Preservation
    - 3. Planning and assistance
    - 5. Land acquisition (LWCF)
    - 7. Land acquisition (Other)
    - 9. Development and construction -- adding new capacity
    - 11. Development and const. -- supporting exist. const.
    - 13. Other road construction
    - 15. Management/operations/maintenance -- new capacity
    - 17. Management/operations/maintenance -- existing capacity
    - 18. Resource protection -- NPS
    - 19. Rare and endangered species
    - 21. Wildlife habitate and production
    - 23. Fish habitate and production

difference in private business between accounting summaries showing the cost of operating each department, say, in a manufacturing plant (e.g. stamping, forging, assembly, and finishing), and the total unit cost for each of the several products turned out by the plant during the year. The first sort of information is necessary in monitoring departmental expenditures and achieving greater efficiency in carrying out each department's operations. The second sort of information is needed in order to make decisions about how much of each product the company ought to produce.

The PPBS structure contrasts with the congressional structure in that it is designed to provide information which is helpful in reaching decisions about the kind and amount of products and services to be made available from public lands. Bureau activities in pursuit of these outputs often are represented in the PPBS structure, but always as subsidiary elements in a program oriented toward providing a specific output. This new sort of structure was required because a new kind of expenditure breakdown was needed to answer "kind and amount" questions. Thus the PPBS structure indicates a different focus for program evaluation. The stress in program planning has shifted, evidently, from questions of operational efficiency toward those of output effectiveness.

Several points are worth making with regard to this difference in program structure. First, neither the congressional budget structure nor the PPBS structure is a pure one. Both contain elements portraying expenditures for inputs and for outputs. And neither structure is a complete one, providing a breakdown of expenditures for all inputs or activities, and for all outputs. Both kinds of expenditure breakdown are needed for fully effective planning and control of public business, and both the executive branch and Congress should have both kinds available to them.

Program Evaluation Information

Some standard or model is needed at this point in order to judge the quality of program evaluation efforts. I offer what follows with some hesitation. It represents my own tentative conclusions about what constitutes useful information for program decision-making. This model is in some respects specific to public land management programs.

My basic point of view in developing this standard is most prosaic. PPBS, in very large measure, is an information system rather than an analytical system. The line between information and analysis is not always clear of course, but there can be no question that PPBS has provided, for the most part, the kinds of data and simple analyses that good accounting and marketing departments provide managers of a private enterprise. What follows then is a model with a rather modest purpose: principally to identify the cost per unit of output for existing government programs, to identify the value of outputs where possible, and to determine how these costs and benefits are distributed among those affected by the program. PPBS is not well adapted to providing much beyond this on a routine basis. But I do not mean to imply that this sort of cost-effectiveness data is easy to obtain or of trivial importance. Indeed, it is crucial to progress in more basic evaluation of the alternatives to current public programs and policies.

Objectives.-- The process of establishing an output oriented program structure goes a longway toward identifying program objectives. Needed is a careful definition of the goods and services which result from the operation of the program. Category-level programs usually involve several to many specific kinds of a given category of output. For example, a recreation program may include urban-oriented day-use parks, wilderness recreation areas, camping, water sports and winter sports facilities, as well as expanded game populations and improved sites for hunting and fishing. It is important to provide a classification of output which is specific enough to allow measurement. Also needed is a summary of the legal authority for undertaking the program, and any legal or political commitment undertaken by the government to provide these outputs.

Current program.--Documentation of the current program is a continuing need. This material is extremely useful to those who are not well acquainted with the program, but must participate in the decision process none the less. Information about the amount and location of output helps indicate the program's general scope. An indication of total production for the nation, and the major non-government suppliers, provides an index of the relative importance of the government's effort. The current clientele should be indicated by number, location and socio-economic characteristics if these are relevant. The program benefits and costs for immediate clientele, and the costs and benefits to others from the program should be described, both with regard to their nature and extent. When possible costs and benefits should be expressed in economic or other quantitative terms.

In land management programs the output arises from the utilization of certain natural resources. The current extent, location and condition of these resources is of interest. Also the trend in their condition or quality will be of concern. It is helpful to the uninitiated if a brief resume of program activities is included, giving some indication of their relative importance, and the necessary timing and sequence relationships involved in producing the good or service in question. Finally, program cost data are needed. These should show overall or average cost per unit of output, but also the costs for various varieties of output, sources of supply, componant activities, and so forth. Data also are needed about the extent to which clientele bear this cost.

Issues.--Certain questions or issues come to surround almost any government program. Program issues often fall into rather well defined categories. The relative efficiency of a current program may be questioned on the basis of the mix of supply sources utilized, the production methods employed, and so forth. Is output being provided in the most efficient manner? Programs also can be questioned with regard to their scale. Has output been expanded to the point where the cost of additional units far exceeds their value? Then too, Questions of distributive equity are important. Is output available to all interested citizens on an equal basis? Should it be? And are users bearing a share of the program cost commensurate with their ability to pay and the benefit they derive? Questions about the future also may enter here. It is seldom desirable to maintain programs at stable levels for many years, because both the need for them and the cost of their provision may change with time. Changes in need or demand usually are related to changes in population, and to changes in income, leisure, mobility and other attributes of life style, as well as changes in tastes or preferences. Changes in cost or supply often can be expected to arise from technological innovation, and from shifts in resource availability or quality.

Long-term plans.--Long-term plans set the general direction and goal level for the program. Explicit consideration is given here to alternate methods or levels of program operation. The appropriate alternatives for analysis will be indicated by the program issues identified. A scale issue will suggest examination of various sources of supply to determine the prospective cost per unit from each source, and will lead to a scale decision which expands the program as long as added output is available at a reasonable cost. An equity of access issue may lead the analyst to examine geographic shifts in program emphasis, or other tactics to equalize access. In each case specific alternatives are identified and evaluated with regard to their cost and effectiveness. How far this evaluation can proceed will depend on the degree to which the input-output relationships are understood, and the extent to which cost and benefits can be quantified in comparable terms. An important element in this process is the establishment of a basis for preference. This basis may range from a simple listing of the factors to be taken into account in reaching a judgment decision about the alternative to be preferred, to a formal economic decision rule such as the maximization of net present worth at a specified discount rate. The basis for establishing preference must be indicated because it is needed in order to identify the specific information required in program analysis.

The resultof this process is the selection of a program option. This selection is not a part of the analytical process, of course. Rather, it is made by the responsible officials in part on the basis of program evaluation results. The selection need not be constrained by budget considerations at this point, but rather is a judgment of what the program should be designed to do in the absence of more urgent program needs, or as rapidly as funding allows. Its framework, once again, is the long-run, which usually means periods from ten to fifty years in most public land management programs.

Budget request.--The budget request stems from the decision about long-term program goals. It shows the federal funding needed during the next several fiscal years to accomplish program objectives. However, it may be necessary to recommed a budget less than that required to meet long-term goals in full, if currently the fiscal situation is unfavorable, or there are other, more urgent, program needs which will limit funds availability. Since long-term program goals are arrived at without a knowledge of the financial resources that can be made available, a less-than-full funding request will tend to be a persistent aspect of budgeting in most program areas. It is at this stage that the specific activities or items of work to be accomplished during this budget cycle can be identified. These form a necessary part of the budget presentation.

The PPBS Program Documents

I have reviewed carefully the program memoranda and related documents for fiscal years 1968 and 1969, covering the forage, timber, minerals and recreation programs of the departments of Agriculture and Interior. This information was provided by these agencies with the understanding that:

> "the material...is now pertinent only to the extent that it may have formed a basis for the recommendations contained in the budget which President Johnson transmitted to Congress for that year.
>
> ...projections for fiscal years beyond 1969 (are) not now current.
>
> ...Such material does not have the approval of the Budget Bureau or the President and is not to be regarded as reflecting the current view either of the agency or the administration."

A brief review of the budget documents used before PPBS, and of the nature of program memoranda and related documents in these early years will help to illustrate the changes implicit in this new system.

Pre-PPBS budget submissions.--Prior to the institution of PPBS the executive branch did its budgetary planning largely by bureau and congressional appropriation line item. Once general planning allowances were established for each department by the Bureau of the Budget, bureau and department budget staffs began to cast up budget needs. This process resulted in a set of budget requests, from the department to the Budget Bureau, generally in line with allowances. The budget requests, stated both in terms of new obligational authority and the anticipated expenditure level, were accompanied by brief "justification statements". A separate statement generally was prepared for each budget line item, and contained an explanation of changes between the last fiscal year's appropriation ("the base") and the current year's request. In general, most of the information useful in program planning was not present in these justification statements. They normally contain only data on the source of cost increases, and the activities to be carried out with additional funding. Basically, they are documentation of budget negotiations already completed rather than program analyses serving as a prelude to decision-making.

Program objectives, current program description, issues, and long-term plans all are absent from justification statements. Did this information exist in some other form? Yes, to some extent. Departments and bureaus often prepared issue papers, on an ad hoc basis, for programs which were of special concern for one reason or another. Then too, bureaus sometimes prepared long-term plans to guide yearly budgeting. The Forest Service's "Ten Year Program for the Development of the National Forests", and the National Park Service's "Mission 66" report both are examples. And a good deal of the data and information required was in the hands, or the heads, of program directors within the bureaus. This

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information was not ordinarily asked for or routinely made available to the department or the Bureau of the Budget. Higher level decision-makers had, largely, to accept the judgment of bureau planners that programs were efficient, of an appropriate scale, run in an equitable manner, adequately integrated with related programs in other bureaus, and progressing on a path consistent with reasonable expectations of future conditions. Program evaluation and review at higher levels was reserved for new programs, and for those in obvious trouble.

Essentially this system of budgeting reflected a general administrative approach often termed "crisis management" or "management by exception". It required a relatively small input of high level internal review and control, but at the same time it guaranteed that crises would arise and that new opportunities would go begging, at least for a while. PPBS can be viewed as a general change from a system of partial and occasional program review, toward one of continuous program monitoring. It requires a great deal more information and managerial time, neither of which have been provided to the extent required as yet. Its benefits can be substantial as well, of course.

Forage program memoranda.--Forage programs are carried forward both by Interior and Agriculture. Six bureaus are involved: the Bureau of Land Management and the Forest

Service in a major way; and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Bureau of Reclamation, the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, and the National Park Service to a much lesser extent.

Interior's forage program comprises a sub-category of the "Land, Forage and Timber" program category. The sub-category has only two elements: "management and utilization" and "development". This structure is the same for both the fiscal year 1968 and 1969 program memoranda.

A good deal of effort has been expeded on this program sub-category. A program description is provided, and the small relative importance of Interior's forage production as a part of the national total is developed. Program clientele are enumerated and identified with regard to the size of their grazing operations. It is pointed out that these persons have legal access to public land grazing, so control of range utilization by the Department is limited. Long-term objectives for this program are stated as follows in the fiscal year 1969 program memorandum:

> "(1) Protect the lands from abuse and deterioration and thus preserve wildlife habitate, retard watershed deterioration, and protect future production potential.
>
> (2) Provide livestock forage from BLM administered lands to help sustain the existing dependent livestock operation, to the extent that benefits justify such utilization.

> (3) To the extent favorable cost benefit relationships for grazing equal or exceed alternative or competing uses of public land resources, increase forage production to help meet increasing livestock forage needs, and to contribute to local and regional economies."

These objectives are to be obtained by undertaking an accelerated program of range allotment examination and treatment. The alternative of reducing grazing is judged to be inappropriate because of the legal rights to grazing involved, and the hardship to users which would result from such a course. Issues recognized include the need for studies showing when range improvement warrents its cost, the equity of current grazing fees, the external effects of public range use, and the control of user-built range improvements. Also, it is recognized that this program cannot be separated from the watershed program for these same acres. Some economic evaluation of alternate program levels was presented in the fiscal year 1968 program memorandum, but was dropped from the 1969 document.

In Agriculture the forage program is treated as a program element of the Department's sub-category dealing with crop and livestock production. As in Interior, the program is further sub-divided between management and improvement activities. The forage program in Agriculture is viewed as a minor component of a large effort, primarily research and extension, directed toward maintaining an adequate capacity for various sorts of agricultural production. As such it gets relatively little attention in the Department's program memoranda.

Forage programs represent a very difficult technical and political problem for both departments. Subsidized use of public range has been a well established fact of life in the West for many decades. Much public range is in high country and is well suited to supply summer grazing for nearby valley ranches. A system has evolved of assigning range use rights to dependent ranch properties on a long-term and continuing basis. Use charges have been only about one-third of the value of the grazing at most. The net value of these grazing rights has added substantially to the value of the allotment holder's ranch property. Allotment holders and their political representatives traditionally have been adamantly opposed to any increase in grazing fees or reduction in grazing rights.

The result has been a continuous overgrazing of much of the public range, causing a cumulative deterioration in the resource both with regard to its range and watershed capabilities. The Bureau of Land Management, the principal public land manager, classified only 16 percent of its rangelands as in good or excellent condition; some 31 percent as in poor or bad condition. And 14 percent of its range even now is declining in condition. Interior's program proposal for fiscal year 1969 called for an increase in expenditures from 9.2 million dollars in fiscal 1966 to 24.4 million dollars in fiscal 1973. This program would raise the animal unit months of grazing available from 15.1 million in 1966 to 15.8 million in 1973. Most of the increased expenditure is needed simply to make it possible to maintain current grazing levels on badly overused range allotments, by uneconomically heavy investments in range reseeding, fertilization , fencing, and other treatments and improvements.

It is unlikely that substantially larger appropriations for range management will soon become available. It is also unlikely that public land agencies will soon be able to reduce grazing pressures significantly. The result is likely to be an increasingly grave deterioration of the public ranges. There is something in the PPB system which does not allow this kind of a dilemma from being put forward forcefully.

Minerals program memoranda.--The Interior Department's minerals program primarily involves a research and development effort. In their fiscal 1968 program memorandum Interior used a program structure of four major sub-categories. The first was "mineral exploration and development", which included a major effort in geological mapping and appraisal, a supporting program of geoscientific research, and several special assistance and subsidy programs. The second program--

"minerals resource base expansion and development"--included research in minerals extraction, processing, utilization and basic scientific research in metals and minerals. A third sub-category called "leasing and sale of Federally-owned non-fuel minerals" covered minerals dispositions from the public lands. And a fourth program of research in metal and mineral industries and commodities was termed "mineral industries surveys and development".

The fiscal 1969 program memorandum used a quite different breakdown of the minerals program category, employing a "technological and research core" sub-category, an "information, support and regulatory functions" program, a "special programs - functional " sub-category, and a "special programs - commodity" sub-category. This shift in program structure is frome sub-categories that indicate output in 1968, to sub-categories indicating activities in the fiscal 1969 document. The shift represents, evidently, some disenchantment with the PPBS concept of output oriented program planning in the case of minerals.

In both years the minerals memoranda contain a gerneral review of each important non-fuel mineral or metal, indicating on a judgment basis the supply outlook and opportunities for program accomplishment. The stress is on presenting a composite picture of the Nation's mineral resources, and of identifying areas of current or potential concern. In the fiscal 1968 memorandum a section of several pages was prepared for each program element, including a statement of objectives, a justification statement, a proposed program, an evaluation of output, and a section outlining funding options. These sections provide an adequate description of the activities undertaken in each program element, but do not go far beyond this. The proposed program is presented without analysis of alternatives, and the funding option section indicates only that the effect of a lower than requested funding level will retard the timing of program accomplishment.

The only program element directly related to public land management is the classification, leasing and sale of Federally-owned minerals. It constitutes a quite small part of the total minerals program in terms of program cost. The Department's long-term objectives in the program were stated in its fiscal 1969 program memorandum as follows:

> "Safeguard the national interest by prudent management of the Federal mineral resources by:
>
> a. Providing a fair market return from the disposal of Federal mineral resources.
>
> b. Insuring adequate development and rehabilitation planning to minimize damage to other resources and the environment.
>
> c. Maintaining a scientific and technical competence to provide the Government with expert advice on on the mineral resources of Federal lands.

Several major program issues also were identified in this program memorandum. First, the point was made that program funding had allowed only a day to day response to industry interest in Federal mineral resources, sufficient only to do essential classification, lease and sale application review, and supervision of extraction. Additional funding would allow advanced classification and certain investigations dealing with "the equity and effectiveness of present leasing laws and regulations", and of the effect of mining on other resource values and uses. A second program issue was the lack of methods for appraising the true merit of individual lease or sale requests in the light of administrative costs and external effects.

The minerals program in Agriculture involves the supervision of mineral leasing on the National Forests. In In the fiscal 1968 memorandum this program formed a part of a program element for "general support management for Federal lands", in the Department's program category for "communities". In fiscal 1969 a new sub-category within the communities program had been identified, called "resource protection and environmental improvement", which included the minerals program. Nothing beyond a brief description of the program was provided in either year.

Minerals management on public lands is difficult to integrate with other programs for managing surface resources such as soil, water, timber, and grass. The mineral extraction process usually causes some damage to the land surface, and in some cases this damage can be severe and long lasting.

There is concern, within the land management agencies involved, about the extent of these diseconomies of minerals extraction. So far, however, it has not been possible to bring this factor fully into consideration when reviewing minerals use applications. There is no adequate factual basis upon which estimates of the physical and economic cost to surface resources resulting from mining can be made at present. Thus, leases are approved without always knowing whether or not benefits will exceed costs. This problem, and the related one of administrative costs, are well presented in Interior's fiscal 1969 memorandum. Further program analysis must await an evaluation of current mineral leases and sales aimed at determining (a) adequate methods of estimating all benefits and costs, and (b) the extent to wich current leasing methods favor applications having unacceptable benefit-cost ratios.

Timber program memoranda.--It appears that more and better program information exists for timber programs than for any other output examined here. Program memoranda are better developed for this reason. Both Interior and Agriculture treat timber as a program sub-category. Agriculture exerts leadership in this program area; Interior in the other three. Agriculture completed four special analytical studies or issue papers in this program area in time for submission as fiscal 1968 or 1969 budget documents.

The Agriculture program includes management of National Forest timber resources, an extension program in cooperation with state forestry organizations to improve private timberland management, and an extensive research effort as well as a tree insect and disease control program. Public and private lands are identifies as alternate sources of future timber supplies. A definate output objective was established for the National Forests, calling for an increase in output from 1.8 billion cubic feet per year in 1962 to 4.0 billion cubic feet in 2000.

Two basic problems have been identifies by Agriculture, one short-run in nature and the other a long-run one. Certain special categories of timber were in short supply causing substantial price increases both for the raw material and for derived goods. Among these were veneer log quality hardwoods in the East, and Douglas-fir peerler logs for plywood in the West. Special efforts to provide additional quantities of these to the market in the short-run, and to improve their utilization, were identifies as program needs. In the longer run a general shortage of most types of timber appeared to be in the offing, and measures to alleviate this problem were suggested, primarily the acceleration of road construction and the intensification of cultural measures. Some economic evaluation of each alternative was provided.

Interior's timber program is more restricted. Most of their timber harvest occurs in Washington and Oregon, and

and the Department does not operate significant extension or research programs in this area. The program memoranda reflect this, with principal concern being expressed for the timber problems particular to the Pacific Northwest region.

A whole series of national appraisals of the timber resource have been carried out by the Federal government since before the turn of the century. These reflect a long-term concern with the condition of timberlands, rooted in the destructive harvesting practices employed historically by the lumber industry. Today, a more subtle controversy exists between some public foresters and some segments of the wood-using industry. Increasing demands for wood products, and the rapid harvesting of privately owned stumpage, have placed public foresters under great pressure to abandon even-flow timber regulation policies, particularly in the Douglas-fir region of the West. There is resistance to this on the part of public foresters because it would result in a substantial reduction in the volume available for harvest in the region during the decades following old-growth conversion. There are good arguements on both sides of the issue, and it is a complex one involving other factors than those mentioned here. This issue is not really met squarely in the memorandum.

There has been a marked shift recently toward more short-run concerns with regard to timber supply and price.

Responsiveness of the timber supply to rapid if temporary changes in wood products demand is beginning to be viewed as an important problem. Recent sharp price fluctuations have given this point of view emphasis. It has also become apparent that timber programs need to be much different from one region to the next. Although all these concern were represented in the Agriculture timber memorandum for fiscal 1969, none was given sufficient stress at that point. However, this memorandum is by far the most comprehensive, and best developed of any examined. There is analytical content of value and a clear demonstration that systematic analysis is both feasible and useful.

Recreation program memoranda.--Recreation comprises a separate program category in Interior, and is perhaps the single output of greatest importance in this department. Componant programs include recreation planning; research, and assistance to states and local governments; the operation of the National Park system; the development of wild rivers, scenic roads and trails, and national recreation areas and seashores; the preservation of rare and endangered species of wildlife, of historic and cultural sites, and of wilderness areas; and the production of migratory birds, fish and other wildlife.

There is an extensive description of the current and proposed program in the fiscal 1968 program memorandum, but little beyond this. A beginning had been made a year later toward developing a multi-factor index of the relative merit of individual recreation developments. Program clientele were not well characterized in these memoranda.

Agriculture's recreation program includes a recreation program on the National Forests, a research program, and technical assistance to private individuals in undertaking outdoor recreation enterprises. It was treated as a subcategory of the "communities" program category. The budget documents for fiscal 1968 and 1969 include two special analytic studies which amplify the memoranda to some extent. But as in Interior no analysis of program alternatives was developed.

There probably has been more rapid progress in this program area than in any other in developing basic information systems. But some very difficult problems remain. Unlike forage, timber and minerals, the recreation program results in outputs which typically are not marketed. Thus, there is no easy appeal to a market mechanism for established economic values in this program area. And planners are left without a measure of the value of output to contrast with cost. This is very apparent in the program memoranda. They consist largely of lists of progects the agency would like to have. No objective justification is possible, nor can analysts contrast the usefulness of one project as opposed to another.

Since there are no economic guides to plan by in this program area some explicit policies that establish relative values are needed. Since market prices are absent, fiat prices must be established. How urgent is recreation as opposed to such services as medical care or education? And what amount of value should be associated with various forms of outdoor recreation, and for various persons or groups? And how should recreation services be distributed, on the basis of ability to pay by some quasi-market system, or on some other basis? These are some of the questions that must be answered beforesystematic analysis will have much utility in this program area.

The State of the Program Planning Art

There can be no question that PPBS has resulted in a very substantial increase in the amount of planning data available at higher levels in the executive branch. The volume of PPBS documents alone indicates a marked augmentation. Indeed, it is remarkable to me that so much was accomplished in so short a time.

New information systems.--There has been a rapid advancement in bureau information systems, at least in part in response to the planning data requirements of PPBS. Accounting systems have been extended in most land management bureaus. The Bureau of Land Management has instituted a new multiple-use, area related management planning system, the National Park Service has established a new system of estimating maintenance and reconstruction needs, the Forest

Service has an improved recreation information system, and so forth. These indicate, of course, that at least some of the information needed in program evaluation was not available at the Washington Office level of these bureaus. Bureau chiefs, too, were dependent on the judgment of other persons in planning bureau programs. These new information systems, together with better information on production functions, will lead to better program analysis as time goes on.

Structure as a guide to analysis.--The PPBS budget structure does a reasonable job identifying major products and services provided from public lands. In each department's structure there are specific categories, sub-categories or program elements which deal with forage, timber, recreation and minerals. Most activities carried out by each department in support of each output program are grouped under the relevant program subdivision. In general, Interior gives more prominence to public land outputs in its program structure than does Agriculture.

The grouping of expenditures by output is one of the great advantages of PPBS. This makes the total expenditure devoted to a particular output obvious and allows computation of cost per unit of output. The structure, then is helpful primarily in identifying current program outputs and revealing the cost of those outputs.

While the PPBS program structure does make routine provision of data on outputs and their cost feasible, it does not do much to foster or guide program analysis. In both Agriculture and Interior analysis primarily is directed toward sub-categories rather than categories. Thus categories like ,"Land, Forage and Timber", and "Communities", simple become catchalls for programs which are related in some vague, undefined way. And the analysis within sub-category programs is quite diverse, being guided more by the particular program issues identified than by the particular output involved.

The quality of analysis.--The identification of program alternatives, the establishment of a basis for preference, and the actual selection of an alternative all are represented in most program memoranda. In addition, some of these aspects of program analysis are more fully treated in special analytic studies. However, during the initial two years of PPBS, analysis of public land programs was a long way from being definitive. Only the most cursory evaluation of alternatives is in evidence for some programs at this date. This, of course,is to be expected at so early a stage in the development of the system. Interestingly, Agriculture displays substantially more progress in actual analysis than does Interior. This stems, no doubt, from the fact that this department had been moving toward program budgeting for sometime prior to 1965, and also had a rather substantial cadre of persons trained in economic analysis upon whom they could call. Agriculture completed six special analytical studies in time for use in the fiscal 1968 and 1969 budget, while Interior had none.

Conversely, Interior's PPBS effort employed a much more fully developed administrative system at this stage. A great deal of progress already had been made by Interior in the direction of systematic and uniform program planning and budgeting procedures.

The quality of the program memoranda, and the special analytical studies which support them, varies widely. They range from very detailed and sophisticated evaluations, to brief descriptions of objectives and alternatives without appeal to data. Length and complexity are not good indices of usefulness,of course. They do tend to indicate, however, the amount of analytical effort expended. Some attempt at analysis was made in every program area, but only a few could be given the amount of analysis justified by the importance of the problems and the quality of the information available.

The scope of program analysis.--If analytical results unavoidably were small at this early stage, was the framework for analysis adequate and well thought out? No, not in most cases. The most noticeable limitation relates to the alternatives selected for consideration. Too often these were too narrow in scope, encompassing only the current activities of the department involved. Seldom was serious attention paid to program alternatives that would reduce program levels, that would fall outside the department's juristiction, or that would involve actions appropriate to the private sector.

Also, the basis for preference seldom is spelled out in these analyses.

Input-output quantification.--Many land management activities have a two-staged, rather than a single stage, production function. For example, a range improvement project first involves land treatments and the construction of facilities, which only eventually will result in increased forage production. The case is even more extreme in timber programs where increased timber yields follow land treatment activities often by decades. In budgeting it should be possible to be quite specific about the kinds and amounts of work--land treatment, facility construction, supervision of use, general administration, and so forth--to be accomplished with the funding requested. And the work actually accomplished provides a ready check on the efficiency of program administration. However, some kind of varifiable output reporting also is needed in order to be certain that budgeted activities actually are effective in increasing program output. In general, expenditures are audited, project work accomplishment is varified, but the effect of expenditures and accomplished work on program output is not always determined.

Misrepresentation of program opportunities.--One of the criteria of effective program planning is the realistic portrayal of that program to decision-makers. One of the serious shortcommings of PPBS, as it applies to land management programs, is that the output orientation of the system forces separate consideration of expenditures and activities which actually are integral within the management program of individual forest, range and park properties. Timber is considered separately from range, and both are budgeted without reference to recreation or water at the Washington level. In general, there is no cross-referencing among program memoranda which would indicate this necessary interrelationship of programs on individual management units. PPBS can substantially misrepresent the true nature of public land management opportunities existing on the ground because of its classification of programs on the basis of output. A decision to augment timber production, for example, cannot be considered in isolation from other output programs, because such an action would modify these other programs, perhaps markedly.

National and local effects.--The output orientation of PPBS also gives an unrealistic national emphasis to programs which, for the most part, have only local impact. Too little attention has been paid in the program memoranda reviewed to identifying those who are affected most by the programs, and the impact of public land programs on the development of local communities. One philosophy of public land management would hold that the basic purpose of government ownership of these resources is to foster better opportunities of life for all citizens, but particularly for those citizens most immediately involved. And it is the user and the local resident who are most immediately affected by public lands programs. Some change in the planning process is needed which fosters an explicit recognition of the individual public land unit as the focus of program planning, both for achieving an integration of output programs and for promoting the advancement of local economies.

A final word.--These program memoranda resulted from a system which was both new and imperfect. The system's newness resulted in a marked limitation in the actual evaluation of programs that proved possible, because of a lack of time and information. The imperfectness of the system is more important. Budget structure, whether output or activity oriented, has not proven to be a useful guide to analysis. The location of analysis efforts in the bureaus and departments carrying forward the programs has brought forth analysis inadequate in scope. The output orientation of the system makes it difficult to portray the true relationships among programs. And the national framework within which analysis proceeds has caused regional and local viewpoints and issues to be slighted.

V - JUDGMENTS ABOUT SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS

Many persons have participated in, studied and commented on PPBS and systematic analysis of public programs. Some of this experience and study is helpful in the present context. What follows necessarily is a selection, from many opinions, of those I found to be interesting and relevant.

Joint Economic Committee Papers

A rather substantial compendium of papers on PPBS[2] recently has been published by the Subcommitte on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee of Congress. Persons of many points of view are represented, and some of their comments are germane to this paper.

Current status of PPBS.--Jack W. Carlson is Assistant Director for Program Evaluation of the Bureau of the Budget. In a real sense, he is the most authoritative spokeman the PPB system possesses. It is his view that the system has been moderately successful in improving the decision-making process within the executive branch. He makes the point that both Democratic and Republican administrations have endorsed the principles upon which PPBS is based. Moderate changes in the system are contemplated during the next budget cycle, indicating general satisfaction with the system on the part of the Budget Bureau.

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[2] US Congress. 1969. The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditures:The PPBS System. Joint Economic Committee. 1241pp. (3 Vol.)

A very interesting paper by Keith Marvin and Andrew Rouse, respectively of the General Accounting Office and the Bureau of the Budget, provides some insight into the conditions necessary within agencies for successful program analysis.

> "The authors find that five factors appear in each agency that has made substantial progress toward the development of PPBS for policy decision making. These are:
> (1) The active support, both formal and informal, of the agency head...
> (2) Leadership of the central analytical unit by an executive with recognized analytic experience, management skills, and an aggressive interest...
> (3) A general perception in the agency that PPB is essentially an agency decision making tool rather than a Bureau of the Budget requirement.
> (4) Qualified agency (analytic) staffs, and
> (5) Sufficient agency (analytic) staffs.

A series of four papers, by Allen Schick, Aaron Wildavsky, Paul Feldman and Samuel Greenhouse, is rather critical of PPBS as a system for policy analysis. By policy analysis these contributors refer to broad, innovative studies of what government ought to be doing. It is their view that PPBS actually may have hindered policy analysis, and certainly has not encouraged it. It is apparent that very little analysis of basic government policy in natural resources has come about. And in part this has been due to the "forced linkage" of policy analysis to budgeting in PPBS. Perhaps a more important reason, however, is that in PPBS the analysis, who are themselves members of the bureaucracy, simply are not in the position to take a broad view of program analysis.

Incentives and constraints.--Several papers treat the factors which tend to constrain government from becoming more effective. One, by Charles Schultze, deals with incentives for improving effectiveness. Schultze, a former Budget Bureau director, stresses the need for some positive stimulus--parallel to the profit motive in business--to the many persons who must concur in the decision to impliment a government program. This surely has been the most vexing aspect of trying to introduce a new system of budgeting at a time of substantial fiscal restraint. Schultze points out that highly centralized and authoritarian control--the alternative to an incentive system that works-- is not effective in many program areas. The relative importance of various sorts of programs and projects can only be judged in the context of the local conditions under which they are undertaken, not in national summaries. The important incentive to exploit here is recognition of differing local needs and goals in contructing program proposals.

With regard to restrictions, Weidenbaum and Achenstein make some relevant comments. Weidenbaum points out that a large portion of the federal budget is uncontrollable in the short-run. Trust funds, permanent and indefinite appropriations, fixed-charge programs with spending levels determined by statute, and funds for partially completed projects all are relatively uncontrollable. He estimates that less than forty percent of the annual budget is "relatively controllable" either in Agriculture or Interior.

Asher Achinstein undertook a questionnaire study of Federal agencies to determine what they felt were the major obstacles in policy formation. Agencies mentioned many constraints, most important among which for our purposes were these. Departments clearly view their role as a limited one in formulating basic government policy. They do not feel free to examine policy alternatives that involve other units of Federal or state governments, or that go counter to long-term arrangements with clientele. They also mentioned fixed funding as a problem, particularly with regard to ear-marked funds. And the third relevant constraint mentioned was statutory limitations on activities. Many public land programs are administered under statutes which substantially limit the degree to which the executive branch can modify them.

Opinions of Decision-makers and Analysts

A series if interviews, with persons connected with PPBS and budgeting, has indicated some rather interesting departures from theory in the actual practice of this new budgeting system. The persons interviewed held positions in land management bureaus, on department PPBS and budgeting staffs, were Bureau of the Budget examiners or consultants, and congressional committee staff members. Here are some of the general points they made about PPBS and systematic analysis.

The system is too comprehensive.--Almost everyone interviewed made comments along these lines. Obviously, the decision to require PPBS for all program areas in nearly all agencies caused a traumatic dislocation of budgeting activities. Agencies were required to plan and budget within a new and unfamiliar program structure, to supply cost and output data they did not possess, and to carry out evaluations without knowing how. Then too, the new budget documents were so voluminous that one Budget Bureau consultant described the attempt to use them as "trying to drink from a fire hose". The new system has generated a good deal more information about government programs than was available before. But the problem of digesting and summarizing this material is only now being solved. It may come to pass that the formal documents produced by PPBS are not as important as the group of informed analysts gradually being developed in each department. Decision-makers tend to ask analysts for verbal summaries of their program findings, rather than reviewing the program memoranda. What analysts say may be more important than what they write.

Decision-makers do not use the system.--It is apparent that most decisions about program funding still are being made outside the PPB system. There are many reasons. First, the fiscal climate has been such that program increases could not be granted in most program areas even when they were shown to be particularly effective and efficient. In many cases Bureau of the Budget reviews of public land programs still followed the congressional appropriation budget rather than the PPBS program structure. Departmental reviews within Interior followed the congressional budget as well. This may have been due to a lack of familarity with the new program structure in part. However, it primarily is a response to the fact that the PPBS budget structure is not used by Congress. Since the congressional committees continued to make program decisions in the old format, executive branch bureau and department heads,perforce, had to plan in these terms. Obviously, a budgeting system without a client is in trouble.

Program evaluation.--The analytical work embodied in the program memoranda and special analytical studies is frequently viewed as having some value. It is true that much of the early evaluation work was carried out on a limited information base, and so had limited credibility. But this analysis has led to changes in the way programs are viewed in some instances, which has resulted in a shift in program emphasis. In some cases program evaluation has allowed a small bureau to compete more effectively for funding. Its program opportunities have become better known to department decision-makers because they were explicitly treated, along with those of other bureaus, in evaluation. Again and again one encounters the interesting effect that PPBS has had on program administration within the bureaus.

Bureau chiefs and program directors often have been encouraged to develop planning procedures better adapted to their own level of activity and decision-making responsibility.

System coordination.--Many expressed the view that while individual evaluations might be helpful, little could be expected in most program areas until standard methods of evaluation were adopted. No standard guide yet has been developed and adopted within the PPB system. So each analyst uses methods and assumptions which seem most appropriate to him. Thus, analyses are difficult to compare, even when they involve similar programs. Then too, no attempt yet has been made to integrate evaluation and planning between departments. This is particularly critical in public land programs where significant activities in most program areas proceed in both the Department of Agriculture and the Department of the Interior.

VI - SOME THOUGHTS FOR THE FUTURE

Public land management agencies have made progress in establishing budgeting procedures, under PPBS, which are compatible with continuing evaluation of thier programs. Accomplishments during the first two years, with regard to program evaluation, were modest yet praiseworthy considering the circumstances. More recently, analytical efforts have been augmented substantially. Yet the system is not all it should be and can be.

Independent policy analysis.--Many persons have remarked on the tendency of program evaluation under PPBS to stress detailed cost-effectiveness studies of various ways of carrying out existing public programs, while slighting the more comprehensive studies of national need and public purpose that so many hoped would be forthcomming from the system. I do not find this surprising. Asking, say, the Department of the Interior to evaluate the need for public land programs, is like asking a major automobile manufacturer to evaluate the need for automobiles. Analysis of national needs and goals, and for the broad policy alternatives for achieving these public purposes, can only be made by analysts standing outside the bureaucracy. The departments and bureaus can determine the opportunities they have to meet identified national needs. They should not be expected to go beyond this.

Analysis of broad policy alternatives is needed in the natural resources field. Indeed, policy choices in this area may be crucial to national health and welfare, so the best and broadest possible studies should be undertaken. Three conditions are required to encourage policy analysis of this sort: analytical groups embodying both technical analytical skill and expertise and experience in natural resource science and administration; a work environment, such as a university, foundation or quasi-public corporation, outside of government to foster a broad and objective point of view; and lastly enough time to become both fully competent and deeply relevant in the work. Why not create a publicly funded Institute for Natural Resource Policy Analysis, reporting the substance of its findings periodically to Congress and the Nation.

Verification of output.--The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 established the necessity for verification of public expenditures. Needed also is a parallel requirement for the verification of work accomplished and output provided. The establishment of a substantiated record of public program cost, coupled with the activities completed and the goods and services produced, is a sure way to foster greater concern for more effective management of public programs.

This is the key contribution that PPBS, as presently constituted, can make to public decision-making. But adequate information gathering systems are only slowly comming into being, especially in the area of output measurement and reporting. Output reporting, as a congressional requirement, would encourage greater progress in this important area, and would make this information available to Congress.

Regional budget summaries.--It is important to have some budget data by area or region. Regional budget summaries for all public lands, particularly for the various geographic areas of the West, can help in three ways. First, they would foster a better representation of the public land use trade-offs that exist in each region. Secondly, they would provide a vehicle for coordination of land programs among the land management bureaus and departments. And third, they could serve as the basis for guiding public land management activity toward a fuller contribution to the development of local communities. Congress should require consolidated regional summaries of all budget requests involving public lands. And to insure local participation in planning, these summaries should be accompanied by the comments of the responsible officials for each state involved.

Green or blue paper

APPENDIX

E

AN OVERVIEW OF PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND PATTERN AND THE FEDERAL LAND MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

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AN OVERVIEW OF PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND PATTERN AND THE FEDERAL LAND MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Introduction

This report treats two general classes of Public Land management as seen from the local, field point of view--the forest ranger station, the state BLM office, the grazing district office, the headquarters of a national park. The two sets of problems are those associated with a highly complex pattern of juxtaposed and intermixed land parcels under different ownerships (state, private, and Federal), and problems pertaining to lands wholly under Federal ownership but managed by different agencies of the Federal Government. They have commonly been designated as problems relating to "intermingled lands" and to "divided responsibilities".

The cadastral and jurisdictional land patterns associated with the Public Lands, and the structure of Federal land managment and resource management agencies, their responsibilities, and their jurisdictions are too well known to require more than the most summary statement here.

After their incorporation into the territory of the United States, all the lands within national boundaries became, with minor exceptions, the property of the Federal Government, part of the Public Domain. However, almost continuously since the founding of the Republic, lands have been removed from the Public Domain. Hundreds of millions of acres moved into private ownership under the provisions of numerous laws, enacted over a period of nearly two centuries. Additional millions of acres were transferred to the states. And finally, tens of millions of acres of Public Domain lands were set aside, reserved, for some special purpose or function of the Federal Government and placed under the administration, jurisdiction and management of special Federal bureaus charged with cultivating those purposes. These lands were reserved by authority of numerous Federal statutes that were enacted to achieve a wide variety of objectives, and the lands are managed in accordance with legislative stipulations, restrictions, and directives commonly applying solely to lands withdrawn for a single purpose.

The cumulative result of the processes just described is the current geographical and jurisdictional pattern of Public Land in the United States and the present organizational structure of the Federal land management agencies.

In some places the Public Land disposal and reservation process has produced large blocs of land under a single type of ownership. In other places, however, private lands, state lands, and Federal land under the management of two, three or four Federal agencies are complexly intermingled.

Just on the basis of common experience we could forecast that the administration and management of lands located within an intricately complex spatial pattern would be fraught with problems and difficulties. Such is the case. And an elaborate and largely uncoordinated organizational structure invariably implies managerial strains and difficulties.

To the local land user (the logger, the camper, the cattle rancher, the prospector) and to the local Public Land manager (the grazing district manager, the forest ranger, the U.S. Geological Survey geologist, the national park superintendent) no problem associated with intermingled lands or divided responsibilities seems particularly serious or momentous. Rather, local land users and land managers view the problems generated by "intermingled lands" and "divided responsibilities" as a number of minor annoyances, as repetitive minor complications of the day's work or as time-consuming, unproductive demands on their time. They constitute a number of minor problems of varying degrees of recalcitrance and exasperation, to which the land resource managers have developed more or less satisfactory, simple, and effective solutions. No one problem is of much importance. Moreover, nearly all employees of Federal land management or land servicing agencies at the local or district level, and most of those at the state or regional level, accept (as realistically they should) the pattern of land jurisdiction (whether simple or complex), the organizational structure of the Federal land management agencies, and the legislative assignments of land management responsibilities and powers among the Federal agencies as given, immutable facts of their day-to-day job. They are simply the circumstances under which they do their work--like the heat in Arizona in summer, or the rarified air of high mountain areas.

Again, at the local or district level, the questions of efficiency of management operations, of manpower productivity, of cost effectiveness, of manpower and equipment are not regarded as either crucial or especially significant aspects of the problems associated with an "intermingled land pattern" or with the jurisdictional and operational structure of Federal land management agencies. The supply of funds, manpower, and equipment that is available to a local or district office of a Federal land management agency is determined by political forces beyond the local agency's influence. The agency manages the land under its jurisdiction as intensively as it can with the manpower and equipment available to it. With

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increased funds available to it, an agency will manage more intensively the lands for which it is responsible; with fewer financial resources available, its management will be cursory. The degree of intensity and thoroughness of management is something extremely difficult to measure--almost impossible; quite impossible without adequate, competent, independent inspection; something the Federal Government has never had for any of its land management agencies. Thus, a twenty per cent increase in the overall management efficiency of a local Federal land management agency would produce a twenty per cent increase in the intensity, efficiency, and thoroughness with which the agency manages its land; an increase, as we have said, that would be difficult to measure or display and quite impossible to prove conclusively. Small wonder then that the increased costs and inefficient management occasioned by the Federal land management agency structure and the fragmented Public Land pattern is viewed by local Federal land management personnel as merely a mild personal vocational frustration, not as a serious agency or Federal problem.

To the Federal land management agency, or to the Federal Government itself, the added costs and inefficiencies induced by an unnecessarily complex pattern of "intermingled lands" or by an unwieldy or awkward managerial agency structure are of major importance. The total of such induced inefficiencies increases the cost of managing the Public Lands, decreases the government's return therefrom, and may well cause total or partial failure to achieve non-fiscal managerial objectives. To minimize the problems induced by "intermingled lands" or "divided responsibilites" is strongly in the national interest. To understand the problems, however, clearly requires an accurate and realistic view of the role and function of the Federal Government and its land managing agencies with respect to the Public Lands.

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND THE PUBLIC LAND MANAGING AGENCIES

Any attempt to understand and evaluate the laws pertaining to the administration and management of the Public Lands and to the institutional arrangements and organizational structure of the Federal agencies managing the Public Lands and administering the Public Land laws demands a clear understanding of the peculiar dual role that all Federal land management agencies must assume. The dual responsibilities and objectives of the Federal Government and its Public Land managing and administering agencies can perhaps best be made most clear by an analogy with a private real estate managing agency.

It is commonly written that the Public Lands are "owned by", "the property of", "belong to" the Federal Government.

The Federal Government as the "owner" of land must needs perform two functions--a proprietary function and a management function. To some extent, of course, the proprietary function inevitably involves management; in the sense that property owners must decide what they shall do with their land, how the land shall be utilized. But once this basic decision is made, innumerable structures, arrangements, and forms of managerial and proprietary functions are possible. A single analogous example will suffice.

The individual owner of an acreage of rural land must make some initial decision as to the most fruitful use of the land. Should he conclude that farming is the most productive use of the land, a wide range of managerial options is open to him. He may decide to manage and operate the farm himself. He may individually decide what combination of crops and livestock will be produced, or he may personally consult with private or government sources of scientific and agricultural information before personally deciding on his plan of operations; or he may simply hire a farm management agency to develop a farm plan that he will execute. He may also, however, lease the land to a renter, who will operate the farm as the owner directs; or the owner may allow the renter to decide on his own farm plan; or the renter may develop his own farm plan in conjunction with the proprietor, or may develop it in line with a few general instructions from the owner; or the owner may hire a farm management agency to develop a farm plan that the operator will implement; or the owner may simply hire a farm management agency to manage the farm including hiring and supervising an operator.

At one extreme, the proprietor, having made an initial decision to farm his property and hired a farm management agency to manage the land for him, can limit his management function thereafter to an annual renewal of his contract with the farm management agency and endorsement of the check he receives from the farm management agency as his return on his investment. At the opposite extreme he may personally plan and execute all the farm activities himself. Or, as we have said, he can adopt a wide variety of intermediate arrangements.

Analogously, the Federal Government has both a proprietary and managerial function with respect to the Public Lands. It may simply lease the land, permitting the lessee to use the land in any way he sees fit, or it may license or lease some specific use of the land and its resources. Far more commonly--in fact, almost universally--the Federal Government has undertaken more active management of its land, by setting up Federal land management agencies to manage selected portions of the Federal acreage to a greater or lesser extent.

We may, thus, think of the Federal Government as a giant corporation, having 200,000,000 shareholders, the citizens of the United States, and holding title to more than 700,000,000 acres that it must utilize for the stockholders' benefit. This corporation has retained a number of real estate management firms, which are the various Federal land management agencies, such as the Bureau of Land Management and the United States Forest Service, to manage its real estate holdings for it. This corporation, the Federal Government, has given its real estate management agencies sets of policy and procedural directives, the Public Land law, as a guide to the management of the real estate under each agency's jurisdiction.

The objective and responsibilities of each Federal land management agency, thus, seem clear: the agency is to manage the land in the optimum long-range interest of the 200,000,000 stockholders in accordance with the policy directives--the Public Land law--it has received from the Congress; precisely as a private real estate management firm handles land placed under its management by a private landowning corporation.

The situations of a private real estate management firm and a Public Land management agency are not, however, identical. To effectively manage the land under its jurisdiction in the maximum interest of the 200,000,000 U.S. citizens, a Federal land management agency must use the land or make some arrangements for someone to use it. These land users may be renters, lessees, fee users, free users, or purchasers. Since these users are invariably citizens of the United States, and as such are among the "owners" of the property they are using, they feel they should be given every opportunity to use the land advantageously and profitably in any way they wish or can. This viewpoint, historically and currently, has been shared by both the Executive and Legislative branches of the

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Federal Government and by the majority of popular opininion. One major factor in the rationale of this viewpoint has been the conviction that anything done to aid, abet, or assist the actual user of the land's resources will eventually redound to the advantage of all the 200,000,000 stockholder "owners".

From the foregoing analysis it should now be clear that the Congress, through its responsibility for Public Land law, and the Executive branch, through the day-to-day administrative and managerial activities of the Federal Public Land management agencies, are constantly in the position of mediating between the joint, common interests of the 200,000,000 "owners" of the Federal land and the special, individual, and immediate interests of a few of the "owners"--those relatively few persons and groups who are actual users of the land. Thus, the central problem relating to the organizational structure of the Public Land management agencies and the Federal laws pertaining to the Public Lands is how to construct policies, procedures, and an organizational structure that will maximize total benefits to the 200,000,000 joint "owners" of the property and protect the "owners" interests against the special interests of the land users and developers, while simultaneously fostering, supporting and simplifying the efforts of the land users to develop, exploit, and utilize the land resources.

Viewing the Federal Government's land holding and land management functions in this way--as a real estate management firm that must mediate between the "owners" and the users, even though all the users are also "owners"--is a great aid to logic and rational analysis in thinking about the problems of Public Land management. Nevertheless, the formulation of Public Land policy, managerial procedure, administrative structure, and day-to-day managerial decisions and actions are, under the view taken here, not simple, clear, and straightforward, but instead are difficult, uncertain, and subject to continuous reassessment in the light of changing circumstances or newly defined goals. Questions must be put and answered, such as: Is the contemplated land use or managerial action in the long-range public interest? Can it realistically be contemplated as the use or action most likely to produce the highest general return? To what extent is the user's short term interest congruent with the general welfare? In cases where the user's short term interest and the long-term general interest do not coincide, what criteria do the management agency or the Congress use in apportioning benefits and costs? The list of such questions could be extended for pages.

Nevertheless, this perspective on the Federal Government's ownership and management of the Public Land does help to clarify the solutions to numerous fundamental and basic policy questions. It becomes clear that the Federal Government's ownership of and managerial functions on the Public Lands are not primarily custodial. The Federal Government retains ownership and management of each separate parcel of the Public Land because its ownership and management are in the maximum general interest. If sale, trade, or grant of any parcel of Public Land would produce an increase in the total collective and private long-term benefits, the sale, trade, or grant should be made. Similarly, parcels of private land would be acquired if acquisition would result in an increased general benefit. In both cases the transaction is exactly analogous to similar actions by a private real estate management firm that buys and sells land on the basis of the anticipated net return to the property owner from the various relevant parcels.

Intermingled Lands and Federal Land Management Agency Structure

The problems associated with intermingled lands and divided responsibilities among Federal land management agencies are partly interrelated problems and partly separate problems.

To a considerable extent a complex pattern of land tenure inevitably leads to numerous management problems; but obviously the problems are compounded if one of the intermingled ownerships is represented by two or three or more administrative agencies each having somewhat different directives, responsibilities, and procedures. On the other hand, the divergent aims, responsibilities, and procedures of two Federal land management agencies may lead to almost no problems at all if the lands for which they are responsible are discrete, in relatively compact blocs, and sufficiently separated so that there is no joint use of lands under both jurisdictions. In short, the problems arising from intermingled lands are exacerbated if intra-Federal or inter-governmental responsiblities are divided. And in like manner, difficulties and inefficiencies arising from division of responsibility among governmental agencies become increasingly acute as fragmentation of the land ownership and jurisdictional pattern increases.

The problems of intermingled lands and divided responsibilities may be thought of as related partly to the degree of intermingling. Viewed on a continental scale all lands are intermingled. At one extreme we have broad areas composed entirely of private lands with only miniscule pieces of state or Federal lands intermixed. In other areas, large National Forests or National Parks comprise hundreds of square miles with almost no intermingled Federal lands under a different jurisdiction and with little or no state or private land. At the opposite extreme we have perhaps the ultimate in land intermingling--the so-called "checkerboard lands" that exhibit a maximum intermingling of private lands, Public Domain lands, state lands, and possibly withdrawn reclamation lands or power sites.

A single 80-acre plot of Public Domain surrounded by private land may well prove a completely intractable management problem for the Bureau of Land Management, if management is conceived as active control and productive use of the land. Similarly an isolated 40-acre tract of private land in a National Forest may foster a bundle of management problems on the adjacent Federal lands. Conversely, an area with alternate sections of Public Domain and private land with some intermingling of state land may prove easy to manage conservatively and productively if all the land is used only for livestock grazing by a single ranch. In short, the severity of land management problems is related to the complexity of the land pattern, the types of land uses, the number and relationships of the users. The significant point, however, is that problems relating to intermingled lands almost invariably involve matters related to the Federal land management organizational structure, and vice versa. In the following sections we have chosen to consider these two groups of problems separately, but it will be seen repeatedly that the problems and the alternative solutions to them will commonly involve changes in both the Federal land management organizational structure and the areal pattern of Federal land.

Intermingled Lands

An intricate, fragmented land pattern generates such a multiplicity of managerial complexities that it is difficult to know how best to enumerate and analyze them economically. Moreover, the juxtaposition of lands under different ownership or jurisdiction has both positive and negative aspects, and these benefits and drawbacks must be weighed against each other. The situation can be illustrated by a simple example--the problem of establishing, marking, and maintaining property boundaries and corners.

Survey Costs

Suppose we have two areas each composed of thirty-six square miles. In one area the land is divided into just two ownerships, thusly.

Fig. 1



In this case, to have an absolutely clear demarcation of

In the second case, the proportions of each type of land owner-the property boundaries requires that only six corners be established and maintained and only thirty miles of boundary lines be surveyed and marked.

are identical to those in the first case; but the amount of cadastral surveying, marking, and maintaining is strikingly larger. The pattern indicated may require locating, marking, and maintaining of more than 90 corners. And the total length of property boundaries to be surveyed and marked might exceed 100 miles.

Cadastral surveying and marking is not cheap, and the figures just cited make apparent a notable cost differential between a simple and a highly complex land ownership pattern. In many locales, moreover, a survey corner, a survey line, or a property boundary will be obliterated in time unless it is maintained, at additional expense. Location, marking, and maintaining survey lines and corners are, thus, a continual expense, an expense not to be needlessly incurred. In case no. 1 above, if the land were used only for range grazing the six corners and thirty miles of boundary line might be all that were required for efficient management of the entire area.

Location and marking of section corners and linesdoes, however, have utility in any circumstance where specific location or delimiting of land is required. If either of the two owners of the properties outlined in case 1 above wished to specify the location of any part of his property, additional surveying would be required--surveying which might well have been wholly or completely done for many areas depicted in case 2.

The conclusions are clear, simple, and not surprising: fairly complete rectangular land surveying is desirable but not inexpensive; currently, surveying appropriations are inadequate to maintain clear marking of previously surveyed areas; the more complex the land ownership pattern, the greater the requisite survey requirements. Hence, a highly complex pattern of intermingled lands may impose unnecessarily high current survey costs and/or create added managerial difficulties arising from uncertain knowledge concerning property boundary locations.

Two means of resolving this problem immediately suggest themselves, but neither is an entirely economical and satisfactory solution. One solution would be to increase notably the level of appropriations and activity for extension and renovation of the rectangular land survey system in the intermountain western states.

But in many places the surveying and marking of lines and corners might serve almost no useful purpose perhaps for decades. The present practice of giving survey priority to those areas in which the need seems most urgent could be continued; but it should be clearly and explicitly realized that the surveying costs represent real, additional costs occasioned by the complex pattern of intermingled lands.

A second solution to the problem is for the Federal Government to simplify its land holding pattern in many areas by consolidating itsholdings and by eliminating small isolated parcels. Such simplification and consolidation can be achieved by purchase, sale, exchange, grants, or by combinations of the four processes. Other things being equal, the greater the degree of simplification and consolidation of Federal land holdings, the greater the savings in surveying costs. The problems involved in the consolidation of Federal land holdings are so numerous and complex that discussion of this solution is deferred for more extended treatment later.

Trespass Problems

Ordinarily trespass is thought of in terms of simply entering a piece of land to which the owner has forbidden access. But degrees of trespass are recognized in a common sense way. An owner having erected "no trespassing" signs on his property might regard indulgently a single foot crossing of the property; he would take a less favorable view of repeated pedestrian crossings; and would take punitive action against picnicking, camping, or hunting. In western Federal land management practice trespass means a forbidden form of use of any land resource. Thus "timber trespass" means cutting timber without a permit on a Federal property where a permit is required; "grazing trespass" has a similar connotation for livestock grazing.

In theory the Public Lands have always been a national "commons", available for any sort of use by any citizen; except where lands have been withdrawn for some specific purpose or where the National Government has specifically forbidden a particular use. That being the case, a citizen is presumed to be free to hike, camp, hunt (within the rules established by the state game regulatory code), prospect for minerals, and engage in many other activities without hindrance on the Public Lands. Livestock grazing is permitted on the Public Domain, on the National Forests, and (if permitted at all) on the National Parks only for a specified number of stock, owned by specified ranchers, in a specified area, during a specified period of time, and upon payment of a grazing fee. Any other livestock use is trespass. To be assured that grazing trespass is not occuring on its lands, a Federal land management agency must have some feasible practical method of ascertaining that only the permitted numbers of livestock are using the area at only the specified times. Grazing use if monitored in numerous ways, some simple and cheap, others time consuming and expensive. If access to an area is possible at only one or two points, grazing use surveillance may be easy and inexpensive. If only cattle are permitted in an area, any sheep sighted are instantly known to be in trespass. If several ranchers are permitted to graze stock in the same area and if an excess of stock is counted in the area, it will be expensive, difficult, or indeed sometimes impossible to establish how many of whose stock were in trespass for how long. Nevertheless, to prevent overgrazing with subsequent deterioration of the vegetation and accelerated erosion, and to obtain the grazing fee for all grazing use, it is important for each Federal land management agency to prevent grazing trespass on the lands under its jurisdiction.

Grazing trespass is of two kinds, intentional and inadvertent. Without going into the numerous complexities of the matter, it will be immediately understandable that the problems of preventing grazing trespass and of detecting it when it occurs will be more severe in an area with a complexly intermingled land pattern than in one with a simple pattern.

Consider the situation with respect to inadvertent or accidental trespass. In western areas where Public Lands are widespread, sheep are almost invariably herded.

In an area where private lands, state lands, and Federal lands are complexly intermingled in small plots, the sheep herder must have accurate knowledge of the location of property boundaries or corners if he is to keep his band of sheep from trespassing on lands where they are not entitled to be. For a herder familiar with an area this will be simple and easy, but for a new herder, unfamiliar with an area, or ignorant of its property lines and corners, unwitting trespass is likely. Cattle are infrequently herded, and consequently will graze any areas within walking distance of water unless they are prevented by topographic barriers or by fences. Obviously in an area of complexly intermingled properties many more miles of fence will be required to prevent cattle trespass than would be the case with few and simple property boundaries. Fencing is expensive. Moreover, every property within which cattle are to be fenced must contain a water source. To create a water source may be prohibitively expensive, or the water source may be so located within the property that the stock make very uneven use of the available forage. Inadvertent sheep trespass can be prevented by clear marking of property boundaries, cattle trespass by fencing. Both are costly. Both sheep and cattle accidental trespass may also be markedly reduced, in many instances, by various sorts of rental and use-exchange arrangements; in effect, simplifying the land use pattern without changing the ownership status. And lastly, of course, the problem can be greatly reduced, if not eliminated, by blocking out properties and simplifying the land ownership pattern.

Deliberate trespass is best prevented by making it unprofitable or costly. To do so, however, it is essential that the property owner be able to detect trespass immediately and invariably, be able to prove it, and to recover legally his damages and costs. The problems of detecting, proving, and recovering losses from either deliberate or inadvertent trespass vary with the local conditions and are too numerous and complex to permit detailed discussion here. Nevertheless, it is possible to generalize about the factors involved.

Significant grazing trespass is not difficult to detect even after the trespassing stock have left. The condition of the vegetation and the ground will clearly reveal previous grazing use to an experienced stockman or range manager. Legal proof of trespass based on this evidence is extremely difficult, and for practical purposes almost hopeless, because manifestly to ascertain how many stock were in trespass and for how long a period is almost impossible. Consequently, to prevent deliberate trespass the land owner or manager must be able to see, count, and identify trespassing stock almost as soon as they enter his land and he should be able to recover full damages and perhaps even punitive damages to discourage any further trespass on his property. That is a situation that has not prevailed over vast areas of the Public Domain. Deliberate trespass is not of major importance for a number of reasons: (1) a trespasser even when trespassing on Public Domain land will be trespassing on other ranchers' grazing allotments, and they will bring informal pressure on him not to repeat the offense; (2) the most prevalent form of trespass is a rancher grazing an excessive number of stock on his own allotment, at the wrong season, or for too long a period; but insofar as it represents truly significant overuse it is antithetical to the rancher's self interest, and he is (if he knows better) not apt to trespass in this way unless he feels some economic pressure to do so. Nevertheless, the total of such trespasses over the entire West is considerable. To stop it, however, will be difficult and expensive under present circumstances. Bureau of Land Management personnel are very thinly scattered over huge, widely distributed acreages. For them to discover most grazing trespass promptly is difficult with the scattered and intermingled land pattern of the Public Domain.

Secondly, trespass that is discovered, proved, and, so to speak, confirmed by the trespasser results only in his payment of the usual fee rates for his trespass grazing use. In short, he cannot possibly lose. At worst he obtains some extra forage at the usual fee rates; it he is lucky he gets it free.

The Bureau of Land Management has an ample hearing and appeals process on all grazing trespass actions. The likelihood of a rancher being unfairly found in trespass seems exceedingly slight. That being true, the case for punitive or maximum fees for trespass use appears very strong, in order to give all grazers a strong incentive to keep their grazing trespass, whether deliberate or inadvertent, at an absolute minimum.

The foregoing analysis carries two clear implications with respect to prevention of grazing trespass. Obviously, the closer Federal land management personnel are to the grazing land under their jurisdiction, the greater the probability they will promptly discover livestock trespass and accurately ascertain its extent both in animal numbers and in time. Secondly, anything that can be done to simplify the grazing use pattern will make trespass easier to prevent and detect; and one direct way of accomplishing such use simplification is to simplify the land ownership pattern, particularly the pattern of Federal property.

Timber trespass--that is, cutting trees on Federal land where a permit is required--is generally of minor importance, mostly because it is so much more difficult to execute quickly and stealthily. Men and equipment must be moved in, the logs must be transported out, and in most cases they must be marketed. Most of the merchantable western Federal timber is in the National Forests. The Forest Service keeps illegal cutting on the Forests to a minimum because of its policy of keeping Forest Service personnel close to the areas under their jurisdiction and hence able to detect timber trespass promptly, and by its use of severe financial sanctions against all unpermitted cutting. Only a tiny fraction of Public Domain lands supports timber of merchantable size. Timber trespass on them is confined to a relatively few locations, commonly to lonely, isolated plots, where agency supervision is at an absolute minimum. Many of the more valuable and productive Public Domain timber lands are located immediately adjacent or close to National Forest. For efficiency of management in all phases, consolidation of these timbered holdings under a single management agency--presumably the Forest Service--would be desirable.

Private Trespass Rules As a Means of Land Use Control

A private landowner, of course, may post his land against any and all trespass. In the West, under some circumstances, private landowners may use this right to obtain effective control over some kinds of land use on Public Lands. Two examples will suffice for illustrative purposes. In one area of "checkerboard lands" in the West, the local ranchers have established effective control over hunting on the Public Domain lands. In the property checkerboard the ownerships are arranged as illustrated in Fig. 2. Since the square mile of either public or private land terminates at a point in each corner, it is practically impossible to go from one private section to another without trespassing on a public section, or to move from one public section to another without trespassing on the adjacent private sections. Since the Public Domain is, as we have previously noted, a commons, it is possible for the private land owners to reach all parts of the area by crossing their own land or the Public Domain. By forbidding trespass on their land, however, the private landowners can prevent others from crossing the area because of the virtual impossibility of doing so without trespassing on the private land. Exploiting this circumstance, a rancher group has stopped public hunting on the adjacent Federal lands, except by persons buying a hunting permit for the ranchers' private land holdings.

Similarly, a rancher can keep exclusive cattle grazing use of an area of Public Domain if he owns land completely surrounding the only feasible water source. Private control of the only feasible crossing of a canyon or river may give a private landowner the legal possibility of preventing grazing use of an adjacent sector of Public Land.

In all the cases just described, the private landowner's power derices from his legal power to forbid trespass on his land. Unhappily for the general good, the Federal land manager does not have countervailing power to forbid trespass on the lands under his jurisdiction. Could he do so, he would in many cases be in a position to prevent such unreasonable exercises of private legal ownership power over Public Land use, by the threat of forbidding trespass on the lands under his jurisdiction. Serious consideration should be given to the possibility of granting to the Federal land management agencies the power to forbid all types of trespass on those public lands where the general welfare seems to require it.

Problems of Access

To establish a new public right of way through a densely populated urban area is an intensely difficult and involved undertaking


Land Tenure Status in a Township in South Central Wyoming
0
3
miles
Public Domain
Private Property

Figure 2

because of the multiplicity of individual ownerships involved and the number of interests that may impinge on each separate piece of property. Under most circumstances, for precisely opposite reasons, simplification of the cadastral pattern tends to simplify access problems. We may, thus, anticipate that one of the principal alternative modes of simplifying problems of access to and through Federal lands will be simplification of the pattern of Federal land holdings.

As we saw in the previous section, problems of trespass and of access are closely interrelated. In general, however, the Federal Government has two sets of access problems: access to its lands, and rights-of-way across its land.

Intermingling of lands is not of great importance so far as rights-of-way across Federal lands are concerned, except in the single case of projected rights-of-way. For the Federal Government to dispose of lands across which it has plans to construct a highway would be ill advised, since sale of the land will inevitably be followed by reacquisition of the land or purchase of easements for highway construction. Obviously, prior to any sale of Federal land, checks should be made to determine whether any federally involved rights-of-way are contemplated crossing that property. If firm plans exist to acquire a right-of-way across the relevant property within a reasonable period of time, that would appear to be sufficient reason for the Federal Government to retain title to the property.

Problems associated with rights-of-way across Federal land are also complicated by mining claims and private subsurface interests. At this juncture it will suffice to say simply that both mining claims and private mineral rights on Federal lands are simply an added complexity in establishing rights-of-way across Federal lands. As in previous cases, simplification and orderliness of the property pattern simplifies the problem.

Simplifying the Land Ownership Pattern: Factors and Problems

Since it is a truism that problems associated with complexly intermingled lands can be ameliorated or solved by simplifying the ownership pattern, a recommendation for a program to bloc out and consolidate the Federal land holdings seems clearly indicated. But two factors in the general problem of intermingled lands have not been considered: (1) the advantages obtained from intermingling of lands, and (2) the nature of problems associated with a program of consolidating Federal land ownerships.

In the section on trespass and access we pointed out the "commons" function of the Public Lands. Since the Public Lands are open to the public, a widely scattered and intermingled pattern of Public Land is statistically more likely to supply land for public use in a greater number of environments, for a wider variety of functions, and of quicker accessibility to a greater number of people. Public objections to the disposal of pieces of Public Land commonly arise from that circumstance. The sale of an isolated 80 acre Federal tract was opposed by the residents of a small nearby town because it was the only local public property where boats could be launched on a river. A few scattered square miles of Public Land may supply the only local public territory for hunting, or riding, or fishing. Or 80 acres of Public Domain, for example, may furnish the only easy access route to larger acreages of attractive lands under another Federal jurisdiction.

In all the illustrations just cited the intermingled land had utility for a single function or a very few functions, commonly for local residents of the adjacent territory. The point to be stressed is the functional utility of the land. If the land should be retained it should be retained because it performs a specific useful public function. Or stated negatively, land should not be retained in Federal ownership simply because it has not previously been alienated. What seems clearly indicated is that for each piece of Public Land an explicit conscious determination should be made of the land's current and potential functional utility. The determination should be made by answering a series of analytical questions:

(1) What local, regional, or national function can the land serve?

(2) Is performance of such a function or furnishing of such service recognized as a legitimate Federal activity? Can it be done most effectively by the Federal Government, or by some other level of government, or by private management?

If the answers to this question indicate that the functions are not the responsibility of the Federal Government or can be carried out more effectively by another government level or private organization, the lands should be transferred to the other agency or sold. If the land is determined to be serving a legitimate Federal function, further questions should be posed and answered:

(3) How much land, and where, is needed for this function? Can the available Federal land serve this function adequately and efficiently? As economically as could other land in the area?

What is being described or proscribed in the previous paragraphs is Public Land management planning by the Federal land management agencies. Public Law 88-607 88th Congress directed that land classification be carried on for all Public Domain lands "pending implementation of recommendations to be made by the Public Land Law Review Commission." Essentially, rational management demands an extension and continuation of that land classification; but it should be done comprehensively and in detail, and it should be made in full coordination with all Federal programs and of all regional, state, and local plans and programs.

Many--perhaps most--Public Lands will certainly prove to be optimally suited and located for any recognized Federal function. Disposal of some Federal lands and acquisition of others will be necessary for any rationalization and/or simplification of the areal pattern of real estate holdings. A program, however, to revise and rationalize the pattern of Public Land holdings will encounter an array of obstacles and problems.

Cost is the most obvious possible obstacle to a program to overhaul the Public Land holdings; but a useful and enlightening analysis demands a clear distinction between types of cost to be incurred in such a program. One cost involves changes in the value of the land holdings themselves. The other is the cost of effecting the real estate transaction. It is obvious that changes in the value of the Federal real estate in an area do not represent a cost unless there is a persistent practice by the Federal land management agencies of selling Federal land for less than its value and buying private land for more than its true worth. In the long run even small real estate "losses" of this kind might be entirely logical and reasonable if they were necessary to facilitate a revision of Federal land holdings that would notably decrease administrative and management costs and increase efficiency of operation. But changes in the value of Federal land holdings should not be considered either a profit or cost of the program. If the Federal Government sold all its land in an area and acquired none, it would show a monetary profit on the program; moreover, it would reduce its land management expenses in that area to zero. To achieve that state, however, the Government would have to lose all the lands' values and forego any valuable functions that the land performed. If far more land were purchased by the Federal Government than sold, the program would show a monetary loss, but clearly the values imbedded in the lands and their functional utilities would have been acquired. But perhaps we have labored the essential point--that the clerical and magagerial costs of buying, selling, and exchanging properties are the only true and relevant costs. Nevertheless, such costs are real and may be of crucial importance.

Suppose, by way of illustration, that we have a township composed of thirty six square miles of checkerboard land; seventeen sections are Public Domain, seventeen sections are private land, and two sections are state properties. The total acreage in the township is 23,040, and we will posit an average value of $20 per acre, making the total value of the land $460,800. Let us assume further that the program of exchange, buying, and selling of lands eventually produces a completely blocked up township of half Public Domain and half private lands each in 18 sq. mile rectangular blocs. It seems reasonable to assume that the values of the lands will not have changed substantially. Now, what of the program costs?

Possible variances in the cost of such a program are almost limitless. Under the most favorable circumstances a Bureau of Land Management official and a single owner of all the alternate sections of private land might informally and quickly agree that the lands were all of equal value and a simple exchange was equitable. The Bureau of Land Management, however, would have to retain appraisers to appraise all lands involved in the exchange. If by some extraordinary turn of events the lands were appraised as equal in value, the local BLM official would draw up a proposed exchange plan to be submitted to the higher echelons of the Bureau for approval. After review, almost certainly involving exchange of correspondence between the various levels and units of the Bureau, the plan would be approved. Perhaps a certain amount of land survey and marking would be required. Thereafter, lawyers and clerks would draw up the necessary documents and legal instruments and the exchange would be completed.

To estimate how much the transaction might cost is impossible. Some costs would be direct costs that would be incurred only to execute this transaction; others--and almost certainly a much larger fraction of total costs--would be overhead or general Bureau costs. They would be extraordinarily difficult to estimate accurately even if we were dealing with a real case, the history of which we could investigate in detail. How much Bureau personnel time had been spent on this transaction that otherwise would have been applied to some other useful activity would be virtually impossible to establish, and yet would represent a significant fraction of the total cost of the transaction. We may, therefore,make an estimate that for a transaction of this magnitude the costs could not be less than $5,760, which would mean that the costs were only 25 cents per acre. Such a program would be a magnificent value. If the costs were double that, $11,520, the cost would be only 50 cents per acre. And were we to double it again, to $23,040, a cost of a dollar per acre for a program as successful as the one postulated here does not seem excessive. If a million acres of intermingled lands could be blocked out and rationalized by equitable exchange of land at a total cost of a million dollars it would be a splendid bargain.

A far greater cost per unit of land exchanged is, however, easy to envisage. We need only postulate a land exchange officer drawing a salary of $15,000 per year, with three or four assistants whose annual salaries total $40,000, a secretarial staff, significant transportation expenses, surveying fees, legal fees, plus considerable general departmental costs assignable to land exchange, and the total annual cost of the program might easily reach $100,000 per year. Were the office to succeed in exchanging only 10,000 acres of land in a year, the transfer costs would be $10 per acre. Again, it is difficult to do more than merely postulate costs and program effectiveness. If the total costs were twice as great and the amount of land exchanged half as large, the costs would be $40 per acre; with half the total cost and twice the amount of land exchanged, transfer costs would be $5 per acre.

The significant point is that costs per acre of simplifying and rationalizing the intermingled pattern of this relatively low value land must not be too high under whatever program is installed. Otherwise it would be better to execute a more economical program by exchanging lands at rates so advantageous to the other party that the program could be rapidly and economically carried to completion.

At this point a caveat must be entered: the number of problems and difficulties facing a program for simplifying the pattern of Federal land holdings is great. The problems essentially arise from the imperfect market for much western land and from the statutes under which the various Federal land managing agencies buy, sell, or exchange land.

Some important causes for imperfections in the western real estate market have already been encountered in our discussions of trespass and access problems. A piece of Federal land entirely surrounded by a single private land holding may be nearly worthless to any potential purchaser because the property could be made inaccessible by the owner of the surrounding property. Even if there were access but the property was small and useful for nothing but stock grazing, a potential buyer might decide that the property was worthless to him because the cost of fencing it and supplying water on the property might well be far greater than the value of the forage it produces. Under such circumstances the property may have true economic value only to the owner of the adjacent property, because only he has access to it, only he need not fence it to graze it, and only he has an available water source for it. However, the surrounding land's owner is not necessarily interested in buying this property even at an advantageous price. If Public Domain land is put up for sale by the Federal Government, the adjacent land owner has a priority to purchase the land at the highest price bid and no more than three times the appraised value of the plot. Since he is commonly grazing the land under Federal permit at fees far below the prevalent commercial rates, and knowing that he has priority to purchase the land at a limited price, he will not be strongly motivated to invest capital in purchasing the land.

Isolated Public Domain lands can be sold for an equitable price only under the following array of circumstances. If the adjacent property owner is financially able to buy the land and if he is willing to pay a reasonable price for it, it can be sold to him. If the adjacent property owner does not wish the plot to go into other private ownership, and if the Bureau of Land Management can find another bidder for the property, it can be sold to the other bidder, or the adjacent property owner will be forced to buy it under his purchase priority. If neither of these circumstances prevails, the land must either be retained in Federal ownership or be sold at whatever price the adjacent landowner is willing to pay for it. Sale of hundreds of parcels of Public Domain land at a fair and equitable price requires the cooperation of the adjacent landowners. It should be clear also, however, that were the purchase priority of the adjacent landowner rescinded, those landowners might be much more strongly motivated to bid and bargain seriously for isolated tracts of Public Domain.

An intermingled land pattern can also be simplified and properties blocked out by direct exchange. If landowners are cooperative and favorably disposed toward exchange the process can go forward smoothly and rapidly. If private owners are uninterested in exchanges it will be virtually impossible except where the BLM can realistically offer the isolated tracts for sale; thereby presenting the adjacent landowners with the choice of trading other real estate currently in his ownership for the adjacent property or of buying it for cash at the priority price.

Blocking of properties and simplification of the land pattern can be done by more complex exchange procedure, sometimes involving a third party. A single example will suffice. A rancher could trade some private land that he owns within the boundaries of a National Forest for a comparable value of Public Domain adjacent to a bloc of state lands located elsewhere. He may then exchange some of the latter piece of Public Domain for two pieces of state land lying within his ranch.

The requirement that the lands to be exchanged be of equal value is a minor impediment to land exchange and a more serious unnecessary complication. It is not unusual for the appraised value of two parcels of land contemplated for exchange to be slightly dissimilar, thus making it necessary either for one party to delete a parcel of that value from his area, or for the other party to add a piece of land to his acreage to be traded. In the former case the deleted plot is apt to remain an isolated tract even after the exchange has been completed. In the latter case, the new owner may have acquired and thereby created a new, isolated tract.

To effect a simplification of the Federal-state land holding pattern clearly requires a cooperative official in charge of the state land in each state. Such cooperation currently varies greatly from state to state. Some state governments are eager to carry out lands exchanges with the Federal Government; others are interested in only those exchanges that will give their state a large net gain from the exchange. Some state land officers are completely uninterested in effectuating exchanges or may actively oppose them.

Minerals and mining constitute a final complication in any program to simplify the land holding pattern by sale, transfer, or exchange. Since surface rights and mineral rights are separable and both rights can be exchanged or one right retained by both parties in an exchange, they constitute an important additional complication in the exchange process. Moreover, the differing Federal regulations relating to the handling of mineral rights on Federal properties of different status tend to further complicate the land exchange program and procedure.

Coordination of Conservation Plans

Intermingling of lands may cause trouble in the formulation and execution of programs of soil and water conservation. Certain kinds of problems are relatively obvious. Attempts at flood damage and erosion control on Federal lands have been vitiated by a complete lack of vegetation management and water control on headway areas under private ownership. Insect infestations on private or public land may be difficult to combat if the intermingled lands do not have a similar control program. Weed and brush control programs are subject to the same possible hazards. Differences of opinion have arisen between the Bureau of Sport Fishery and Wildlife and both the Forest Service and the BLM regarding the carrying capacity of the range for big game, domestic livestock, or both on the same range. They are rarely settled by discussion and investigation.

In various areas of the West a rancher's private range lands are intermingled with Federal range land that he has a permit to graze.

At his request the Soil Conservation Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture may create a farm management conservation plan for his farm. As part of the plan, the SCS technicians will calculate a grazing carrying capacity for the intermingled range lands. If the SCS carrying capacity ratings are higher than those previously established by the BLM, the rancher will immediately begin asking to have the size of his BLM grazing permit increased to the level implied by the SCS ratings. And he may trespass his cattle or sheep on his grazing allotment if the BLM refuses to increase the size of his permit.

The necessity for coordination of conservation plans can either be obviated or rendered much less important if intermingling of lands is reduced to a minimum. Meantime an important objective of all Federal land management personnel engaged in planning conservation programs for intermingled lands should be to reach agreement with all intermingled land managers concerned before settling on a final approved plan. Agreement among all Federal land managers seems easiest to achieve and most obviously indicated. Problems of plan coordination are, of course, related to both intermingled lands and divided responsilities.

Problems of Land Use Surveillance

The owner of any piece of real estate wishes, of course, to maintain relatively close control over use of his land. Land use means any form of human activity on the land. At minimum an owner wishes to know of all use of his land because of its possible effect on the land's resources. The Federal Government is no exception to this generalization even though much of its land is regarded as a "commons". The nearly infinite range of possible uses of the land, and the range of possible consequences of that use make it imperative for the Federal land manager to know at all times how the land under his jurisdiction is being used. So various are the possibilities that it is difficult to generalize.

A family's camping on a remote piece of Federal property may seem a harmless use; but they may cut a valuable tree for firewood; they may start a brush or range or forest fire; they may leave debris or garbage; they may graze a few horses for a few days. Except for the fire, the campers' actions are of trivial importance; but a thousand similar campers over a period of two or three years can have a major impact.

The significance of knowing immediately about grazing trespass and timber trespass has already been discussed. Prospecting for minerals may be done on most Federal lands without any permit or notice of any kind. Activities associated with prospecting may produce a variety of possible consequences--fire, accelerated erosion, timber cutting, and choking of stream channels with debris. At the very least the land manager should know of the activity.

To have immediate and direct knowledge of all uses of the land, nothing is more efficacious than to have an official of the land management agency close by. A land manager who is near the lands under his responsibility will see many of his lands every day, neighbors will tell him of activity that they have observed, he will be conscious of unusual traffic on the road, or unusual parked vehicles; new trails or tracks may come to his attention, or sounds or smells or animal movements. Proximity, because it keeps the land manager closely in touch with all sources of information, makes for better stewardship of the land.

With respect to land supervision there are considerable differences between the Federal agencies. In general, Forest Service supervision is closest. As compared with Public Domain lands, the National Forest lands are relatively compact. Each Forest has its own technical and supervisory personnel. Each Forest is divided into areal subunits, the smallest of which is the ranger district. Each such district has a district ranger, who has a ranger station within the district where he has working headquarters, and in many cases the ranger will actually live within his district. Because of this constant physical proximity of the Forest rangers to the land under their jurisdiction, because of the relatively few access routes to the lands of most ranger districts, and, finally, because the Forest Service has the practice of scheduling personnel trips to the various parts of each ranger district partially for the purpose of maintaining regular and frequent inspection of the land, the National Forest staff succeeds in maintaining comparatively up-to-date, reliable, detailed information about all forms of use of National Forest lands.

Public Domain lands are much more widely scattered and far less compactly arranged, and BLM personnel is much more thinly scattered over the vast areas within which Public Domain is located. Moreover, there are numerous small isolated plots of Public Domain land. The combination of all these factors makes adequate supervision and inspection of Public Domain lands an impossible task for the BLM. The last factor, the number of small isolated plots, would make effective and prompt knowledge of land use everywhere on the Public Domain extraordinarily difficult even were the manpower of the BLM considerably expanded.

To insure continuous surveillance of activity on Public Lands requires the frequent or continuous physical proximity of the Federal personnel responsible for each plot of land; that is, the presence of a National Forest ranger near a piece of Public Domain, or of a National Park technician in a National Forest, or of a BLM District Manager near a wildlife range is wholly inadequate assurance that undesirable use of the land is noted, recorded, and possibly influenced or curtailed; land managers having jurisdiction over and responsibility for the land in question must be present to keep it under surveillance. From the standpoint of land use surveillance, a strong implication of the foregoing assertion is the desirability of a compact areal arrangement of the lands under each management agency's jurisdiction. Isolated pieces of Public Domain near a National Forest are, from the standpoint of use surveillance, much better transferred to National Forest jurisdiction, and similarly with isolated blocs of National Forest near a substantial piece of Public Domain. Most of the isolated, fragmented pieces of Federal land are highly susceptible to unsupervised use. These facts carry several implications. Isolated, intermingled land holdings should be eradicated, mainly because management, and especially supervision, are impossible in most cases, and prohibitively expensive where attempted. Sale of isolated tracts at a price fair to the Federal Government is not easy and in many cases is impossible. Nevertheless, a vigorous program should be launched to sell and exchange such isolated tracts, unless they can be shown to have some unique, special function either for Federal use or for the general welfare. Viewing the problem from the viewpoint suggested in this report--that is, regarding Federal land management as analogous to the functioning of a private real estate investor--it might be well to alienate some isolated properties at less, perhaps, than their appraised value because the public interest in them is so small, the income from them is so small and the administrative costs so high that they are expensive to retain to serve no significant Federal purpose.

Statutory authorization giving Federal land managers the greatest flexibility in selling and exchanging isolated tracts would be a great aid in implementing a program to eliminate isolated tracts. As a private real estate investor selling his property would not be constrained by any considerations against his own advantage, a Federal land manager should have few rigid controls aside from those needed to protect the public interest.

Within the Federal organization the land holdings of the Federal land management agencies should be inspected, and, where indicated, lands should be transferred between agencies in order to produce a more compact and, hence, more supervisable land pattern, or, at least, a pattern that could be supervised and monitored more effectively and cheaply. In at least three instances that came to my attention--in western Montana, southern Wyoming, and northern Idaho--local and state level representatives of two Federal land management agencies have worked out detailed plans for the transfer of lands between the agencies for the purpose of producing more compact and efficiently manageable patterns of land holdings. In all three cases, local representatives of both agencies involved reported that the recommended land exchange plans had been submitted to the Washington offices of both agencies for review, and hopefully, approval and eventual implementation. In every case, after a time lapse of two or three years or more no decision nor, in fact, any reaction to the plans proposed by the Washington offices, had reached the agency technicians who had evolved and submitted the plans. Clearly, one simple and obvious way of implementing the simplification and rationalization of Federal holdings would be to insure that inter-agency transfer plans developed at the field level received careful, prompt analysis in the agency headquarters in Washington and either be implemented or reasons for a negative decision be promptly returned to the originating local offices.

We have previously reiterated the importance of having a representative of the responsible Federal land management agency near to the lands he is to keep under surveillance. If all Federal land were managed by a single agency, the chances for an uneven distribution of management personnel--overlapping districts in some areas and wholly inadquate or no local personnel in other places--would be decreased. With a single land management agency, the land management technician nearest any piece of Federal land would be a responsible official. This is one of the strongest arguments for a single Federal Public Land management agency: a single land management agency would permit the optional areal distribution of agency personnel and would obviate any necessity for land transfers within the Federal Government structure. Problems of isolated Public Land fragments would still exist, but no lands would be unsupervised because they were located near a Federal land management technician not responsible for their management.

Problems of Overlapping Functions and Divided Responsibilities Among Federal Land Management Agencies

In discussing problems associated with land-use surveillance the joint significance of the land ownership pattern and the organizational structure of Federal land management agencies as factors in the problem was evident. These same factors are operative with varying weight in all aspects of Federal land management wherever the lands are located.

Fire Prevention

All Public Lands are subject to some danger of damage by fire. Each Federal land management agency has a clear interest in and responsibility for the prevention or suppression of fire on the lands under its jurisdiction. Fire control necessitates prompt discovery of the existence of a fire followed by effective action to extinguish it. Some sort of fire-observation and -reporting system is required and a fire-fighting organization of men and equipment with plans of action when fire is reported. This is all straightforward and tiresomely obvious if a land management agency has a large, compact land unit to manage. If, however, two agencies have several smaller, intermixed or adjacent land holdings, the possibilities of inefficiencies increase. For each agency to achieve independently the same degree of fire protection on its properties will require two almost duplicate fire-fighting organizations, and if they act completely independently the cost of fire protection for the same lands will be almost double what a single organization would cost.

In general the leading Federal land management agencies have developed their own fire-watching and -fighting systems; but the advantages of cooperation and mutual assistance are so obvious that a fairly elaborate inter-agency cooperative system has developed. Ordinarily each agency informs the other of fires on the other agency's land. In many places the Forest Service with its effective fire lookout system does all the fire watching on intermingled Public Domain also. If the fire is small each agency undertakes to put out the fires on its own land; but, not uncommonly, personnel of one agency discovering a small fire on another agency's land or on private land may attempt to put out the blaze while simultaneosly informing the responsible agency's personnel of the fire's existence and location. If fire on a National Forest threatens to spread to Public Domain or vice versa, both agencies not uncommonly cooperate in bringing it under control.

As the size of a fire increases the extent of inter-agency cooperation increases. An inter-agency organization called the Boise Interagency Fire Center acts as a mobilization and control center for combatting the larger and more threatening fires on any Public Land. Essentially the center mobilizes and dispatches what men and equipment seem required to suppress the fire. The Center has contact with agency sources of fire-fighting personnel and

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equipment nationwide. It is thus able to assemble as much fire-fighting power as is needed for almost any fire, without leaving any other area so stripped of fire-fighting organization that it cannot be protected against the outbreak of new fires. Overlapping duties and divided responsibilities for fire control have not produced any serious local deficiencies in fire-fighting capacity nor any notable or expensive duplication of capacity for fire fighting on Federal lands.

State lands, which in several western states compose a substantial acreage of publicly owned lands, are also subject to fire hazard. The states are, of course, responsible for detection and suppression of fires on their own lands. In several states, however, the state lands are so widely scattered that the small state land agency is quite unable to cope effectively with the problem. Those states whose state lands embrace extensive commercial timber values have somewhat more effective fire-fighting organization and equipment, but it may be relatively high-cost protection. Federal agencies furnish on a reimbursable basis fire-fighting personnel and equipment to the states for fighting fire on state lands. Because of this reimbursement requirement, some state land agencies request Federal help in fighting fires on state lands only belatedly and under the most stressful circumstances. And if a state has an unusual concentration of large and severe fires, its debt for Federal fire-fighting assistance may become burdensomely large. For several of the western states the entire fire-fighting problem is compounded by the extremely scattered and fragmented pattern of state owned lands--another powerful argument for simplification of the western land ownership pattern.

Grazing Management

Almost universally the western Public Domain lands managed by the Bureau of Land Management are used for livestock grazing. And similarly those higher lands in the National Forests that are not bare rock nor covered by dense tree growth are also leased for livestock grazing by western ranchers. Although sheep and cattle prefer to eat every day of the year and despite the fact that hundreds of western ranchers have permits to graze their stock on both Public Domain and National Forest, coordination of the two agencies' grazing administration has always been minimal. In general, the Forest Service emphasizes the watershed protection and erosion prevention aspects of the vegetation on its lands, and grazing is managed almost completely to maintain or enhance vegetation condition. To this end National Forest technicians set dates for the onset of grazing in early summer with relation to spring temperatures. If temperatures have been low enough to delay adequate vegetation growth by the usual opening date for grazing, the Forest Service will defer the opening date ten or fifteen days. The grazing control section of the BLM has long regarded its contribution to the well being and stability of the western range livestock industry as one of its prime responsibilities. Consequently its grazing management of Public Domain lands has been far more permissive and flexible than that of the Forest Service. If, as in the example used just above, the Forest Service decrees a two week postponement of the onset of the grazing season on Forest land, the Bureau of Land Management will almost invariably retain the livestock on their Public Domain allotments for the additional period necessitated by the change in the Forest Service's opening date, even though grazing on the Public Domain allotments is scheduled to end at the normal Forest opening date. In recent years the Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management have planned and executed integrated grazing plans for a few ranches in a few western areas. The Bureau of Land Management would, doubtless, favor the extension of such integrated plans to a greater number of western ranches. Because a range livestock ranch is a year around integrated operation, it seems obvious that all the range lands involved should be integrated into a complete year plan, and any operational modifications of the grazing plans should be worked out and subsequent necessary adjustments made jointly.

A single plan worked out jointly by the rancher, the Bureau of Land Management, and the Forest Service for each rancher's grazing schedule would have the advantage for the rancher of making it necessary for him to deal with only one Federal agency instead of two. It would also be possible to arrange for him to obtain only a single permit for all his grazing on Public Land were it not for the difference in grazing fees charged by the two agencies. A lessee pays significantly higher fee per animal unit month on a National Forest than he does on his Public Domain lease. Present Federal regulations envisage a steadily decreasing differential between the two fees until they become identical in less than a decade. Meantime, this difference in grazing fee cost will constitute an additional, minor complication to integrated planning and management of National Forest and Taylor Grazing leases.

The grazing fee differential also constitutes an obstacle to any transfers of land between the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management designed to make their pattern of land holdings more rational and efficient. Since ranchers must pay a higher fee for grazing use of National Forest lands, they may confidently be expected to oppose transfers of their grazing leased land from the Bureau of Land Management to the Forest Service.

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Solely from the standpoint of efficiency grazing administration, a single agency to administer all grazing on Public Land would be preferable; but for general land management objectives a single grazing agency might be less effective in protecting non-grazing interests in the land. If the Federal land management agencies continue to administer their lands separately, efficiency would be notably increased by the extension of joint, integrated grazing plans to all ranchers who use more than one class of Public Land.

Wildlife Management

Game commissions of the several states and the Bureau of Sports Fisheries and Wildlife are directly and primarily charged with responsibility for the management of wild game populations. Nevertheless, as implied by their very wildness, game populations will use the natural resources of food, water, and cover on any piece of land they can reach, without, of course, being affected in the slightest by the ownership or jurisdiction of the land. Consequently, Federal land is a major fraction of the habitat of most species of western game. Since the game and its habitat are the primary responsibility of separate agencies, coordination of their activities is imperative. In the case of large herbivores such as deer and elk there is direct competition between the game and domestic livestock for the range forage. If the range vegetation is not to be overgrazed, the number of game animals must be kept in check, a responsibility of the state game commissions; but if game numbers are to be increased the land management agencies must take responsibility for maintaining the vegetation's vigor on their lands. The Forest Service and the National Park Service may forbid hunting on their lands, but they cannot legally permit hunting, if it is forbidden by state regulations; hence, the problem of bringing game numbers and habitat into a stable relationship demands a cooperative program by the interested agencies. Such a program, however, involves other interests than simply those of the Federal and state agencies. Hunters wish game populations to be kept sufficiently high to give reasonable assurance of hunting success. Conversely, ranchers do not want wild game use of forage to be heavy enough to produce noticeably adverse effect on the amount of forage available for their permitted domestic stock; and they are even more strongly opposed to any proposed increase in wildlife forage consumption that might entail a decrease in their permitted livestock numbers on their allotment.

An example is supplied by the Charles Russell Game Range in Montana, where the Bureau of Sports Fisheries and Wildlife wished to increase notably the number of grazing game animals. Since the annual prodcution of forage had previously all been used by the domestic livestock of the permitted Taylor Grazing lessees, a number of possible consequences could be and were anticipated. If domestic livestock numbers remained the same and wildlife grazing use increased, less forage than previously would be left for the domestic stock, and the vegetation might decline under too heavy grazing pressure, an outcome not desired by any interested party--Montana game management officials, Bureau of Sports Fisheries and Wildlife, Bureau of Land Management, nor the Taylor Grazing permittees. The Bureau of Land Management was under pressure to reduce domestic livestock numbers, the grazing permittees were outraged by any suggestion that permits should be reduced in size or the number of permits decreased, and the Bureau of Sports Fisheries and Wildlife was frustrated by its inability to increase wildgame numbers without seriously increasing grazing pressure on a somewhat precarious vegetation. Currently, the Bureau of Land Management is hopeful that a program of carefully managed rotational grazing for use of the range lands, including complete rest from grazing for each piece of the range at lengthy intervals, will increase total range forage production sufficiently to meet adequately permitted domestic livestock grazing pressure and increased wildlife forage demands. Clearly, however, the record indicates unmistakably the need for a coordinated, single plan for total grazing use of the area by both domestic and wild grazing animals and for management of the range vegetation to supply the forage.

The National Elk Refuge in Jackson Hole, Wyoming is essentially an area devoted to the winter feeding of Elk that spend the remainder of the year on the adjacent Federal mountain lands, particularly the Teton National Forest. Grazing pressure on the National Forest vegetation will be directly proportional to the number of Elk carried over the winter on the National Elk Refuge, indicating again the need for a single coordinated program to adjust domestic and wildlife grazing pressure to the carrying capacity of the National Forest lands that supply the forage.

Recreation Management

Managing recreational land use is a complicated business, involving all those activities that the recreationists come to engage in, plus all the activities and functions associated with transporting the recreationists to and about the area, and all the activity necessary to feed and shelter them while they are in the area. Moreover, recreationists engage in a great variety of sports and activities; some require very special environments and conditions, others can be done anywhere quite acceptably.

Recreational use of Public Lands is growing rapidly and steadily. And all the important Federal land management agencies are developing and managing recreational use of their land. Possibly it is the most important single function of the National Park Service. Properly to service, administer, and manage recreational use of land is a rather complex responsibility, and as intensity of use increases, management difficulties increase in parallel.

In those sections of the West where more than one Federal land management agency holds land and recreational use is heavy, a general overall plan for management of recreational land use could produce the most effective adjustment of land and managerial resources to recreational needs. An outstanding example is supplied by the complex of Federal holdings in northwestern Wyoming--Yellowstone National Park, Grand Teton National Park, Shoshone, Bridger, Teton, and Targhee National Forests. The two National Parks attract literally millions of recreational visitors. Nearly all of them arrive by auto, almost all of them must plan to spend at least one night in the region, many would like to spend from a few days to as much as two weeks in a variety of recreational activities in the general area, and a significant fraction of them wish to camp in tents or trailers during their sojourn in the area. Since the region is sparsely inhabited, scheduling and accomodations for this flood of visitors and campers is a major problem. Huge areas are needed for camp grounds, and basic utilities must be installed for such large camping populations. During most of the summer, camp grounds in Yellowstone National Park are filled to capacity and hundreds of would-be campers are diverted elsewhere. Because the Park Service wishes to maintain the "natural" characteristics of the park lands, it wishes to set a limit to the number and size of the camp grounds to be established in each park. In 1969 the Park Service had decided--temporarily, at least--neither to establish any more camp grounds in Grant Teton National Park nor to enlarge the existing ones. Essentially the same situation is true in Yellowstone Park.

Tourist pressure has become so great in the Yellowstone-Grand Teton area that Federal land managers have developed a cooperative program to deal with it. Short run actions consist of a program to gather information daily and even hourly on the availability of camping sites and lodging accomodations in the entire area, and make this information available to tourists approaching the area's fringes. For example, when all accommodations in the heart of the area are filled, tourists are advised to utilize lodgings or camp sites on the area's borders, and not to proceed farther into the area until the next day, unless they hold confirmed reservations somewhere.

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Because the two National Park administrations do not wish to enlarge their camping facilities the National Forests of the region are the logical and obvious areas in which to choose sites for additional camp grounds, the optimum location being the narrow strip of Teton National Forest lying between the northern end of Grand Teton National Park and the southern border of Yellowstone. The Forest Service is establishing new camp grounds and enlarging older camp grounds at various locations within the Forests adjacent to the National Park, and are taking a few steps to divert tourist campers to lesser used camp grounds a few miles from the main tourist travel routes, and perhaps to induce them to spend part of their vacation time in some of the unpublicized Forest lands, rather than further crowding the scenes at the most widely known scenic attractions.

The problem just described cannot be considered as a recreational land use plan for the area; it is simply a rather pragmatic joint effort by the two agencies to cope temporarily with a situation that had already developed. Clearly, a single, jointly developed, moderately comprehensive recreational management plan for the full range of recreational activities and recreation supporting services would result in a more effective program.

Wherever juxtaposed or adjacent Federal lands under management by more than one agency are used for recreational purposes a situation develops like the one in northwestern Wyoming, although in most cases it is of far smaller dimensions and intensity. Nevertheless, in all cases the development of a joint interagency recreational plan will give the maximum satisfaction to the recreationists with minimum effort and lowest costs to the Federal land management agencies.

Minerals Management

The allocation of responsibility within the Federal structure for minerals development and management presents a particularly clear example of the general problems relating to the organizational structure of Federal land management. Three general sets of problems may be encountered in Federal administration of mineral properties. The first problem is protection of surface values when minerals prospecting or development is proceeding. Because of the legislative history of the Public Lands, mineral deposits underneath Public Lands are classified as either "leasable" or "locatable"; the distinction being that locatable minerals on the Public Lands can be mined by anyone, at any time, without any permit, without giving any notice, and without paying any fee. Locatable minerals can also be "claimed" by private developers and these claimed lands can be brought to patent, if it can be established that minable minerals are located in the claimed area. Proof of the existence of the minerals is clearly implied in the foregoing case, and the government must make this determination before granting patent. For locatable minerals on Public Domain, land the U. S. Geological Survey makes the determination, although sometimes the Bureau of Land Management makes its own determination also. On mineral patent applications on National Forests, mineral determinations are made by BLM technicians.

Leasable minerals can be mined only under lease from the Federal Government for which a tonnage royalty is paid. If the minerals are in a known structure or deposit the lease is awarded only by competitive bidding; if not, the mining lease may simply be awarded, but the royalty payment rate must be established. The decision as to whether a mineral is in a known structure is made by the USGS as are all other technical matters relating to the geology of the area under consideration. The USGS collects royalty fees, but then turns them over to the BLM. Other matters relating to the locating, prospecting, and exploitation of the mineral are administered by the Bureau of Land Management. The Forest Service and the BLM are responsible for management and protection of the surface resources on and adjacent to leased mineral deposits, although the Forest Service has more power in such matters than does the BLM. One continuous source of difficulty concerns balancing of surface values and underground values. The USGS is partially responsible for the consideration of the effects of minerals extraction operations on surface conditions, but the delineation of these responsibilities between the USGS and BLM is not very clear. The Forest Service-USGS and BLM-USGS relationships in this regard may be highly instructive. Because the Forest Service (Agriculture) and the USGS (Interior) are in different departments of the Executive Branch the responsibilities of the two agencies in reconciling mining operations with surface management have been fairly clearly set forth. Not so with responsibility allocations between BLM and USGS for reconciling mining and surface value conflicts. Presumably, coordination of their activities should be easy because both agencies are in the same department; but apparently this has not invariably proved to be the case. The degree of difficulties produced by this somewhat vague division of responsibility apparently varies with the area and with the individuals involved. One BLM State Manager told me that problems of responsibilities divided with the USGS for reconciling conflicts between surface and subsurface values on mineral leases were the biggest problems he had. But the BLM officials directly responsible for handling minerals matters in two states expressed the view that coordination of BLM and USGS activities and responsibilities was no problem at all. One asserted that any difficulty that arose could easily be resolved by a phone call to the USGS personnel with whom he had cordial and effective relations. He also advanced the opinion that the only significant coordination problem involved lessees or prospective lessees, who upon contacting either the BLM or the USGS might be irritated to learn that they should call the other agency for the particular information or transaction in which they were interested.

Nevertheless, divided responsibility for minerals matters on Public Lands is not generally satisfactory to the personnel of any of the agencies involved. Many technicians of the BLM believe that minerals management efficiency would be greatly increased if the personnel of the Mining and Leasing Branches of the Conservation Division of the USGS were transferred to the appropriate division of the BLM. They argue that this would consolidate technical expertise and responsibility for all surface and subsurface resources in one place, thereby increasing efficiency, effecting economy of operations, and making it possible for all problems involving conflicts of interest between surface and underground values to be resolved by discussion and coordination within that single branch.

The relatively few USGS technicians with whom I spoke opposed transfer of the Conservation Branch to the BLM, for two reasons. First, they felt it would be a professional loss and handicap for the transferred USGS technicians to be separated from the scientific, technical, and library resources of the Geological Survey. And secondly they submitted the view that a more rational and logical means of achieving integration of all minerals development activities on Federal land would be to consolidate all functions and activities relating to subsurface resources in the USGS, an agency that specializes in such resources. The question we have just been considering is, of course, simply a specific aspect of the more general problem of the optimum Federal organizational structure for administration and management of the Public Lands.

The Problem of Federal Public Land Management Organization

Because administrative structure for managing the Public Lands can be organized in an almost infinite number of ways, it will be helpful to categorize these organization permutations and combinations into a relatively few categories based upon some organizational rationale.

All land may be perceived, conceptualized, from three distinct viewpoints. First, land may be viewed as real property requiring custody and management; second, land may be thought of as consisting of a bundle of natural qualities, each requiring scientific, technical management; and third, every piece of land may be perceived as a bundle of resources, facilities, or capital equipment capable of supplying or serving a number of human wants or purposes.

In organizing a managerial structure for the Public Lands, any one of these three perspectives may be adopted and given priority. That is, the land management agency may be regarded as a real estate managing agency responsible for all matters relating to the land under its jurisdiction. Or it may be decided that technical control and scientific management of the land's resources are of overriding importance and require the services of specialized, technical, natural resource management agencies to act as custodians, planners, and managers of each individual land resource wherever it is found on the Public Land. Or, lastly, the Public Lands can be regarded primarily as a source of supply for goods and services desired by the national population, and allocate the Federal lands to various agencies to enable them to discharge their responsibilities.

The crucial point, however, is that every piece of Public Land possesses all three of these characteristics, exhibits all three aspects: every tract of Public Land is real property requiring management in all its aspects, is a bundle of natural qualities needing to be scientifically controlled, exploited, and manipulated; and possesses resources that can be used to serve human purposes. No matter what organizational form is adopted, no matter which aspect of the land is accorded priority in managerial organization, provision must be made to deal with all three aspects of the Public Lands. If not, the land will be mismanaged.

What is being discussed here is, of course, the organization of Federal activities for Federal land and land resource management. It is a major problem of Federal governmental organization that has received repeated, high level, extended consideration by individuals and groups both inside and outside the Federal Government. It is certainly not the intent of this report to add new suggested solutions to the organizational problem. To the contrary, the analysis in the previous paragrpahs indicates that there can be no best single organizational structure for Federal land management. The suitability of all organizational arrangements depends upon the priorities assigned to the management objectives.

The Federal real estate must, inescapably, be managed. Use pressure on the Public Lands has been, is, and will be increasing. The idea that Federal lands can be used as an unplanned, uncontrolled commons is totally unrealistic. Use of the Federal lands must be planned and controlled. Land use planning and control are management. It is, therefore, reasonable and sensible to make comprehensive Federal real estate management the primary objective and priority in the structural organization of Public Land management.

Currently, the three major Federal land management agencies--the Forest Service, the Park Service, and the BLM--all serve as real estate managing agencies. They buy, sell, and trade land. They grant easements and rights-of-way. They lease their land for grazing. The Forest Service and BLM sell timber, issue mineral leases, and lease land for a variety of minor uses. They collect funds for use of their lands, and disburse some of the receipts locally, in lieu of taxes. The Congress and the Interior and Agriculture Departments establish laws, rules, and regulations concerning use and management of the land, which the agencies administer and enforce in a variety of ways.

Responsible custody of the Public Lands requires that their natural qualities be managed, protected, controlled, and developed. A comprehensive land (real estate) managing agency must insure the adequate technical-scientific handling of its land's resources. But a land management agency can organize these technical-scientific functions in more than one way. The BLM, National Park Service, and Forest Service all have technically and scientifically trained personnel within their organization to conserve, utilize and manage the various resources under their jurisdiction. To use a current term, they have an "in house" technical organization to manage their land's resources and natural qualities. All three agencies do not maintain the same technical capability; each agency's "in house" roster of technical and scientific personnel is related to the characteristics of the land it manages and to what it has come to recognize as its primary service functions.

A land managing agency does not, however, need to maintain its own technical-scientific manpower resources. It can obtain such services from outside sources, which to some extent is done currently by the major Federal land management agencies. Examples have been mentioned previously in this report. Surveying requirements for National Parks, Federal game reserves, and National Forests are nearly all executed by the surveying section of the BLM. The USGS performs technical geological work for the land management agencies. The Bureau of Sports Fisheries and Wildlife makes some wildlife surveys for the other land management agencies. Other examples could be cited. However, the Federal Government supports a comprehensive array of highly skilled and competent technologic-scientific bureaus and agencies. To a considerable extent their capabilities, interests, and functions overlap those of the cognate sections of the land management could transfer

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and allocate most of these natural resource management responsibilities to the Federal technical-scientific agencies. To do so, however, raises a new set of questions about how the functions of the land management agencies and the technical-scientific support agencies are to be coordinated and articulated. The questions are so numerous and perhaps obvious that they can only be suggested here. How can the land management agencies' uneven demand for technical services be scheduled into the work load of the technical agency? If the land management agency has a continuous demand for a technical service, how will personnel of the technical agency be assigned to the work? How will the technical services be funded? Who in the land management agency will interpret and evaluate the technical services? Each land management agency can maintain its own technical-scientific staffs; but this decision will also raise new questions: shall the technical-scientific supporting staffs be organized on a national basis? a regional basis? or a local basis? If the first, how shall personnel be distributed among areas? Should the land management agency maintain a competent staff for services that it rarely needs? If not, how shall the services be acquired when needed?

The land management agencies also supply and market materials, goods, and services. These are now handled almost entirely by agency personnel. The tourist-serving concessionaires in the National Parks are a good example of the rare exceptions to that generalization. There is no reason, however, why the service functions need be handled directly by the land management agencies. Stumpage on the National Forests could be marketed by an independent agency, and similarly with grazing leases, minerals leases, hunting and fishing permits, etc.

The rationale of administration just presented is vaguely that of the current organization of Federal Public Land management. Each land management agency is regarded as having a mission somewhat different from that of the others, and related specifically to the characteristics of the land placed under its jurisdiction.

Each Federal land management agency and the land under its jurisdiction may well have a single primary function or management objective; but most land may serve several actual or potential functions. This is to state what has now become almost a Federal land management cliché: land should be administered to conserve its valuable natural qualities and to serve many of its potential functions. And each Federal land managing agency virtuously publicizes itself as administering multiple use or multi-purpose resource management programs. But, if each agency is a multi-purpose land resource managing agency, the notion immediately arises that they might all be merged into one general multi-purpose Federal land management agency.

During the surveys I made in preparation for this report, I asked most of the Federal land management technicians and administrators that I interviewed their opinions concerning the utility and desirability of establishing a single multi-purpose Federal land managing agency. The majority, doubtfully, expressed the opinion that such a merger is a desirable development. But a large minority opposed a merger of Federal land management agencies, and they advocated their point of view with strong conviction. Almost every opponent of merger based his argument on the differing missions of the various agencies, and their importance. If the individual agency missions seem so vitally important that a special agency to pursue each objective seems desirable, little significant loss in efficiency will be achieved by that organizational structure, provided that all the requirements for adequate land management--comprehensive land use planning and control, technical-scientific care and management of the land's natural qualities, and multi-purpose land use--are properly and explicitly provided for.

There are, of course, some unnecessary costs of additional and duplicating supervisory personnel in partially functionally overlapping agencies, and similar additional costs may result from duplicated travel, uncoordinated technical programs, and the like. But the total additional costs of such inefficiencies is not large. In general, Federal land management agency costs are closely related to the size of the area under its jurisdiction. Viewed in the large, the extent of the duplicated agency effort and expense is small.

Multi-agency structure has advantages as well as disadvantages; but these advantages and disadvantages have been reviewed so often in the past that they need not be repeated here.

Much more important than agency structure is the provision of suitable and effective statutes, regulations, rules, and procedures for use in achieving the agencies' objectives.

If it is decided to view the Public Lands as Federal real estate, as real property requiring management, and to create an agency to manage the land, the following conclusions are logically implied:

First, if Federal land is undifferentiated real estate requiring skilled management, one land management agency is enough. A multiplicity of land management agencies is superfluous, overlapping, unnecessarily complicated. Clearly what is needed is a single land managing agency that manages all Public Land.

Secondly, a single Federal land management agency will require a complete spectrum of supporting technological-scientific supporting services for managing all natural resources and dealing with all technical environmental problems that arise. The organization within the agency of the technological-scientific personnel will still present problems of where they should be stationed with respect to the location of the lands under the agency's jurisdiction, and with respect to the character of the different agency lands and the resource management problems associated with them. Just as there is no best interagency structure, there is no best single agency internal structure.

Perhaps the difficult and controversial questions concerning organizational structure of Public Land management are best viewed in this perspective: currently the Public Land management agencies and the relevant supportive technical-scientific staffs are located in different sections of different departments of the Executive Branch. Programs are formulated and differences of opinion are resolved or persist at every level of each agency. Some programs and procedures are imposed uniformly over all sections of the agency below the level where the decision is reached. Policy disagreements at any level may be sent to higher echelons of the agency for resolution. They do not go higher than the lowest common supervisory level of the disagreeing parties, whether it is a local grazing district supervisor, a regional forester, an assistant secretary of Interior, a departmental secretary, or ultimately the President, or public opinion. Reorganization can somewhat change the number of locations and the levels at which final decisions are reached, but essentially the same programs will be formulated and problems resolved by approximately the same procedures. Any change in Federal land management organizational structure will exchange one set of advantages and disadvantages for another set.

The New Mexico Public Land Consolidation Program

As we have seen, a program to bloc out, consolidate, and simplify the Federal-State-Private land jurisdiction pattern is subject to such an array of formidable difficulties that very little land exchange has been effectuated. Nevertheless, the formidable obstacles and the dearth of successful land exchange experience do not demonstrate the impossibility of a successful land exchange, as evidenced by the outstandingly successful program carried out largely under the aegis of the BLM in New Mexico; although, in passing, it should be noted that the BLM's current State Director for Mexico and the man most responsible for the exchange program, W. J. Anderson, in his public addresses always explicitly stresses that suggestions and initiative for land exchanges frequently originate with private ranches, real estate dealers, or with New Mexico state land officials.

The scale and salient characteristics of the exchange program are indicated in the following table taken from a BLM memo from the State Director, New Mexico to the Director of the Bureau of Land Management.

Private and State Exchange Acreage in New Mexico
(Fiscal years 1964 through 1968, inclusive)

	Public Land Acres Out of Federal Ownership	Acres Into Federal Agencies	
Private Exchanges	438,954	183,021	(Public Domain)
	145,892	76,009	(Nat. Forest)
Sub totals	584,845	259,030	
State Exchanges	93,897	66,520	(Pub. Domain)
	264,345	76,468	(Nat. Forest)
Sub totals	358,241	142,988	
Grand totals	943,087	402,018	

In the five year period 1964-1968 more than 1.3 million acres of land were exchanged with private land holders and the State of New Mexico. To the National Forests in New Mexico were added, by exchange, 152,000 acres, most of it exchanged for Public Domain lands. It will also be noted that more than two acres of Federal land were exchanged for each acre of land obtained from New Mexico state or private owners. Although the Federal law under which exchanges are made requires that the appraised values of the exchanged lands be equal--and there seems no reason to suppose it was not followed in the New Mexican exchanges--the New Mexico state land officer held the view that an exchange of lands of equal value that resulted in a net increase in acreage to the state was an advantageous exchange and should be fostered. He did foster it to the not inconsiderable extent indicated in the table. In 1969 a new state land officer took office who, initially at least, held a somewhat different attitude toward land exchange, and the rate of exchange fell virtually to zero.

A definite and explicit rationale and program of exchanges was formulated by the BLM state office. The first objective was the elimination of tiny, scattered, isolated tracts. In numerous places in eastern New Mexico the small scattered pieces of Public Domain composed less than 10% of the area. They were so expensive and difficult to manage effectively that their elimination seemed clearly desirable, and exchange an efficient way to do it.


An Individual Grazing Allotment in New Mexico
0
3
miles
Public Domain
State Land
Private property of allotment holder

Figure 3

allotments. Priority is given to exchanges that significantly decrease cadastral survey problems and expenses by decreasing the length of property boundaries.

Exchanges have been pushed to obtain lands with high values for various Federal programs, such as recreation areas, special wildlife areas, high silt producing areas, and possible future Federal highway rights-of-way. The land exchange program has also been used to aid particular Federal programs by making exchanges for New Mexico state land and private land within an Indian irrigation project, lands within military reservations that necessarily must be used almost exclusively by the military, lands within National Forests and within National Parks (Monuments).

A very few real estate brokers and operators have contributed significantly to the success of the exchange program in New Mexico. Essentially their objective is to assemble or create large, relatively compact, integrated, private ranch units under commission from a client or for sale to a private buyer. To achieve such compact properties they purchase private lands--in many cases from several different sellers--within the area of their interest, to serve as the nucleus for the projected ranch. They are, of course, unable to purchase New Mexico state lands or Public Domain lands; but they are able to trade for them. Therefore, they ascertain the location of private lands that the Forest Service would like to acquire within a National Forest, private lands that the BLM needs to bloc out some of its holdings or to further some other Interior Department program, and private lands that the New Mexico state land office would like to obtain in trade for some of its other state lands. The real estate broker then purchases some of these private properties, which he exchanges for Public Domain or state land within the area he is attempting to consolidate into a private ranch. The statutory requirement that land exchanges be of equal value is, in some cases, an aid to this program. A real estate operator may purchase a single relatively high value private property within, for example, a National Forest, which he subsequently exchanges for a much greater acreage of low value Public Domain within the area he is attempting to bloc up. Exchanges of this kind largely explain the acreage imbalance of exchanged lands. It should perhaps be added that the interested parties have evolved other more complex and involved purchase and exchange procedures to facilitate blocking up of single-jurisdiction properties.

Such exchanges benefit all concerned. In the example used, the Forest Service eliminates an undesirable private property within a

National Forest without drawing on its severely limited funds for land purchase. The BLM eliminates some scattered Public Domain tracts. Some grazing permits, with their attendant administrative costs, may be eliminated; and the grazing pattern in one or more allotments may be simplified. The State of New Mexico may have acquired lands wanted for some special state purpose, eliminated some scattered, administratively expensive state lands, and perhaps have consolidated a state grazing lease. And a large investor is enabled to purchase an extensive, compact, balanced ranch.

Some factors in the New Mexico land situation may be especially favorable for effectuating land trades. For example, much of the BLM grazing land in New Mexico is year 'round range; hence, such lands tend to be virtually homogeneous for grazing purposes, and thus add no complexities concerning season of use and the like to negotiations for land exchanges. It may well be that the Director of the state land office of New Mexico has been unusually favorably disposed toward land exchanges with private parties and the Federal Government. Nevertheless, the situation in New Mexico with respect to land exchanges is probably not significantly better than in other western states, where land exchanges have been trivial.

How then explain the success of the exchange program in New Mexico? It seems attributable to the activities in the state office of the BLM in New Mexico, and particularly to the drive and conviction of the current State Director, W. J. Anderson. As is true of any thoughtful Federal western land manager, Mr. Anderson knows that properly executed land exchanges that simplify and rationalize the land status pattern benefit all parties concerned, by increasing the efficiency of land management, simplifying patterns of use, decreasing management costs; and, moreover, these savings continue indefinitely, whereas the costs of effecting the land exchanges and transfers occur just once. Mr. Anderson has devoted thought, effort, imagination, drive, and energy to the land exhange program in New Mexico. He has allocated a significant fraction of his time and of some of his assistants' time to the exchange program under the conviction, shared by this writer, that investment in an effective land exchange program produces a larger long range return than does almost any other governmental land management and adminstrative activity. The costs stop with completion of the exchange, but the returns in increased efficiency and managerial savings continue indefinitely.

As we have been at pains to point out, there are many difficulties to overcome and many serious obstacles to exchange programs. Moreover, a voluntary exchange program requires that all parties wish to effect an exchange; but in many cases at least one party will not wish to exchange because it believes that it benefits more from the present situation. So great are the problems of a land exchange program that at least one prominent student of western land problems, Marion Clawson, concludes that land exchange programs are not very promising. However, a land exchange program does have one great advantage. Any profitable land exchange produces valuable results, quite apart from what other exchanges may or may not be made. Almost any useful exchange anywhere produces managerial savings, and the success of nearly all potential land exchanges is not dependent upon the success of any individual exchange or any group of exchanges. Therefore, when we contemplate that a small, but intelligently and energetically led, program in New Mexico exchanged well in excess of a million acres in five years, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that few actions within the authority of the Forest Service and BLM would be more efficacious and profitable for the public good than to set in motion land exchange programs in each state of the efficiency and scope of that going forward in New Mexico.

Land Types, Land Status, and Public Land Management in Northern Utah

The interrelationships between the land status pattern of an area, the natural qualities of the land, and the problems associated with the organizational structure of the Federal land management agencies have been detailed in this report. The situation with respect to Federal land and its management in northern Idaho is unusually instructive.

Northern Idaho, north from the Salmon River or northward from the eastern end of the southern boundary of the State of Washington--is a sparsely populated region composed largely of forested mountains with a few valleys wide enough to permit a tiny amount of irrigated hayland, the establishment of a lumbering town or a road. Toward the southern and western margin of the region the land is less mountainous, and, being lower and drier, it is used somewhat for grazing. The northern tip of the state is almost completely mountainous.

Of the Federal agencies involved the Forest Service controls the lion's share of Public Lands in this region, not surprising in an area predominantly in forest. In the area under consideration are parts or all of five National Forests embracing a total of more than 6½ million acres of federally owned National Forest land. Of the National Forest acreage, more than three-fourths is tree covered, and probably two-thirds is commercial timber.

Scattered around the fringes of the National Forests and in patches and isolated tracts among the private lands of the region are approximately a quarter-million acres of Public Domain land under the management of the BLM. In only a few places in the entire area do the Public Domain lands occupy most of the land surface in a contiguous bloc. The most common pattern is to find the Public Domain acreage concentrated in a fringe at the boundary of a National Forest. Partly they are historical remnants; they represent the Public Land that was not included when the boundaries of the adjacent National Forests were drawn. A common situation is depicted on the map (Fig.4). The area within the boundaries of the St. Joe National Forest is exclusively National Forest land. Along the western margin of the Forest is a complex pattern of scattered small plots of National Forest land, intermingled with private land, Public Domain, and scattered parcels of Idaho state land. The land status pattern at the northern margin of the National Forest presents an especially interesting case, but not an unusual one for northern Idaho. It will be noted that the zone of intermingled land along the boundary is narrow and of unusually complex pattern. That area is a highly mineralized area in which scores of mining claims, many of which were eventually brought to patent, are located. When the National Forest boundary was drawn, the Forest Service deliberately excluded these areas of mining claims to avoid the numerous administrative and managerial complexities associated with lands of that status, complexities that the Forest Service felt it did not wish to become involved with, and which were not part of its primary mission or competency. The odd-shaped tracts of Public Domain lying along the Forest fringe between the private lands are covered with mining claims--none of which were ever brought to patent. Farther north, the valley of the St. Maries River is all in private hands; patented for mining, agricultural, transportation, or urban use.

Unlike Public Domain lands in nearly all other sections of the western states, the majority (75%) of the Public Domain of northern Idaho is forest covered, and the great preponderance of the timbered land is commercial stands. Grazing land comprises little more than a fourth of the lands managed by the BLM. The sole BLM office and staff headquarters in Northern Idaho is at Coeur D'Alene. With lands of such an unusual character for the BLM under the jurisdiction of the Coeur D'Alene office, it would be reasonable to expect that the sources of agency income, the nature of the work load, and the professional training of the technical staff of the Coeur D'Alene office would differ from that in most offices of the BLM. Such is the case. An unusually high proportion of BLM income in northern Idaho arises from timber sales. Most of the work load of the Coeur D'Alene office staff is related to forestry--forest survey and mensuration, timber sales, reforestation of cut over areas and burned

Land Status Near Margin of St. Joe National Forest, Idaho



Figure 4

over areas, and forest fire prevention and fighting. Finally the staff of the Coeur D'Alene district office has an unusually large proportion of professionally trained and experienced foresters on its technical staff, an obviously logical situation in view of the work load.

The circumstances just described inevitably raise a question concerning the utility of having two separate agencies, the BLM and Forest Service, managing closely intermixed and essentially similar lands. The question has been raised repeatedly. The most common recommendation is that the Public Domain lands be transferred to Forest Service jurisdiction and management. Such a recommendation makes a great deal of sense, for reasons made obvious by the foregoing description of the Public Land situation in northern Idaho. It has also been suggested that, in addition to extensive Public Domain transfers to the Forest Service, isolated tracts, not amenable to efficient management by the Forest Service be sold if possible and that extensive areas be traded to the State of Idaho for state lands elsewhere in the state where isolated state owned sections are the only interruptions to areas of solid Public Domain.

So persuasive is the argument against having a second Federal agency, the BLM, managing such small, scattered Public Domain tracts, that, I was informed in Idaho, a recommendation had once gone from the BLM in Idaho to Washington, D. C., that all Public Domain in northern Idaho be eliminated by transfer within the Federal system, by exchange, and by sale.

Such a transfer would produce a neater, more orderly land status pattern and Public Land management organizational structure. The increase in efficiency and economy of management are appealing and real. But the gains in effectiveness would not be huge. The Forest Service would be saddled with handling the numerous, complex, and disorderly mining claims and mineral activities which they have previously succeeded in avoiding. All the numerous problems relating to land survey and marking would still be handled by the BLM. The Forest Service would take over the administration of the BLM's grazing leases, a transfer that the rancher permittees might not approve. Competition, so far as it exists, between the BLM and Forest Service in the sale of logging permits may work to the advantage of the logging industry in northern Idaho. Northern Idaho is an area where wholesale transfer of land from one agency to another seems strongly indicated, but even there, to this observer, the net gains in administrative effectiveness do not seem truly impressive.

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Study of Withdrawals and Reservations of Public Domain Lands. Prepared by Charles F. Wheatley, Jr. Revised September, 1969. Order numbers: P B 187 002, P B 187 003, P B 187 004.

Administrative Procedures and the Public Lands. Prepared by The University of Virginia, School of Law. Revised September, 1969. One volume. Order number: P B 187 205.

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